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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller
Th e transnationalisation of law and of social rights challenges our understanding 
of law, society and the state. Facing the recent social and economic crisis in 
world society, this volume scrutinises both the potentials and the boundaries 
of de-coupling the notion of “social rights” from the nation-state and of 
transferring it to the transnational sphere. “Transnationalisation”1 is an 
encompassing process which aff ects national, supranational, international 
and global law. Th e seminal works by Boaventura de Sousa Santos,2 Gunther 
Teubner,3 Sally Falk Moore4 and others provide profound insights into the 
emerging global legal pluralism and the inter-legality of fragmented clusters of 
law. Th e best example for this stems directly from the juridical sphere: courts 
at diff erent levels increasingly engage in a dialogue across borders.5 Or think 
of recent confl icts about austerity programmes and investment protection. Th e 
countries aff ected oft en invoke international law – such as the UN Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or the European Social Charter – when 
they resist the attempts of multinational companies or creditors to implement 
1 For a comprehensive overview, see Jean L. Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty. Rethinking 
Legality, Legitimacy and Constitutionalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
p. 21 et seq. Th e seminal point of reference for this debate is Philip C. Jessup’s Transnational 
Law, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1956).
2 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Beyond Neoliberal Governance: Th e World Social Forum as 
Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality”, in: Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César 
A. Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan 
Legality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 29 et seq.
3 Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
4 Sally Falk Moore, Law as a Process: An Anthropological Approach, (London-Boston MA: 
Routledge & K. Paul), 1978.
5 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Global Community of Courts”, (2003) 44 Harvard International 
Law Journal, p. 191 et seq.
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measures which serve their interests.6 In this situation, we need to establish a 
more process-oriented notion of the transnational in order to grasp the multiple 
and oft en transversal chains of legal communication which cannot be slavishly 
tied to a distinct level of juridical and political decision-making.
However, there is another reason for drawing on the notion of 
transnationalisation. Th e legal dynamics that we are facing are part of a 
historical shift  to world society.7 Th e evolution of social communication does 
not stop at national borders. Social systems, such as the economy, the sciences 
and politics, all tend to transcend territorial boundaries. Th e economic system, 
in particular, with its cognitive expectation structure and strong pressures to 
adapt, plays the role of a forerunner. Echoing this line of thought, we contend 
that it is absolutely necessary to scrutinise how legal communication interacts 
with other social systems and – most notably – with the colonising tendencies 
of the economic system and the struggles that try to re-embed it. Accordingly, 
we follow an agenda that integrates legal, sociological and political perspectives. 
Transnational law may not be a matter of legal  discourse alone, but – as the 
sociological backgrounding of the contributions to the volume show – amounts 
to an interdisciplinary research fi eld.
Not least, such a notion of transnationalisation seems promising because of 
the ongoing developments in international law. Since the 1990s, we can observe 
that international law undergoes a tendency to fragmentation. Accordingly, it 
cannot be reduced to either a dualistic interplay between international law and 
national law, or to the monistic supremacy of international law. Th e increasingly 
prevalent trend consists in the emergence of transnational legal regimes in 
subject areas as diverse as the economy, the  environment, health, etc.8 Th e report 
of the International Law Commission on “Th e Fragmentation of International 
Law” had turned special attention to this circumstance:
“What once appeared to be governed by ‘general international law’ has become 
the fi eld of operation for such specialist systems as ‘ trade law’, ‘human rights law’, 
‘environmental law’, ‘law of the sea’, ‘European law’ and even such exotic and highly 
specialized knowledge as ‘investment law’ or ‘international refugee law’, etc. – each 
possessing their own principles and institutions. Th e problem, as lawyers have seen 
it, is that such specialized law-making and institution-building tends to take place 
6 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Human Rights in Times of Austerity Policy: Th e EU 
Institutions and the Conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding, (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlag, 2014).
7 Niklas Luhmann, “Th e World Society as a Social System”, (1982) 8 International Journal of 
General Systems, p. 131 et seq.
8 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, “Regime-collisions: Th e Vain Search for 
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law”, (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International 
Law, p.  999 et seq; Kerstin Blome, Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Hannah Franzki, Nora 
Markard and Stefan Oeter (eds), Contested Collisions: Interdisciplinary Inquiries into Norm 
Fragmentation in World Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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with relative ignorance of legislative and institutional activities in the adjoining fi elds 
and of the general principles and practices of international law. Th e result is confl icts 
between rules or rule-systems, deviating institutional practices and, possibly, the loss 
of an overall perspective on the law.”9
In our view, this perspective must be extended: the diff erent regimes are 
entangled in broader processes of transnationalisation and they revolve around 
the dynamics of the respective social systems. But, most importantly, the 
emerging legal regimes bring to the fore diff erent types of rationalities and also 
entail diff erent layers of law and judicial fora. Th is is another reason why the 
concern with transnationalisation is the starting point of this book: Instead of 
meticulously discerning diff erent levels of legalisation, the contributions are all 
engaged in elucidating linkages, in shedding light on new types of confl icts or 
showing how transnational legalisation plays out at local level.
I. SOCIAL RIGHTS AND MARKET-LIBERAL 
DOMINANCE
Th e process of transnationalisation is characterised by large asymmetries. In 
particular, it is the global economy – which has seen a strong tendency to dis-
embed itself in the last decades – which assumes a powerful role.10 Th is is also 
refl ected in the legal fi eld. In the meantime, a dense network of transnational 
economic law exists which privileges free- trade and investment protection. 
Th ird world approaches to international law (TWAIL) have again and again 
pointed out the most important fact, that the Eurocentric vision of international 
law,11 which ignores these asymmetries in the history of international law, 
fails to commemorate the colonialist, imperialist and racist heritage of the 
international system. Authors such as Antony Anghie,12 Upendra Baxi,13 José-
9 See, for example, UN General Assembly, “Fragmentation of International Law: Diffi  culties 
Arising from the Diversifi cation and Expansion of International Law”, (Report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission: Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi), (13  April 
2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_
cn4_l682.pdf, as corrected (11 August 2006) UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1.
10 See Claire A. Cutler and Stephen Gill (eds), New Constitutionalism and World Order, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Kolja Möller, Formwandel der Verfassung: 
Die postdemokratische Verfasstheit des Transnationalen, (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2015).
11 James Th uo Gathii, “International Law and Eurocentricity”, (1998) 9  European Journal of 
International Law, p. 184 et seq.
12 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
13 Upendra Baxi, Th e Future of Human Rights, 3rd ed., (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2013).
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Manuel Barreto,14 B.S. Chimni,15 Makau Mutua,16 Obiora Okafor,17 Sundhya 
Pahuja,18 Balakrishnan Rajagopal,19 Shalini Randeria20 and others, have all 
shaped our understanding of these hegemonic forces.
With these approaches of TWAIL, we share the aim to re-embed the 
economy and re-foster counter-movements that assure claims to social justice 
and re-distribution. In the nation-state era, social rights played a crucial 
role in countering the destructive forces of nascent market economies.21 
Th ey were considered a tool which could bring about a humanisation of the 
economy, involving welfare schemes, democracy at the workplace, and even 
equality of men and women. It is one of our central concerns in this volume to 
discuss the possible avenues to renew the legacy of social rights in the light of 
transnationalisation. Clearly, the challenge is far more complex: While social 
rights could traditionally refer to the state on a clearly demarcated territory 
as its organising entity, the fragmented structure of world society is marked 
by new types of contradictions and confl icts in which the traditional division 
between labour and capital is just one among many others. Nowadays, we 
are facing a severe environmental crisis due to climate change, unsustainable 
modes of production and standards of living. And we witness sharp tensions 
between the urge towards modernisation and the claim to secure traditional 
and communal forms of living. It is not by accident that the human-rights 
 discourse has entered a stage of “third generational human rights” which 
emphasises the right to development and environmental rights.22
14 José-Manuel Barreto, Human Rights from a Th ird World Perspective: Critique, History and 
International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
15 B.S. Chimni, “Capitalism, Imperialism, and International Law in the Twenty-fi rst Century”, 
(2012) 14 Oregon Review of International Law, p. 17 et seq.
16 Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victims and Saviors: Th e Metaphor of Human Rights”, (2001) 42 
Harvard International Law Journal, p. 201 et seq.
17 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Poverty, Agency and  Resistance in the Future of International 
Law”, in: Richard Falk, Balakrishnan Rajagopal and Jacqueline Stevens (eds), International 
Law and the Th ird World, (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 95 et seq.
18 Sundhya Pahuja, “Th e Poverty of Development and the Development of Poverty in 
International Law”, in: European Society of International Law (eds.), Select Proceedings of the 
European Society of International Law, 3/2010 (2012), p. 365 et seq.
19 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Right to Development and Global Governance”, (2013) 35 Human 
Rights Quarterly, p. 893 et seq.
20 Shalini Randeria, “Legal Pluralism, Social Movements and the Post-Colonial State in India: 
Fractured Sovereignty and Diff erential Citizenship Rights”, in: Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
(ed), Another Knowledge is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies, (London: Verso Books, 
2007), p. 41 et seq.
21 See the seminal analysis in: Th omas H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other 
Essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).
22 See Manfred Nowak, CCPR Commentary, 2nd ed. (Kehl am Rhein: N.P. Engel, 2005), Art. 1, 
note 15.
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II. THE DIMENSIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL 
SOCIAL RIGHTS
Notwithstanding all these complexities, this book draws on the legacy of 
social rights and aspires to be an aggiornamento. It refers to social rights as an 
overarching instrument and even as a political agenda. In this sense, it uses the 
term “social rights” not as something which is simply identical with the already 
existing regime of social human rights in international law. It alludes to the 
historical legacy and even to the normative desiderates that were once associated 
with the struggle for social rights as well. Accordingly, transnational social rights 
entail three dimensions:
1. Social Rights and Welfarism: Th e concept of social rights had its heyday 
with the establishment of national welfare-state regimes. In this perspective, 
social rights are not restricted to a defi nite set of rights relating to social-security 
schemes,  working conditions etc., but rather as a counterforce which should 
perform a double function: on the one hand, social rights should provide for 
a re-distribution of wealth and a correction of market failures. But they were 
not simply meant to correct negative externalities. On the other hand, they 
should deliver a material basis for negative and participatory rights and should 
implement participatory rights in other social spheres, most prominently in the 
economy. Nowadays, in times of a “transnational social question”, the pressing 
challenge consists in the transnationalisation of this endeavour.23
2. Social Rights as Societal Rights: At the very minimum, the notion of social 
rights evokes a non state-centric understanding of law. While liberal private law 
theory draws a clear distinction between public and private law, the demand 
for social rights undermines this diametric distinction. Accordingly, public law 
should be seen as a means for the self-organisation of a broader public sphere 
which is sensitive not only to the state institutions but also to societal structures. 
And, vice versa, private law should be “socialised”, in the sense that it must be 
responsive to claims for justice and democracy, by inserting the necessary “drops 
of socialist oil”.24 It is especially this “societal” drift  which seems to be a starting-
point for confronting the emerging liberal private law regime at transnational 
level with the force of a social law.
3. Social Rights and/as  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR): Th e 
evolution of social rights is already part of the UN Human Rights System.25 In 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and in the International 
23 Th omas Faist, “Th e Transnational Social Question”, (2009) 24 International Sociology, p. 7 et 
seq.
24 Otto von Gierke, writing on the occasion of the development of the German Civil Code in the 
nineteenth century in Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts (“Th e Social Function of Private 
Law”) (1889), reprinted in 1946, p. 28 et seq.
25 Matthew C.R. Craven, Th e International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
A Perspective on its Development, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998).
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Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( ICESCR) (1966), we fi nd 
a long list of social rights, such as the  right to social security, health, food 
and education. And we face a series of attempts to strengthen these parts of 
international human rights law – be it via ratifi cation and reporting procedures 
or via individual complaint-mechanisms before the UN  Committee on 
 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which the recent adoption of the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
has established.26 Th e question remains as to how the emergence of “social 
human rights” within the framework of the UN can take on a broader notion 
of social rights, and in what way it has the capacity to embody and renew its 
broader programmatic and normative implications.
Bearing in mind these three tenets, it becomes clear that the debate on 
the future of social rights cannot be reduced either to a mere bemoaning of 
the decline of the welfare state under the auspices of global neo-liberalism 
or to a rather naïve praise of “ corporate social responsibility” agreements in 
multinational companies or to a managerial  discourse about the  ICESCR. 
A transnational social rights agenda will only succeed in challenging the vast 
problems of world society when it relates to the diff erent sites of struggle. It 
has to be specifi c with regard to the concrete scopes for legal enforcement and 
judicial doctrine. But it must also constitute a broader horizon which opposes 
market liberal dominance at transnational level in order to be eff ective.
III. THE ORGANISATION OF THIS VOLUME
Th is book proceeds in three steps. Th e fi rst part (“Transnational Social Rights in 
Context”) discusses the basic challenges of a transnational social rights agenda. 
In their contribution, the editors focus on the question of how social confl icts and 
transnational legalisation are related. By drawing on a framework that combines 
insights from systems theory and critical legal theory, they establish a new 
perspective on the transnationalisation of social rights, analyse various concrete 
confl icts, and discuss avenues of reform with regard to the social human rights 
regime. However, the question remains as to what foundational normativity is 
at stake in the claim to transnational social rights. Georg Lohmann elucidates 
26 See, most recently, Eibe Riedel, Gilles Gaccia and Christophe Golay (eds), Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014); see, also, Craven, note 25 above; John Squires, Malcolm 
Landford and Bret Th iel, Th e Road to a Remedy: Current Issues in the Litigation of  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, (Sydney: Australia Human Rights Centre, 2005); Margot E. 
Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of 
International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Aiofe Nolan (ed), Economic 
and Social Rights aft er the Global Financial Crisis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014).
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the philosophical background of the basic conceptional issues, such as “ Human 
Dignity” or “Duty” and “Right”. His analysis is geared towards a normative 
re-construction of the human rights regime. Th e fi rst section closes with a 
contribution of Alexandra Kaasch, who gives an encompassing overview of the 
diff erent layers and arenas of transnational social rights.
Th e second part of the book (“Foundations, Institutions and Enforcement 
Structures”) is concerned with the legal mechanisms that are characteristic 
of transnational social rights. In his contribution, Stefan Lorenzmeier turns 
to a discussion of the legal enforcement mechanisms and engages – using the 
example of the  right to food – with debates about the judicial enforceability 
of transnational social rights. Ibrahim Kanalan and Sebastian Eickenjäger’s 
contribution is concerned with the hotly debated issue of binding multinational 
companies to social human rights standards. Th ey extend the perspective 
to formally private arenas and scrutinise the role of the so-called “horizontal 
eff ect” of human rights. Finally, Eva Senghaas-Knobloch focuses on the 
International Labour Organization and its endeavours to integrate “ informal 
work”, such as  care work or undocumented work, within its framework. 
Her analysis shows that the  ILO provides an already established legal and 
institutional framework which is sensitive to the current social transformations.
Th e contributions in the last part of the book (“Transnational Struggles”) 
endeavour to scrutinise their respective subjects areas and the concerned legal 
norm (the  right to food, the  right to land, and cultural rights) by applying a 
methodology that is sensitive to the process of transnationalisation and the 
interplay of diff erent legal regimes. Th ey all elucidate how social transformations 
and the claim to social rights mutually instigate each other. Th e former  ILO 
advisor Anne Trebilcock reveals the interlinkages between the diff erent legal 
arenas. Transnational social rights may not be an issue for a sole legal regime, 
but, instead, as Trebilcock shows with regard to the  right to food, rely on a highly 
complex interplay between diff erent institutional settings. In his contribution, 
Steff en Kommer not only focuses on the “ right to food” as the most basic 
social right, but also contextualises his reasoning with regard to the ongoing 
food crisis and the rise of  agroenergy markets. Although Judith Schacherreiter 
and Guilherme Leite Gonçalves’ text, as well as the contribution by Maria 
Backhouse, Jairo Baquero Melo and Sérgio Costa examine two diff erent cases 
from  Mexico, Colombia and Brazil, they both share a common starting-point: 
It is widely acknowledged that cultural rights can also be considered as social 
rights. But this may come at the price of internal tensions in the social-rights 
regime. Backhouse, Baquero and Costa show how the cultural bias tends to 
distort the claims of minorities in the Brazilian case, while Schacherreiter and 
Leite de Gonçalves touch upon the issue of  land rights and the arising tensions 
between customary law, international and national law.

PART I
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS 
IN CONTEXT
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CHAPTER 2
THE STRUGGLE FOR 
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS
Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller
I. THE TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL QUESTION
Financial crises, food crises, environmental crises, migration crises: world 
society is facing dramatic challenges. Th ese crises are both interconnected and 
rife with contradictions. While the Euro zone bailout fund is leveraged with 
roughly a trillion euro, nobody seems willing to put up the 13 billion dollars 
which, according to UN calculations, would be necessary to relieve world 
hunger. Deutsche Bank, a German high-street bank, generated a benefi t of 4 
billion euro in 2014; meanwhile more than 1.3 billion people around the world 
live in poverty, on less than 1.25 US dollars per day. Refugees fi nd themselves 
in a particularly precarious situation. In 2014, there were more than 50 million 
displaced persons, a situation the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
attributes to urbanisation, food and water insecurity, as well as shortages of 
raw materials. Th ese global problems, he says, “are increasingly inter-related, 
exacerbating confl ict and combining in other ways that oblige people to fl ee their 
homes”.1
Th ese trends point to one conclusion: the “social question” is now fi rmly a 
transnational social question.2 Societal confl ict lines no longer run primarily 
along national borders. Th e global economy, global politics, transnational law, 
and global scholarship and science all contribute, in their own way, to the 
formation of zones of social exclusion. Th e axes of disadvantage can intersect 
and be exacerbated. Th e existing transnational power structures are both 
complex and merciless. Th ose worst aff ected do not even have – or are denied – 
access to the very means for sheer survival.  Nation states no longer possess 
1 António Guterres, “Forced Displacement: Responding to the Challenge of the Next Decade, 
Statement to the Berlin Symposium for Refugee Protection”, June 2011, available at: www.
unhcr.org/4c1737c09.html.
2 Th omas Faist, “Th e Transnational Social Question”, (2009) 24 International Sociology, p. 7 et 
seq.
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adequate solutions to these problems. Nor do they remain the only important 
players in this fi eld. Sociologists and political scientists accept that the state is 
just “one of the actors” when it comes to  global  social policy, and acknowledge 
that non-state actors such as international organisations and global social 
movements have now fi rmly gained entrance to the “contested terrain” of 
emerging global governance.3 It is on this contested terrain that the debates 
on the crises facing world society are played out. It is here, for instance, that 
political scientists are making the link between climate change and  global  social 
policy.4 Th e interdisciplinary research group FLOOR (Financial Assistance, 
Land Policy, and  Global Social Rights) explores the possibility of securing a 
global system of guaranteed basic income.5 Philosophers study the requirements 
of  global justice and put forward the charge that “our failure to make a serious 
eff ort toward poverty reduction may constitute not merely a lack of benefi cence, 
but our active impoverishing, starving, and killing of millions of innocent 
people by economic means”.6
Law, too, is itself a contributor to this state of aff airs. Transnational law 
paved the way for and enabled the various crises. Th e global players of industry 
have long had a hand in shaping transnational law. Transnational corporations 
operate in global markets, bolstered by international contracts based upon 
the so-called lex mercatoria, the self-regulating law of global commerce. Th ey 
have developed techniques to ensure that the law remains in their service, and 
have shaped a world that corresponds to their own vision. Huge international 
law fi rms off er the legal know-how required to assert and secure a company’s 
interests. Judicial forums have been installed at the World  Trade Organization 
(WTO) and at the World Bank, in which the law of free  trade and the rights of 
private investors are both enforced and re-inforced. To leave transnational legal 
policy to the global players and limit ourselves to mitigating the consequences 
of globalisation in national welfare states is to address merely the symptoms, 
while failing to tackle the root of the problem. Th is is why we need to look for 
new ways to renew the promise of global social justice. In a bid to establish the 
relevant necessary steps, we will examine four distinct issues: (1) What are the 
3 Bob Deacon,  Global  Social Policy and Governance, (London-Th ousand Oaks CA, SAGE 
Publications, 2007), p. 15.
4 Ian Gogh, “Climate Change and Sustainable Welfare: An Argument for the Centrality of 
Human Needs”, (2014) NEF Working Paper.
5 Ulrike Davy, “Th e Rise of the Global Social: Origins and Transformations of Social Rights 
under UN Human Rights Law”, (2013) 3 International Journal of Social Quality, p. 41 et seq; 
Benjamin Davy and Sony Pellissery, “Climate Change and  Global  Social Policy”, (2011) 11 
 Global  Social Policy, p.  106 et seq; see, also, the homepage of the research group FLOOR: 
www.fl oorgroup.raumplanung.tu-dortmund.de/joomla.
6 Th omas Pogge, “Priorities of  Global Justice”, in: David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds), 
Th e Global Transformations Reader, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p.  548; Simon Caney, 
“Global Poverty and Human Rights: Th e Case for Positive Duties”, in: Th omas Pogge (ed), 
Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 275 et 
seq.
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central characteristics of the global crises? (2) What role does transnational 
law play? Should we turn to the law at all, or is it an instrument of domination 
with which it is too perfi dious even to engage? (3) What is the current state of 
transnational social rights? Where can they be found? (4) Which concrete legal 
and political mechanisms can be used in order to challenge the course of neo-
liberal globalisation?
A. THE COUNTER-HEGEMONIC AGENDA
Ever since the 1980s, a neo-liberal trend has dominated the development of 
transnational law. Th is development can be seen in the international institutions 
of the global economy, such as the WTO and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Th is trend pushes for the liberalisation of the markets and protects the 
global players – not social rights.7 Yet, there are an increasing number of groups 
that seek to counter neo-liberal norms with an agenda of transnational social 
rights. Brazilian farm workers invoke social human rights as they call for land 
reform as a necessary pre-condition for  food sovereignty and a life without 
poverty.8 German students have instigated court proceedings against the 
introduction of university tuition-fees, relying on the obligation contained in the 
International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( ICESCR) to 
ensure access to higher education “by every appropriate means, and in particular 
by the progressive introduction of free education”. Anti-racist networks are 
demanding social rights for illegalised immigrants. “Nomadic universities”, 
networks of academics and other temporary university employees, are calling 
for a charter of social rights, including the right to a basic income, the right to 
cross-border mobility, and the recognition of common goods such as natural 
resources or social infrastructure as “ Commons” which should not rely on 
 private property rights.9 In December 2011, the International University College 
of Turin launched an initiative towards a “European Charter of the  Commons”, 
with a particular focus on strengthening the global protection of communally-
held resources, such as water, through a process of “globalisation from below”.
All of these movements rely on the central  idea of human rights: that 
every human being – regardless of where he or she is from – has the right to 
rights.10 Th e call for “transnational social rights” is increasingly central to the 
7 David Kennedy, “Law and the Political Economy of the World”, (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of 
International Law, p. 7 et seq.
8 See, also, Dejo Olowu, “Conceptualising a Rights-based Approach to Poverty Alleviation in 
Africa”, (2003) 43 Th e Indian Journal of International Law, p. 67 et seq.
9 See the Universidad Nómada, Manifesto of the  Commons: Towards a New Charter of Social 
Rights, 22 May 2011, available at: www.universidadnomada.net/spip.php?article372.
10 As discussed by Hannah Arendt in: Th e Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Company, 1951), p. 294.
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activities of globalisation critics. Th ey are based upon the understanding that 
rights must be realised by “fi ghting for the democratisation of transnational 
institutions”.11 Th ereby, they use the label “transnational social rights”, 
broadening the traditional understanding of social rights to one which also 
includes environmental rights, migrant rights and the right to a guaranteed 
basic income. Th e framework as a whole can also be seen as a project in 
which seemingly independent or distinct discussions fi nd a common thread, 
which serves to off er them a joint foundation and the potential for combined 
action. Th is is because these various initiatives are concerned not solely with 
countering the globalisation of capital, of the markets and of goods with a 
globalisation of social rights.12 Transnational social rights, as a whole, are 
moving towards a counter-hegemonic agenda, one which relies on rights which 
already exist.
Th e transnational framework is not intended to distract from the political 
decision-making of national governments or communes. What it does do, 
however, is shift  the perspective. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt express this 
best when they write that globalisation is not just one thing, but a collage of 
disparate processes. Our political task, they argue:
“is not simply to resist these processes but to reorganize them and redirect them 
towards new ends. Th e creative forces of the multitude that sustain Empire are also 
capable of autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political 
organization of global fl ows and exchanges.”13
Based upon the appeal of a “counter-empire”, a transnational legal policy is 
called for, one which focuses on social and ecological justice, and which explores 
how the potential of world society could be used to establish alternatives to the 
existing socio-economic conditions.
B. JURIDICO-POLITICAL STRUGGLES
Following on from the series of questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, 
we wish to put forward four overarching theses with regard to the transnational 
constellation.
11 Th omas Seibert, “Globale Soziale Rechte in der Konvergenz von politischer Aktion und 
Philosophie”, (2008) 41 Kritische Justiz, p. 337.
12 See, for example, the platform available at: www.globale-soziale-rechte.de.
13 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2000), p. xv.
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1. Th e social question traverses borders. In other words, it is a transnational 
social question:
Solving the twenty-fi rst century social question cannot be achieved by 
addressing only the contradictions within nation states. Even the development of 
social rights within nation states oft en relies on factors and institutions outside 
the control of the political institutions. Th e causes of the present fi nancial crisis, 
climate change and the  global food crisis all lie within world society. It is at this 
level that we must tackle them.
2. World society is determined by new contradictions, collisions, and 
fragmentations. Transnational law forms part of this contradictory system, and 
is, as such, part of the problem:
Huge corporations have long been operating on transnational terrain, in 
which transnational law plays a central role. Th e law provides neo-liberal ideas 
with a secure legal foundation, corporations with a global playing-fi eld, and 
investors with the safeguarding of their property. To the state, it off ers legitimacy 
for military action. Moral appeals and non-committal political announcements 
are not enough to deal with the fl agrant dangers inherent to an unfettered global 
economy, with multi-national corporations, or with fundamental socio-economic 
confl icts.
3. Transnational social rights can lead to the formation of a counter-law. Th is 
counter-law should ensure that the global social order is determined by world 
society itself, instead of by those who profi t, economically and politically, from 
globalisation.
Th e social human rights of the UN Covenants together with the European 
Social Charter and the Core Labour Standards of the International Labour 
Organization ( ILO) already provide a body of transnational social rights. Th ese 
can act as a starting point in the struggle for law. Th e goal must actually be to 
redeem the promises of social and ecological security, democratic participation 
and involvement, which are contained in these documents.
4. Th ere are many juridico-political arenas in which the strengthening of 
transnational social rights is needed.
Within the state, eff orts must be made to ensure that transnational social 
rights are binding before the courts. Th is will bolster the monitoring procedure 
of the UN Covenants and the  ILO. In addition, the Social Charter must attain 
a central role at European level. A European social union must replace the 
current economically driven European organisation. At transnational level, not 
only international organisations such as the UN and the WTO, but also non-
governmental organisations and transnational corporations, must be obliged to 
uphold transnational social rights.
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II. THE TRANSNATIONAL CONSTELLATION
Th e word “globalisation” is oft en invoked to refer to a number of phenomena, 
such as the growth in transnational economic relations and the increasingly 
important role of international institutions, as well as the interdependence of 
nation states. As a result, the debate on globalisation oft en remains superfi cial, 
merely scratching the surface of the issues, without actually addressing the 
underlying structures that are shaping the transition to a world society. Th e 
transnational constellation is not just the manifestation of international state 
co-operation and world  trade. A more far-reaching change of perspective is 
required in order to understand fully the root causes of globalisation. Th e 
increasing connectivity of social relationships around the world in the most 
diverse sections of society means that the phenomena of globalisation extend far 
beyond the transborder, capitalist, global economy. Its processes are not limited 
to business and politics but also exert infl uence in the fi elds of religion, art, and 
education, as well as in technology and risk regulation, transnational public 
spheres and cyberspace. While the international system of states nonetheless 
remains important, it no longer enjoys the absolute primacy that it did before. 
World society is a society both without a head and without a centre. Centralised 
zones of political decision-making within various similarly structured states are 
now things of the past. A highest point of decision-making in a unitary nation 
state no longer exists.
Within this complex world society, the creditworthiness of states is 
determined by the rapid risk assessments of rating agencies, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports put national 
education systems under pressure to adapt, and oppositional movements turn 
to social networks to topple authoritarian regimes. Th is de-centralisation and 
diff erentiation of world society are Janus-headed phenomena, off ering new 
opportunities and changing power structures while simultaneously evoking 
great risks. Th is poses the transnational social question. In the last years, it has 
primarily been the big players of the global economy and fi nancial markets, who 
have feathered their own nests at the expense of the  environment and social 
justice. Yet global science and technology also generate new risks to health and 
to the  environment. Diff erent social sectors tend to maximise their own forms 
of logic and impose them on their social environments. Th e WTO, the World 
Bank and the lex mercatoria are among those that have assumed a dominant 
role within this transnational constellation in their attempt to universalise their 
free-market liberal Esperanto.14 In doing so, they hope to assert their interests, 
their way of thinking and their rules on all other social spheres. Th e systematic 
14 Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties”, (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law, p. 578.
Chapter 2. Th e Struggle for Transnational Social Rights
Intersentia 17
desire for power is evidenced by the important roles played by politico-economic 
institutions such as the WTO and the IMF, which form the regulative framework 
for the global relations of production.
Th e political institutions, however, are not the only ones growing in the 
process of global governance; they are joined by legal institutions. Legal norms 
and the reach of courts are expanding into more and more aspects of society. 
It seems that there are no limits to what can be considered and decided as a 
legal question. States have set up courts such as the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), regional human-rights courts, the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as 
the monitoring bodies of universal human rights treaties; the United Nations 
has established ad hoc criminal tribunals, and the international community has 
permitted the prosecution of international crimes in East Timor and elsewhere 
before so-called hybrid courts. National courts are included into this system of 
world courts,15 such as when US courts hear compensation cases arising from 
grave human-rights violations in South America or a Dutch court orders Shell 
Nigeria to compensate Nigerians for oil pollution damage caused by third-party 
sabotage in Nigeria.16
Th ese forums are also on the rise outside the state-created system of global 
jurisdiction: transnational corporations assert the lex mercatoria through 
privately established courts of arbitration.17 International judicative and quasi-
judicative bodies, such as the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), are on their way to becoming world courts.18 It 
is clear that law has long been transnational, aff ording rights to, and imposing 
duties on, individuals, states and transnational corporations.19 Th e only way to 
ensure that this transnational law upholds basic social and environmental justice 
is – as Otto von Gierke put it – to allow the necessary “drops of socialist oil” to 
fi lter through the legal system.20
15 See George Scelle’s theory of “dédoublement fonctionnel” in: idem, Précis de droit des gens, 
Vol. I, (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1932), p.  54 et seq; on this, see Antonio Cassese, “Remarks on 
Scelle’s Th eory of ‘Role Splitting’ (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law”, (1990) 
1 European Journal of International Law, p. 210 et seq.
16 See, also, note 66 below.
17 Claire Cutler, “Legal Pluralism as the ‘Common Sense’ of Transnational Capitalism”, (2013) 3 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, p. 719 et seq.
18 For a powerful critique, see Ibironke Odumosu, “Th e Law and Politics of Engaging  Resistance 
in Investment Dispute Settlement”, (2007) 26 Penn State International Law Review, p. 25 et 
seq.
19 See, most recently, Sally Engle Merry, “Firming up Soft  Law”, in: Terence C. Halliday and 
Gregory Shaff er (eds.),Transnational Legal Orders, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), p. 374 et seq.
20 Otto von Gierke, writing on the occasion of the development of the German Civil Code in the 
19th century in Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts, (“Th e Social Function of Private Law”) 
(1889), reprinted in 1946, p. 28 et seq.
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Th e complexity of the transnational constellation is brought sharply into focus 
by the response to the  global food crisis, within which we see various crisis 
points collide with devastating eff ects. In 2009, shortly before the G20 states 
gathered for their summit in Pittsburgh, Olivier De Schutter, the former United 
Nations  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, issued a statement in which he 
called on the G8 and G20 states not to limit their discussions to the fi nancial and 
economic crisis, but to strive also to reach agreements on fi ghting global hunger, 
stating:
“Just like the collapse of large banks, widespread hunger entails systemic risks.”21
Th is is, indeed, the case. Since 2008, we have seen, parallel to the global fi nancial 
crisis, an intensifi ed worldwide food crisis. Th e explosion in food prices led to 
an extra 40 million people going hungry in 2008 alone, bringing the number 
of people worldwide who are living in hunger to over one billion. More people 
die each day from hunger than in all the military fl ashpoints around the 
world combined. A report of the World Bank of 201122 made clear that the 
huge increase in the number of people living in hunger is largely due to the 
commodifi cation of food production, food price fl uctuations, and the economic 
crisis. Th e 82 states then classifi ed as Low-Income Food-Defi cit Countries, i.e., 
countries which depend on food imports in order to meet their own demand, 
were aff ected particularly badly by the crisis.
Th e food crisis is not, however, merely a crisis of supply. We are also noticing 
a crisis in climate, which is rendering entire regions unsuitable for farming. A 
closer look at the economic structure of the agricultural sector confi rms that the 
current food crisis will not simply lead back to the ostensibly older phenomenon 
of malnutrition. Th e unfolding of events is now shaped by global speculation on 
food products and by the major agricultural companies. “Agribusiness”, which 
incorporates huge agricultural companies such as Monsanto, concentrates 
on industrial growth and the development of monocultures at the expense of 
ecological structures and smallholders.
Such fi rms sell their patented, genetically engineered seeds and matching 
pesticides at high prices to farms. If a farmer suff ers a crop failure and 
subsequently cannot aff ord the newest plant technology, he or she goes bankrupt. 
Farmers who do not subscribe to seed-buying from such large companies are 
oft en sued if patented plants are found growing in their fi elds, even if the land 
was cross-contaminated through no fault of the farmer. Big companies oft en 
21 Olivier De Schutter, “Th e  global food crisis is not over”, 26  June 2009, available at: www.
ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=8991&LangID=E.
22 World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Equity Group, August 2011, p 1, available at: http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/335642–1210859591030/FPW_August 
2011.pdf.
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obtain large tracts of land in the Global South, striking deals with the relevant 
governments and driving small farmers from their holdings.23 Th is land is 
generally used to grow monocultures such as soya, which is shipped back to the 
company’s home country to be used as fodder or as palm oil, which is used in 
the production of so-called “agrofuel”. Th is practice of land expropriation is now 
known as “ land grabbing”.24
During the 1990s, foreign direct investment in agriculture amounted to 
an annual average of 600 million USD; between 2005 and 2007 this rose to an 
average of 3 billion USD.25 Th is structural change is leading to an increased 
globalisation of the agricultural industry, a process dominated by large 
transnational companies. It is estimated that roughly 50 million hectares of land 
are aff ected, in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Th ese land deals are about more 
than just profi t, they are also made with an eye to geo-strategic interests and 
spheres of infl uence. Th e climate crisis and population growth in many parts of 
the world has turned the issue of nutrition into a geo-strategic question of power. 
Th us, agribusinesses oft en co-operate with the governments of the countries in 
which they are based, including the governments of states in the Global South, 
in order to secure a competitive advantage in the approaching fi ght for food 
supplies.
Th e phenomenon is best evidenced by the case of Madagascar, where 
the South Korean fi rm Daewoo sought to obtain 1.3 million hectares of land. 
According to the NGO Grain, the land was to be used solely for the cultivation 
of maize and palm oil for export back to South Korea. Madagascar belongs to 
the poorest third of the world and is plagued with malnutrition and poverty. 
Th e  land grabbing resulted in a severe setback for the country’s already ailing 
food supply system. Th e Madagascan government backed the deal with Daewoo 
but was subsequently toppled by widespread protest against Daewoo’s land 
acquisition. Th e new government was able to revoke the deal, and the Daewoo 
Corporation has, for the time being, withdrawn from the transaction.
What is driving these scandalous developments which are exacerbating the 
food crisis and expropriating whole sections of the population? Th is question 
brings us back to the UN Rapporteur’s appeal to the G20 states. Th e NGO Grain 
points to a direct link to the crisis in the fi nancial markets:
23 See the critique of investor protection in international law by Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising 
International law, Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 95 et seq; see, also, Saskia Sassen, “Land 
Grabs Today: Feeding the Disassembling of National Territory”, (2013) 10 Globalizations, 
p. 25 et seq.
24 See Steff en Kommer, Chapter 9 in this volume.
25 Olivier De Schutter,  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, Report: Agribusiness and the 
 Right to Food, A/HRC/13/33, 22 December 2009, at para. 6.
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“Given the current fi nancial meltdown, all sorts of players in the fi nance and 
food industries – the investment houses that manage workers’ pensions, private 
equity funds looking for a fast turnover, hedge funds driven off  the now collapsed 
derivatives market, grain traders seeking new strategies for growth – are turning to 
land, for both food and fuel production, as a new source of profi t.”26
Th e interplay between these two phenomena is instantly clear. Th e economic 
crisis has shown fi nancial products to be extremely risky, and so the search 
begins for “future-proof” investment options as an alternative to capital 
markets. It becomes apparent that agricultural land is being imbued with a new 
signifi cance: it is being transformed into a commodity and recast as a whole 
new economic sector. Its attractiveness as an investment rises with the threat 
of climate change, which is posed to reduce the amount of land available. More 
frequent extreme weather conditions will see entire tracts of land sink into the 
sea. Th e greenhouse eff ect will be amplifi ed though the expansion of industrial 
agriculture which relies on the use of chemicals and the depletion of natural 
resources. Th e dynamics of the fi nancial, food, and climate crises are gradually 
combining to form a global social crisis.27 Th ese developments will also have 
consequences for migration patterns; the World Bank identifi es high food 
prices as a signifi cant trigger for the movement of refugees. Th e World Bank 
also points out that an eff ective response to these crises cannot be found within 
the individual sectors and calls, instead, for “an integrated agricultural,  food 
security, poverty, and climate agenda”.28
III. EMANCIPATION THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW?
But doesn’t the Global North simply fashion transnational law in its own image? 
Isn’t transnational law simply a more or less subtle way for industrialised nations 
to keep the Global South in a state of dependence?
A. DIALECTICS OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
Like all law, transnational law always plays a part in the formation of alienated 
social relations and, as such, is part of the problem. In a world shaped by political 
emergencies, and economic and environmental crises, law does not always make 
the world a more just place. A common critique posits that modern law is an 
26 Grain, Grabbing for Land, 18  January 2009, available at: www.grain.org/article/entries/753-
grabbing-land-for-food.
27 For these linkages, see Anne Trebilcock, Chapter 8 in this volume.
28 World Bank, note 22 above, p. 1.
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instrument of domination. Th is line of argument is particularly pertinent when 
it comes to the transnational constellation. Th e law constructs a veil of equality 
and thus obscures the reality of socio-economic inequality. And no one can 
say that everyone has the same access to legal procedures. Who can match the 
resources of transnational companies or the giant factories of advocates known 
as international law fi rms? How many people have the requisite know-how to 
bring a case before the International Court of Justice? Th e idealistic belief in 
civilising the world through law may seem naïve if one fails to take into account 
the simple fact that the very starting point for this juridico-political struggle is 
rife with inherent inequalities. Th e law merely provides a liberal smokescreen to 
obscure the inherent injustice of global power relations.
Th e fact that even human rights can be instrumentalised is the central tenet of 
critical theories of law. At the global level, too, it is clear that this poses a virulent 
risk: the economic instrumentalisation of human rights is particularly evident in 
the lending policies of the IMF and the World Bank. In the main, the buzzwords 
“human rights” and “good governance” denote a particular borrower’s economic 
policy orientation: the protection of liberal human rights, the investors’ property 
rights, and the patent rights of transnational companies.29 As well as serving the 
crystallisation of economic property relations, human rights are also invoked 
in the context of security policy. Th us, in the case of so-called “humanitarian 
interventions”, we see human rights being re-framed as an interventionary 
norm. Th e vague nature of human rights allows for “ interpretation by special 
interests” according to their own purposes, while re-interpretations of human 
rights are employed to legitimise  violence.
All of this, however, is just one side of the story. One can also point to the 
way in which NGOs and other networks are articulating their concerns through 
the language of human rights and thereby drawing attention to injustice in the 
transnational public sphere. Th e socialisation of transnational law has nothing 
to do with a new vein of juridical socialism. It is concerned not with the legal 
 interpretation of socialism, but with interpreting transnational law in a socialist 
way. In the words of Friedrich Engels and Karl Kautsky, social and democratic 
demands must be formulated “as legalistic demands within a program”.30 Th e 
struggle for transnational social rights is able to represent an emancipatory 
project if we express social claims in the form of legal demands, and, in this 
spirit, re-interpret and re-organise existing rights.
As far as human rights policy is concerned, the above shows the contradictory 
and paradoxical way in which the law is hauled back and forth between 
domination and emancipation. Th is ambivalent quality of law gives rise to a 
number of warnings. Why should the subalterns turn to the law when it represents 
29 David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and 
Democracy’s Promise, (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
30 Friedrich Engels and Karl Kautsky, “Juristen-Sozialismus”, printed as “Juridical Socialism”, 
in: (1977) 7 Politics and Society, p. 203 et seq., at 219.
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the very tool which guarantees the existing societal order,31 and which maintains 
the essential structures that facilitate the re-occurrence of acts of domination?
As far back as the 1920s and 1930s, this was the central question of the 
critical legal theories emerging from the Frankfurt School. Th e works of Franz 
L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, in particular, off er important insights 
relating to the transnational constellation. Kirchheimer and Neumann 
provided devastating portrayals of how law worked and its capacity for 
instrumentalisation. Both take as their starting point the idea that modern 
law develops into an autonomous social form. Neumann described the law as 
being only relatively independent.32 Law is embedded in social relations. Here, 
Neumann recognised that the reference to its economic embeddedness is not 
suffi  cient in order to describe the function of law. He saw that the law is related to 
politics and academia, too. Political, religious and intellectual structures as well 
as family structure are all realities that aff ect the law, just as the economy does.
Otto Kirchheimer’s analyses of juridifi cation similarly address this treatment 
of law as an autonomous force which is independent of other societal spheres, 
and meticulously describe the processes of juridifi cation that expand to furthest 
corners of society:
“In all fi elds of endeavor things are turned into law.”33
Everything is subjected to legal  discourse: from administration, the principles 
of business and economics, worker co-determination and the education system, 
to issues of family and private life.  Discourse theory took on these ideas and 
interpreted them as the colonising tendencies of functional systems. Th e existing 
colonisation through law turns all social problems and confl icts into legal 
questions.34 World society’s most complicated confl icts are given legal hearings, 
translated into legal terminology and oft en unrecognisably transformed into 
confl icts of principles; there is no longer any issue of world society that cannot 
be decided in the language of law, the programme of law and the code of law. Th e 
key players in this fundamental juridifi cation are the transnationally operating 
courts, élite lawyers, law fi rms, transnational companies, and NGOs. All are 
engaged in stabilising societal structures through the legal structure.
31 Otto Kirchheimer, “Reichsgericht und Enteignung: Reichsverfassungswidrigkeit des 
Preußischen Fluchtliniengesetzes?”, (1930), in: Otto Kirchheimer, Von der Weimarer Republik 
zum Faschismus: Die Aufl ösung der demokratischen Rechtsordnung, edited by Wolfgang 
Luthardt, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976), p. 77 et seq., at 78.
32 Franz L. Neumann, Th e Rule of Law: Political Th eory and the Legal System in Modern 
Society, (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishing, 1986).
33 Otto Kirchheimer, “Th e Socialist and the Bolshevik Th eory of the State”, in: idem, Politics, 
Law, and Social Change: Selected Essays of Otto Kirchheimer, edited by Frederic S. Burin and 
Kurt L. Shell, (New York-London: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 3 et seq., at 7.
34 Jürgen Habermas, Th e Th eory of Communicative Action, Vol. II, (Boston MA: Beacon Press, 
1987), p. 362 et seq.
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In extreme cases, fundamental questions are no longer decided in 
democratically organised forums, but, instead, in an expertocratic way before 
the world’s courts, be it by national Constitutional Courts, regional Courts or 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).35 Kirchheimer was the fi rst to describe 
the subtle mechanisms of the legal structure in terms of its tendency to subjugate, 
alienate and determine social relations. His conclusions also off er an important 
impetus for a transnational legal policy. He did not call for de-juridifi cation, 
something that would have been too simple as well as unrealistic. He realistically 
assessed the chances of an alternative legal policy by combining Karl Marx’s 
analyses with a movement towards politicisation. From Marx, he adopted the 
observation that social relations undergo a diff erentiation, and that one section 
can follow its self-referential expansionary tendencies to the detriment of other 
sections of society. Th us, Marx’s economic analysis that the economy produces 
an autonomous commodity form is extended by Kirchheimer to law and legal 
structure. He combines this Marxist analysis with a critical legal perspective, 
which reveals the political moment within law’s autonomy. He holds in contempt 
those petty practitioners of the law who believe that law is divorced from politics 
and that identifying the objective law is a purely scientifi c exercise. He sees legal 
decisions not as a mathematical calculation, but as the product of legal and 
political confl icts. If we accept the diagnosis of juridifi cation, it follows that there 
are consequences for the form that these confl icts take: in the juridifi ed society, 
they always relate to law and the legal code.
Th rough Kirchheimer, one can demonstrate how the law, which, at fi rst 
glance, only seems to function in a mechanical and technical way, can – itself – 
be internally re-politicised.36 A considered understanding of transnational 
social rights requires one to “bring to light power relations”37 and confront the 
established and employed techniques of domination; only then can strategies 
of  resistance be identifi ed, invented or strengthened. Since “[t]he element of 
strife and of struggle […] is an integral part of [the law], and has been from the 
35 On the relationship between law and politics at global level, see the International Court of 
Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 204, ICJ Reports, p. 136 et seq. (155, para. 41).
36 On this kind of link between analysis and scope for politicisation in Kirchheimer, see 
Gunther Teubner, “Man schritt auf allen Gebieten zur Verrechtlichung: Rechtssoziologische 
Th eorie im Werk Otto Kirchheimers”, in: Marcus Lutter, Ernst C. Stiefel and Michael Hoefl ich 
(eds), Der Einfl uß deutschsprachiger Emigranten auf die Rechtsentwicklung in den USA und 
in Deutschland, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993), p. 505 et seq. Parallels to this challenging 
model based upon Kirchheimer’s analysis can be found in the materialist theory of law in the 
work of Evgeny Pashukanis. See Evgeny Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Th eory, 
(London: Pluto Press, 1978).
37 Michel Foucault, “Th e Subject and Power”, (1982) 8 Critical Inquiry, p. 777 et seq., at 780.
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fi rst”,38 the law is a battleground for the “civil war of ‘language’ with itself”.39 
Th is opens the way for world society to re-appropriate the law and allows for 
the re-socialisation of the juridifi cation process, thus reclaiming the arenas of 
transnational law from the technocrats.
B. TRANSNATIONAL JURIDIFICATION
Th is kind of re-appropriation of the law has yet to be achieved. While world 
society has gone through an intensive juridifi cation, transnational law is 
predominantly geared towards those interested parties within the functional 
systems. As far back as 1971, the sociologist Niklas Luhmann put forward the 
“speculative hypothesis” that law would see a move from normative expectations 
(politics, morality, law) to cognitive expectations (economy, science, technology):
“At the level of global society, this means that norms (in the form of values, 
stipulations, goals) will no longer pre-programme recognition patterns; rather, and 
in stark contrast, the problem of learning adaptation will gain structural primacy, 
so that the structural conditions for learning within each social system must be 
supported through normatisation.”40
In other words, the functional systems – primarily the economy – manage to 
procure everything that they require from world society – including law.
In order to be in a position to suggest eff ective changes, it is important to 
establish which legal, economic and political factors allowed for the emergence 
of fi nancial market capitalism – from the watered-down capital requirements 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to the structural adjustment 
programmes of the IMF. What the public debate on managers’ bonus packages 
overlooks is that the current economic crisis is part of a development that began 
in the 1970s with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of internationally 
fi xed exchange rates. Only since then have we witnessed the triumphant march 
onward of neo-liberalism and the extreme pressure thereby exerted on social 
rights. In international political economy, this epoch – in which the global 
economic players provide their own neo-liberal legal norms – will be seen as 
38 Rudolph von Jhering, Th e Struggle for Law, originally printed by Callaghan and Co., 1915, p 
138.
39 Th is formulation in Jean-François Lyotard, Th e Diff erend: Phrases in Dispute, (Minneapolis 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) (Th eory and History of Literature Vol. 46, 1988, 
§198, p. 141).
40 Niklas Luhmann, “Die Weltgesellschaft ”, (1971) 57 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 
p.  313 et seq., English translation gathered from Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther 
Teubner, “Regime-collisions: Th e Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global 
Law”, (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law, p. 999, at 1000, translated by Michelle 
Everson.
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one of market-liberal constitutionalism.41 Th e global economic order primarily 
protects the rights of private industry.
Th e path towards this market-liberal dominance was not a straightforward 
one. Th e global economic crises prior to the Second World War and the failure of 
the supply-orientated economic doctrine resulted in calls for a socially orientated 
regulatory system coming even from those who had previously supported the 
capitalist economic order: the Atlantic Charter drawn up by Roosevelt and 
Churchill in 1941, the 1944  Declaration of Philadelphia of the International 
Labour Organization, the Charter of the United Nations from 1945, and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, were the fi rst to formulate – 
with the claim of universal application – the idea of social human rights and an 
international system geared towards social objectives.42
Of the many forms of capitalism, the epoch of embedded liberalism in 
Western nations is distinguished by economic regulation that is demand-
orientated, and which stimulates growth through public institutions and wage 
increases. Th is economic appeasement policy is supplemented by corporatist 
arrangements and social compromises between the bourgeois and the subaltern 
classes.43
At international level, this period corresponded with increasing law-making 
under the framework of the United Nations. Th e Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) (1966) and the  ICESCR (1966) all three emerged in this period. Th e 
latter bears witness to the fact that the increased signifi cance of social rights on 
a national scale at the time was also borne out on an international scale. Th e 
 ICESCR secures the  right to social security, the right to freedom of association, 
and the right to strike. 
Th e so-called Bretton Woods Institutions exert their infl uence over the 
sphere of international economic regulation. Th e International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank safeguard the system of fi xed exchange rates and, in doing 
so, rule out – offi  cially at least – currency speculation and high-risk fi nancial 
transactions.44
Th is model plunged into crisis in the early 1970s, and the system of fi xed 
exchange rates was abandoned and replaced by a fl oating exchange rate system. 
41 Stephen Gill, “Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations”, (2002) 4 
International Studies Review, p. 47 et seq.
42 Benjamin Davy, Ulrike Davy and Lutz Leisering, “Th e Global, the Social and Rights. New 
Perspectives on Social Citizenship”, (2013) 22 International Journal of Social Welfare, issue 
supplement 1, p. 1 et seq.
43 Wolfgang Abendroth, “Zum Begriff  des demokratischen und sozialen Rechtsstaates im 
Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, (1954), in: Gesammelte Schrift en Band 2, 
(Hannover: Offi  zin Verlag, 2008), p. 338 et seq., especially at 354.
44 A watering-down of this attitude has been evident since the 1960s. See Duncan Wood, 
Governing Global Banking: Th e Basel Committee and the Politics of Financial Globalisation, 
(Aldershot-Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), p. 32.
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Only since then has it been possible to speculate on fl uctuating exchange rates, 
which has since allowed banks to expand their activities in the area of fi nancial 
and exchange rate speculation.
Neo-liberal economic policy was in line for a change. Th e IMF and the 
World Bank acquired a new role: ensuring stable conditions for speculation. 
Th e establishment of the WTO in 1995 provided a legal framework for the 
liberalisation of world markets. It aimed to contribute to “the substantial 
reduction of tariff s and other barriers to  trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international  trade relations” (WTO-Agreement).
Th is market-liberal constitutionalism is the product of the one-sided 
confi guration of a transnational law that legally guarantees the transactions of 
the global economy. It also involves a de-democratisation of decision-making 
processes.45 Th is democratic defi cit mainly arises from the elimination of the 
public spheres open to democratic participation and the establishment – in 
their place – of private institutions without democratic legitimacy. Under this 
new arrangement, corporate freedom and corporate property rights are removed 
from democratic and public supervision. Th ese neo-liberal norms are bolstered 
by a system of global jurisdiction, which sees transnational institutions install 
their own jurisdictions and dispute resolution procedures, such as the WTO 
arbitration procedure.
Th is leads to legal mechanisms that are diffi  cult to change, and whose 
market-liberal viewpoint excludes alternative paths of politico-economic 
development. Instead of being subject to democratic decision-making processes, 
the economic and societal order is safeguarded by a less than transparent 
process of juridifi cation hatched in the back rooms of international diplomacy 
and corporations.
While the winners in the global economy have long taken control of the legal 
machinery and thus created the perfect conditions for their own interests to 
fl ourish, attempts to introduce a sense of social and environmental responsibility 
to the system remain all too rare. As yet, there have been no radical changes in 
thinking on the scale necessary to bring about a lasting socialisation of neo-
liberal excesses.
If the diagnosis is correct that the process of globalisation has given free rein 
to the economic system, it seems fl awed to expect the remedy to come from a 
kind of national résistance. We would be better advised to pinpoint elements of 
an alternative juridico-political approach that have the potential to re-arrange 
the unfettered transnational system in a social and ecological way.
Two examples demonstrate the need to extend the fi ght for social rights 
beyond the constraints of the nation state:
45 See Kolja Möller, Formwandel der Verfassung. Die postdemokratische Verfasstheit des 
Transnationalen, (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2015); Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy, (Cambridge-
Malden MA: Polity Press, 2004).
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1. Th e World  Trade Organization: AIDS Medicines and the  Right to Health
WTO law primarily supports the liberalisation of world markets, a position 
which leads to a number of negative consequences. But in the dispute between 
Brazil and the US over patent protection for AIDS medicines a political struggle 
around the WTO’s essential commitments took place. It escalated in 2001, with 
the US claiming that Brazilian law was too lenient regarding the production of 
generic medicines and was thus violating the patent rights of US pharmaceutical 
companies. Th e US commenced proceedings against Brazil before the WTO 
arbitration panel, which had to decide between the social  right to health and 
the economic right to patent protection. Th e US, however, had under-estimated 
the forces that it would be up against. From the US perspective, there could 
not have been a worse time to initiate proceedings relating to patent protection 
for AIDS medicines before the WTO. A special session of the UN General 
Assembly focusing on HIV/AIDS was scheduled to begin just a few months aft er 
the start of the WTO proceedings. Such special sessions, which focus on issues 
of the utmost importance, are relatively rare, requiring years of preparation 
and involving players from both national and civil society spheres. Before long, 
there was a widespread public outcry surrounding the fact that US economic 
policy was denying appropriate treatment to people suff ering from AIDS. Keen 
to harness this public sentiment, Brazil managed to get a resolution passed at 
the next sitting of the UN Commission on Human Rights: Resolution 2001/33 
was passed with 52 votes out of 53 – the US abstaining – and called on states:
“[t]o ensure that their actions as members of international organizations take due 
account of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health.”
Th e resolution made fairly plain reference to the simmering confl ict around 
the Brazilian AIDS programme, and served as a diplomatic barometer for the 
pressure mounting against the US government. Th is explains why, on the fi rst 
day of the UN’s special session, the US announced that it was withdrawing the 
WTO complaint in favour of negotiations with Brazil. From a US perspective, 
the proceedings also had a counter-productive eff ect within the WTO system, as 
it led to the so-called Doha Compromise (2001), which provided for exceptions 
from WTO obligations for developing countries.
2. Th e Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Bolivia and the 
Right to Water
Another example is provided by the protests by residents of the Bolivian town 
of Cochabamba against high water prices and poor water quality following 
the privatisation of the water supply. Public pressure eventually led to the 
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government reversing the privatisation, to wit, re-nationalising the “public” 
utility. Th is prompted the company in question, Aguas del Tunari, a subsidiary 
of the US fi rm Bechtel, to bring the Bolivian government before the ICSID in an 
attempt to force them to uphold the contracts.46 Th e case posed the fundamental 
question of whether the property rights of Aguas del Tunari could trump the 
rights to food, to freely enjoy natural resources, and to one’s own means of 
subsistence as guaranteed by the  ICESCR. Civil societal pressure which pitted 
property rights against social counter-rights led to an out-of-court settlement, 
and exposed the contradiction of world society. Th is is much more than a 
collision between national regulation and the norms of globalisation. At heart, 
the confl ict represents the tension between profi t-driven private business and 
access to public goods. Th is tension, prevalent in national law, is also evident 
in transnational law, as two diff erent normative regimes collide – WTO law 
and the law of the  ICESCR. What happened aft er the ICSID proceedings 
reveals the socio-structural confl ict at play. Not only were Bolivia’s water laws 
amended, but its new 2009 Constitution also guarantees the right to access to 
water and stipulates that access to water may not be the object of concession 
or privatisation. It shows that intervention was required to prevent democratic 
and social rights from being trounced by global norms, and demonstrates how 
successful civil-society protests can be.
IV. TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS
Th e category of transnational social rights unites three strands of rights that 
have been separated in conventional legal  discourse. Transnational social 
rights combine liberal, social and political human rights. Th e fact that these 
rights would be amalgamated in this way is far from self-evident, due to a 
pervasive tendency to treat liberal human rights and social rights as two distinct 
categories, and, in turn, to separate both groups from the category of democratic 
rights. Liberalism has been particularly eff ective at giving priority to liberal 
human rights at the expense of political and social interests. Over time, this has 
weakened social rights and prevented them from achieving their democratic 
potential.
A. THE INDIVISIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Initially, social and liberal human rights were conceived of as one. Th is is evident 
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the UN General 
46 ICSID, Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3).
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Assembly on 10  December 1948, which refl ected the prevailing conceptions 
of rights immediately aft er World War II. Along with the usual liberal rights, 
such as freedom of expression, the prohibition of torture and the right to bodily 
integrity and eff ective legal protection, it also included social rights, such as the 
right to  social protection, work, health and food, within the catalogue of human 
rights.
A tendency to separate these categories of rights emerged with the adoption 
of the two international covenants in the 1960s, wherein social rights are 
textually split from liberal human rights: the ICCPR ratifi ed by 168 states, and 
the  ICESCR with 164 parties. Th is division is echoed at European level. While 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) focuses on liberal human 
rights, social rights are relegated to the European Social Charter.
Th e main result of this division was that the two categories of rights were 
not made equally enforceable. Th e liberal human rights are safeguarded by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), while the social rights are 
protected only by a committee, which does not even have the power to hear 
individual complaints. Finally, some attempts are under way to introduce a 
complaint mechanism into the context of the  ICESCR. An optional protocol 
to this eff ect was drawn up by the General Assembly in 2008 and entered into 
force in May 2013.47 Since then, those whose rights have been violated are able 
to make a submission to the Committee, which can then make the appropriate 
recommendations to the state in question.
Th e separate institutional handling of the two categories of rights shows that, 
while liberal human rights are conceived of as “hard” actionable rights, social 
rights are oft en reduced to the status of non-actionable “non-rights”, which robs 
them of their normative clout.
Slowly, however, the debate is picking up speed. Th e 1993 Vienna Conference 
on Human Rights made a signifi cant contribution to the idea of the indivisibility 
of human rights. Many states ratifi ed both UN Covenants in the wake of the 
conference. Th e current status of ratifi cations indicates that liberal and political 
human rights and social human rights can claim to be valid right across cultural 
boundaries. Both the Vienna Declaration – adopted at the end of the Vienna 
Conference in June 1993 – and the United Nations Millennium Declaration 
explicitly stress the indivisibility of human rights, with the Millennium 
Declaration going so far as to set out the goal, in paragraph 19, “[t]o halve, by 
the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose income is less than one 
dollar a day and the proportion of people who suff er from hunger”.
Th e concepts of the indivisibility of human rights and the inter-dependence 
of liberal, political and social rights are now once again fi nding favour. Th is 
47 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(UN GA Res. A/RES/63/117 from 10  December 2008); available at: http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-a&chapter=4&lang=en.
Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller
30 Intersentia
viewpoint sees social, political and liberal rights as simply various manifestations 
of human rights, and not as categorically separate entities.
Th is typology of human rights is therefore not limited to liberal rights; 
instead, it can be thought of as being three-dimensional.  Th e (liberal) human 
rights of the fi rst dimension include defensive and freedom-orientated rights, 
such as the right to life and to personal freedom. Th e (social) rights constituting 
the second dimension are, to a large extent, codifi ed in the  ICESCR.48 Th ese are 
joined by the third group of rights to political participation and collective rights, 
such as the rights to development, peace, solidarity and the right to share in the 
common heritage of mankind.49 Th ese three dimensions are diff erent forms of 
human rights. Th ey are interwoven with one another and cannot be categorically 
divided. Only together can they fulfi l their purpose: namely, to enable individual 
and collective self-constitution.
Other recent codifi cations of fundamental and human rights re-inforce this 
conception of indivisible human rights. Th e Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU – which became incorporated into primary law following the Treaty of 
Lisbon – encompasses social as well as liberal rights. Th e same is true for the 
Banjul Charter of the African Union and the American Convention on Human 
Rights. Specialised agreements such as the  Convention on the Rights of the 
 Child and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities include 
both liberal and social rights.
Even where there is no such immediately apparent merging of social and 
liberal rights, the categorical separation of the groups cannot be maintained; 
the two sets of rights are mutually dependent. Th e liberal rights have a social 
dimension, and the social rights have a liberal dimension. Th e social  right 
to health is not limited to basic claims to health- care – it includes liberty 
rights which protect the individual against state interference. Relevant state 
interference could consist of permitting the use of dangerous technologies or 
breaches of bodily integrity through irreversible surgical measures carried out 
on intersexual children. Th e liberal right to free choice of employment brings 
with it the obligation to provide for fair and reasonable allocation of jobs. 
Liberal property rights can give rise to social security entitlements, while the 
right to  human dignity combined with the principle of social justice and the 
welfare state leads to an entitlement to the guarantee of the socio-cultural basic 
income.
48 Manoj Sinha, “New Dimension of International Human Rights Law, with Special Reference 
of Economic Rights”, (2009) 6 Soochow Law Journal, p. 65 et seq.
49 To the gender-related questions in relation with those third-generation rights, see Celestine 
Nyamu, “How should Human Rights and Development respond to Cultural Legitimization 
of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries”, (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal, 
p. 381 et seq; see, also, Mosope Fagbongbe, “Th e Future of Women’s Rights from a TWAIL 
Perspective”, (2008) 10 International Community Law Review, p. 401 et seq.
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Similarly, there is no clear delineation between political and social human 
rights. Th e fundamental right to worker co-determination, for example, is 
derived from  human dignity, general personality rights and the free choice 
of profession. Th ese liberal rights give rise to an employee’s entitlement to 
contribute to the governing of his or her own professional  environment. Th e 
fundamental right to co-determination is therefore not only a social right which 
is derived from liberal rights, but is also a political right since it establishes the 
entitlement to democratic participation in business life. Th e sociologist Th omas 
H. Marshall pointed out that the social right to freedom of association, for 
example, also counts as one of the political participation rights that transfer 
the status as citizen into the industrial sphere, giving rise to the notion of 
industrial citizenship.50 Major features of industrial democracy arose through 
the  interpretation of liberal and social human rights.
While the principle of transnational social rights puts emphasis on a 
combined approach to liberal, political and social human rights, it is possible to 
identify fi ve distinct kinds of social rights within this approach:51
1. liberal human rights with a social component (e.g., free choice of profession) 
and social human rights with a liberal component (e.g., the  right to health);
2. political human rights with a social component (e.g., the right to 
co-determination) and social human rights with a political component (e.g., 
the right to strike);
3. equality rights which provide social entitlements to inclusion;
4. rights to social security, which can range from social support to health and 
environmental protection; and
5. social objectives, such as the goals of social progress and international peace 
set out in the preamble of the  UN Charter.
All of the fi ve elements of this typology have the potential to establish subjective 
entitlements, i.e., individual social rights that can be enforced in courts. Th e 
discovery that social rights exist in current international law leads us directly 
to the most important point of debate: What are the required conditions to turn 
subjective rights into concrete enforceable entitlements?
B. OBJECTIONS
Conservative lawyers argue against unlocking the potential of transnational social 
rights for a number of reasons. Four main objections are generally presented.
50 Th omas H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1950).
51 See, also, the typology used by Karl-Jürgen Bieback, in “Soziale Rechte”, (2010) 43 Kritische 
Justiz, p. 230 et seq.
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1. Vagueness
It is oft en claimed that social rights are too vague and too ill-defi ned to establish 
concrete rights and duties. Th is was the approach taken, for example, by a 
German administrative court in refusing to recognise the substantive content 
of a number of norms from the  ICESCR. Students who tried to rely on the 
Covenant to fi ght against university fees in Nordrhein-Westfalen in Germany in 
2007 were blocked from doing so by the court, which stated:
“the text of the treaty … lacks the necessary exactness for a legal norm … Th e 
normal requirements of certainty and precision relating to international treaties 
cannot be applied here. Due to its political nature and its character as the product 
of diplomatic compromise, the law of international treaties is oft en vaguely worded, 
and occasionally not at all intended to regulate a real life situation, but instead 
deliberately uses language to cover up the fact that precisely nothing is, in fact, meant 
to be regulated.”52
Th is attempt to erode social rights was subsequently rejected by a higher court, 
which recognised in its decision that the ICESCR can indeed establish norms and 
is not merely a political declaration of will.53 Th is makes it clear that “vagueness” 
is, in itself, a vague criterion. All legal norms are vague. Th e central task of 
the law is to convert inexactness into exactness, in other words, to determine 
indeterminable issues. Th e uncertainty of the law is the starting-point for every 
legal dispute, which involves pitting two competing interpretations of the law 
against each other to see which will prevail. Legal norms, particularly human-
rights norms, are always in need of concretisation. Take, for example, the fi rst 
provision of the German Basic Law: “ Human dignity shall be inviolable.” Th is 
provision is no less in need of concretisation than the social  ICESCR-guaranteed 
right at stake in the case of the university fees, which states that:
“with a view to achieving the full realization of this right [to education] … [h]
igher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by 
every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free 
education.”
2. Progressive Realisation
Social rights are oft en guaranteed only on condition of feasibility. Article 2 (1) 
of the Convention on Social and Political Rights obliges a state to do no more 
than “take steps […] to the maximum of its available resources, with a view 
52 Higher Administrative Court of Münster, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 2007, 1442.
53 Federal Administrative Court, Offi  cial Series, 134, 1 et seq.
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to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures”. Th e fact that social rights are to be progressively realised 
does not mean, however, that it is impossible to substantiate these rights. Th e 
 Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the monitoring body of 
the  ICESCR, thus diff erentiates between the obligations of states to respect, to 
protect and to fulfi l rights. It argues that progressive realisation, as set out in 
Article  2 (1) of the Convention, is proof that the Convention represents more 
than a non-binding list of aims. As Eibe Riedel correctly notes, Article 2 (1) of 
the Covenant “places an unequivocal legally-binding duty on all State Parties, 
the intensity of which is balanced against the objective situation in which State 
Parties fi nd themselves”.54 Th is duty can establish a prohibition on retrogressive 
measures, for example, the prohibition on the introduction of university fees, but 
can also lead to a duty to improve the situation progressively, which could entail 
a duty to abolish such fees gradually.
3. Resource Dependence
Th e argument based upon the resource-dependent nature of social rights and the 
need for democratic decisions on the distribution of limited resources has had a 
signifi cant infl uence on international law practice. It is indeed the main reason 
for the reluctance on the part of states when it comes to establishing monitoring 
bodies for the enforcement of social rights. Th is approach disregards, however, 
that political and liberal human rights also depend on resources. Th is is all the 
more true if the right requires legal mechanisms to be set up. Th e establishment 
of the system of patent protection in order to uphold liberal property rights, 
for example, entails signifi cant costs. Th e World Bank estimates the costs of 
enforcing a WTO-compliant intellectual property right in developing countries 
at around 1.5 million to 2 million USD per country and warns that:
“Given other pressing needs in education, health, and policy reform, it is questionable 
whether the least-developed countries would be willing to absorb these costs, or 
indeed whether they would achieve much social payoff  from investing in them. 
Moreover, note that poor countries are extremely scarce in trained administrators 
and judges, suggesting that one of the largest costs would be to divert scarce 
professional and technical resources out of potentially more productive activities.”55
54 Eibe Riedel, “Measuring Human Rights Compliance, Th e ISBA Procedure as a Tool of 
Monitoring”, in: Andreas Auer, Alexandre Flueckiger and Michel Hottelier (eds), Les Droits 
de l’homme et de la Constitution: Études en l’honneur du Professeur Giorgio Malinverni, 
(Geneva: Schulthess, 2007), p. 251 et seq., at 256.
55 World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2002: “Making  Trade Work for the World’s Poor”, 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2002), p. 136 et seq.
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Th ere is a further fl aw in the argument that the actionability of social rights 
would lead to immense costs, in that there are lots of social rights that do not 
lead to an entitlement to services. Th ey oft en have more in common with classic 
defensive rights. If the right to water is violated by environmental pollution, 
what is required is not some cost-intensive service, but, instead, a mere omission, 
just as with liberal rights. And where social rights do give rise to entitlements, 
granting these entitlements does not necessarily result in a burden on state 
fi nances. Th e fair distribution of available natural resources such as land and 
water, the recognition of the traditional usage rights of  indigenous peoples or 
other local communities, or the permission to produce generic medicines despite 
existing patents, all represent rights that do not entail increased costs to the 
state. Th e actionability of social rights does not mean that the court will never 
take fi nancial considerations into account – quite the opposite. Th is is why the 
 Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights leaves a certain amount 
of discretion when it comes to the allocation of resources. Th e burden of proof 
rests on the state if it cites “resource constraints” as an explanation for its failure 
to fulfi l its obligations. In practice, the Committee applies the following criteria 
to the legality of any retrogressive steps taken by a state: the country’s level of 
development, the severity of the alleged breach of rights, the country’s current 
economic situation, and the existence of other serious claims on the state party’s 
limited resources; for example, resulting from a recent natural disaster or from 
recent internal or international  armed confl ict.56
4. Judicial Enforceability
Th e fi nal objection to social rights holds that, for structural reasons, it is 
generally not feasible to conceive of social fundamental rights in the same way 
as directly enforceable rights, such as liberty rights.57 Th is argument challenges 
the justiciability of social rights as such, and generally takes one of two forms. 
Th e fi rst one voices doubts about the applicability of such a right, and questions 
whether the norm has the structural capacity to oblige the addressee to take a 
particular course of action. Th e second one posits that such rights represent a 
duty imposed by international law that is binding on states, but that this does not 
empower an individual to have recourse to international law in order to claim 
the right. Both points are important fi elds of legal and political debate in the 
battle to determine whether norms may be enforced or whether these provisions 
will be rendered toothless.
56 UN Committee on Economic, “Social and Cultural Rights, An Evaluation of the Obligation 
to take Steps to the ‘Maximum of Available Resources’ under an Optional Protocol to the 
Covenant”, 10 May 2007, E/C.12/2007/1, para. 10.
57 See, for example, Wolfgang Rüfner, “§40 Leistungsrechte”, in: Detlef Merten and Hans-Jürgen 
Papier (eds), Handbuch Grundrechte II, (Heidelberg: CF Müller, 2007), para. 53.
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A look at the European Social Charter demonstrates the fate that awaits 
social rights when this battle is not fought to the end. For example, the Charter 
guarantees the right to strike, a right not limited to union-led wage-based 
strikes. Th e German approach, which forbids so-called “political strikes”, 
therefore represents a breach of the Charter. German courts, however, have been 
reluctant to apply the Charter, despite the fact that Germany has ratifi ed it. Th e 
reason given for this reluctance is that the Charter’s provisions are to be seen as 
aims that all state parties should strive to achieve. Th e prevailing legal opinion 
in Germany maintains that the word “aims” implies that the Charter is not 
intended to establish subjective rights.
Th ere is good reason to reject this approach, a view shared by the European 
Committee of Social Rights, the treaty’s monitoring body.58
Th e EU Charter of Fundamental Rights presents a similar situation. Th is 
Charter introduced a diff erentiation between “‘real’ rights” and “principles”. Th e 
offi  cial clarifi cation given is that “‘real’ rights” are to be treated as “subjective 
rights”, while “principles” need only to be generally observed. Here, in the small 
print, we see another attempt to weaken social rights – the principles are largely 
made up of social rights – by framing them in terms of vague concepts, instead 
of actionable rights.59
Th e enforceability question is also debated with reference to the justiciability 
of these rights in international forums. As mentioned, states have, to date, been 
extremely reluctant to allow for individual or collective complaint procedures 
before both the  ICESCR and the European Social Charter. In both cases, the 
legal and political debate must focus on working towards strengthening these 
rights. Th ere is nothing in the structure of social, liberal or social-liberal rights 
that can justify the diff erent way in which these norms are treated.
Th ere is no principled distinction between social human rights and liberal/
political human rights. Nor are social rights any less binding. Transnational 
social rights are equal to, overlap, and cannot be divided from, liberal and 
political rights. Without the right to self-constitution, i.e., the right to a 
guaranteed basic income, and without the rights to environmental protection 
and migration, political and liberal human rights would be rendered hollow.
Liberal and political human rights cannot adequately deal with the problems 
of people living in refugee camps or people who have lost their livelihoods due 
to environmental disasters. Social rights are thus a necessary addition to – and 
not the opposite of – liberal and political rights. All three dimensions rely upon 
58 Tino Frieling and Roland Czycholl, “Auswirkungen der Europäischen Sozialcharta auf das 
Arbeitskampfrecht. Das Streikrecht aus Art.  6 Abs. 4 ESC als vorrangige gesetzgeberische 
Entscheidung”, (2011) Zeitschrift  für europäisches Sozial- und Arbeitsrecht, p. 322 et seq.
59 Th omas Giegerich, “Steuern Völker- und Europarecht die Globalisierung ‘im Geiste der 
Brüderlichkeit’?”, in: Th omas Giegerich and Andreas Zimmermann (eds), Wirtschaft liche, 
soziale und kulturelle Rechte im globalen Zeitalter, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2008), p. 7 et 
seq., at 26 et seq.
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each other. Th ey are indivisible. Th e co-originality of political, liberal and social 
rights is essential for the self-determination of individuals.60 Th is indivisibility 
also means that there are no rights without social rights. Transnational law is 
social, or it isn’t law at all.
V. ARENAS OF TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY
Th ere are three diff erent arenas where transnational social rights must 
be strengthened: (A) at global level, the main challenge is to fi nd a timely 
solution to the threats to social rights posed, not by states, but by transnational 
corporations. At European level (B), we have to make sure that a social Europe 
becomes a reality. Th is is of utmost importance with regard to the strengthening 
of transnational social rights: a social union which resists the temptation to 
establish imperial and exploitative (transnational) relations, could be a powerful 
resource which promotes social rights. Lastly, we must ensure that (C) states and 
the political organisations of global governance are held to the standard of the 
emancipatory ideal.
A. TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS AND 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
A crucial element of contemporary legal policy is to ensure that transnational 
corporations are bound to respect social human rights.61
Th e fact that Deutsche Bank can, on the one hand, speculate on crop 
failures, food scarcities and hunger-related deaths while, on the other, it can 
issue enthusiastic declarations relating to the UN Global Compact Initiative on 
upholding human rights is evidence of the complexities of transnational legal 
policy. How can private companies be bound to uphold transnational social 
rights? How can the concept of human rights for corporations move from being 
a mere marketing instrument to becoming actionable legal obligations? We 
urgently need to fi nd answers to the new kinds of risks that social rights face not 
from global politics, but from transnational corporations.
But what obligations – if any – does international law impose on transnational 
corporations? For decades, the steadfast position was that international law is a 
legal order both for and by states. Th e authors and addressees of this law were 
therefore states, and not individuals or corporate entities. Yet the transnational 
constellation of global communication, as well as global social systems of 
60 Jürgen Habermas, trans. William Rehg, “Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights”, 
(1998) 24 Philosophy and Social Criticism, p. 157 et seq., at 161.
61 See Ibrahim Kanalan and Sebastian Eickenjäger, Chapter 6 in this volume.
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business, science and technology, all raise the question of how international law 
– and particularly human rights – respond to these all-encompassing processes 
of transnationalisation. As far back as 1934, Hans Kelsen recognised that:
“[t]o the extent that international law penetrates areas that heretofore have been the 
exclusive domain of national legal orders, its tendency toward directly authorizing 
and obligating individuals must increase.”62
Calls for direct obligations to be placed on non-state actors are still, however, 
met with stiff   resistance. It is extremely diffi  cult for the victims of violations of 
transnational social rights to have their rights enforced. Th is is made shockingly 
clear in the case of violations of social human rights relating to the  right to food. 
Oil drilling in the Niger Delta has caused extensive environmental pollution. 
Consortia of transnational corporations headed by the British/Dutch oil 
company Shell have devastated huge tracts of land, collaborated in the execution 
of human-rights lawyer Ken Saro-Wiwa and his supporters, and violated the 
social rights of the Ogoni people. In 2011, the United Nations  Environment 
Programme published an extensive report detailing the contamination caused 
by oil exploration and production in the Ogoniland of Nigeria.63
Th e oil drilling is a violation of the  right to food as well as the collective right 
to the protection of the natural  environment. Th is protection is one of the key 
concerns – indeed, the core ecological demand – of transnational social rights. 
Th is is due to the fact that environmental rights are rights that are closely linked 
to human rights. Courts oft en read ecological concerns into liberal and social 
human rights, a phenomenon known as the “environmentalisation of human 
rights”. In this way, the European Court of Human Rights has developed the 
environmental components of the European Convention on Human Rights 
based upon the right to life and the right to privacy. Similarly, the UN Human 
Rights Committee interprets the ICCPR in such a way as to include ecological 
human rights.
Th e environmental leaning is particularly important when it comes to social 
human rights. Th e right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate 
nutrition, clothing, accommodation and health, contained in the  ICESCR also 
encompasses the right to stable environmental conditions to enable human 
existence. Th e UN  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights thus 
found that these two norms could be read as establishing a right to water.64
All of these fundamental norms are directed, in the traditional way, at states. 
Th ese rights impose three legal obligations on states: (1) the duty to respect 
62 Hans Kelsen, Pure Th eory of Law, (Oakland CA: University of California Press, 1978), p. 327.
63 United Nations  Environment Programme, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, Nairobi 
2011.
64 UN  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, 2002, 
E/C.12/2002/11 from 20 January 2003.
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obliges all states to refrain from violating these rights; (2) the duty to protect 
obliges all states to protect against violations of these rights by third parties; and 
(3) the duty to fulfi l obliges states to ensure that these rights are enforced, which 
includes their taking active measures to do so.
However, this triad of duties cannot directly impose any obligations on the 
transnational corporation Shell. Th e powerlessness of transnational law when it 
comes to the human rights obligations of transnational corporations is evidenced 
by the fact that, to date, there has been no fi nal court judgment against Shell. Th e 
proceedings in the Netherlands are still ongoing, as Shell has appealed against a 
judgment of the District Court of Th e Hague which granted compensation to the 
victims.65
Th e jurisdiction of national courts also presents problems, as this requires 
a legal connection to the state in which the court is sitting, i.e., that the 
corporation, the victim, or the place in which the crime was committed has a 
connection to the state in question. Th is is oft en diffi  cult to achieve in the case 
of human rights violations. A certain amount of legal creativity is required if, 
for example, a Nigerian victim of a crime that took place in Nigeria wishes to 
take a foreign subsidiary of a transnational corporation to court. Th e US legal 
system off ers quite a lot of scope in cases such as these. In the US, corporations 
involved in grave violations of human rights may be brought before courts even 
if there is no immediate connection between the violation and the US. It was for 
this reason that lawyers taking a case relating to the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa 
initiated proceedings before a New York court. When, in June 2009, the court 
declared the compensation claim admissible, Shell agreed to a settlement with 
the victims in the region of 15 million USD.66 Apart from this case, which made 
use of the opportunity presented by the US legal system, there is little scope at 
global level to seek a judgment against Shell.
Judgment on the issue has been handed down only to the state of Nigeria, in 
a case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights relating 
to violations of the  right to food. In its decision, the Commission stressed the 
importance of the  right to food in the human rights system, fi nding that:
“the minimum core of the  right to food requires that the Nigerian Government 
should not destroy or contaminate food sources. […] Th e Government has destroyed 
food sources through its security forces and State Oil Company; has allowed private 
oil companies to destroy food sources; and, through terror, has created signifi cant 
obstacles to Ogoni communities trying to feed themselves.”67
65 District Court of Th e Hague, C/09/337050 / HA ZA 09–1580, judgment of 30 January 2013.
66 US District Court Southern District of New York, Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum, 96 Civ. 8386, 
Settlement of 8 June 2009.
67 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, SERAC, Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria, October 2001, ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, para. 65 f.
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Th e crux of this decision from the African Commission was the involvement of 
the Nigerian state in violations of social rights.
But what concrete human rights obligations exist for transnational 
corporations?
Th us far, attempts have failed to formulate a draft  on the responsibility of 
corporations under international law and on a declaration of a code of social 
responsibility with universal applicability and direct eff ect.68 Currently, the 
concept of voluntary codes does have some traction. While these voluntary 
declarations are problematical, they do at least represent a start. One should not 
be too quick to reject categorically the legal applicability of such declarations 
just because they are voluntary in nature. Law is not limited to what states, 
themselves, set out. Legal norms can also be formed in society. To see the 
concept of law as being too closely linked to the state is to overlook the unique 
nature of social norms.
Th e struggle for law has always entailed debate on the signifi cance of certain 
symbolic texts. Even the idea that the constitution could have a binding eff ect on 
politics was established only aft er a legal debate. Even the Magna Carta was not 
initially conceived of as a justiciable document.
In a similar way, transnational social and democratic legal policy will have to 
work to transform these voluntary declarations into binding transnational social 
rights. Th e future obligations on transnational corporations to uphold human 
rights might take a multi-dimensional form, encompassing binding fundamental 
rules, incentives and voluntary initiatives. Th ere is certainly no shortage of 
initiatives to create such norms. Th e following initiatives are of particular 
importance: (1) Th e  United Nations Global Compact (UNGC): a public-private 
initiative of the UN, which aims to establish ten universal principles, including 
that business should respect the protection of human rights. (2) In May 2010, 
the UNGC came to an agreement with the  Global Reporting Initiative to 
monitor the ten principles by means of the “G3 Guidelines”. Th is will, for the 
fi rst time, provide guidelines for a monitoring mechanism. (3) Th e  International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) should also be mentioned in this 
context. In May 2010, it adopted the draft  ISO 26000 on Social Responsibility. 
Th is ISO norm makes a signifi cant contribution to the standardisation of the 
human rights obligations of companies. (4) Th e  ILO Core Labour Standards also 
provide for binding human rights obligations on companies. Th e Declaration 
on  Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of June 1998 sets out universal 
fundamental principles for corporations operating internationally, such as the 
ban on  child labour. (5) Finally, reference must be made to the  OECD Guidelines 
68 See Ronen Shamir, “ Corporate Social Responsibility: A Case of Hegemony and Counter-
hegemony”, in: Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law 
and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 92 et seq.
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for Multinational Enterprises, a code of conduct for responsible worldwide 
corporate behaviour.
A common feature of all these eff orts is that they are stated in terms of 
recommendations, attempts to standardise, or voluntary commitments, and thus 
are not declared as law in a formal sense. Th is does not, however, exclude the 
possibility that the legal character of these rules can emerge as a result of the 
struggle to determine their substance.69 Th e legally binding nature of these rules 
may also emerge with the help of national law. A common litigation strategy of 
transnational lawyer groups is to hold companies accountable to their  Codes 
of Conduct. Voluntary standards can oft en be enforced in accordance with 
competition or consumer laws, where they include relevant representations 
to the consumer. Th us, a corporation’s non-adherence to its own codes can be 
enforced before courts in the country of the corporation’s headquarters.
Th ese are the tentative fi rst steps in the attempt to “get serious” about 
the human rights obligations of transnational corporations. Transnational 
social rights that place obligations on corporations can develop out of the 
complex interplay between various state and non-state systems. In his report 
from 2008/2009,  John Ruggie, the former UN Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative for  Business and Human Rights, referred to precisely this multi-
dimensional aspect. Ruggie sees complementary responsibilities in terms of 
human rights, and categorises these interconnected duties into a three-pillar 
system. His “protect, respect and remedy” framework encompasses, apart 
from the state duty to protect against human rights violations, a corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, i.e., a direct duty, aimed at corporations, 
to act with due diligence to avoid infringing upon the rights of others. Added to 
this is the right of access to judicial and non-judicial remedies. Th us, alongside 
the traditional state obligations, he sets out a distinct corporate responsibility, 
which he says has acquired near-universal recognition. He states:
“By near-universal is meant two things. First, the corporate responsibility to respect 
is acknowledged by virtually every company and industry CSR initiative, endorsed 
by the world’s largest business associations, affi  rmed in the Global Compact and 
its worldwide national networks, and enshrined in such soft  law instruments as the 
 ILO Tripartite Declaration and the  OECD Guidelines. Second, violations of this 
social norm are routinely brought to public attention globally through mobilized 
local communities, networks of civil society, the media including blogs, complaints 
procedures such as the OECD NCPs […] Th is transnational normative regime 
reaches not only Western multinationals, which have long experienced its eff ects, 
69 On the emergence of binding legal rules in the fi eld of the lex mercatoria, see Moritz Renner, 
“Occupy the System! Societal Constitutionalism and Transnational Corporate Accounting”, 
(2013) 20 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, p. 941 et seq.
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but also emerging economy companies operating abroad, and even large national 
fi rms.”70
Ruggie goes into more detail on this corporate responsibility in his fi nal report 
of 2011, in which duties to adhere to certain due diligence standards are placed 
on corporations in order to guarantee human rights.71
Ruggie’s work has, however, been criticised for not going far enough. Indeed, 
eff orts must be made, particularly in the area of social rights, to ensure that it is 
not just defensive rights that exist against transnational corporations, but that 
corporations can also be obliged to take certain positive steps.72 In the above-
mentioned example of patents for medicines, it is easy to imagine situations in 
which the patent holder could be obliged to allow for the production of generic 
drugs or be obliged to make lifesaving medicines available.
What does this mean for the enforcement of transnational social rights 
regarding corporations? It is clear that defensive as well as positive rights 
should be demanded from corporations. Political human rights should also be 
developed in the same way so that the idea of participation can be applied against 
corporations as well. Th e Aarhus Convention set up innovative participation 
and control structures in relation to corporations and environmental issues. 
Strengthening the rules on co-determination in transnational corporations thus 
remains a central task.
In all of these areas, it is essential to open up access to judicial avenues. 
Th e Ruggie report sets out the right to greater access to eff ective judicial and 
non-judicial remedies for victims, and refers to the UN General Assembly’s 
“Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of  International Humanitarian Law”. Th e General Assembly declared 
that these principles emanate from customary international law. Th e question 
remains, however, as to whether or not public international law as it currently 
stands provides for a duty to compensate. If rights violations can be attributed 
to a corporation, are they obliged to compensate the victims? Conservative 
international lawyers fl atly deny the existence of any individual right to 
compensation under international law. Yet there is no settled prevailing opinion 
on the matter. A further question relates to which transnational social rights are 
included in these basic principles and guidelines, i.e., whether the latter apply 
only to “gross violations” of human rights. Restrictive answers to this question 
70  John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises 2009, para. 
47.
71  John Ruggie, “ Guiding Principles on  Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework”, 21 April 2011, A/HRC/17/31.
72 For recent attempts to draft  an international convention concerning human rights and 
business, see Ibrahim Kanalan and Sebastian Eickenjäger, Chapter 6 in this volume.
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refer to the draft ing history of the principles. During negotiations, the term 
“gross violations” was understood as referring only to crimes in the category of 
genocide and slavery. But states decided against such a narrow  interpretation. 
Instead, it was made clear that systematic violations would also trigger the legal 
obligation to provide compensation. Th e task here is to ensure that as many 
kinds of violations as possible are included in this system of compensation.
Of more fundamental importance, however, is the dispute over whether the 
right to the legal proceedings and compensation set out by Ruggie also applies 
in cases of the violations of rights by private persons and corporations. Here 
again, the restrictive view argues that the principles are directed solely at states. 
Th is claim is not, however, supported by the wording of the principles, which 
stipulate the duty to:
“Provide those who claim to be victims of a human rights or humanitarian law 
violation with equal and eff ective access to justice, as described below, irrespective of 
who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation.”73
It is certainly possible that even those violations of transnational social rights 
that are caused by private parties could trigger a claim to an adequate, eff ective 
and prompt remedy. In short, based upon these principles and guidelines, it is 
possible to extrapolate from the existing law an obligation on corporations to 
compensate victims where the former have violated transnational social rights.
B. THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL UNION
Th e European Union is a forceful example for a transnational polity that is highly 
juridifi ed and even vested with parliamentary institutions. Th is aff ects not only 
the European continent. Th e EU and the Eurozone is an integrated market that 
establishes relations of economic exchange to the rest of the world. And, in 
international institutions such as the WTO, the EU acts as a unitary polity. For 
the strengthening of transnational social rights, it is absolutely crucial that such 
regional actors promote social rights instead of echoing the market-liberal and 
imperial dominance that we have already pointed out. Th is is why the quest for a 
social Europe attains a huge importance with regard to the overall project.
Not least, the turn towards austerity policies that the Union has seen in the 
last years is an important example in order to elucidate the devastating eff ects 
of neglecting social rights: the social and democratic defi cit of the EU is one of 
the main reasons why the European competitive order is increasingly plagued 
by crisis. Th ere is no economic stability without social stability. Financialisation 
and massive wage restraint have led to economic imbalances. Th e riots and 
unrest that we have seen spreading through Europe over the last years are a 
73 UN GA, A/RES/60/147, 21 April 2008, Guidelines, No. 3) c).
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reaction to these imbalances, which leave many Europeans with no prospects. In 
the Parisian banlieues, young people, in particular, are protesting against social 
stigmatisation, while, in the latest occupations at Puerta del Sol in Madrid, well-
educated students and graduates are drawing attention to their lack of prospects 
and demanding a democracia real. Th ey call for “a Europe of the citizens and 
not of the markets. We are not commodities in the hands of politicians and 
bankers”.74
Th e lack of European harmonisation in social and economic policies has 
exacerbated the crisis. Th e increasingly precarious job markets play a central 
role here. Minimum social standards have been lowered while the low-wage 
sector and atypical forms of employment fl ourish. Even beyond socio-political 
considerations, the urgent question now is whether or not a social union which 
protects  minimum  wages and income can be established, which could, in turn, 
help to prevent future imbalances. To date, a Europeanisation of social rights 
is diffi  cult to discern. In contrast, the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice, the European Commission and of most of the Member States is agreed 
that Europe is principally a sphere of economic competition, not a sphere of 
social justice.
But the crisis in the European competitive order extends beyond the 
socio-economic dimension in that it is closely linked to the crisis of European 
democracy. Th e latter arises out of a growing sense of alienation between the 
majority of EU citizens and the political and economic élite.
Th is is also refl ected in the EU’s approach to international  trade policies 
and regional co-operation. While it tries to establish free- trade agreements 
with the US and Canada, it is not willing to implement fair  trade, based upon 
asymmetrical  trade relations, with the Global South.75 It still echoes the chants 
of free  trade. And not least of all, it attempts to shield its borders against refugees 
by implementing new police and security apparatuses. Clearly, the current 
state of the Union is neither committed to social rights nor to an awareness of 
Europe’s colonial past.
As the EU’s situation intensifi es, the question must be asked: Will the EU 
deepen its market-liberal constitution and set up increasingly authoritarian 
means of regulation, or will it face the crisis by prioritising social rights, 
democracy and economic re-distribution?
A European social union can only be achieved if we make a great eff ort to 
transform the market-liberal legal structure into one that guarantees democratic 
and social rights. Th is will require institutional reforms as well as pressure from 
civil society.
Two issues could be of particular signifi cance when it comes to the 
Europeanisation of social rights. Th e strengthening of the European Social 
74 See www.democracyrealya.es.
75 See Steff en Kommer, Chapter 9 in this volume.
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Charter and the establishment of a “social” EU citizenship by means of a 
minimum income system.
1. Th e strengthening of the European Social Charter and the establishment of 
a European court of social rights could act as a counter development to market-
liberal single market integration. With the adoption of the Social Charter, 
the majority of the Council of Europe agreed on a catalogue of social rights, 
precisely those social rights that the European Court of Justice categorises as 
being subordinate to economic fundamental freedoms: the rights to strike and to 
demonstrate, and the right to collective bargaining.
In a whole series of judgments from the 1970s and 1980s onwards, the 
ECJ developed a market-liberal leaning. Recent examples of this tendency can 
be found in the Court’s jurisprudence in the decisions in the Laval, Viking, 
Luxembourg and Rüff ert cases.76 In the Laval and Viking cases, the Court found 
that strike and protest actions against wage dumping represented violations 
of fundamental freedoms. In the matter of Luxembourg, the ECJ found 
Luxembourg’s laws protecting workers were not in conformity with EU law. Th e 
decision in the Rüff ert case found that, when awarding contracts, the German 
state of Lower Saxony was not permitted to set minimum wage limits.
In each of these cases, the Court asserted that the four economic freedoms 
of the single market – the free movement of goods, people, services and capital – 
are more important than collective bargaining autonomy and the right of  trade 
unions to strike. It seems that the eff et utile of European law has long become an 
eff et néolibéral, which cossets the European competitive order against calls for 
social justice.77
While the European Charter of Fundamental Rights has become binding 
with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it remains unlikely that the 
ECJ will revise its single market leaning at any time in the near future. Th ere 
is nothing to suggest that this might change signifi cantly in the near future. 
Th e outlook is all the more gloomy given that the social rights set out in the 
Charter are largely categorised as “principles”, thus deliberately rendering the 
enforceability of such rights uncertain.
It would be a real breakthrough for social rights in Europe if the EU itself 
were obliged to adhere to the European Social Charter, given that the Charter 
is an international treaty that forms part of the law of the European Council 
and has been signed and ratifi ed by 27 European states (but not by all the EU 
Member States). As it currently stands, the treaty is of meagre signifi cance.
76 Decisions of the European Court of Justice: Viking – C-438/05 of 11 December 2007, Laval 
– C-341/05 of 18  December 2007, Rüff ert – C-346/06 of 3  April 2008 and Luxembourg – 
C-319/06 of 19 June 2008.
77 Christoph Schmid, “From Eff et Utile to Eff et Néolibéral: A Critique of the New Methodological 
Expansionism of the European Court of Justice”, in: Rainer Nickel (ed), Confl ict of Laws and 
Laws of Confl ict in Europe and Beyond, (Oslo: Arena, 2009), p. 421 et seq.
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Apart from the required ratifi cation, there is no reason why the rights 
contained in the Charter could not be relied upon in court or invoked to establish 
an individual or collective complaint procedure. Th e EU should sign up to the 
European Social Charter, a move which would signifi cantly bolster the Charter’s 
status. A judicial forum under the framework of the Charter – a “European 
Court of Social Rights” – could supplement the network of existing European 
courts. Such a court could be established in complementarity to the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Alternatively, the monitoring of the 
Social Charter could be entrusted to the Strasbourg court. Both approaches 
would fulfi l the same purpose: there is a need for a court which – unlike the 
ECJ/CJEU – does not give priority to upholding the principles of the single 
market, but, instead, aims to ensure that social rights fi nally become a central 
concern in Europe. Th is is not about legal chicaneries or jurisdiction tricks; it 
is simply a question of where and how the collision between social democracy 
and market-liberal economy can be articulated by law, but without priority rules 
automatically relegating social guarantees to the status of second-class rights.
2. If the observation is correct that securing a minimum standard of 
subsistence is crucial for inclusion and democratic participation, then this brings 
with it direct consequences for a socio-legal policy in Europe. Th e goal is to 
establish a social EU citizenship by way of a nuanced system of guaranteed basic 
income. Precarity and a lack of prospects have an exacerbating eff ect on Europe’s 
crises: wage levels and purchasing power plummet while fi nancial insecurity 
makes it more diffi  cult for people to participate in democratic processes or 
to have a hand in shaping the future. Th e sociologist Pierre Bourdieu thus 
found that such increasingly precarious conditions gave rise to a new form 
of domination.78 Th e right to a basic income could represent an important 
antidote to the fundamental insecurity felt by people in Europe. In this vein, the 
Committee on Employment and Social Aff airs of the EU Parliament called on 
the Member States to provide for minimum-income schemes in order to “prevent 
poverty and social exclusion”.79
In the report, the Committee fi nds that “social assistance in most Member 
States is already below a level which makes poverty a risk”, i.e., under 60 per cent 
of the national average income. Th us, the Committee calls for a diff erentiated 
minimum income for everyone in Europe based upon the income levels of 
the particular state. Th is social security system should guarantee a minimum 
income, while  minimum  wages should be introduced to combat wage dumping. 
Th e call for a minimum income is thus framed in terms of a fundamental 
entitlement. Th e system would not represent charitable hand-outs, but would, 
78 Pierre Bourdieu, “Prekarität ist überall” (Precarity is everywhere), in: idem, Gegenfeuer. 
Wortmeldungen im Dienste des Widerstands gegen die neoliberale Invasion, (Konstanz: UVK, 
1998), p. 96 et seq.
79 Report on Promoting Social Inclusion and Combating Poverty, Including  Child Poverty in 
the EU, Committee on Employment and Social Aff airs, A6–0364/2008 at 2 (a).
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instead, ground actionable legal claims. Th e demand for a legally-enforceable 
minimum income in accordance with the economic situation of each country 
could inject new energy into the struggle for social rights in the European 
Union.80
Th e European Court of Justice, in a series of decisions on single-market 
integration and cross-border mobility, has found that all EU citizens – regardless 
of their nationality – should have access to social entitlements in their country of 
residence.81 Th is lays the foundations for a form of EU citizenship, which would 
need to be attuned accordingly in a system of minimum income and expanded 
to include  minimum  wages and economic participation. We must aim to create a 
social EU citizenship that entails more than just cross-border mobility and anti-
discrimination rights. Th is would guarantee a minimum level of subsistence, 
which could form the basis for further calls for co-determination rights and 
economic democratisation.
C. INSTITUTIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS
Th e question remains: In which forums can transnational social rights be 
enforced? Th e answer depends on whether the aim is of national, regional or 
worldwide enforceability.
National infrastructure has an important role to play in the enforceability 
of transnational social rights. It is not just the US legal system that allows for 
fundamental human rights to be enforced in a de-centralised manner – i.e., 
before national courts. Th rough “role splitting”,82 national court decisions can 
write transnational legal history. National courts represent more than just an 
important addition to international institutions; they can – in themselves – drive 
the enforcement and strengthening of transnational social rights. In the Pinochet 
case, for instance, Spanish and British courts made a signifi cant contribution to 
the protection against the arbitrary use of state power. In numerous cases, US 
courts – against the interests of US foreign policy – are playing a leading role in 
the enforcement of transnational law. 
Th e existing regional and global forums for the protection of human rights 
must also be strengthened. Th is applies, fi rst and foremost, to judicial practice. 
Here, pressure must be applied to ensure that national courts are obliged to 
take the statements of these and similar bodies into account. Th e organs of the 
80 Th is could be linked with a model of diff erent social corridors within the EU. See Klaus 
Busch, “Th e Corridor Model – Relaunched”, Working-Paper, International Policy Analysis, 
(Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2011).
81 See Dawid Friedrich, Patrizia Nanz and Kerstin Blome, “Free Movement and the Emergence 
of European Social Citizenship”, (2012) 41 Österreichische Zeitschrift  für Politikwissenschaft , 
p. 383 et seq.
82 See note 15 above.
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International Labour Organization that monitor observance of core labour 
standards must be strengthened, as must the complaint procedure of the OECD 
relating to adherence to the  OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises.
Non-state actors must, to a greater degree, be brought into the system 
of global jurisdiction. Transnational corporations as well as international 
organisations such as the United Nations and NATO must be subjected to 
the jurisdiction of human-rights forums. Th e same is true for transnational 
corporations.
VI. THE POLEMICS OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL 
RIGHTS
Th e right to a minimum basic income, participation rights, the right to an 
undamaged  environment, and the right to freedom of movement: all of these 
refer to the law of world society as we know it, while simultaneously suggesting 
an alternative. Th e promise of transnational social rights lies not in an elaborate 
blueprint for a better world order; instead, it is confi ned, at least for the moment, 
to the modest demand of allowing the inherent contradiction(s) in transnational 
law to emerge, so that the critical appropriation of human rights can fi nd a 
way to gain traction in the arena of legal and political debate. We can use the 
language of human rights in order, fi nally, as Th eodor Adorno put it, “to put a 
spark to all this antiquated mustiness, which may even blow it apart”.83
Transnational social rights are thus directed in a polemical way against the 
existing system of rights. We thereby enter a confl ict of laws. Without pólemos, 
that is, without a fi ght, without argument, without dissent, a new and diff erent 
world will remain out of reach. Transnational social rights gently endeavour to 
achieve the coarsest demand: the ideal of emancipation.
83 Th eodor W. Adorno and Hellmut Becker, “Education for Maturity and Responsibility”, (1999) 
12 History of the Human Sciences, pp. 21–34, at 24.
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CHAPTER 3
NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON 
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS
Georg Lohmann
INTRODUCTION
Th e various modes of globalisation have made us conscious of the fact that the 
inequalities in life chances and increasing poverty are now the problems of a 
global society. Th e struggles against discrimination, exclusion and other forms of 
injustice can no longer solely be aligned within the respective state borders, but 
must, in order to be successful, (also) be conducted transnationally and globally. 
Social struggles emerge around concrete and local experiences of injustice. But 
then, the normative demands and justifi cations have to address the transnational 
roots of these injustices, and national actors tend to turn into international 
actors. Th erewith, the framework of social struggles and of normative 
justifi cation changes. Th e fi eld ranges from voluntary, humanitarian aid to 
moral demands of global social justice and the enforcement of transnational 
social rights. Social rights, which traditionally protect and defend the life 
chances of citizens in a domestic frame, now need be conceived as transnational 
social rights and need transnational orientations and justifi cations. Th is chapter 
seeks to determine, from a philosophical point of view, which conceptual and 
argumentative problems can be found in these normative perspectives.
I. CONCEPTIONAL AND SYSTEMATIC 
CLARIFICATIONS
A. “TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS” AS HUMAN 
RIGHTS
I would like to understand “transnational social rights” as human rights. 
Frequently, human rights are seen – unfortunately, particularly by moral 
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philosophers – as purely “moral rights” which merely correspond to “moral 
obligations” for all. Th is is, in many ways, not just one-sided, but will frequently 
lead to false and distorting considerations and conclusions. Human rights, 
properly understood, have three dimensions, which cannot be reduced to 
one another: a moral, a legal, and a political-historical dimension.1 Th ey are 
motivated by historical processing of experiences of grave injustices and crimes 
against humanity; since the Second World War, international (political-given, 
legally-constituted and morally-justifi able) human rights, have been accredited 
in the same way to every human being in virtue of his or her  human dignity.2 
Th us, philosophical refl ections on human rights should not only methodically 
emanate from the legal (national and international) human-rights documents, 
but must also track each other’s separate considerations in political and moral 
terms.
Human rights are “global” or “transnational” in two ways:
1) all human beings are bearers of these rights; and
2) corresponding duties have a transnational broadcast, i.e., the bearers of the 
corresponding duties cannot merely be identifi ed in the national, but must 
also be identifi ed in the international or “global” realm. It remains unclear 
who, exactly, is backing the corresponding obligations: every single human 
being, all states, or staggered, multi-level subsidiary obligors?
Human rights are formulated in lists of rights, which traditionally can be 
diff erentiated in three or four substantial groups of individual liberal rights, 
political and legal participatory rights, and social rights of participation.3 In 
spite of this substantial diff erentiation, all the groups belong together and are 
“universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated”.4 Th e concrete list 
of social human rights can both vary according to the conception of human 
rights and between one document and another (see, in particular, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Articles  22–27, and, further, the 
International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( ICESCR). 
1 Samantha Besson, “Th e Law in Human Rights Th eory”, (2013) 7 Zeitschrift  für 
Menschenrechte, p.  120 et seq; see, already, Georg Lohmann, “Menschenrechte zwischen 
Moral und Recht”, in: Stefan Gosepath and Georg Lohmann (eds), Philosophie der 
Menschenrechte, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998), pp. 62–95.
2 For this diff erentiated and complex view of human rights, compare Arnd Pollmann and 
Georg Lohmann (eds), Menschenrechte: Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch, (Stuttgart-Weimar: 
J.B. Metzler, 2012).
3 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller, Chapter 2 in this volume; see, also, Georg 
Lohmann, “Die unterschiedlichen Menschenrechte”, in: Karl Peter Fritzsche and Georg 
Lohmann (eds), Menschenrechte zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, (Würzburg: Ergon, 
2000), pp. 9–23.
4 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, 12 July 
1993, (UN-Doc. A/CONF.157/23, No.5.
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Together they respect, protect and secure or enable the participation of every 
individual human being in the social, cultural and economic spheres of life. 
Instead of talking of “social” rights in general, one can, therefore, as in the 
 ICESCR, more precisely talk of “economic, social and cultural” rights; in the 
following, I will use the more precise abbreviation of “ESC” rights in place of the 
term “social rights”. How ESC-rights relate towards the other groups of rights 
is a contested question, however, and, below, I will defend a certain conception 
which sees them in equal unity with the other substantive groups.
B. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS FROM A DUTY-BASED 
OR A RIGHT-BASED PERSPECTIVE
By the term a “normative perspective” on ESC-rights, I mean the discussion 
of the allegations and normative assets which go along with them, i.e., their 
conceptual clarifi cation and justifi cation. Especially relevant here are, on the 
one hand, the assertions and justifi cations of who is the actual bearer of what 
specifi c human right(s) and, on the other hand, who is obligated by these 
ESC-rights to what, i.e., which mandatory addressees are constituted by them 
and to what they are obliged. We therefore have – by defi nition – at least two 
normative perspectives: starting from the bearers of rights or from the addressees 
of the obligations. In the following, I will defend the thesis that we will arrive 
at considerably diff erent results depending upon which perspective we actually 
follow. From a moral point of view, a duty-oriented perspective seems to be a 
comprehensive one, but I will argue that the rights-based perspective is the one 
which deals with human rights adequately, and that a duty-oriented perspective 
can, so to speak, be considered in the light of it.
In order to clarify the diff ering normative perspectives, I start very generally 
by looking at what the consequences are if someone is in need. By the term 
“need”, we can distinguish between a situation in which someone is in “absolute 
need”, which means that his or her life is in danger, or in which he or she is 
in “relative need”, which means that his or her welfare is in danger.5 Not all 
ESC-rights are aimed at protecting against or providing remedies for extreme 
emergencies and absolute poverty (absolute need), some are simply means of 
empowerment or of enabling people to lead a life with a guaranteed minimum 
welfare (relative need). However, in both cases, what a person in need has need of 
is help, support, and the absence of injuries and harm.
If we start with the situation in which other people (people A) are in need, 
for example, in existential emergencies such as disease, hunger, poverty, high 
mortality, etc., traditionally they were the moral objects of voluntary help or 
Christian charity. In cases of voluntarily doing something good, one received 
5 For the start, I ignore whether the need is self-infl icted or not.
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praise when one helped, but was not blamed if one did not. Of these forms of aid 
which go beyond strict moral obligations (supererogative actions), the duties of 
the virtue of charity and helpfulness must be distinguished, to which a person B 
is prompted to act due to his or her good character and the prevailing customs 
and moral duties. Here, one receives praise for what one does voluntarily out of 
virtuousness, and one is blamed if one does not.
Ethics based upon emotions such as the ethics of compassion explain 
emergency aid as the result of a weak anthropological pre-disposition to feelings 
of pity or empathy, and they make it appear to be both wise and sensible not to 
harm others and to help those in need as best as one can.
Here, we have negative duties (the obligation to refrain) and positive 
duties (the obligation to act), but they depend on having certain feelings 
(e.g., sympathy) and are generally only conditioned and weak obligations. 
“Conditioned”: if someone feels sympathy, then he or she should either do this or 
that or refrain from it. “Weak”: if someone does not act in the manner in which 
he or she should according to this view, then he or she acts unwisely and one can 
accuse him or her of lacking compassion.
Only Immanuel Kant and comparable ethics justify unconditioned, universal 
moral obligations to help others in emergencies. Kant, however, makes a 
distinction between negative obligations of omission and positive obligations to 
act. Contrary to what is oft en assumed, Kant sees positive obligations, I believe, 
as equally stringently and generally justifi ed as negative obligations; however, 
they are diff erent in the way that they are “incomplete”, for they do not specify 
what one precisely has to do in a situation in which one is supposed to help. 
Th e morally (by the categorical imperative) strictly-established duty to help 
leaves open what precise or specifi c action is adequate and reasonable in order 
to fulfi l this duty. In this way, positive duties are “incomplete”, i.e., they have to 
be complemented by more than purely moral considerations and require wise 
judgement and the ability to act in a way which is appropriate to the situation. 
Th erefore, Kant is treating them, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, as duties of virtue. 
Such moral duties depend on the inner belief and the conscientiousness of the 
individual helping. From the outside, they can, therefore, not be enforced by 
any outside means. Although, as we have learned from Adam Smith, the non-
fulfi lment of such a moral obligation produces aff ective responses such as a sense 
of guilt and accusations of guilt, and moral outrage and moral shame for those 
who are convinced of their duty. But these morally-aff ective reactions for non-
compliance only have social-appellative pressure if the individual has a moral 
sense. Th is was also the reason why Kant did not want to base moral obligations 
on moral feelings.
So far, we have looked at the interpretations of “help in need” always from 
the view of the person (potentially) granting that help (person B), i.e., from the 
perspective of the obligor. Th ese interpretations change if we turn to look at 
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“help in need” from the perspective of the one who is in need (person A). Here, 
we can distinguish three kinds of expressions of the person in need (A) towards 
the helping person (B):
1. A needy person A can ask for help; in these cases, the answering assistance 
by person B is a voluntary benefaction of mercy, charity or general humanity. 
Where assistance is granted, gratitude towards B is the appropriate response. 
Considering the gravity of emergencies, scandalous poverty and overlapping 
exclusions, a plea for help oft en appears to be inappropriate. If the emergency 
is too great and forces a request for help, it is no longer asking in the normal 
sense, but a pleading, or beseeching for help.
2. In these cases, a person in need can look for stronger affi  nities that he or she 
shares with the helping person, which he or she can invoke and which can 
be a motivation to help. He or she does not ask, but appeals to a third party: 
to a commonly-shared value conviction, a common ethical practice (e.g., of 
a mutual, virtuous helpfulness) or to rationally-justifi able moral beliefs that 
can establish moral obligations to help. Th e moral justifi cation of auxiliary 
claims can strengthen the plea; it can be seen as a morally-justifi ed claim, 
albeit not yet as a right.
3. Only in cases of the third type does the distressed person go beyond merely 
appellative claims of moral duties and assert a “right” to assistance by others. 
Person B is obliged because person A has a right.
4. “Duties” and “rights” are, philosophically speaking, not on the same 
systematic level: if B has a duty towards A, it does not mean that A has a 
right and therefore that B has a duty. Th is is especially obvious for moral 
philosophies in the Kantian tradition. If one talks of “rights”, then one 
pre-supposes a new and diff erent language game, and a new and diff erent 
institution of the members of a “rights” community. To have a right means 
to be a recognised member in a community. Here, we need to distinguish 
entitlements that claim a merely moral right, from entitlements in which 
person A claims a legal right. Legal communities diff er institutionally 
from merely moral communities. Unlike mere moral entitlements, in 
order to claim a right means: a) that the corresponding duties of others can 
be enforced in one way or another; and b) that there exists a form of legal 
remedy that can be called upon by the right-holder and that ensures the 
enforcement and compliance of a right.
Because these two notional implications of “right” can only be realised 
imperfectly for moral rights, they are – if we want to call them rights at all – 
weak rights. Th ey are weak in the sense that the only means of enforcement 
are aff ective sanctions, as with moral obligations, and that the authority for 
complaints is the moral public that is being asked for a moral judgement. Th is 
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weakness of moral rights does not, however, render them meaningless. In 
particular, its political signifi cance lies in the fact that a person who claims a 
morally-justifi ed right sees himself or herself as a generally recognised, and 
especially respectable and respected person. He or she claims a right for his or 
her own sake and is, therefore, able to fi ght for his or her right. And, of course, 
he or she can fi ght for his or her – so far only morally-granted – right to be 
converted into a legal regulatory right.
Even if one understands the normative claim to the transformation of weak 
moral rights into strong legal rights in the sense of natural law, legal human 
rights have to be a result of a political law-making process by a legitimate 
legislator. Th us, the above-mentioned substantive group of political human 
rights becomes important. Although there is not an explicit single human-
right of or to democracy, taking all political rights together leads to the claim 
of democratic law-making. Th is is also the republican meaning of the post-
1945 concept of  human dignity, in which the bearer of the right should also 
become the author of his or her right.6 It is this anti-paternalistic, democratic 
nature of human rights that ensures that the transformation process from purely 
moral rights into politically-set legal law is not a simple change of form, but a 
complicated historical process of law-making that refl ects the intrinsic logic of 
law and politics.
II. WHAT OBLIGATIONS TO WHAT ADDRESSEES 
CORRESPOND TO THE ESC RIGHTS?
For the time being, from a rights-based perspective, the obligations 
corresponding with human rights are only legal obligations in the Kantian sense, 
which are limited to the externally enforceable forms of behaviour and action of 
others. Th ey constitute neither obligations towards oneself nor inner obligations 
that concern inner attitudes or beliefs. Th is restriction and abstraction should 
also be noted when human rights are seen as only moral rights, which are not yet 
fully institutionalised.
Out of a liberalistic understanding of human rights that pre-dominated 
until the 1980s, it was believed that human rights only constitute negative 
injunctive obligations. Th us, social rights, which obviously were connected to 
positive obligations, were not even seen as proper human rights. Th is, for sure, 
was one of the reasons (others included the reservations of the colonial powers 
and the east-west confl ict) why the only programmatic UDHR was juridifi ed 
not in one, but in two international covenants, with considerable diff erences in 
6 See Georg Lohmann, “Menschenwürde als ‘Basis’ von Menschenrechten”, in: Jan C. Joerden, 
Eric Hilgendorf and Felix Th iele (eds), Menschenwürde und Medizin: Ein interdisziplinäres 
Handbuch, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2013), pp. 179–194.
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design. From a liberal perspective (still strong in the US today) only the rights 
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) were seen 
as legally-binding rights, while the rights of the  ICESCR were only seen as 
“manifesto” rights, that is, as declarations of intent. Th is liberalistic position has, 
by now, experienced profound critique and has been rejected by many experts of 
international law. I will not go into this interesting discussion here, but merely 
limit myself to mentioning the result. Human rights in general, but ESC rights 
in particular, correspond both to negative and to positive duties. Th e state of the 
debate can be found in the talk of a duty trias: the duty to respect, to protect, and 
to help or fulfi l.7
Judging from the human rights set in the international human rights 
covenants ( ICESCR), we have three groups of addressees of the corresponding 
obligations: fi rst of all, the respective state in which a person lives. Second, if 
the state does not fulfi l its duty or does not do so adequately, secondarily and 
subsidiarily, all the states of the treaty (and, in cases of customary international 
law, also those states that are not an explicit contracting party of the respective 
state) will become addressees of the corresponding obligations. Furthermore, 
all states are required to ensure that the people on their territories comply with 
human rights when interacting with each other. Th irdly, mediated through 
a duty of the state to protect, in a mode of “horizontal eff ect”, all people are 
indirectly obliged to respect human rights in their civil interactions with one 
another.8
It remains, furthermore, contested as to whether all the obligations of the 
duty trias commit all the addressees in the same way; it is oft en said that they 
all have negative duties (duty to respect) but that only some – or all, but only 
in a staggered manner – have positive duties (the duty to protect and to help or 
fulfi l). Th ese and other questions become more tangible if we now consider the 
legal bailment and the political and legal institutions for the enforcement and 
realisation of these rights.
III. WHAT RIGHTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN 
THE LIST OF ESC RIGHTS?
Th e dispute between the two normative perspectives – duty-based or rights-
based – shows its relevance, on the one hand, when it comes to the question 
of what rights should be included in the list of ESC rights, and, on the other 
hand, when we ask how the duties relating to them can and/or should be 
7 See Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affl  uence and US Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
8 Th e question of whether transnational corporations are also obliged by human rights is 
discussed below.
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justifi ed, enforced and imposed. However, I have to limit myself to more general 
considerations.
Dealing with questions of the justifi cation of ESC rights, we have to 
distinguish, rather formal questions concerning social human rights in general, 
from specifi c, rather substantive questions that concern the justifi cation of 
a specifi c ESC right. Since the list of individual social rights is historically 
open, it seems quite likely that we are dealing with a variety of perspectives of 
content here. Th e justifi cation of one ESC right cannot simply be transferred to 
another; for example, we must establish the important cultural  right to education 
(Article  13,  ICESCR) with regard to content in a diff erent way than the social 
right to an adequate standard of living (Article  11,  ICESCR), or the economic 
right to union formation (Article  8  ICESCR). Nevertheless, and despite the 
diff erences in content, it makes sense to look for a unifying principle of ESC 
rights.
A solely duty-based perspective has to justify and construct ESC rights out 
of moral considerations. Here, we fi nd quite diff erent approaches, depending 
on the respective philosophical position. However, they oft en constitute only 
some of the ESC rights, or speak only of abstract, and very vaguely of, social 
rights. Moreover, they oft en understand ESC rights only as a means of securing 
other rights, and, therefore, seen systematically, determine them as secondary. 
If, for example, one assumes that everyone has a moral duty to protect the 
freedom or capacity of human beings to act through rights, then ESC rights 
emerge as the necessary forms of protection of this freedom or capacity to act. 
Starting from certain anthropological basic needs, interests and abilities, ESC 
rights will result from moral justifi cations regarding the obligations of the 
recognition and protection of these needs, interests and abilities. If one argues 
for a justice-based approach, ESC rights result from the obligation to ensure 
equal distribution of opportunities. In the fi rst case, ESC rights are seen as a 
means of securing certain normative goals, in the second approach, they appear 
as an anthropological reportable list of substantive ways of consideration, 
and, in the third case, they are derived from the super-ordinated principle of 
obeying the norms of justice and are constructed via single cases. All of these 
exemplary, listed approaches contain quite acceptable considerations, and each 
of them is worthy of debate. But, as I would like to argue, they construct human 
rights from the wrong side and are too one-sided. Th ey ultimately represent a 
form of moral paternalism and idealism, for, in the end, they determine human 
rights merely from a moral perspective and ignore their political and legal 
dimensions.
Th e fact that a human right is suffi  ciently justifi ed morally does not 
automatically make it a legal right. For that, it needs both a political legislative 
process and a legal setting, either within the framework of a constitution as a 
fundamental right or as a recognised right of international law. Only by these 
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legal and political settings and events, which are both based, in contrast to moral 
justifi cation, upon decisions, are human rights adequately institutionalised. 
Only now can we ask about the contexts of justifi cation and the setting, of legally 
enforcing and realising, and of complaining, which characterise the realisation 
and compliancy of human rights.
According to the right-based perspective which I am defending, I start 
methodically and heuristically from the legal constitution of the human rights. 
Th e question of which rights generally belong to the canon of ESC rights has, 
therefore, in a way, already been decided, and does not have to be lengthily 
constructed in a duty-based approach. Th is does not mean, however, that the ESC 
rights actually listed in the  ICESCR are already the fi nal answer to the question 
of which social rights should actually exist.9 I do not defend a legal positivist 
position here. Th erefore, considerations of the legal dimension of human rights 
are to be set, in each case, in relation to arguments from the other dimensions, 
i.e., to the political setting and institutionalisation, and to moral justifi ability 
(see below). In the actual struggle for human rights, all three dimensions are 
involved, and they interact in a systematic way, although they can, nevertheless, 
be distinguished at a theoretical-analytical level. In the following, I would like 
to discuss (or, at least, thematically present) some exemplary problems of a 
normative perspective, while, in each case, focusing on one dimension.
IV. A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE LEGAL 
DIMENSION OF ESC RIGHTS
A. LEGAL-IMMANENT NORMATIVE PROBLEMS: 
“ HUMAN DIGNITY” AND THE “UNIFICATION OR 
SEPARATION MODEL” OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANTS OF 1966
ESC rights are legally established in diff erent regional and international 
covenants and national constitutions.10 I will discuss some aspects of this.
Initially, we can observe that the international law documents themselves 
refer to normative issues. In Article  1 of the UDHR, we fi nd that “all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”, and that they “should 
9 See, for example, the struggle for water as a human right: Barbara Bleisch, “Th e Human Right 
to Water – Normative Foundations and Ethical Implications”, (2006) 4 Ethics and Economy, 
pp. 1–23; Asit K. Biswas, Eglal Rached and Cecilia Tortajada (eds), Water as a Human Right 
for the Middle East and North Africa, (Oxford-New York: Routledge, 2008).
10 See the corresponding articles in Pollmann and Lohmann (eds), note 2 above; Eibe 
Riedel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 
International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014).
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act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. (my italics) Th e “spirit of 
brotherhood” has, since the French Revolution, evoked the moral demands for 
solidarity, justice and “a dignifi ed life” by which social human-rights can be 
justifi ed.11 In the preamble of the  ICESCR, it explicitly states that “these rights 
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”.
Th is notion of  human dignity was re-designed in the international human 
rights documents aft er the Second World War. It has become a new normative 
foundation of human rights and has gradually established itself globally in 
this function. Th is notion of dignity diff ers from others (general and special 
dignity terms) which, before 1945, were always associated with obligations 
towards both oneself and towards others, but not with the possession of rights. 
Th is is (see above), however, what the concept of  human dignity has claimed 
since 1945. At the same time, according to a republican understanding,  human 
dignity demands that all people are not only the bearers of human rights but 
also that they are the selfsame authors of the laws in which these rights are 
constituted.12 Th us, the normative basis of the human rights referred to in 
the human rights documents has a strong democratic and anti-paternalistic 
substance. Accordingly, they demand that social rights not be separated 
from other substantive human rights classes (liberal and political rights), as 
some state socialist interpretations have suggested. Th ey must, I believe, be 
understood in a way (in accordance with the “model of unifi cation”) that calls 
for the interaction and inter-relationship of the two International Covenants 
of 1966, the ICPCR and the  ICESCR.13 What this means for the determination 
of social rights is that they are to be determined by the political participation 
of relevant stakeholders. Th is is especially true for the determination of what 
specifi c services can be reasonably expected from the state as the addressee 
of social rights. Th is will necessarily be a process of political negotiation, and 
will have to take the economic and other available resources of the state into 
account.
11 Georg Lohmann, “ Human dignity and socialism”, in: Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, 
Roger Brownsword and Dietmar Mieth (eds), Th e Cambridge Handbook of  Human Dignity: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 126–134.
12 I have explained this in more detail in Georg Lohmann, “Die rechtsverbürgende Kraft  der 
Menschenwürde. Zum menschenrechtlichen Würdeverständnis nach 1945”, (2010) Zeitschrift  
für Menschenrechte, pp. 46–63; idem, “Menschenwürde als ‘Basis’ von Menschenrechten”, 
note 6 above.
13 Th is is also pointed out by Chisanga Puta-Chekwe and Nora Flood, “From Division to 
Integration: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as Human Rights”, in: Isfahan Merali 
and Valerie Oosterveld (eds), Giving Meaning to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
(Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p. 39 et seq.
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B. THE NORMATIVE OF THE “ GENERAL COMMENTS”
Th e complex, uneven and slow progress of the enforcement of ESC rights 
within international law again cannot be treated in detail here. However, I wish 
to emphasise the “Concluding Observations” and the “ General Comments” 
that the ESC Committee have published since 1989,14 which have outlined 
the right-internal, normative perspective on ESC rights in a very challenging 
way, precisely because they reject excessive interpretations and only make 
recommendations. If the international and national institutionalisations 
followed these recommendations, this would be a great gain in the fi ght for the 
realisation of social rights.
C. LEVELS OF GLOBAL OBLIGATIONS
Do ESC rights legally have a global radiation? In the  ICESCR, each contracting 
state is to undertake:
“steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.” (Article 2.1)
Th is may sound like the maximum of pretentious commitment to opportuneness 
and randomness. But it is the case that, as is oft en the case with human rights, 
rhetorical confessions in a written form are transformed into normative 
standards that then have (or may have) an unexpected political eff ect. It seems 
crucial to me that, for a start, the states are willing to see themselves as the fi rst 
recipients of the obligations corresponding to the ESC rights. Th is is not only 
important in normative terms, but also in a factual sense: many ESC rights 
require the long-term institutionalisation of complex organisations, for example, 
for the  right to education, the establishing of a complex school system, which, in 
each case, must fi rst be done at national level. And, at the same time, the states 
must undertake to report internationally on their progress in implementing 
human rights; and this, it seems to me, is the key step that enables the global 
range of ESC rights legally. For example, an attempt could be made to create an 
International Social Court, just as one should have a national social jurisdiction, 
in order to make individual complaint possible, as contained in the concept of 
14 See the reports of the  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights available at: www.
ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/ cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx. See, also, Riedel, Giacca and Golay (eds), 
note 10 above.
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human rights. Th e fact that this seems utopian, and politically perhaps neither 
necessary nor desirable, is another question.
What is crucial here is that, even in the legal dimension of ESC rights, we 
have an albeit staggered and subsidiary, yet global range of obligations. But it 
does not commit all the people directly; i.e., the  right to education of a person in 
India does not oblige me to enable him or her to attend school or to ensure that 
girls have the same opportunities to attend school, etc.
However, every person is obliged, mediated through the actions of his or 
her government, to ensure that his or her state fulfi ls his or her human rights 
obligations. Furthermore, he or she further has to make sure that his or her own 
state participates in an appropriate manner in the international control of its 
duties, and, where necessary, that it also fulfi ls its subsidiary duties.
V. SOME REMARKS ON A NORMATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 
OF ESC RIGHTS
A. POLITICAL STRUGGLES FOR ESC RIGHTS
In general, ESC rights need the political participation of the holder of the rights. 
Th us, they call for a better, democratic structure of the given policy structures. 
Of course, ESC rights, like all human rights, are tools in the political struggle 
for power. And, very oft en, they are merely an instrument to particular political 
interests. Th us, the socialist countries tried to favour social human rights at the 
expense of freedom and political rights. Actually, they institutionalised no real 
human rights, but only limited basic state supplies with massive restrictions to 
freedom.
But even aft er the collapse of the Communist regimes, they have been both 
the target of, and subject to, political social struggles in general.  Th e classic 
socially-oriented parties are fi ghting for an improvement of ESC rights, and 
because ESC-rights are forced to depend on the political participation and 
co-decision of the stakeholder (see above), internationally-oriented NGOs 
support local and international eff orts both to improve and to realise ESC rights. 
While these political struggles were initially limited to the national sphere, 
they are increasingly becoming internationally-oriented in important areas 
(development policy, the balancing of the eff ects of globalisation, global poverty 
reduction, international health policy, etc.).
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B. ON THE NORMATIVITY OF POLITICAL LEGAL 
SETTLEMENTS: DEMOCRATISATION AND ESC 
RIGHTS
Th ese political struggles manifest themselves in the national and global 
political public-spheres, where struggles about legal texts and moral 
justifi cations take place and where contested subjects are transformed into 
politically-relevant decisions. “Weak publics” of opinion formation aim at 
becoming “strong publics” of institutional decision-making procedures. In 
fact, we have very inadequate structures which refl ect the given interests and 
power structures. From a human rights perspective, the democratisation and 
constitutionalisation of international law are necessary requirements here.15 
With regard to the realisation of ESC rights, democratisation is necessary for 
yet another reason, too: Amartya Sen has shown that, in the long term, the 
democratisation of a society is the most eff ective means of poverty reduction.16
C. NEW AND MORE PROBLEMS OF GLOBAL 
OBLIGATIONS
From the perspective of ESC rights, the diverse ways of globalisation have very 
diff erent, oft en ambivalent, consequences. “Politics” is challenged by these 
processes in quite a new way. Th e given political structures of global governance 
are oft en inadequate, ineff ective and, at best, have a slowdown eff ect (see above.) 
Although the international community is trying to improve the situation of 
social rights (see, for instance, the poverty reduction programme in 200017), to 
date, there is a lack both of the political pressure and of the power that would be 
needed to achieve the respective decisions.
Now new potential addressees of obligations come into sight. International 
companies oft en violate the fundamental conditions for a decent life that have 
been formulated in ESC rights. In order to do this, they take advantage of the 
fact that the respective national legal systems of the countries in which they 
have outsourced their production (and they may re-locate again if it suits their 
economic interests) are oft en catastrophically weak, corrupt or ineff ective. In 
my opinion, the attempts by international corporations to escape legal control, 
for example, by voluntarily undertaking “ corporate social responsibility” (CSR) 
15 I cannot go into this here, but see Georg Lohmann, “Menschenrechte zwischen Verfassung 
und Völkerrecht”, in: Marten Breuer et al., (eds), Der Staat im Recht, (Berlin: Dunker & 
Humblot, 2013), pp. 1175–1188.
16 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (New York: A.A. Knopf, Inc., 1999).
17 See Th e Millennium Development Goals Report 2012, UN Development Report.
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within the framework of a Global Compact, are to be viewed as ambivalent.18 
From a right-based perspective, the duties which they are obliged to respect 
are clear. From a duty-based perspective, however, this seems to be far from 
clear and is connected with a lot of philosophical problems.19
VI. A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE MORAL 
DIMENSION OF ESC RIGHTS
A. JUSTIFICATIONS IN GENERAL AND THE POLITICAL 
IMPORTANCE OF PLURALISM OF JUSTIFICATION
From the moral point of view, the justifi cation of social rights has to be 
established fi rst in general, and then specifi cally for individual ESC rights. Many 
moral philosophers displace the problem and search for the justifi cation of moral 
obligations, which they assume accompanies social rights. Th eir paradigmatic 
conceptual model is that one has to ask oneself why one is obliged to help other 
people in the world who are in need, or why one is, in certain respects, obliged 
to provide others with housing, food, etc.20 I believe that this model approach is 
too simplistic, that it suggests misleading questions and false conclusions, and 
that it oft en resolves issues (or tries to resolve them) which, from a right-based 
perspective, have, I believe, already been solved. However, I cannot explore the 
critique of the duty-based perspective here.
In a rights-based approach, as I said, the mere fact that a right is found in 
an International Covenant does not establish a moral justifi cation for that 
right. But what precisely has to be justifi ed? A right, as such, does not become 
justifi ed, but, fi rst of all, conceptually explicated. What need to be justifi ed are 
the normative assertions and normative claims that are associated with a right. 
Take, for example, “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living 
…” (Article  11.1  ICESCR). In this article, the normative claims are explicated 
further, and a General Comment explains the associated normative assertions 
and demands towards the state parties.
18 See, for example, Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006);  John Ruggie, “ Guiding Principles on  Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework”, Report 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 21 March 2011, A/HRC/17/31.
19 For a good discussion, see Christian Neuhäuser, Unternehmen als moralische Akteure, 
(Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2011).
20 Peter Singer, in particular, has initiated this model discussion with his paradigmatic case: 
“Who is Obligated to Rescue a Drowning Child and What is he Obliged to? See Peter Singer, 
Th e Life you can Save, (New York: Random House, 2009).
Chapter 3. Normative Perspectives on Transnational Social Rights
Intersentia 63
What has to be justifi ed in particular are the resulting, staggered obligations 
of others. But a moral justifi cation claims to be justifi ed not just towards these 
addressees, but, quite simply, to be justifi ed, that is to say, objectively justifi ed. 
An acceptable justifi cation has to prove itself in the realm of reason. It does 
not depend on decisions, but on the conviction that there are good reasons for 
a claim. Philosophically, we have to accept at this point that we have diff erent, 
competing conceptions and ideas of what a justifi cation actually is. Th e same 
is true for the question of whether a problematical assertion is justifi ed or not. 
Th is ultimate indeterminacy is, however, not an argument by which to abandon 
the claim of justifi ability as such. Rather, human rights are based upon the 
assumption that any restriction of freedom needs to be justifi ed to the bearers 
of rights and any obligation has to be justifi ed to the obligor. Th ey are based 
upon the culturally-rooted appreciation of the ability to self-determination 
of each human being; and this is one of the important constitutive features of 
the concept of  human dignity since 1945. Th e idea that the normative claims of 
human rights and the duties associated with them must be justifi ed, follows, I 
believe, from the new normative foundation of the post-1945 human rights: 
from a new  interpretation of  human dignity as pre-constitutional principle (GR. 
axia).21 Th ey have, however, no fi nal normative foundation and are, therefore, 
like all human inventions, not eternal but fi nite and historically changeable. 
Human rights are, therefore, a historical project, even though they claim to hold 
a non-relative, universal justifi cation for their normative implications.
I would now like to argue that this universal justifi cation claim can be 
redeemed in various ways. We have a pluralism of approaches of justifi cation, 
as I have already pointed out above. For sure, the dispute regarding what kind 
of justifi cation is acceptable for a specifi c claim, what is true, what is false, is 
initially a philosophical and a scientifi c dispute. But a philosophical expert 
judgement appears in the public dispute over adequate justifi cation only in the 
form of the public opinion of a citizen. Th erefore, it cannot receive recognition 
as an expert judgement unless it is able to convince other citizens. Now, moral 
arguments are strong arguments in public debates, just as rights in liberal 
societies can function as trumps. But they are only “strong arguments” because 
they can count on an “accommodative” public culture of human rights, which 
functions, as it were, as the last horizon against which one can argue about 
human rights in a meaningful way. Th is is one reason why the human rights 
declarations and International Covenants contain general claims relating to the 
cultivation and fostering of such a human rights culture; and this is also why the 
United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
translates these claims into educational activities.
21 See Lohmann, “Menschenwürde als ‘Basis’ von Menschenrechten”, note 6 above.
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B.  GLOBAL JUSTICE OR  HUMAN DIGNITY AS THE 
NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES OF THE ESC RIGHTS?
Th e most demanding moral theories to justify the corresponding normative 
assertions of ESC rights are theories of justice. We have here, following John 
Rawls, a number of diff erent theoretical approaches that have come about as 
particular theories of  global justice with remarkable results.22
From a duty-based perspective, they can justify far-reaching moral duties 
which include, especially in terms of social justice, the mutual and universal 
obligation of all people to a just distribution of goods, a fair equality in exchange 
relationships and help in emergency situations. From a cosmopolitan view of 
 global justice, for instance, Charles R. Beitz23 and Th omas Pogge24 demand a 
global equitable distribution of goods to enable a minimum standard of living 
for all people. Beitz and Pogge are using arguments of Rawls, who had expressly 
limited these arguments exclusively to national circumstances, to the relations 
of the states. Th e hypothetical original position is expanded to international 
relations, and the “veil of ignorance” also hides to which state (rich or poor) the 
rational actor belongs. Th us, the contractarian justifi cation procedure calls for 
not only the same individual and political freedoms for all, but also the global 
validity of the diff erence principle. Th erefore, a re-distribution of goods follows, 
in order to improve the position of the world’s most disadvantaged people.25 
Although Pogge emphasises that he understands human rights in a manner 
in which the duties corresponding to them are addressed to an international 
institutional order, the resulting obligations nonetheless only fulfi l a purely 
moral perspective. And although he diff ers from Peter Singer with this mediating 
institutional approach, aft er which people worldwide are directly obliged to aid 
and re-distribution mutually,26 the result of his considerations fi ts a duty-based 
perspective.27
22 See, for example, Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Th eory, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); David Miller, National Responsibility and  Global Justice, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; Christoph Broszies and Henning Hahn (eds), Globale 
Gerechtigkeit, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010); my view: Georg Lohmann, “Globale 
Gerechtigkeit, Menschenrechte und korrespondierende Pfl ichten. Eine Skizze”, in: Hans-
Helmuth Gander (ed), Menschenrechte: Philosophische und juristische Positionen, (Freiburg-
Munich: Alber, 2009), pp. 35–58.
23 Charles R. Beitz, Political Th eory and International Relations, (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), new edition 1999.
24 Th omas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
25 See Th omas Pogge, “Rawls and  Global Justice”, (1988) 18 Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 
p. 233.
26 See, for example, Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011).
27 Wolfgang Kersting, “Globale Rechtsordnung oder weltweite Verteilungsgerechtigkeit?”, 
(1995/96) Politisches Denken Jahrbuch, p. 226 et seq.
Chapter 3. Normative Perspectives on Transnational Social Rights
Intersentia 65
Such theories of justice do have their independent and political value. But 
the idea of justice is wider than the  idea of human rights and human rights 
themselves are only a sub-class of possible moral rights. Th us, theories of justice 
capture too much on one side, and too little on the other. Compared with the 
situation resulting from human-rights obligations, they demand too much, 
because they really need to demand an optimum of justice, whereas a restriction 
on minimum standards appears contingent. Th ey also demand too little, 
because, in its purely moral terms, the necessary political participation to decide 
upon the living standards cannot be taken into account appropriately.28
I believe, therefore, that theories of  human dignity off er a corrective 
alternative here. Certainly, they need to understand the concept of  human 
dignity, as indicated in the post-1945 human rights documents. “ Human 
dignity” is determined from the outset in the three dimensions of law, politics 
and morality. As a legal concept,  human dignity allows each person the same 
self-esteem and self-respect because of his or her equal legal position with all 
other people. As a political term, it stands for the claim of every human being 
not only to be a holder of human rights, but also to act with others as the author 
of his or her rights. As a moral concept,  human dignity stands for the universal 
consideration, feasible in his or her deliberate, self-determined, bodily and 
spiritual life. “ Human dignity” thus functions as a pre-legal or pre-constitutional 
basis for human rights. It allows the unity of the diff erent groups of the human 
rights to be defended as a unifying moral principle.29
Respect for  human dignity includes the criterion of moral justice, as it 
calls for the impartial treatment of all. But the  human dignity approach has, 
from the outset, added the demand for democratic participation and legal 
institutionalisation. How this can be done in detail and with reference to the 
ESC rights in particular has still to be shown. Th e philosophical perspective 
can try to emphasise the plurality of normative justifi cations for transnational 
social rights and their challenges. It is in social and political struggles that actors 
choose their respective conceptual framework. Th e aim of this contribution has 
been to show how encompassing and well-founded struggles for transnational 
social rights are, and that their realisation justifi es the eff ort to realise all human 
rights.
28 Both authors have changed their approach now: Charles R. Beitz, Th e  Idea of Human Rights, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Pogge, note 24 above, second edition, 2008.
29 See Jürgen Habermas, “Th e Concept of  Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human 
Rights”, (2010) 41 Metaphilosophy, pp. 464–480.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCEPTUALISING 
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS: 
DEVELOPMENTS AND FORMS
Alexandra Kaasch
I. INTRODUCTION
As has been elaborated on in the introduction to this volume, there are 
numerous ways of approaching transnational social rights. Th is chapter maps 
and conceptualises transnational social rights from a  global  social policy 
perspective. Th is fulfi ls two aims: on the one hand, it provides an alternative 
approach to the study and understanding of transnational social rights; on the 
other, it contributes to the literature on  global  social policy by adding to recent 
attempts at conceptualising and theorising this fi eld of study.1
Case studies are one approach used in the literature on  global  social policy.2 
Th eory-testing has also been used as a way to refi ne and improve existing 
 global  social policy concepts.3 Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs4 have applied 
common concepts from sociological theory (agency, structure, institution, and 
 discourse) to the study of  global  social policy, and some chapters in a volume on 
 global social governance5 approach the theorisation of  global  social policy and 
1 See the Special Issue of (2013) 13  Global  Social Policy, issue 1, available at: http://gsp.sagepub.
com/content/13/1.toc.
2 See, for example, Bernhard. Leubolt, “Institutions,  Discourse and Welfare: Brazil as a 
Distributional Regime”, (2013) 13  Global  Social Policy, pp. 66–83.
3 See, for example, Alexandra Kaasch, “Contesting Contestation:  Global  Social Policy 
Prescriptions on Pensions and Health Systems”, (2013) 13  Global  Social Policy, pp. 45–65.
4 Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs, “ Global  Social Policy Studies: Conceptual and Analytical 
Refl ections”, (2013) 13  Global  Social Policy, pp. 5–23.
5 Alexandra Kaasch and Kerstin Martens (eds), Actors and Agency in  Global Social Governance, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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governance with reference to inter- and intra-actor relationships,6 and as a meta-
theoretical concept.7
Nevertheless, it is not only the way, but also the understanding of what 
exactly makes a theory or a concept, and what the appropriate process of  theory-
building is, that diff ers between diff erent scholars and disciplines.8 At the most 
general level,  theory-building has to do with making sense of something. Oft en, 
it is associated with explanations about what is causing a particular, observed 
outcome (causal models or relationships). A theory, though, also has to do 
with a generalisation, and, therefore,  theory-building can also take the form 
of establishing typologies and systematising observed phenomena, which then 
facilitates further, more detailed, and causal theoretical arguments.
Th is chapter focuses on the systematisation of transnational social rights as 
one element of global social policies (along with global social re-distribution 
and regulation). In particular, the meaning of the “social” in  global  social policy 
is central here, which contributes to a refi ned concept of  global  social policy, 
and related governance structures, and in this way specifi es the meaning and 
importance of transnational social rights as well.
Despite this explicit and strong connection to the  global  social policy 
literature, rather than discussing  global  social policy as struggles over 
policy ideas and discourses, this chapter is interested in the processes of the 
transnational legalisation of international social rights. Although it connects to 
other  global  social policy literature in putting a particular emphasis on  global 
 social policy actors and the development of a supranational  global  social policy, 
the focus is on the legalisation and rights discourses concerning transnational 
social rights.
II. CONCEPTUALISING  GLOBAL  SOCIAL POLICY
 Global  social policy as an academic fi eld has seen a signifi cant increase of studies 
and publications over the past two decades or so. It has been conceptualised, in 
particular, in the work of Bob Deacon, Mitchell Orenstein, and Nicola Yeates.9
6 See Kaasch, note 3 above.
7 Bob Jessop, “ Global  Social Policy and Its Governance: A Cultural Political Economy 
Approach”, in: Kaasch and Martens (eds), note 5 above.
8 See Karl E. Weick, “Th eory Construction as Disciplined Imagination”, (1989) 14 Th e Academy 
of Management Review, pp. 516–517.
9 See Bob Deacon,  Global  Social Policy and Governance, (London-Th ousand Oaks CA: SAGE 
Publications, 2007), and Bob Deacon, Michelle Hulse and Paul Stubbs,  Global  Social Policy: 
International Organizations and the Future of Welfare, (London: SAGE Publications, 1997), 
Mitchell A. Orenstein, “Th e New Pension Reform as Global Policy”, (2005) 5  Global  Social 
Policy, pp. 175–202, and Nicola Yeates, “Social Politics and Policy in an Era of Globalisation: 
Critical Refl ections”, (1999) 33  Social Policy and Administration, pp. 372–93, and idem, 
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 Global  social policy, in this stream of the literature, is understood as 
consisting of two forms: prescriptions for national  social policy, and emerging 
supranational  social policy.10 Th e term “supranational” in this context – in 
contrast to the discussion about the diff erent connotations with “global” and 
“transnational” (see below) – refers to the observation that there are forms of 
a genuine  social policy at transnational policy levels. Th is could be described 
as having the character of an emerging, though very limited, global welfare 
state.11 Th e term “supranational” is used in this context because it concerns an 
independent form of  social policy, as we fi nd at regional levels (in the EU in 
particular). Transnational social rights are one element of this “supranational 
 global  social policy”. Th eir development and meaning is strongly linked with the 
other two elements – global social redistribution and regulation. Global social 
redistribution encompasses the various forms of development aid, global taxes, 
remittances, and other mechanisms that enable goods, services and fi nancial 
means to travel and to be (re-) distributed transnationally. Regulation includes 
international or global labour and social standards,  trade matters, voluntary 
 codes of conduct by business, global tax regulation and migration. Th e social 
rights component fulfi ls the function of protecting the individual who is aff ected 
by these global processes, or who happens to live in a place with low national 
social rights protection. Th eoretically, transnational social rights also have a 
negative dimension; for example, when transnational enterprises refrain from 
particular, hazardous production modes or  working conditions. However, in 
the concept of  global  social policy presented here, this would form part of the 
regulation side (which includes voluntary codes of conducts).12
Th e meaning, and usefulness, of global in the term “ global  social policy” 
is contested, and it is diffi  cult to come to a defi nite conclusion on whether or 
not it is suitable. Global can be used to refer to a specifi c dimension of  social 
policy-making, and a particular type of actors and processes involved in 
 social policy, which goes beyond the nation state. Th e actors concerned are 
diff erent kinds of organisations that are comprised of regional or global groups 
of governments and/or various types of civil society organisations (CSOs), 
business organisations, professional organisations and so on. Th e processes 
of policy formulation and/or decision-making are diff erent from those of 
national policy-making in that they are legitimated in other ways than national 
“Th e Idea of  Global  Social Policy”, in: idem (ed), Understanding  Global  Social Policy, 1st ed. 
(Bristol-Chicago IL: Policy Press, 2008), p. 1.
10 See Deacon, note 9 above, p. 1.
11 For discussion, see Lutz Leisering, “Gibt es einen Weltwohlfahrtsstaat? [Is there a 
Global Welfare State?], in: Mathias Albert and Rudolf Stichweh (eds), Weltstaat und 
Weltstaatlichkeit: Beobachtungen globaler politischer Strukturbildungen, (Wiesbaden: Verlag 
für Sozialwissenschaft en, 2007), pp. 185–205.
12 For more details on these concepts, see Deacon, note 9 above, and Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs, 
note 9 above; regular overviews of recent developments are provided by the  Global  Social 
Policy Digest.
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(democratic) procedures (e.g., through mandates by member states and through 
the specifi cation and  interpretation of these mandates by the organisations 
themselves) and oft en less, or at least diff erently, organised (e.g., as networks, 
policy-learning processes).13 It needs to be taken into account that there is a 
disagreement about the usefulness of global versus transnational. Th is is due to 
the connotation of global to be applicable in the same way at any place and time 
(universal applicability). Th e disadvantage of the term transnational, however, is 
that it is – literally – still attached to “the national” while  global  social policy 
concepts also include forms of a “truly” (supranational)  global  social policy, 
including the development of social rights law. In addition,  global  social policy 
studies have also focused on the relationships between global actors (independent 
of the power of, and their relationships with, their member states). In both cases, 
the processes are neither exclusively, nor always, shaped by the unit of the nation 
state. Transnational, thus, is rather a useful term when the issue to be explained 
still connects to national re-distribution, regulation and rights, or in studies that 
trace the transfer and translation of policies into national contexts.
At the same time, the “social (policy)” part of the “ global  social policy” 
defi nition oft en lacks special discussion. On the one hand, it is frequently 
observed that ever more policy-fi elds go global.  On the other, there is an 
increasing tendency to “socialise” globalisation – meaning that ever more 
aspects of today’s globalised world are framed as issues of  social policy. While 
it is certainly true that narrow concepts of clearly distinguishable policy-fi elds 
are problematical (as such fi elds tend to overlap and to depend on each other), 
looking for appropriate concepts and theories in the study of  global  social 
policy, boundaries are a pre-requisite in order to be precise on forms and general 
mechanisms. Th is chapter focuses on one particular element within  global  social 
policy, namely, transnational social rights, in order to engage with questions of 
the “social” in  global  social policy.
Furthermore, Mitchell Orenstein defi nes global social policies as “those that 
are developed, diff used, and implemented with the direct involvement of global 
policy actors and coalitions at or across the international, national or local levels 
of governance”.14  Global social governance is understood as a multi-actored 
process of shaping global and national social policies.15 It involves diff erent types 
of actors that interact and exert infl uence over policies by means of collaborative, 
as well as individual, agency. Th e mandates and spheres of infl uence may be 
overlapping, and specifi c actors may function in diff erent and multiple roles. 
Th e relationships between actors can be characterised by consensual, as well as 
13 See, for example, Christina Boswell, “Th e Political Functions of Expert Knowledge: 
Knowledge and Legitimation in European Union Immigration Policy”, (2008) 15 Journal of 
European Public Policy, pp. 471–488.
14 See Orenstein, note 9 above, p. 177.
15 See Deacon,  Global  Social Policy and Governance, note 9 above.
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contestational, modes.16 Struggles over positions drive  global social governance, 
irrespective of whether the content issue is highly or only slightly controversial 
–  global  social policy actors are legitimacy-seeking agencies that depend on 
multiple forms of external and international, long-term as well as short-term, 
mandates. Th ese mandates are closely related to the governance mechanisms at 
the disposal of diff erent global actors, and the scope or leeway for developing 
infl uence over a  social policy issue. Although the transnational social rights 
concepts developed in this chapter build upon this, it does not engage with their 
political struggles, but is, instead, interested in the development of social rights 
as human rights, and the functions of international organisations in putting 
such rights into international treaties. Nevertheless, this chapter is not about the 
success of ESCRs in terms of the justiciability, but is an attempt to capture  global 
 social policy as a set of social rights emerging and developing at global policy 
levels.
III. TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS
While transnational social rights have been considered and conceptualised 
as an important element of supranational  global  social policy, they have been 
little defi ned as such. Th ere are some contributions, however, usually with 
regard to particular rights, such as the  right to health.17 Th is chapter attempts 
to systematise transnational social rights by distinguishing two forms – those 
rights that are related to a particular group of (vulnerable) people, and those 
related to particular social problems.18 Although this is primarily an exercise 
of mapping and conceptualisation, some comments will be made about the 
practical application of the distinction between the two forms of rights (see 
Section IV).
Most generally, social rights are those rights that are related to the means 
which enable people to live their lives and take part in societal life.19 Th ey 
concern the needs of persons who cannot look aft er themselves, and social 
problems or needs that require action by someone other than the person 
16 See Kaasch, note 3 above.
17 See Wolfgang Hein and Lars Kohlmorgen, “Global Health Governance: Confl icts on  Global 
Social Rights, (2008) 8  Global  Social Policy, pp. 80–108. See, also, Gunilla Backman et al., 
“Health Systems and the  Right to Health: An Assessment of 194 Countries”, (2008) 372 Th e 
Lancet, pp. 2047–85, available at: www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140–
6736(08)61781-X/abstract.
18 In addition, but not addressed in this chapter, there are overarching rights that relate to 
broader social problems or groups, such as the right not to be poor, the right to development 
or the right to an adequate standard of living.
19 Hartley Dean, “ Social Policy and Human Rights: Re-thinking the Engagement”, (2007) 7 
 Social Policy & Society, pp. 1–12.
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aff ected.20 Accordingly, granting and realising social rights to a signifi cant 
extent involves resources,21 and is connected to diff erent forms of re-distribution 
within societies, as well as to regulation to make sure that particular practices 
which threaten or harm social rights cannot be sustained.
While the institutionalisation of social rights in national contexts is strongly 
dependent on the policy and politics of political parties and interest groups, and 
can be studied as the evolution of welfare states, studying transnational social 
rights needs to be approached by considering global political agencies, structures 
and institutions.
In this context, though, the defi nitions introduced above for  global  social 
policy more generally, are not fully applicable. Th e “global” carries diff erent 
meanings and problems depending on the form, fi eld or issue of  global  social 
policy addressed. Th e processes of defi ning and adopting “global” social rights 
are rather international ones. Th e discourses over social rights could be classifi ed 
as transnational or global. Th e application might be a global (ideally universal) 
one, but this is not uncontested as the very concept of social rights is not globally 
shared, but is, instead, linked to Northern welfare-state conceptions – while some 
argue that “Southern” social rights, such as those of the Nuevo constitutionalism 
in Latin America – globalise much more easily than Western-rights traditions. 
At the same time, in combination with global social redistribution and 
regulation, social rights have been conceptualised, and claimed for – as part of 
an evolving “supranational  global  social policy”22 – an approach that has also 
grown out of Northern welfare-state traditions and scholarship.
By engaging with social rights as part of (global) human rights, and trying to 
understand the concept and development of (global) social rights, this chapter is 
concerned about the “social” element and its meaning. What are social rights? 
What problems or groups do they connect to? How are they institutionalised at 
trans- or supra-national policy levels?
Th e meaning of social rights and their degree of realisation have been 
approached in diff erent ways, for example, from national concepts of social 
rights to global notions of social rights, or by making distinctions between 
diff erent forms of universal human rights. Social rights also appear as claims 
within transformative approaches to what the world should look like from a 
 social policy perspective.
Ramesh Mishra in his contribution “Towards a  Global  Social Policy” in the 
 Global  Social Policy Reader,23 links his discussion of  global social rights to the 
20 Anna Maciejczyk Jaron, “Constitutional Courts as Actors of Fundamental Social Rights”, 
in EUI Social and Labour Law Working Group (ed.): EUI Working Paper LAW 2009/05, San 
Domenico di Fiesole: EUI.
21 For example, Deacon, note 9 above.
22 Ibid.
23 Ramesh Mishra, “Towards a  Global  Social Policy”, in: Nicola Yeates and Chris Holden (eds), 
Th e  Global  Social Policy Reader, (Bristol: Policy Press, 2009), pp. 275–280.
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development of citizenship in the modern democratic state. Instead of accepting 
welfare as being bound to stigmatising charity, fi rst social-democratic type 
welfare states, and subsequently basically all Western countries, connected their 
welfare states with the institutions of rights or entitlements. Th is also comes 
with the idea of universalism – that the right should apply to all citizens of a 
state. Based upon this concept, Mishra highlights the diffi  culties of realising 
social rights, as the confl icts with economic or property rights, which – in a 
capitalist society – have an important status, and are not easily limited. Mishra 
adds a discussion about the Westernised idea of individual rights versus more 
community-related rights that might be better understood in other parts of the 
world, and he questions the tendency of rights to defi ne minimum standards.
Stephen Marks shows how national developments in  Mexico and Russia 
(notably not just the “Western world”), infl uenced the Constitution of the 
International Labour Organization ( ILO) in 1919, and international labour 
standards. Th ese developments refl ected what he calls a “second generation 
of human rights, characterized by intervention rather than the abstention of 
the state. Indeed, the rights to decent working condition, to social security, to 
education, and to health were inconceivable without an active role by the state. 
Th e human rights emerged in the second generation were claims rather than 
freedoms, positive rather than negative”.24
More generally, parallel to the national developments, as a consequence of 
the experience of the world wars, a process of developing a universal human 
rights canon took place in the 1940s. Th e concrete idea of defi ning human 
rights has been linked to an initiative of the former US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, who claimed four basic individual rights that should be granted to 
any individual, which included “freedom from want”.25
Th e history of transnational social rights, viewed as part of a UN process 
on universal human rights, refl ects many of the problems and ambiguities of 
defi ning and realising transnational social rights. Th e debates about social rights 
emerged as part of the development of the universal human rights body. At the 
most general level, “[i]nternational human rights are those human needs that 
have received formal recognition as rights through the sources of international 
law”.26 Th e institution through which this mainly happens at a global level is the 
United Nations General Assembly.
Social rights have been defi ned by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), a key and universal, but non-binding document. Th ey are 
distinguished from civil and political rights, and have been adopted, together 
with economic and cultural rights, in the International Covenant on  Economic, 
24 Stephen P. Marks, “Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?”, (1980–1981) 
33 Rutgers Law Review, p. 435, at 438.
25 www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/pdfs/fft  ext.pdf.
26 Marks, note 24 above, at 436–7.
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Social and Cultural Rights ( ICESCR) (1966) – a legally-binding document, 
accessible to joining parties, but without a guarantee regarding the universal 
application of the norms in the treaty. Th e fact that these diff erent types of rights 
became divorced in two covenants shows that “ economic, social and cultural 
rights were essentially subordinated to their civil and political counterparts and 
became the ‘casualties’ of Cold War politics”.27
In 2008, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights was opened for signing in order to facilitate the 
possibility for individual complaints in line with other human-rights machinery. 
Th ese general treaties were followed, and are accompanied, and added to, by a 
number of conventions and treaties related to particular groups of people, such 
as the  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), the  Convention on the Rights of the  Child ( CRC), and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to mention just a few.
Th e key UN institution responsible for the development, formulation, and 
realisation of social rights at global level is the UN’s  Human Rights Council. 
It is an inter-governmental body comprised of 47 states. Th e  Committee on 
 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( CESCR) is another important body 
within the UN system, although it is not an international organisation, but 
a group of independent experts, which has been tasked with monitoring the 
implementation of the International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights ( ICESCR) by its states parties. Importantly, the Committee also publishes 
interpretations on the provisions of the Covenant (“ General Comments”). As 
a further key actor in terms of formulating social and labour rights, the  ILO 
needs to be taken into consideration here. It developed and adopted a substantial 
number of social rights, as part of its international labour standards.
IV. TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS 
DIMENSIONS
What is the content of (transnational) social rights? We can distinguish between 
the rights relating to particular groups of people, and the rights on particular 
 social policy-fi elds or problems. While this is certainly not exhaustive, and 
might be criticised for not being suffi  ciently diff erentiated (which is a more 
general concern in  global  social policy studies, as data are scarce and research 
methods and data collection oft en explorative), it needs to be taken into account 
that the “rights to” and the “rights of ”, as transnational social rights in the sense 
of this chapter, have to be understood in relation to each other. While they can 
be distinguished conceptually, the focus on the transnational social rights of a 
27 Smita Narula, “Th e  Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under International 
Law”, (2006) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, p. 691.
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particular group, for example, is about the access to the institutions of health 
 care, education, food, and so on (or the obligation of a state or the international 
community to provide for particular goods and services to be available to needy 
people). Th us, it concerns the right to participate in the “social infrastructure” as 
a human being.
A. TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS TO …
One form of transnational social rights are rights that concern particular social 
needs or problems, and can be related to “fi elds” of  social policy. Th ese are, for 
example, the  right to health, the  right to social security, the  right to education, 
the  right to food, and the right to water and sanitation. All of them highlight the 
importance of a particular set of social standards that – at the very minimum – 
should be provided upon a universal basis.
Th ese kinds of social rights are characterised by a rather common process 
of institutionalisation and development. Th eir promotion or realisation is 
connected to specifi c UN bodies, namely, the  World Health Organization 
( WHO), the International Labour Organization ( ILO), the UN Educational, 
Scientifi c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization ( FAO). On water issues, the inter-agency mechanism UN-Water 
interconnects the relevant UN agencies.
Th ese “social rights to” are part of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and specifi ed in the International Covenant of Economic, Social, Cultural 
Rights. Th ey also feature prominently in the constitutions of the related UN 
organisations. Since the 1940s, they have all seen frequent mentioning and 
(re-) affi  rmation in international declarations, partly specifi cally-related to a 
particular social right, partly integrated in declarations on related issues. All of 
them are specifi ed by so-called “ General Comments”.
Th ese social rights have also been addressed in both regular and 
extraordinary major international venues and summits, such as the general 
assemblies of international organisations, or events such as the regular World 
Water Summit. Th eir realisation is further claimed, developed, discussed, and 
observed by special rapporteurs or independent experts.
Furthermore, these types of rights have, albeit to diff erent extents, 
been translated into global goals and campaigns, such as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), the Education for All (EFA) or Health for All 
(HfA) campaigns, and, most recently, they form part of the  Social Protection 
Floor initiative.28
28 See Bob Deacon,  Global  Social Policy in the Making: Th e Foundations of the  Social Protection 
Floor, (Bristol: Policy Press, 2013).
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Th e “ right to social security” is particularly important from a  global  social 
policy perspective. It formally originates from Article 22 of the UDHR (1949), 
but can be traced back further to the Constitution of the  ILO (1919). It has, 
however, so far “remained – almost untouched – on the ‘to do list’ of the global 
community of nations”.29 Nevertheless, in 2008, a General Comment (no. 19) on 
social security specifi ed its meaning. Currently, the  ILO led  Social Protection 
Floor initiative is an attempt to bring more life into the  right to social security,30 
and the UN’s Chief Executive Board adopted the  Social Protection Floor as one 
of its nine initiatives to cope with the eff ects of the global economic crisis. Th e 
implications are less likely to be measurable in terms of the implementation 
of  social protection schemes as a consequence of this UN initiative. Instead, it 
may make an impact by means of emphasising the importance of strong  social 
protection systems in places where they exist and/or are in danger of being 
retrenched in attempts to respond to economic crises by cutting public spending.
Th e  right to education, similarly to the  right to health, has been supplemented 
by discourses of “goals and targets”.31 Furthermore, the discourses on these 
rights are connected to diff erent levels of provision (e.g., primary education, 
primary health  care). Th e international agreements are clear that at least primary, 
elementary education and basic health  care should be free and accessible to all. 
Regarding the  right to health specifi cally, this has quite an important and long 
history, beginning with Article 25 of the UDHR, and is articulated in numerous 
international treaties and conventions. Since the Alma-Ata Conference and 
Declaration,32 the understanding of what it involves has improved. Th e  ICESCR 
and other international treaties and global goals (such as the MDGs) specify the 
content and scope of the  right to health, although there is not one commonly 
agreed upon understanding of what exactly must be done to realise the  right 
to health. For example, Wolfgang Hein and Lars Kohlmorgen33 state that it 
includes the prevention of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases, 
and a claim that it creates the conditions that provide for the provision of the 
appropriate medical services in the event of sickness; however, these documents 
“are rather inconclusive with respect to the ‘standard of health’ that is supposed 
to be ‘attainable’”. In the year 2000, a General Comment which specifi es the  right 
29 Michael Cichon, Christina Behrendt and Veronika Wodsak, “Th e UN  Social Protection Floor 
Initiative: Moving Forward with the Extension of Social Security”, IPG 2/2011:38.
30 See, for example, Magdalena Sepú lveda and Carly Nyst, “Th e Human Rights Approach to 
 Social Protection”, Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Aff airs (Finland). 2012, available at: http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2114384.
31 Pam Christie, “Th e Complexity of Human Rights in Global Times: Th e Case of the  Right to 
Education in South Africa”, (2010) 30 International Journal of Educational Development, pp. 
3–11, at 3.
32 Th e Declaration of Alma-Ata was adopted at the International Conference on Primary 
Health  Care at Almaty (formerly Alma-Ata), Kazakhstan (formerly Kazakh Soviet Socialist 
Republic), 6–12 September 1978.
33 Hein and Kohlmorgen, note 17 above.
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to health was draft ed. Although certainly not determining the full and concrete 
meaning of the  right to health, what the document does is to confi rm that states 
parties have particular obligations with regard to the provision of health  care. 
Such documents provide points of reference for state and non-state actors to 
claim their rights to health and education. By that way, a stronger emphasis on 
health and education rights might fi nd their way into national legislation.
In terms of their actual realisation, rather depressingly, the related literature 
states that none of these rights has been developed to any meaningful extent to 
tackle global social problems.34 Th at is despite remarkable advances in ESCR 
discourses on questions of justiciability,35 and the development of international 
 indicators.36
B. TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS OF …
Another category of social rights can be identifi ed, relating to particular groups 
of people. More concretely, we fi nd rights on age-related groups (children and 
older persons), gender (women’s rights), citizenship or migration status (the 
rights of migrants, refugees, indigenous people and, to some extent,  domestic 
workers), and those rights connected to health rights, which is the case for the 
rights of persons with disabilities (but also partly concerns women and children’s 
rights).
With the exception of the  rights of older persons, which refl ect a rather 
recent development, all of these group-related social rights come with specifi c 
UN conventions and declarations. All the related declarations or conventions 
highlight the particular needs of the respective groups. Th ey do this with explicit 
reference to the more general human and social rights frameworks and are oft en, 
only to some extent, explicit with regard to the concrete social rights involved. 
Instead, the main emphasis is on the equal treatment of the diff erent groups 
of societies and  non-discrimination, as well as basic protection levels in the 
case of any form of migration. An interesting case can be found in the rights 
of indigenous people, which try to catch both – notions of equal treatment, 
and of being diff erent. Th e attention to the needs and interests of indigenous 
people and their participation at all levels of policy-making have, amongst other 
34 See, for example, Marks, note 24 above; Cichon, Behrendt and Wodsak, note 29 above, and 
Christie, note 31 above.
35 See, for example, Michael T. Dennis and David P. Steward, “Justiciability of  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Should there be an International Complaint Mechanism to 
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?” (2004) 98 Th e American Journal 
of International Law, pp. 462–515; Salma Yusuf, “Th e Rise of Judicially Enforced Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights – Refocusing Perspectives”, (2012) 10 Seattle Journal for Social 
Justice, pp. 753–791.
36 See, for example, Judith V. Welling, “International  Indicators and Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights”, (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 933–958.
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things, resulted in their being considered more seriously in the context of the 
defi nition of the post-2015 development agenda and the draft ing of the so-called 
 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).37
In contrast to the social-policy-fi eld-related rights discussed above, the 
“rights of ” have seen a more uneven development, albeit with a rather recent 
increase in attention, and are much more diffi  cult to systematise. Refugee rights 
have a long-established tradition with the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (CRSR) approved in 1951. Th e  Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) originates in the late 1970s/
early 1980s. In the early 1990s, the issue was about children’s and migrants’ 
rights. Th e specifi cation of the rights of indigenous people,  domestic workers, 
persons with disabilities and older persons have seen their development since 
the mid-2000s. However, the historical development of a specifi c right does 
not necessarily imply weaker or stronger implications regarding improvements 
in the situation of the people aff ected at national and transnational levels. Th e 
current issues about large streams of refugees, for example, discussed in the 
context of dangerous crossings of the Mediterranean Sea, and the question of 
Europe’s responsibilities in protecting these refugees, shed a rather depressing 
light on the degree to which refugees are granted their rights.
Institutions which specifi cally relate to the respective target groups of these 
rights are only partly established. Quite in line with the historical development 
around the respective rights, in the year 2010, UN Women was established to 
ensure that women’s rights (including their components of social rights) are dealt 
with by one entity dedicated to the empowerment of women. Children’s and 
migrants’ rights have respective committees. Th e rights of indigenous people are 
furthered by a “Permanent Forum”.
Th e crucial issue about group-related rights is what makes them social 
rights, or to what extent they can be considered as social rights. Th e “rights 
of ” particular groups always come with reference to the more general human 
rights, and the  economic, social and cultural rights. Th ey are only social rights 
to a particular extent, as they also include political and other rights. Th e main 
issues about group-related rights commonly include equal treatment of actually 
or potentially disadvantaged and vulnerable groups ( non-discrimination). 
However, to some extent, the provision of basic protection levels matters as well. 
Interestingly, the rights of indigenous people also consider rights to be diff erent. 
More concretely, group-related rights include elements of the rights to health, 
education, labour, housing, and the  right to social security.38
37 See, Draft  Report, Chapter I: Matters calling for action by the Economic and Social Council 
or brought to its attention. http://undesadspd.org/Portals/0/UNPFII14_L3.pdf; see, also, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/majorgroups/indigenouspeoples.
38 On these specifi c rights, see, for example, Rosemary Kayess and Phillip French, “Out of 
Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, 
(2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review, pp. 1–34.
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One example of such group-related social rights is included in the  rights of 
 domestic workers. Th e general  Domestic Workers Convention contains civil, 
social labour rights – specifi cally, the  rights of  domestic workers are connected 
to work-time issues, health and safety regulations, and food and housing.39 
Mundlak and Shamir have shown that the specifi c application of such global 
norms into world-regional norms, such as the ECHR, has enhanced the 
protection of  domestic workers.40
Another example can be found in the more recent development of specifying 
the  rights of older persons. Even though the concern about older persons was 
already on international agendas in the 1980s, the considerations with regard to 
rights appeared only in the 2000s. Th e 1982 World Assembly on Ageing adopted 
the “Vienna International Plan on Ageing” which was then also adopted by the 
UN General Assembly (GA). Th is document only referred to the UDHR. Th e 
later UN GA “Proclamation on Ageing” did not make a connection between 
older persons and rights, either. Th e fi rst signs of changes became visible in 
the UN Principles of Older Persons (1991). Th e real change came in 2009 when 
the Advisory Committee of the  Human Rights Council suggested that a study 
should be conducted on the need to protect the human rights of the older person. 
Since then, the  rights of older persons have increasingly been in focus.
Concerning the practical application of the distinction between the “rights 
to” and the “rights of ”, it is obvious that the “rights to” are at the core of the 
activity of international organisations and are one mechanism which the 
international community has to develop a basic and common standard of 
 social protection to any “world citizen”. It is what passes for a very rudimentary 
“welfare statism” at global level, in terms of the claims that can be made 
regarding particular social problems and needs, and what people can expect to 
be granted irrespective of any particular status or citizenship. Looking beyond 
the current data regarding nutrition, health, and education, serves to highlight 
both the immense challenge and the limited progress in realising transnational 
social rights. Th is is where the “rights of ” come in. Th ese represent an advocacy 
and adjustment tool for claiming and improving the situation for particular 
groups of people. On the one hand, referring to a particular group is a means of 
emphasising their status as being particularly vulnerable; on the other, it is a way 
of engaging with the specifi c forms of the problems and needs that this particular 
group have to face. Th ese problems and needs are, naturally, diff erent when it 
concerns women or children, where the problem is oft en one that is dependent 
on the particular structure of national societies, and the claims are oft en 
connected to the right to be included in particular institutions. Th us, it is when 
39 Einat Albin and Virginia Mantouvalou, “Th e  ILO Convention on Domestic Worker: From the 
Shadows to the Light”, (2012) 41 Industrial Law Journal, pp. 67–78.
40 Guy Mundlak and Hila Shamir, “Th e Global Governance of  Domestic Work” in: Bridget 
Anderson and Isabel Shutes (eds), Migration and  Care Labour: Th eory, Policy and Politics, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 192–213.
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we talk about the social rights of refugees,  domestic workers or disabled people 
who are usually characterised by having very specifi c needs, in addition to the 
question of whether they are, or can be, included in the existing institutions of 
social security. For people who fall into several of these categories (for example, 
female migrant  domestic workers), there is a multiplication of vulnerabilities, 
and the need to give attention to them as a group and to defi ne their “rights of ”’, 
is important in order to improve their protection at diff erent levels.
V. DISCUSSION
Th e concern, formulation and adoption of transnational social rights have a 
long history which, to some extent, is integrated into the development of more 
general universal human rights. Not all of them have developed simultaneously. 
Th e above sections have distinguished between global social “rights to” (social-
policy-fi eld-related) and global social “rights of ” (group related). While the 
social “rights to” particular standards of social provision have developed rather 
simultaneously, the “rights of ” particular groups reveal a rather uneven and 
recent development.
From a comparative perspective, group-related rights oft en add up to a 
rather similar list of essential human rights that need particular consideration 
when it concerns a potentially or actually vulnerable member of the respective 
group. Th e policy-fi eld-related-rights are much more in need of specifi cation and 
clarifi cation as to the specifi c meanings or claims around their content. Th ey 
may also reveal signifi cantly diff erent meanings with regard to their implications 
in high-income countries and low-income countries, or concerning the question 
of their implications for national and international policies (for example, aid) 
respectively.
In contrast to the group-related rights, the social rights that relate to 
particular policy-fi elds do not always come with specifi c declarations, but with 
goals or guidelines. Th ey are part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
or are oft en mentioned and re-inforced by numerous international agreements 
and declarations.
Each of the policy-fi eld-related-rights is usually connected with the work of 
a particular UN agency. Th e social rights of particular groups, in contrast, are, 
instead, developed by committees and similar units within UN international 
organisations. Nevertheless, other international organisations may engage in 
related rights-debates as well. And most signifi cantly, claiming particular rights 
is an important part of the engagement by various civil society organisations 
(CSOs).
Th e international mechanisms serving the realisation of transnational social 
rights are manifold. At the level of international organisations and institutions, 
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special rapporteurs are particularly important. More concretely, the UN’s 
 Human Rights Council uses special procedures to promote transnational social 
rights. Th is happens by means of independent experts that are mandated to 
report and provide advice on various human rights from diff erent perspectives. 
Apart from taking part in various thematic meetings on the specifi c rights 
that they represent, these independent experts – or special rapporteurs – may 
undertake country visits, communicate with states regarding rights violations, 
and generate knowledge and expertise on the relevant issues. Th ey frequently 
report to the  Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly.41
Th is chapter has singled out social rights in order to specify an issue within 
the study of  global  social policy. However, with regard to human rights more 
generally, this is not unproblematical.  Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja 
Möller42 have argued that the indivisible character of human rights as such 
makes any classifi cation or “singling out” diffi  cult, as social rights are only to 
be realised in conjunction with other, i.e., political and legal, rights. Clearly, 
social and other types of human rights overlap and depend on each other, 
as do diff erent transnational social rights. Or they are the diff erent sides of 
the same coin. At the same time, though, the two diff erent types of social 
rights are identifi ed by somewhat diff erent developments and structures that 
reveal some trends in current transnational social rights development. While 
important in terms of improving the conceptualisation of  global  social policy 
and transnational social rights, it remains an issue if the tendency to defi ne ever 
more specifi c social rights, particularly with regard to diff erent groups, makes 
the general social rights claims stronger or weaker, and raises questions about 
the indivisibility of human rights.
At the same time, the question arises as to whether transnational social 
rights have ever been defi ned or been considered as concrete standards or levels 
to be reached. Th eir conceptualisation as goals, as something in which – at the 
very least – one should not fall behind, and that should be constantly improved, 
might be more useful from several perspectives. On the one hand, states will 
be more willing to sign agreements about goals to be reached than to make any 
commitment to particular social standards and levels to be realised, particularly 
if they require resources. On the other hand, cultural diff erences and concepts 
might make the defi nition of concrete, universally applicable contents on social 
rights very diffi  cult.
Another question would be how desirable (or possible) it is to have absolute 
standards; for example, is the  Global  Social Protection Floor a (welcome) step 
in this direction? Or what comes aft er the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs)?
41 See www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx, last accessed 01  June 2015; 
see, also, Stefan Lorenzmeier, Chapter 5 in this volume.
42 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller, Chapter 2 in this volume.
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In addition, specifi c transnational social rights debates can be placed within 
diff erent contexts. Transnational social rights discourses may have an impact on 
the development of national social rights, and the discourses may transform and 
inform transnational social rights formulation and its – potential – translation 
into global goals or targets; and transnational social rights may be contextualised 
with regard to their transformative power in conjunction with global social 
re-distribution and regulation. If not at national or local level, transnational 
social rights can, nevertheless, be utilised to generate transnational obligations 
or claims as to the mutual support of states in realising transnational social 
rights (as is happening through the MDG process).
International (social) rights treaties and agreements are usually celebrated as 
great successes, and developments in the situations of particular groups, or the 
manifestation of social standards worldwide. At the same time, particularly with 
regard to the policy-fi eld-related-social rights, it is frequently claimed that they 
are not specifi c or powerful enough. In addition, issues concerning the actual 
change achieved at local levels are frequently raised. Even if the treaties, at least 
for those countries that ratifi ed them, are binding, sanctioning mechanisms 
remain weak.
Last, but not least, it needs to be mentioned that – while this chapter has 
exclusively focused on rights to be furthered by policy-makers at diff erent levels 
– there are also important issues with regard to the extent to which corporations 
and other private actors have to be made accountable for respecting social rights.
VI. CASE STUDY:  RIGHT TO FOOD
In this fi nal section, we take a look at one particular example, namely, the  right 
to food. How do the fi ndings and considerations presented above apply to the 
case of the  right to food?
Th e  right to food is most clearly a type of social rights in that it is important 
for people to live their lives and to participate in society. Given that there is 
food scarcity in major parts of the world, and apart from eff orts to generate new 
resources, there is an important (re-) distributive issue that raises major issues 
concerning global social (in-) justice and (in-) equality. One way to address 
these is by responding with individual and collective rights to food. At the same 
time, it will be necessary to address some of the causes of food shortages, by 
addressing transnational regulation, and preventing land-grabbing and trading 
practices which cause damage.
Th e  right to food, apart from being part of the UDHR (Art.  25), is most 
clearly related to development and humanitarian or aid agendas. It has been 
defi ned by the  ICESCR as the right to be free from hunger and to have access 
to suffi  cient food. It belongs to the group of solidarity rights, leading to state, 
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as well as international, obligations. Special general comment 12 on the right to 
adequate food of 1999 interprets the article’s content and resulting obligations 
of states. More concretely, this general comment sets out, that states have the 
obligation to facilitate peoples’ access to food in various ways, including the 
provision of food if needed, and even in times of “severe resource constraints”.43
Given that there has been a  global food crisis for some years now, the 
discussion about global food policies and rights is importantly linked to this 
context. And it is precisely due to this process of engaging with a global social 
problem, namely, food scarcity, that the links between the three elements of 
 global  social policy (re-distribution, regulation, and rights) become apparent; 
the multiple-actor involvement complicates the picture, and the development 
of transnational social rights becomes signifi cantly inter-linked with other 
 global  social policy processes and mechanisms. More concretely, the rights 
 discourse cannot be understood without taking the development of knowledge 
through global actors into account – it is organisations such as the  FAO and the 
World Bank that defi ne the problem, and these organisations then collect data 
and monitor the development of this global social problem (e.g., Th e Global 
Monitoring Report 2012, the World Bank’s regular Food Price Watch, or the  FAO 
Food Price Index), while, in particular, the international fi nancial institutions 
(IFIs) are also always seen to be part of the problem of the current global 
economic order.
Supporters of rights-based approaches regret that the focus is not more 
on the development of a global  right to food. Nevertheless, there is a UN 
 Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, currently Hilal Elver, who acts as 
an independent expert in order to evaluate the state of the  right to food. Th is 
includes annual reports to the  Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly 
on the state of the  right to food, based upon the monitoring of the food situation 
worldwide, and reporting of insights from country visits and consultations.
What can also be observed is that the  right to food is frequently connected 
to the rights of particular groups, particularly with regard to women and 
children. For example, the CEO of “Th e Hunger Project” emphasised the key role 
of women in tackling poverty and hunger.44 Th is was only one of many recent 
statements regarding the importance of women in fi ghting hunger.
Similar to other social rights, the  right to food has also been part of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and is in the focus of the post-
2015 development agenda. In its report “Th e Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending 
Poverty, Transforming all Lives and Protecting the Planet”, UN Secretary-
43 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “ Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Examination of State 
Obligations”, in: Sarah Joseph and Adam McBeth (eds), Research Handbook on International 
Human Rights Law, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), pp. 36–70, at 56; for more 
detail, see, also, Anne Trebilcock, Chapter 8 in this volume.
44 Th e Hunger Project. Statement by Asa Skogström Feldt, available at: https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/12899hungerproject.pdf.
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General Ban Ki-moon gave attention to the aim to end hunger.45 Th e right to 
water and sanitation, and  land rights are also partly related. Furthermore, the 
Ebola outbreak in 2014, signifi cantly deteriorated not only the health situation of 
the communities aff ected, but also their status of  food security. Furthermore, the 
process of phrasing and framing a new set of development goals, the so-called 
 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), is an important part of the process for 
strengthening the promotion of the  right to food. For example, in his annual 
report to the UN General Assembly, Special Rapporteur Hilal Elver emphasised 
the key role of the Global Strategic Framework for  Food Security and Nutrition 
of the Committee on World  Food Security46 for the “implementation of eff ective 
models of governance concerning food, agriculture and nutrition for States, 
intergovernmental actors and the corporate private sector”.47
Nevertheless, major discourses have concerned the threats to such rights, 
through privatisation, instead of real progress in people’s social rights. Th erefore, 
while we see increasing numbers of social rights on specifi c issues and on 
particular groups of people accompanied by numerous initiatives and claims 
about their realisation, the involvement of multiple actors and the clash of 
competing interests open ever new spaces for the struggles around transnational 
social rights.
45 UN General Assembly (2014), “Th e Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming 
all Lives and Protecting the Planet”, Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General on the Post-
2015  Sustainable Development Agenda, available at: http://ow.ly/GTW9B.
46 See www.fao.org/fi leadmin/templates/cfs/Docs1213/gsf/GSF_Version_2_EN.pdf, last accessed 
1 June 2015.
47 See http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/498/25/PDF/N1449825.pdf?Open
Element, last accessed 1 June 2015.
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CHAPTER 5
ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL 
SOCIAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL 
AND NATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS
Stefan Lorenzmeier
I. INTRODUCTION
Th e enforcement of transnational social rights in international and national 
legal orders is a pivotal issue for the development of and respect for these rights.1 
Individual and collective human rights are a serious matter as they concern 
the obligations of states to individuals,2 and the  right to food does, moreover, 
address a fundamental human need.
Social human rights, as second generation human rights,3 and, as such, 
situated at the cross-roads between individual and collective rights, are like the 
classic fi rst generation ones4 directed vertically at the respective public body, to 
1 Enforcement is a fundamental part of the “struggle for transnational social rights”, as pointed 
out by Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller, Chapter 2 of this volume.
2 Rolf Künnemann, “Th e Right to Adequate Food: Violations Related to its Minimum 
Core Content”, in: Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell (eds), Core Obligations: Building a 
Framework for  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2002), pp. 161–
163.
3  Asbjørn Eide and Allan Rosas (eds), “ Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal 
Challenge”, in: Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause and Allan Rosas,  Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 2nd ed., (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff , 2001), pp. 3–4; Erika 
Szyszak, “Social Rights in the European Union”, in: ibid., pp. 493–4. Mashood A. Baderin 
and Robert McCorquodale perceive this category to be very unhelpful (“International 
Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Forty Years of Development”, in: 
Mashood A. Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and Economic 
Rights in Action, (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 3–10). In 1987, K.J. 
Partsch voiced “grave doubts whether the concept of generation of rights is well-founded”; 
see K.J. Partsch, “Th e Enforcement of Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights: Observations 
on their Reciprocal Relations”, in: Rudolf Bernhardt and John Anthony Jolowicz (eds), 
International Enforcement of Human Rights, (Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer Verlag, 
1987), p. 25.
4 See, for example, the individual rights enshrined in Part III of the ICCPR.
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wit, the state. Th us, it is the task of states to give these rights the proper eff ect 
within their national jurisdictions. Moreover, the distinction between several 
generations of human rights should not lead to their division. All human rights 
are, in the words of the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, “universal, 
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated”,5 and the draft ing of two diff erent, 
yet interrelated, Covenants on the subject-matter should not lead to a diff erent 
conclusion. Th e original proposal of the Human Rights Commission was a 
single document entailing civil and political as well as  economic, social and 
cultural rights,6 which were subsequently split up in separate documents due 
to political pressure. Even aft er the split, the United Nations General Assembly, 
in its decision on the two Covenants, the International Convention of Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights ( ICESCR), stressed that the two sets of rights are 
“interconnected and interdependent”,7 and the respective preambles of the 
Covenants pay regard to both sets of rules as well.8 Th e division between 
the two sets of rules seems to be artifi cial and should not be pursued further 
than absolutely required by law. Tribute should also be paid to the aspect that 
individual civil and political human rights are not limited to the sphere of the 
ICCPR, but have, due to their interconnectedness, a collective dimension as 
well. Even the European Court of Human Rights stressed that “no water-tight 
division” is possible between the individual rights enshrined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the collective ones of the European Social 
Charter.9
5 Vi enna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23, no. I.5. It states further that 
“the international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, 
on the same footing and with the same emphasis. While the signifi cance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be 
borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, to promote all human rights and fundamental freedoms”.
6 HR Commission, UN ESCOR, sup 9 (E/1992), 4 May 1951, pp. 20 et seq.
7 GA res 543 (VI), 5 February 1952, preamble.
8 See, for example, the preamble of the  ICESCR: “[…] in accordance with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political 
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone 
may enjoy his  economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights” 
and the almost identical wording in the ICCPR: “[…] in accordance with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political 
freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created 
whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his  economic, social and 
cultural rights.”
9 ECtHR, 6289/73, Airey v Ireland, judgment of 9  October 1979, para. 26. For an in-depth 
analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this regard, see Arno Frohwerk, Soziale Not in 
der Rechtsprechung des EGMR, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 2012).
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II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RULES
Th e international legal embodiment of social human rights can be found in the 
International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights10 and rules 
of customary law and/or general principles of law in the meaning of Article 38 
para. lit. b) and c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.11
A. SOURCES OF LAW
Th e topic of the analysis, the  right to food, constitutes a part of the category 
of “transnational social human rights”, and is fi rst and foremost enshrined in 
Article 11  ICESCR,12 as part of treaty law,13 and Article 25 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) as part of customary law.14 Although, at the time of 
draft ing, the UDHR was generally not seen as a binding agreement,15 which can 
be inferred from its name (“Declaration”, instead of “Convention”),16 over the 
due course of time most principles of the UDHR developed into international 
10 Of 19  December 1966, entered into force on 3  January 1976. UNTS vol. 993, p.  3. For the 
draft ing history, see Matthew C.R. Craven, Th e International Covenant on  Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), reprinted 2002, p. 16 et seq., and 
Marco Odello and Francesco Seatzu, Th e UN  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Th e Law, Process and Practice, (Oxford: Routledge, 2011), p. 4 et seq. See, also, Anne 
Trebilcock, “Transnational Socio-Economic Rights: Inter-linkages in the Context of the  Right 
to Food”, Chapter 8 in this volume, Section IV.1. A history of the provision is provided by Ben 
Saul, David Kinley and Jacqueline Mowbray, Th e International Covenant on  Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), “Th e Right to an Adequate Standard of Living”, p. 867 et seq.
11 Of 26 June 1945.
12 Kerstin Mechlem, “Food, Right to, International Protection”, in: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 14, regards the  right to food not 
just as an aspirational goal but as a full-scale right. See, also, Asbjørn Eide, “Th e Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living Including the  Right to Food”, in: Eide, Krause and Rosas (eds), 
note 3 above, p. 133 et seq. Another noteworthy provision is Art. 54 of Additional Protocol I 
(protection of victims of international armed confl icts) to the Geneva Conventions, which 
prohibits inter alia the starvation of civilians as a means of warfare.
13 ESC rights have to be perceived, at least in the 21st century, as being full rights and not just 
aspirational goals or non-justiciable. See Baderin and McCorquodale, note 3 above, pp. 3–10 
with further references.
14 Mechlem, note 12 above, para. 13. Critically, see Hans Morten Haugen, Th e  Right to Food and 
the TRIPS Agreement: With a Particular Emphasis on Developing Countries’ Measures for 
Food Production and Distribution, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff , 2007), p. 151 et seq. Moreover, 
the UDHR can be seen as the initial foundation of SECR. In this regard, see Eide and Rosas, 
note 3 above, pp. 9–17.
15 GA resolutions are as such not binding on the UN’s Member States, see Art. 10  UN Charter.
16 Louis Henkin, “Th e International Bill of Rights: Th e Universal Declaration and the 
Covenants”, in: Bernhardt and Jolowicz (eds), note 3 above, pp. 1–5.
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norms.17 Even the United Nations General Assembly intended the UDHR to 
establish “ a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations 
[…]”.18
Some academic discussion is still continuing with regard to the legal status of 
the social and economic rights of the UDHR, such as its Article 25 on the  right to 
food.19 Th e most extreme view is that all the principles embodied in the UDHR 
became part of customary law.20 Th e majority of legal scholars is fostering a 
more diff erentiated approach. Th ey are stressing the historically rather minor 
status of second generation human rights to fi rst generation rights, and that 
the former have not acquired the same legal status as the latter.21 According to 
this reasoning, the customary status of the  right to food cannot be determined 
exclusively from Article  25 UDHR, but from a plethora of international 
documents,22 including Article 55 lit. a)  UN Charter23 and Article 11  ICESCR, in 
which it is explicitly enshrined.24 As a result, both views grant the  right to food 
the additional status of a customary right in the meaning of Article 38 para. 1 lit. 
b) ICJ Statute.
Furthermore, a third possibility is sometimes argued. It is stated that social 
and economic human rights are not generally part of customary law, because the 
existence of a customary norm is sometimes very diffi  cult to prove,25 but these 
rights are instead part of the general principles of law as laid down in Article 38 
para. 1 lit. c) ICJ Statute.26
For the scrutiny at bar, it is not necessary to decide comprehensively between 
the two approaches (customary law or general principle of law) due to their 
17 Hilary Charlesworth, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, in: Wolfrum (ed), note 12 
above, para. 16.
18 Resolution 217 (III). International Bill of Human Rights.
19 Art. 25 has a very similar wording to Art. 11  ICESCR. It reads in paragraph 1: “Everyone has 
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical  care and necessary social services, and 
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age 
or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”
20 Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, “Th e Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens 
and General Principles”, (1988) 12 Australian Year Book of International Law, pp. 82–84.
21 Smita Narula, “Th e  Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under International 
Law”, CHRGJ Working Paper no. 7, 2006, p. 70.
22 For example,  FAO, Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right 
to Adequate Food in the Context of National  Food Security, 24 November 2004, available at: 
www. fao.org/righttofood/en or the resolution 22/9 of the  Human Rights Council on the  right 
to food of 9 April 2013, A/HRC/RES/22/9.
23 Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht: Th eorie und Praxis, 3rd ed., 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1984), §1247 considers this provision as the foundation for 
social human rights.
24 See the convincing analysis of Narula, note 21 above, p. 70 et seq., and the conclusion on p. 84. 
Verdross and Simma, note 23 above, at §1247 in 1984 did not confer the status of a right to the 
 ICESCR, but only as a “programmatic approach”.
25 Charlesworth, note 17 above, para. 16.
26 Simma and Alston, note 20 above, p. 82.
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independent legal eff ect, the status of an international non-treaty right. To the 
author, the status as a customary law is slightly more convincing due to the vast 
amount of international documents and the rather diff erent legal basis of general 
principles stemming from the national legal systems. Whether the  right to food 
is substantially enshrined in all domestic legal orders is diffi  cult to prove and, 
moreover, the lacunae-fi lling function of the general principles speaks against 
such a reading.
B. IMPLEMENTATION AND SUPERVISION
Th e rights of the  ICESCR have to be implemented. An important aspect in 
this regard is the supervision of the implementation of the international  right 
to food, which is supervised by various international bodies, especially the 
 Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( CESCR).27 In 1999, the 
 CESCR issued General Comment (GC) no. 1228 on the right to adequate food 
within the meaning of Article  11  ICESCR,29 which covers the availability and 
access to food resources for the member states of the said Covenant.30 Besides 
the work of the  CESCR, the work of the “Special Procedures of the  Human 
Rights Council”, namely, independent experts with mandates to report and 
advise, has to be mentioned. Th ese special procedures are performed either by an 
individual or a group of experts, the former being called a “special rapporteur” or 
“independent expert”. Th ey are appointed by the  Human Rights Council, serve 
in their personal capacities, and are to be independent and impartial. Th eir task 
is inter alia to undertake country visits, sending communications to states, to 
conduct thematic studies and to raise public awareness on a given human rights 
issue. Th is system is a rather new, but central element of the UN human rights 
monitoring systems.31 Th e mandate of the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to 
Food is a good example of this in the context in question. Resolution 6/2 of the 
 Human Rights Council32 aimed at the then Special Rapporteur Jean Ziegler, for 
example, states at point 1. (a) that it is his task to “promote the full realization 
of the  right to food and the adoption of measures at the national, regional and 
international levels for the right of everyone to adequate food […]”. For this, 
he is to examine ways of overcoming both existing and emerging obstacles (1. 
27 Th e  CESCR is the principal UN body; in this respect, see Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston and 
Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context, 3rd ed., (Oxford-New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 277.
28 Subsequently abbreviated as “GC 12”.
29 UN Doc.: E/C.12/1999/5 of 5 May 1999. For an overview of its content, see Odello and Seatzu, 
note 10 above, p. 219 et seq.
30 Haugen, note 14 above, p. 18.
31 Further information can be obtained here: www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/
Introduction.aspx.
32 See http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_6_2.pdf.
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(b)) and is to present recommendations on possible steps for achieving this aim 
(1. (e)). Th e Special Rapporteur is also at the interface inter alia of the  Human 
Rights Council, the states and non-governmental organisations (1. (f)). With 
the introduction of the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, a very eff ective 
means for the supervision of the implementation of the  right to food had been 
created.
Th e Food and Agriculture Organization ( FAO) is also active in providing 
guidance on the  Right to Food, but has, to date, been unsuccessful in making 
the work on the  right to food one of its priorities.33 Public awareness is also 
raised by non-governmental organisations supervising the implementation of 
human rights.34 Th ey are active in nearly every aspect of international human 
rights practice,35 and frequently report on the human rights situation publicly 
and, in so doing, put pressure on states and various United Nations bodies,36 and 
heavily infl uence their decisions. It also avails of the use of open letters.
Th e importance of GC no. 12 for the clarifi cation of the Covenant’s  right 
to food and its implementation can hardly be overstated. Th e comment states 
convincingly that the  right to food is inseparable from social justice, and 
requires appropriate action at both national and international level.37 Such 
action has been instrumental for promoting the  right to food.38 Moreover, GC 
no. 12 also explicitly states that “the right to adequate food is indivisibly linked 
to the inherent dignity of the human person” and, as such, it is indispensable for 
the fulfi lment of other human rights.39
As conclusively opined by scholars, it is, as a consequence of the above, 
inseparable from social justice and requires the adoption of respective laws at 
national and international level.40 In addition, the  ICESCR provision is not only 
33 See the  FAO web site for further information: www. fao.org/righttofood/right-to-food-home/
en. Th e  FAO adopted its “ right to food guidelines in 2005, see www. fao.org/3/a-y7937e.
pdf. Th e “Voluntary Guidelines have been accepted by the  Human Rights Council as “a 
practical tool to promote the realization of the  right to food for all” ( Human Rights Council, 
Resolution 6/2, no. 6; adopted at its 20th meeting, 27 September 2007).
34 See, for example, the work of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, described by 
Aryeh Neier, Th e International Human Rights Movement: A History, (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), p. 186 et seq., “Amnesty International”, p. 204 et seq., “Human Rights 
Watch”, and p. 233 et seq.
35 David Weissbrodt, “Roles and Responsibilities of Non-State Actors”, in: Dinah Shelton (ed), 
Th e Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), p. 721.
36 Ibid., p. 725.
37  CESCR, GC 12, para. 4.
38 Mechlem, note 12 above, para. 33.
39  CESCR, GC 12, para. 4.
40 See Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Marc Cohen, “Agricultural Biotechnology Risks and 
Opportunities for Developing Country  Food Security”, (2000) 2 International Journal of 
Biotechnology, pp. 145–160. See, also, Odello and Seatzu, note 10 above, p. 21 et seq.
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addressed to states and individuals, but also to the people in accordance with 
Article 1  ICESCR.41
III. INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS
Internationally, the issue of the enforcement of human rights is usually focused 
on civil and political rights as traditional fi rst generation individual rights. For 
the present analysis, a short comparison between the ICCPR and the  ICESCR 
may be used for the discussion of the international enforcement of social human 
rights.
Th e enforcement of social human rights at international level, as they 
are laid down in the  ICESCR, is, from the outset, quite distinct from those 
enshrined in the ICCPR,42 because Article  2.1.  ICESCR speaks only of the 
“progressive realization of these rights” and that the member states are “to 
take steps” to achieve the rights recognised in the Covenant. Moreover, in the 
 ICESCR, individual provisions are “couched” as state obligations to recognise 
such a right and not as a statement of the individual’s entitlement to the right.43 
A further important diff erence between the two covenants is that the  ICESCR, 
in Article 4, entails in only a very general provision for the derogation from its 
guarantees.
Th us, it was frequently argued formerly that the rights enshrined in the 
Covenant were not a matter of rights and were only of a political nature.44 Th is 
view is, especially because of 40 years of legal practice, rarely voiced today.45 
Due to permanent societal change, human rights law is among the most living 
instruments in international law, and, as such, has a growing legal corpus.46 Th e 
diffi  culty in defi ning “an adequate standard of living”47 is still at issue, but a 
wide, rather open term cannot be held against the possible enforcement of social 
human rights. Th is will now be elaborated in depth.
41 Th e “own means of subsistence” are a part of the principle of self-determination of people. See 
Haugen, note 14 above, p. 16.
42 Eide and Rosas, note 3 above, pp. 9–10. In the ICCPR, states undertake to respect and ensure 
civil and political rights.
43 Henkin, note 16 above, pp. 1–15.
44 Eide and Rosas, note 3 above, pp. 9–10.
45 Eibe Riedel, “International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, in: Wolfrum 
(ed), note 12 above, para. 52.
46 Gerald Staberock, “Human Rights, Domestic Implementation”, in: Wolfrum (ed), note 12 
above, para. 5.
47 Henkin, note 16 above, pp. 1–16.
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A. THE JUSTICIABILITY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS
A common criticism against the implementation of social human rights is 
that they are not justiciable.48 Th e justiciability of economic and social human 
rights is, from the outset, usually very weak with regard to the said rights due 
to the wording of the international treaty provisions and their international 
monitoring mechanism.49 Th is led, aft er the entry into force of the  ICESCR in 
1976, to its widespread treatment as a second class set of human rights, which is 
lower in the hierarchy than the rights of the ICCPR and to the widely purported 
assumption that the rights of the  ICESCR are non-justiciable.
Th is negative assumption has drastically changed over the course of time 
due to the continuing codifi cation of these rights and the ongoing jurisprudence 
upon them,50 and cannot be upheld in a modern human rights system. Th e 
Ogoni case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
deserves special mention. In this case, the Commission held that Nigeria had 
violated inter alia its obligation to protect the  right to food by destroying the 
food resources of the Ogoni people through the Nigerian security forces and its 
national oil company.51
In the light of this development, the non-justiciability view has lost a 
lot of argumentative ground and is rarely argued in the scholarly debate 
today. Furthermore, the modern discussion convincingly considers the non-
justiciability view as being arbitrary,52 and, in the words of the  CESCR, it “would 
drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society”.53
Th is view is supported by some additional arguments. According to the 
 CESCR’s GC no. 12, Article  11  ICESCR entails three diff erent types of legal 
obligations for the member states of the Covenant: the obligation to respect, 
to protect, and to fulfi l.54 In more detail, the obligations require that third 
parties do not interfere with the enjoyment of the  right to food (the obligation 
to respect), that third parties are prevented from a possible interference (the 
48 For a general study, see Fons Coomans (ed), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights: 
Experiences from Domestic Systems, (Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia-Hart Publishing, 2006); 
Malcolm Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
49 Martin Scheinin, “Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights”, in: Eide, Krause and Rosas 
(eds), note 3 above, pp. 29–30 and infra.
50 Mechlem, note 12 above, para. 14, where the “deepening understanding” of ESC rights is 
stressed as well.
51 ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, decision of 27 May 2002.
52 Baderin and McCorquodale, note 3 above, pp. 3–11.
53  CESCR, GC 9, para. 10.
54  CESCR, GC 11, para. 15. Anne Trebilcock, “Transnational Socio-Economic Rights: Inter-
linkages in the Context of the  Right to Food”, Chapter 8 in this volume, Section IV.1.
Chapter 5. Enforcement of Transnational Social Rights
Intersentia 95
obligation to protect), and fi nally that the member states adopt the proper 
measures necessary for the full enjoyment of the  right to food (the obligation 
to fulfi l).55 Th is understanding of the  ICESCR rights, and, namely, the  right to 
food, grants full legal eff ect to Article 11  ICESCR56 and is in accordance with the 
general interpretative principle that international treaties should be interpreted 
to their full eff ect.57
Th is line of reasoning is also fostered by GC no. 3 of the  ICESCR. Even as 
early as 1990, the Committee conclusively established the rule that the Covenant 
entails a minimum core of rights which are incumbent on any state party.58 
It expressly stated that the  right to food might be violated if a state was not 
providing a signifi cant number of individuals with essential foodstuff s.
A diff erent reading of the Covenant, to wit, that it does not entail such a core 
obligation, would largely deprive it of its raison d’être.59 Such a reading would be 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the  ICESCR and would constitute 
a violation of Article 31 VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Yet, 
it has to be seen in this context that the obligation is limited. Article 2 para. 1 
 ICESCR refers to a state’s available resources, and account has to be taken of the 
resource constraints in the state concerned.60 A state relying on this defence for 
not fulfi lling its core obligation has to demonstrate that every eff ort has been 
made to use all the resources that are at its disposition in an eff ort to satisfy 
the obligation.61 Hence, every  ICESCR member state has to ensure at least the 
minimal core content of the  ICESCR rights, since they are not just soft  law.62
Furthermore, it is argued against justiciability that economic, social and 
cultural (ESC) rights are much more resource-oriented than fi rst generation 
rights. As such, it is not possible to fulfi l them at once, but only progressively.63 
Th is distinction between fi rst- and second-generation human rights would 
water down the obligations of states under the  ICESCR and, generally, cannot 
be accepted. Th e  CESCR stated conclusively that although this principle is 
55 Th e responsibilities are elaborated by Künnemann, note 2 above, p. 161 & 171 et seq.
56 Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 285. For the history of the tripartite typology, see ibid., p. 280 et 
seq.
57 “Eff et utile”, the principle is now embodied in Art. 31 para. 1 VCLT as part of the “good faith” 
and the object and purpose”; see Richard Gardiner, Treaty  Interpretation, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 160.
58  CESCR, GC 3, para.10.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. A part of the eff ective application of the  right to food is its domestic application,  CESCR, 
GC 9, para. 2 and infra.
62  CESCR, GC 3, para. 10.
63 See the analysis by Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, “Th e Nature and Scope of State Parties’ 
Obligations under the International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 
(1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 156 et seq. Art. 2 para. 1  ICESCR is also leading in this 
direction.
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laid down in Article 2 para. 1  ICESCR, the Covenant also imposes obligations 
of immediate eff ect.64 Th e obligations of the  ICESCR are a combination of 
obligations of conduct and obligations of result.65 As a result, ESC rights are 
not only aspirations, but also full rights which, as a general rule, enjoy greater 
discretion on the part of the states that implement them. Th e progressive 
realisation has also to be seen in accordance with the time of ratifi cation and the 
entering into force of the  ICESCR in 1976,66 which means that some states have 
had these obligations for almost forty years, and the argument of “progressive 
realisation” in connection with the state’s resources can hardly be accepted for 
developed and developing states. Th e proposed view is supported by the wording 
of Article 11 para. 1  ICESCR. Th e provision expressly states that the states have 
to “ensure the realization of this right” (the right to an adequate standard of 
living including the  right to food). Th e ordinary meaning of the term “ensure” 
is almost comparable to a “guarantee”, and it must be considered as being a very 
strong obligation67 and not just a political aspiration. Lastly, the International 
Court of Justice in its “Construction of a Wall”- advisory opinion expressly 
accepted certain provisions of the  CESCR as rights, namely, Articles  6, 11, 
12 and 13  ICESCR.68 Also the number of national judgments adjudicating on 
economic, social and cultural is a convincing indicator that these rights are fully 
justiciable.69
Moreover, in 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/
RES/63/117 concerning an “Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, which has been ratifi ed by ten states and 
has recently entered into force.70 Despite its ratifi cation status, the existence of 
the Optional Protocol is a strong indicator for the stated change of perception 
of social human rights,71 and of the fact that they are conceived as full rights 
nowadays.
64  CESCR GC 3, para. 1.
65 ILC Report, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1977, para. 8.
66 Eibe Riedel, “New Bearings in Social Rights? – Th e Communications Procedure under the 
 ICESCR”, in: Ulrich Fastenrath, Rudolf Geiger, Daniel-Erasmus Khan and Andreas Paulus 
(eds), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 574–575.
67 Haugen, note 14 above, p. 123. On page 124, Haugen concludes that the term “ensure” was 
included with the understanding of the state parties that it would imply relatively stronger 
obligations on them.
68 “Th e wall violates the rights to work, to an adequate standard of living, health and education.” 
See ICJ, “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory”, ICJ Rep. 2004, para. 130.
69 See, for example, the cases stated by Olivier De Schutter, note 56 above, p. 829 et seq., and the 
author’s contributions on the application of Art. 13 para. 2 lit. c) in Germany.
70 Th e scope of the Optional Protocol is a complaint procedure whereby inter alia individuals 
are entitled to send a communication to the  CESCR in case of a violation of one of the 
 ICESCR rights by a member state, see Art. 2, 3 Optional Protocol.
71 Available at: www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ cescr/docs/A-RES-63–117.pdf.
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Th us, in line with the above-mentioned arguments, it has to be accepted 
that economic and social human rights are, at least nowadays, fully justiciable 
and that the opposite view can no longer be sustained. Yet, the interpreters 
of the law must take the margin of appreciation granted to the states for their 
implementation into account.
B. INTERNATIONAL MONITORING MECHANISM
In general, international monitoring mechanisms are important for the 
implementation of human rights because, on the one hand, they fi ll a gap if 
national implementation fails to be suffi  cient, and, on the other, they have an 
impact on national jurisdictions.72 Vice versa, national jurisprudence infl uences 
the  interpretation of international human rights as well.73 Th us, international 
monitoring is of special relevance because it is a means of supervision and 
enforcement.74
Th e primary responsibility for monitoring the  ICESCR is assigned to the 
 CESCR.75 Formally, the  CESCR is a sub-organ of the ECOSOC (the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations) and an organ, not a treaty body.76 
It should only assist ECOSOC in the consideration of  ICESCR member states’ 
reports under Article  16  ICESCR. In addition, the  FAO has been entrusted 
with the task of dealing with “ right to food” matters. In 2004, the  FAO Council 
adopted the “Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the 
Right to Adequate Food in the Context of  Food Security”, which are the most 
recent pronouncement of the stated right.77 In the year 2000, another actor joined 
the international food protection scene: the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to 
Food. Th e position was established by the UN Commission on Human Rights 
and is expected to present thematic reports on issues concerning the  right to 
food.78 According to Article 16  ICESCR, the states are required to submit reports 
about the measures adopted in order to implement their treaty obligations. Th e 
reports are to indicate the factors and diffi  culties aff ecting the implementation 
of the  ICESCR.79 Th e expert commission prepares “concluding observations” 
upon the basis of these reports which identify positive and negative aspects.80 
72 Staberock, note 46 above, para. 3.
73 Ibid., para. 5.
74 Verdross and Simma, note 23 above, §1249.
75 ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17, UN Doc E/1985/85 (1985). Scheinin, note 49 above, pp. 29–45. 
Th e development can be seen by Craven, note 10 above, p. 39 et seq.
76 Craven, note 10 above, p. 50.
77 Mechlem, note 12 above, para. 34.
78 See the overview by Mechlem, note 12 above, para. 35.
79 Manual on Human Rights Reporting, Offi  ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Geneva, 1997, Olivier De Schutter, note 56 above, p. 871.
80 Ibid., p. 871.
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Th e reporting process is supported by non-governmental organisations. Th ey 
support the fi rst-hand information of the Committee members in the form of the 
so-called “shadow reports”, which are oft en better documented than the offi  cial 
state reports.81 Th e consultative status of non-governmental organisations is 
even acknowledged in Rule 69 of the Rules of Procedure of the  Committee on 
 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.82
Th e  CESCR is made up of independent and impartial experts83 with a quasi-
judicial role due to their independent evaluation of the submitted reports.84 
Beyond this, upon the basis of the evaluation of the reports submitted, the 
 CESCR has to make suggestions on the improvement of a state’s performance.85
In Resolution 1987/5, the ECOSOC addressed an invitation to the  CESCR 
to issue  General Comments. Th e  CESCR followed the invitation, and the GCs 
are intended to assist the member states in the task of fulfi lling their reporting 
obligations.86 Despite its questionable legal basis, the competence for the 
adoption of  General Comments stems from the authority to assist the ECOSOC, 
the practice has not been objected to by the member states,87 and it can be 
regarded as a subsequent interpretive practice in the meaning of Article 31 para. 
3 lit. b) VCLT.
Th e role of the  General Comments is descriptive and not innovative; they 
are intended to summarise the view of the ECSCR on a particular issue.88 
Th ey are neither academic works nor administrative acts.89 Yet, their practical 
importance has surpassed their pure legal status. It has to be observed that they 
have, over time, developed into a highly relevant form of commentary on the 
interpretations of the rights contained in the  ICESCR,90 similar to a re-statement 
of the law91 as it is known from the US legal system.
81 Ibid., p. 876.
82  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Rules of the Procedure of the 
Committee, E/C.12/1990/4/Rev.1.
83 See the “Decision of the  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 
proposed guidelines on the independence and impartiality of members of the human rights 
treaty bodies”, adopted at the  CESCR’s 49th meeting in November 2012; available at: www2.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/ cescr.
84 Craven, note 10 above, p. 56.
85 Nisuke Ando, “ General Comments/Recommendations”, in: Wolfrum (ed), note 12 above, 
para. 2.
86 UN Doc. E/1988/14, p. 63, para. 367. Th e GC has to be distinguished from the “concluding 
observations”, which are only addressed at a particular state party, see Ando, note 85 above, 
para. 2.
87 Craven, note 10 above, p. 90.
88 UN Doc. E/1993/22, p. 19, para.49.
89 Natan Lerner, Religion, Secular Beliefs and Human Rights: 25 Years aft er the 1981 
Declaration, (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2006), p. 26, note 29.
90 Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, note 10 above, “Introduction”, p. 5.
91 Staberock, note 46 above, para. 11. See, also, Odello and Seatzu, note 10 above, p. 195, and the 
 FAO Information Paper,  FAO Doc: IGWG RTFG INF/1, Feb. 2004, para. 5 et seq.
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Th us, the  General Comments of the  CESCR do not acquire the same legal 
status as a complaint or petition procedure, but they entail some considerable 
weight for the  interpretation of an  ICESCR provision.92 In a strict sense, they 
are not legally-binding, but the GCs are, at the very least, a source for assessing 
and interpreting the  ICESCR in a persuasive way.93 In this context, it is of 
special note that the GCs, by bringing together the knowledge of a wide range of 
experts, are the most important interpretative guides for the Covenant.94 Hence, 
over time, they have developed into a highly relevant form of commentary on 
the  interpretation of the rights,95 and are a strong force for the development 
of social human rights from a purely aspirational character to enforceable 
human rights. Although the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not yet 
paid tribute to the  CESCR GCs, it seems very likely that the Court would apply 
a similar system to that used for the ICCPR, using them as guidance for its 
own  interpretation. Following the stated line of reasoning and by interpreting 
the provision extensively, they can be considered as a subsequent means of 
 interpretation in the meaning of Article 38 para. 1 lit. d) ICJ Statute, as part of 
the notion of “judicial decisions”, although the GCs are not “judicial” in a strict 
formal sense.96
C. CUSTOMARY LAW/GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A diff erent international enforceability of the  right to food is ensured by the other 
 sources of Public International Law. In this respect, it does not matter whether 
it is enshrined in customary law or whether it is a general principle of law. 
Both set of rules are an independent legal source and establish, in themselves, 
the independent status of rights that have to be respected by the international 
actors.97 Th ese  subjects of international law can, unlike the membership in 
the  ICESCR, encompass all international legal entities and have a much wider 
impact. For instance, while the Covenant is directed exclusively at states, the 
rules of customary law are also applicable for international organisations and 
are the traditional  subjects of international law, like the Holy See. Th e European 
Union is, in line with the well-established case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
92 Scheinin, note 49 above, pp. 29–45. Craven, note 10 above, p. 91.
93 Riedel, note 45 above, para. 39; Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, note 10 above, “Introduction”, p. 5.
94 Ibid., para. 39.
95 Staberock, note 46 above, para. 11 (explicitly so for the ICCPR).
96 Th e jurisprudence of the ICJ supports this view; see, for example, ICJ, Wall Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Rep. 2004, p. 136, para. 109 and ICJ, Diallo, ICJ Rep. 2010, para. 66 et seq. See, also, Alain 
Pellet, in: Andreas Zimmermann, Karin Oellers-Frahm, Christian Tomuschat and Christian 
J. Tams (eds), Th e Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, 2nd ed., 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Art. 38, para. 318.
97 Pellet, note 96 above, para. 271 et seq.
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European Union, also bound by customary rules.98 Th us, the scope of the  right 
to food gains almost universal eff ect.
IV. NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
Th e status and the enforcement of social human rights in national jurisdictions 
depend upon the respective national legal order. Th e issue of enforcement arises 
foremost with regard to legally-binding obligations,99 and secondly with regard 
to the directness of the enforcement (i.e., whether the rights can be enforced 
by natural or legal subjects before national courts). For instance, the  right to 
food is explicitly protected in 24 national constitutions,100 and 46 constitutions 
guarantee an adequate standard of living.101
A. LACK OF ENFORCEMENT – GENERAL 
CONSIDERATIONS
In this context, it is argued that social human rights have a lack of enforcement, 
because they do not create individual rights and cannot, as a consequence, be 
challenged or brought to life in a domestic court proceeding. In domestic legal 
systems, an individual is usually only entitled to bring a claim if he or she is the 
holder of an enforceable right. If this is not the case, a national court would not 
hear the case based upon this argument. Th us, the aforementioned statement 
would indeed hamper the legal value of social human rights. Yet, it does not 
seem to be totally convincing.
Th e legal binding of social human rights can derive from one of the 
aforementioned three  sources of Public International Law laid down in 
Article  38 para. 1 lit. a)-c) ICJ Statute. Most important, for the scrutiny 
at hand, are the sources provided by treaty law and the rules of customary 
international law. Th e legal status of the  right to food, and hence its 
enforcement, diff ers due to its international legal source. Regarding treaty law, 
the  CESCR has stated that any human-rights treaty imposes three diff erent 
levels of obligations for its member states; namely, the obligations to respect, 
98 ECJ, C-162/96, Racke, ECR 1998, I-3688.
99 Staberock, note 46 above, para. 7.
100 Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, note 10 above, “Th e Right to an Adequate Standard of Living”, 
p. 887 et seq.
101 See the overview given by Mechlem, note 12 above, para. 25. Th e numbers vary, the  FAO 
calculates that 33 states have constitutions which include the  right to food in a broader 
context, see Lidija Knuth and Margret Vidar, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, Constitutional and Legal Protection of the  Right to Food around the World, (Rome: 
 FAO, 2011), p. 21.
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to protect, and to fulfi l, including an obligation to facilitate and an obligation 
to provide.102
In addition, the term “progressive realisation” entailed in Article  2 para. 
1  ICESCR is the crucial notion for the national enforcement of the Covenant. 
Some authors conclude from this that domestic legal implementation is limited 
to civil and political rights.103 Th is view fails to pay suffi  cient regard to the 
fact that even the  ICESCR secures minimum rights which can be enforced 
immediately.104 Th is is the view of the  CESCR as well, which stated even in GC 
3, one of its fi rst  General Comments, that the obligation to ensure rights without 
discrimination, the obligation to take steps to ensure these rights, and the 
respect for a minimum core of rights, all carry immediate obligations.105 Hence, 
a violation of the  ICESCR exists if a state is not guaranteeing the minimum level 
of being “free from hunger”.106 In addition, it is disputed as to whether Article 11 
can only be realised in a progressive manner in accordance with Article 2 para. 
1  ICESCR.
B. TREATY LAW
Th e member states of the  ICESCR have to incorporate the treaty into their 
domestic law, either by using a monistic or a dualistic system.107 In a monistic 
system, an international treaty will become automatically part of the national 
legal order, while, in dualist countries, a state act of incorporation is necessary.108 
Independently from the dogmatic question of incorporation, the international 
legal order requires a state to provide the respective treaty with an appropriate 
status in its legal order.109 Th is can be qualifi ed as an international duty of 
co-operation.110
102  CESCR, GC 12, para. 15. According to GC 12 the obligation to respect ensures that anyone has 
access to adequate food resources. Th e obligation to protect means that the states guarantee 
that no other actor deprives individuals of their access to adequate food. Th e obligation 
to facilitate means that a state must pro-actively engage in measures guaranteeing the 
availability of food resources. Finally, the (legal) access to the  right to food must be secured 
by the Member States. See, also, Eide and Rosas, note 3 above, pp. 9–23 et seq.
103 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism, 2nd ed., (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 110 et seq., states: “where there is no right there can be no 
remedy.”
104 Staberock, note 46 above, para. 13.
105  CESCR, GC 3, para.1; Staberock, note 46 above, para. 13.
106  CESCR, GC 12, para. 17. As the GC clearly and correctly points out, it has to be distinguished 
between unable and unwilling states.
107 Scheinin, note 49 above, pp. 29–49.
108 Sandra Liebenberg, “Th e Protection of Economic and Social Rights in Domestic Legal 
Systems”, in: Eide, Krause and Rosas (eds), note 3 above, pp. 55–77.
109 Staberock, note 46 above, para. 18.
110 Anja Seibert-Fohr, “Neue internationale Anforderungen an die Überführung von 
Menschenrechtsabkommen in nationales Recht: Das Verhältnis des internationals Pakts 
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Th e legal situation led the  CESCR in 1990 to issue the statement that, for the 
implementation of the  ICESCR, “legislation is highly desirable”.111 Applying the 
above-mentioned principles to the  right to food entailed in Article 11  ICESCR, 
the member states have a general duty to incorporate the treaty text directly 
into their domestic law.112 Th is would inter alia avoid the translation of treaty 
provisions and the problems connected with it.113
Th e concept of  eff ective implementation is a central element for the 
implementation of treaty law, i.e., the means used should produce results which 
are consistent with the full discharge of the state’s obligations.114 Th is is rather 
complicated for social human rights due to their discretionary legal nature. 
In GC 9, the  CESCR addressed this issue and stated that it was obligatory for 
the states to use all the means at their disposal.115 Moreover, Article 27 VCLT 
requires the modifi cation of national legal orders to give full eff ect to the 
provisions of a treaty.116 Special attention should be given to justiciability, which 
is oft en the best way to grant an eff ective domestic legal eff ect to the Covenant’s 
rights.117
Justiciability does not mean that  ICESCR rights should be granted the status 
of self-executing rights. Th ese two legal concepts are independent from each 
other. It is frequently questioned as to whether a Covenant establishing social 
human rights can be self-executing. Such an understanding of the  ICESCR is 
not necessarily cogent. Th e Covenant does not entail a provision excluding such 
a possibility. Moreover, in its draft ing history, such a norm had been discussed 
but was not accepted.118 Th is supports the opinion that the draft ers did not want 
to exclude the possibility of self-execution of the  ICESCR rights. As a “living 
instrument”,119 the states are certainly not bound by the intention of the draft ers, 
but Article  32 VCLT considers the travaux préparatoires as supplementary 
means of  interpretation,120 which can be considered for the understanding of the 
Covenant. Moreover, social human rights are only becoming more trenchant in 
the due course of time, and the living instrument- interpretation today is more 
in favour of accepting the status of self-executing rights than before. Th us, in 
general, it is possible for states to grant the  ICESCR rights self-executing status 
as part of their implementation procedure.
über bürgerliche und politische Rechte zu nationalem Recht”, (2002) 62 Zeitschrift  für 
ausländisches öff entliches Recht und Völkerrecht, p. 391 et seq.
111  CESCR, GC 3, para. 3.
112  CESCR, GC 9, para. 8.
113 Ibid.
114  CESCR, GC 9, para. 5.
115 UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/24, para.2.
116  CESCR, GC 9, para. 3.
117 Ibid., para. 7.
118 Ibid., para. 11.
119 ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Namibia (Legal Consequences), ICJ Rep. 1071, p. 16, para. 53.
120 See Gardiner, note 57 above, p. 303 et seq.
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A further distinction has to be drawn between the direct and indirect 
protection of these rights in the domestic legal orders. Direct protection means 
that international social human rights can be enforced by the legal action of 
natural and legal subjects, while indirect protection is a much weaker way of 
protection through other rules of law, usually by means of  interpretation or the 
application of sets of rules. Th e direct protection method should be the preferred 
mechanism for the implementation because it ensures much more diligently 
the protection of these rights for those in need: to wit, human beings without 
adequate access to food resources.
C. LIMITATIONS
Th e  right to food is not guaranteed without limits. In this regard, Article  4 
 ICESCR deserves special attention. Th is provision regulates the general rule that 
the rights enshrined in the Covenant can be limited by national laws if these 
laws are in compliance with the nature of the  ICESCR rights and do serve to 
promote general welfare in a democratic society. Th is condition is, compared 
to the one entailed in the ICCPR, far-reaching due to the somewhat undefi ned 
limits of the state’s right, considered to be “shield and sword” for the member 
states.121 Th is becomes more important in the light of the oft en open-wording of 
the  ICESCR rights, which have to be implemented and executed by the member 
states.
As a limitation to the Covenant’s rights, the norm has to be interpreted 
strictly.122 Article 4  ICESCR is not particularly vague and its requirements can 
be clearly determined by way of  interpretation. Th e “promotion of the general 
welfare in a democratic society” is an undefi ned legal term that leaves much 
room for  interpretation. It grants the member states a very wide margin of 
discretion that is hardly justiciable. Yet, if a measure is clearly out of bounds and 
unsuitable for the promotion of the general welfare, it would be incompatible 
with this requirement. Th e term “democratic” should not be over-interpreted, 
and covers a number of democratic theories.
More important for the acceptance of a limitation is the fi rst requirement that 
the laws have to be in compliance with the nature of the  ICESCR rights. Hence, 
if the  right to food constitutes a core obligation that is a fundamental part of the 
nature of the Covenant, any restriction of the core part of the right would be 
illegal. Th is conclusion has to be drawn for the minimum rights entailed in the 
 ICESCR because any limitation would necessarily constitute an infringement of 
the nature of the Convention.
121 Alston and Quinn, note 63 above, pp. 156–193.
122 ICJ, Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 2004, para. 136 et seq.
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D. CUSTOMARY LAW/GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Th e rules of customary law and the general principles of law can also become 
part of domestic law; in Germany, this is laid down in Article 25 Basic Law.123 
Th e provision covers, despite a formerly narrow reading of it, both sources of 
international law.124 In general international law, how a rule of customary 
international law or a general principle of international law is applied in a 
domestic legal order is an issue of the underlying legal system, a monistic or a 
dualistic one, as well. Th e aforementioned ideas apply in this regard, too.
E.  INTERPRETATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE  ICESCR
An indirect way of enforcing social human rights can be found in the 
 interpretation of national law in the light of the applicable international social 
norms. Such a procedure is followed by several courts in a number of countries125 
and is a very discretionary approach.126 Th e  CESCR states that the  interpretation 
in favour of the Covenant is an international obligation of a state.127
Th e weakness of this approach lies in the absolute limit of  interpretation, 
which may constitute a hindrance to provide full eff ect to social human rights. If 
the wording or the telos of a national norm cannot be interpreted in a favourable 
way for social human rights, the respective national norm cannot be interpreted 
in the light of social rights, and these rights, as such, cannot be enforced by using 
the tool of  interpretation. Due to the constraints stated, this approach can rightly 
be considered as being the weakest one among the various possibilities for norm 
enforcement.
F. RETROGRESSIVE MEASURES
It is also disputed whether retrogressive measures constitute a violation of the 
Covenant and can be directly enforced. Strictly argued, the limits of Article 2 
123 Th e provision reads: “Th e general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal 
law. Th ey shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the 
inhabitants of the federal territory.”
124 Ondolf Rojahn, in: Ingo von Münch and Philip Kunig, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 6th ed., 
(Munich: C.H. Beck, 2012), Art. 25 Basic Law, para. 6.
125 See the overview given by Liebenberg, note 108 above, pp. 55–76 et seq. In Germany, the 
 ICESCR become prominent in the discussion about the introduction of tuition fees at its 
universities and had been applied by a number of national courts including the Federal 
Administrative Court; see Stefan Lorenzmeier, Case note on the ruling of the Federal 
Administrative Court, ZIS 2009, 438.
126 Riedel, note 66 above, pp. 574–575.
127 CESC, GC 9, para. 15.
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para. 1  ICESCR are not applicable in such a situation, because the social human 
right has been fully realised by a member state and the full realisation is the 
ultimate obligation of result in Art.  2 para. 1.128 A possible example is the 
express codifi cation of access to food resources and the realisation of such a 
right by national civil and political human rights which also establish social 
rights.
One school of thought relies on the wording of Article  2.1  ICESCR, and 
states that the “full realisation” is not covered by the agreement and that such a 
situation would not deprive a member state, due to the inherent issue of resource 
availability, of its mandate to ensure only a minimum core standard and start 
the “progressive realisation” anew. A further argument in this respect is that 
the  ICESCR does not have a clear provision on the limits of the guaranteed 
rights.129
Th ese arguments do not seem to be fully conclusive. A retrogressive measure 
aft er full harmonisation has to be considered an aliud to the progressive 
realisation of Article  2 para. 1  ICESCR, but it is, in itself, a violation of the 
Covenant because the obligation to take steps with a view to achieving the full 
realisation of the  ICESCR-rights could not be fulfi lled. As such, the prohibition 
of regressive measures has to be qualifi ed as an accessory right to the primary 
obligation of the social human right.130 Otherwise, every member state would 
be entitled to circumvent its obligations by using a retrogressive measure, and 
social human rights could never be realised.
Th e Committee seems to prefer a third way. It considers retrogressive 
measures as a justifi able violation of the Covenant.131 Th us, GC 3 states that 
retrogressive measures must be “fully justifi ed”.132 Without providing possible 
grounds for justifi cation, such as the principle of proportionality, the CSCR 
clarifi ed its position in its 2007 Statement regarding the Optional Protocol to 
the Covenant by adding that the “burden of proof rests with the state party” to 
show that it has abided by these conditions of justifi cation for any retrogressive 
measure.133 It is argued that the  CESCR envisaged two forms of justifi cation, 
fi rst, an economic crisis in a member state, and, second, the use of a retrogressive 
measure as a means for the improvement of the totality of the rights of the 
128 See, for example,  CESCR, GC 3, para. 9.
129 See, for example, the legal discussion in Germany on the re-introduction of tuition fees, 
especially OVG NRW, 15 A 1596/07, judgment of 9 October 2007.
130 Matthias Kradolfer, “Verpfl ichtungsgrad sozialer Menschenrechte”, (2012) 50 Archiv des 
Völkerrechts, pp. 255–269.
131 Craven, note 10 above, p. 131 et seq.
132  CESCR, GC 3, para. 9.
133  CESCR, Statement: An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the maximum available 
resources under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, E/.12/2007/1, 10 May 2007, para. 9. 
See, also, Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, note 10 above, “Progressive Realization of  ICESCR 
Rights”, p. 150.
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Covenant.134 Th is clearly shows the very practical approach of the Committee.135 
As a result, such measures have to be justifi ed in the light of the full use of the 
available resources.136
Dogmatically, the Committee’s view is also not fully conclusive due to the 
inherent violation of Article 2 (1)  ICESCR, which considers the full realisation 
as the ultimate goal.  In this light and even if some do not follow the proposed 
opinion that retrogressive measures always constitute a breach of the  ICESCR, 
any justifi cation for such a measure can hardly meet the requirements of the 
proportionality-test, and the vast majority of cases will, in practice, constitute 
a violation of the Covenant. Th is is especially true if the retrogressive measure 
is part of a deliberate policy of the respective state.137 Hence, retrogressive 
measures constitute at least a prima facie violation of Article 2 para. 1  ICESCR 
that can only be justifi ed in extreme circumstances such as severe economic 
crises. A “ trade-off ” between human rights cannot be accepted as a ground 
for justifi cation because the Covenant does not accept a hierarchy between the 
enshrined rights.
G. FURTHER ISSUES
Th e full implementation of the  right to food is not limited to legislative measures. 
It also requires an adequate institutional framework, political programmes and 
administrative measures within a state.138 Th ese types of general measures 
would lead to a holistic application of social human rights and could foster the 
general well-being of a society.
Th e elaborated monitoring system of the  CESCR is a tool for the Committee 
to engage in a dialogue with the member states on their domestic implementation 
of  ICESCR rights.139 A state with diffi  culties in providing the required adequate 
protection of human rights should be given the opportunity to improve 
its record. Th e  General Comments, as a part of the monitoring system, are 
designed to provide authoritative guidance to states discharging their reporting 
obligations.140 Moreover, they serve to create a harmonious application of social 
human rights among the member states of the Covenant.
134 Craven, note 10 above, p. 132.
135 Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, note 10 above, “Progressive Realization of  ICESCR Rights”, p. 150.
136  CESCR, GC 3, para. 9.
137 Craven, note 10 above, p. 132.
138 Mechlem, note 12 above, para. 26.
139 Staberock, note 46 above, para. 11.
140 Ibid., para. 11.
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V. CONCLUSION
Transnational social human rights such as the  right to food are full and 
enforceable human rights at both international and national level.141 Th eir 
original weakness, the vague, very resource-oriented wording of the obligations, 
has, over time, developed into a fully enforceable legal right, whose core 
minimum content is, at the very least, fully justiciable and enforceable at 
international, and, even more importantly, at national level. Furthermore, the 
enforcement of social human rights cannot only be achieved by direct measures 
granting a subjective right, but can also be achieved by indirect measures such 
as the  interpretation of national law in the light of the  ICESCR, and should be 
accompanied by structural as well as political measures. Monitoring mechanisms 
carried out by treaty and non-treaty bodies as well as the “shadow reports” of 
non-governmental organisations are an eff ective tool for the realisation of 
transnational social human rights at the international and the national level.
In this regard, it seems necessary, for the enforcement of social human rights, 
that the member states of the  ICESCR not only apply the law, but also foster their 
realisation of social human rights by other means, such as the information on 
the existence of transnational social human rights and the ratifi cation of other 
legal documents like the above-mentioned Optional Protocol to the  ICESCR. 
Th e proposed measures would support the full realisation of transnational social 
human rights to a great degree.
141 See, also, Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller, “Th e Struggle for Transnational Social 
Rights”, Chapter 2 in the volume, Section IV.
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CHAPTER 6
HORIZONTAL EFFECTS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EU PROPOSAL 
FOR A NON-FINANCIAL 
REPORTING FRAMEWORK
Ibrahim Kanalan and Sebastian Eickenjäger
I. INTRODUCTION
Th e accountability of private actors, especially the accountability of 
multinational corporations (MNCs), for human rights violations is one of the 
most disputed issues, not only in the academic world, but also in international, 
regional and national politics.1 Th e question of whether private actors should 
be bound by human rights, and, if so, through which means and to what extent 
they can be held accountable, is more controversial than ever. Th is question is 
one of the major challenges in the twenty-fi rst century.2 Consequently, a large 
number of approaches and concepts have been developed in the last decades, 
which aspire to solve this very question.
Regarding this issue, currently the most contested approach is the struggle 
to create an international binding  business and human rights treaty. Th e debate 
on a binding treaty has arisen again in the course of a draft  Resolution3 that 
1 See Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo, “Th e New Political Role of Business in a 
Globalized World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and its Implications for the Firm, 
Governance, and Democracy”, (2011) 48 Journal of Management Studies, p. 899, at 903 et seq.
2 See Th e Panel of Eminent Persons, “Protecting Dignity: An Agenda for Human Rights”, (2008), 
available at: www.udhr60.ch/documentation.html.
3 UN  Human Rights Council, “Draft  Resolution draft ed by Ecuador and South Africa: 
Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations 
and other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights” (2014), UN Doc A/
HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1. See, also, the Resolution draft ed by Norway requesting the working 
group to “launch an inclusive and transparent consultative process (…) to explore and 
facilitate the sharing of legal and practical measures to improve access to remedy, judicial and 
non-judicial, for victims of business-related abuses, including the benefi ts and limitations of 
a legally binding instrument, and to prepare a report thereon”. (UN  Human Rights Council 
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has been submitted to the UN  Human Rights Council by Ecuador and South 
Africa, and which was fi nally passed in June 2014. Th e Resolution stipulates the 
setting up of an open-ended intergovernmental working group with a mandate 
to elaborate an “international legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights”. In 
contrast to other initiatives to hold corporations accountable for human rights 
violations, this approach would be a binding inter-governmental instrument 
that would be part of international law without any restrictions.4 While the 
realisation, possible outcome and content is highly contested and will have to 
be negotioated in the process set in motion by the UN  Human Rights Council,5 
the intergovernmental working group already focused, in its fi rst session, 
on major topics and issues, namely, the question of the legal nature of MNCs 
in international law, the human rights to be covered by the instrument, the 
obligations of states to guarantee that human rights are respected by MNCs, 
including extraterritorial obligations, enhancing the responsibility (and liability) 
of MNCs, and the building of national, international and corporation-based 
mechanisms for access to remedy.6
Acknowledging the major importance of a binding treaty on the issue of 
 business and human rights, this chapter aims to address the question of the 
accountability of private actors, that is, the horizontal eff ect of human rights, 
from a diff erent perspective, and to propose an unconventional approach to 
ascertaining the accountability of private actors for human rights violations.
Aft er sketching the direct legal human rights obligations of multinational 
business corporations de lege lata, in the fi rst part of this chapter we will claim 
that, by endeavouring to hold private actors accountable for human rights 
violations and thus binding them to fundamental human rights, it is necessary 
to go beyond classical concepts and patterns of human rights and international 
law. Th us, it is essential for a new approach to detach itself from the traditional 
understanding of human rights, and to consider the origins of human rights as a 
starting-point for the justifi cation of the validity of human rights in the private 
sphere. In so doing, fi rst, the justifi cation of the validity of human rights for 
private actors has to be derived from the normative power of the human rights 
(2014), “Draft  Resolution draft ed by Norway: Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and other Business Enterprises“, UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.1).
4 See Bread for the World, FIAN International et al, “ Right to Food and Nutrition Watch – 
Th e Treaty on TNCs and the Struggle to Stop Corporate Impunity: An Interview with Civil 
Society“, (October 2015), p 39, 40.
5 Recent information on the proposed binding treaty and current statements, initiatives and 
commentaries are available at: www.business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty.
6 UN  Human Rights Council, “Draft  Report of the Open-ended intergovernmental working 
group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human 
rights – Report of the Chairperson-Rapporteur: Amb. María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés“ 
(2015).
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itself, and, second, the abstract  idea of human rights has to be transferred to 
private actors.
In the second part of the chapter, we will try to bridge the gap between 
theory and practice. Th us, we want to explore how such a concept can be realised 
in a progressive manner within the framework of the struggle for transnational 
social rights.7 In this respect, we will analyse new approaches on non-fi nancial 
reporting;8 to be precise: the actual legislation of the EU on non-fi nancial 
reporting. In so doing, we will fi rst present a brief introduction on non-fi nancial 
reporting and the EU legislation in this fi eld. Aft er that, we will review the EU’s 
approach and assess the potential of this initiative for realising the horizontal 
eff ect of human rights and thus its potential for the struggle of marginalised 
persons and groups.
II. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PRIVATE ACTORS
A. ACCOUNTABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS DE LEGE LATA
Although the violation of human rights by private actors is not a new occurrence, 
a satisfactory solution to this problem has not been found yet. Mostly in line 
with the traditional concept of international law, the human rights obligations of 
private actors and thus the obligations of multinational corporations is rejected 
since they are not recognised as  subjects of international law.9 Although it is no 
doubt possible to impose human rights obligations on private actors within the 
framework of international law by means of international treaties,10 there is no 
international treaty which codifi es the general accountability of private actors 
for human rights violations.11 Customary international law hardly provides any 
general human rights obligations for private actors.12 In the national legal order, 
7 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller, “Th e Struggle for Transnational Social 
Rights”, Chapter 2 in this volume.
8 Also known as social accounting, social and environmental accounting, corporate social 
reporting,  corporate social responsibility reporting, non-fi nancial accounting.
9 However, the legal personality of multinational corporations is highly disputed. See, for 
example, Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), Chapter 1 and Chapter 6, especially p.  266 et seq; Adam McBeth, 
International Economic Actors and Human Rights, (New York: Routledge Publishing, 2010), 
p. 56 et seq.
10 See Steven R. Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights: A Th eory of Legal Responsibility”, 
(2001) 111 Th e Yale Law Journal, p. 443, at 538–539.
11 Occasionally, international treaties exist which regulate the responsibility of private actors 
for human rights violations, for instance, the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court. 
See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 
p. 94 et seq; Ratner, note 10 above, p. 467.
12 See  John Ruggie, “ Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of 
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts”, Report of the Special Representative 
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there are some regulations which bind private actors to human rights and hold 
them accountable for human rights violations.13 Th e most prominent provision is 
the  Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in the USA.14 Th ere are similar provisions in 
the UK and Australia, and they are also being discussed for the EU.15 However, 
these provisions are, on the one hand, solely occasional regulations, while, on 
the other, they face various diffi  culties in preventing human rights violations,16 
and can barely provide suffi  cient protection of human rights.17 Th ese diffi  culties 
include, for instance, the lack of interest on the part of the home states of the 
business corporations in question to pass comprehensive binding regulations. 
Host states, on the other hand, are either not interested in regulating, or, due to 
asymmetrical power relations, not able to regulate the human rights violations of 
private actors.18
Another option in order to hold private actors accountable for human rights 
violations can be considered by means of public and private  codes of conduct (the 
self-regulation of private actors). In the last decades, such provisions have been of 
prominence and have led to the creation of a large number of initiatives.19 Some 
of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/035 para. 34. But see, 
also, William S. Dodge, “Corporate Liability Under Customary International Law”, (2012) 43 
Georgetown Journal of International Law, p. 1045.
13 For detailed analysis, see, for example, Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human 
Rights Litigation, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); Jennifer A. Zerk, Multinationals and 
 Corporate Social Responsibility, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). See, also, 
Ratner, note 10 above, pp. 533–536.
14 See, generally, Beth Stephens, “Corporate Accountability: International Human Rights 
Litigation Against Corporations in US Courts”, in: Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-
Zarifi  (eds), Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law, (Th e Hague et 
al: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 209; Joseph, note 13 above, p. 21 et seq.
15 Joseph, note 13 above, p. 113 et seq; Olivier De Schutter, “Th e Accountability of Multinationals 
for Human Rights Violations in European Law”, (2004) CHRGJ Working Paper No 1, 
available at: www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/wp/s04deschutter.pdf.
16 See, for example, the discussion around the ATCA: Jochen von Bernstorff , Marc Jacob and 
John Dingfelder Stone, “Th e Alien Tort Statute before the US Supreme Court in the Kiobel 
case”, (2012) 72 Zeitschrift  für ausländisches Recht und Völkerrecht, p. 579; Jennifer L. Karnes, 
Comment: “Pirates Incorporated?: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and the Uncertain 
State of Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute”, 
(2012) 60 Buff alo Law Review, p. 823.
17 See Alice de Jonge, Transnational Corporations and International Law: Accountability in the 
Global Business  Environment, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), p. 91 et seq, & 
117; Joseph, note 13 above, p. 153 et seq.
18  John Ruggie, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for  Business and Human Rights”, 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 
paras. 14 et seq; Oxfam, Land and Power – Th e Growing Scandal surrounding the New Wave of 
Investments in Land, (September 2011) Oxfam Briefi ng Paper, p. 23 et seq.
19 See, for example,  John Ruggie, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises (2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/97; idem, note 12 above, (2007) UN Doc A/
HRC/4/035; Clapham, note 9 above, p.  195 et seq; S.D. Murphy, “Taking Multinational 
Corporate  Codes of Conduct to the Next Level”, (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
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of the most prominent instruments can be found, for instance, in the Guidelines 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
regarding the duty of multinational corporations (Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises),20 or the Tripartite Declaration of the International Labour 
Organization ( ILO) concerning multinational enterprises and  social policy.21 
Ultimately, the approach of the business actors to regulate their accountability 
for human rights violations by themselves can be discussed as an alternative 
approach to bind private actors to human rights obligations. According to the 
concept of “ Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR), business actors endeavour 
to regulate their human rights responsibilities in order to prevent human rights 
violations.22 Th is concept includes the “voluntary” self-binding provisions of 
business actors to take “social responsibility” for human rights violations.23
What all these instruments have in common is that they operate, 
from the perspective of state law, upon a “voluntary basis” and contain 
“recommendations” for states or business enterprises. Th ey utilise a vague 
language with regard to obligations and hardly have any legally-binding 
nature according to the concept of the state law.24 In this manner, the  OECD 
Guidelines, for instance, state that the Guidelines are recommendations of the 
member states to business enterprises. Th eir observance is voluntary and not 
legally enforceable.25 Another weakness of the Guidelines is the insuffi  cient and 
non-coercive monitoring system.26
Law, p.  389; Olivier De Schutter, Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, (Oxford-
Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2006); de Jonge, note 17 above, p. 21 et seq.
20 OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises – 2011 updated version. (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2011).
21 Th e Declaration was adopted at the 204th Session (1977) and amended at its 279th Session 
(2000) and lastly at its 295th Session (2006).
22 Ruggie, note 12 above, (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/035 paras. 63 et seq; European Commission, 
“Green Paper” (2001) (COM (2001) 366) paras. 20 et seq; European Commission, “A Renewed 
EU Strategy 2011–14 for  Corporate Social Responsibility”, (2011) (COM (2011) 681), p.  6; 
Murphy, note 19 above.
23 See, for example, the European Commission, “Green Paper”, paras. 8 et seq, para. 52. See, 
for a comprehensive concept, the European Commission, “A Renewed EU Strategy”, note 22 
above, p. 6 et seq.
24 See, for example, Justine Nolan, “With Power comes Responsibility: Human Rights and 
Corporate Responsibilities”, (2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law Journal, p. 581, 587 
et seq, & 593 et seq; David Kinley and Junko Tadiki, “From Talk to Walk: Th e Emergence 
of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law”, (2004) 44 Virginia 
Journal of International Law, p. 931 & 950 et seq.
25  OECD Guidelines, Concepts and Principles para. 1 (p. 17).
26 Th e Guidelines provide so-called National Contact Points (NCP) but the object and 
tasks of this monitoring mechanism are very general, ibid., Part II, Implementation 
Procedure, p.  65 et seq. See, also, Germanwatch, “Überarbeitung der OECD-Leitsätzefür 
multinationaleUnternehmen”, (May 2011) available at: www.germanwatch.org/en/
download/2215.pdf; Amnesty International, “Th e 2010–11 Update of the  OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises has come to an end: the OECD must now turn into  eff ective 
implementation”, (23  May 2011), available at: www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/
IOR30/001/2011/es/6bcc9b85–9a89–4511–9712-a965ee267564/ior300012011en.html.
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Recently, the former  Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, 
 John Ruggie, proposed a new framework for the accountability of private actors 
for human rights violations. He elaborated the duties of corporations within 
the “‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework”,27 and, provided the so-called 
 Guiding Principles,28 with recommendations to implement this concept. 
According to this concept, business corporations have the obligation to respect 
human rights, just as states have obligations to protect human rights against 
the violations which are caused by private actors. As far as the normative 
foundation of the horizontal eff ect of human rights is concerned, Ruggie refers 
to the “social expectation of the society” to impose obligations on private actors. 
Th e obligations of business actors to respect human rights are, according to 
Ruggie, the “the baseline norm for all companies in all situations” which have 
acquired “near-universal recognition”.29 He bases his concept upon voluntary 
obligations.30
Even though these approaches are important steps to hold corporations 
accountable for human rights violations, they are, both for the aforementioned 
reasons and for the fact that they are considered from the state-centric 
perspective of law as voluntary provisions, not suffi  cient to protect human 
rights comprehensively. Ultimately, the theoretical and doctrinal approaches 
do not provide a persuasive and satisfactory solution to the horizontal eff ect of 
human rights, and thus do not hold private actors accountable for human rights 
violations because they adhere to the orthodox concept of international law31 
and the liberal construction of human rights.32 In sum, convincing solutions 
to the problématique of the accountability of business corporations for human 
rights violations have not been found.
27 Ruggie, note 18 above, (2008) UNDoc A/HRC/8/5.
28  John Ruggie, “ Guiding Principles on  Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework”, Report of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary- General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31.
29  John Ruggie, “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises”, (2009) 
UN Doc A/HRC/11/13paras. 46–48; idem, note 18 above, (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 paras. 
54–55.
30 Ruggie, note 28 above, (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 para. 6; idem, note 18 above, (2008) 
UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 para. 9, 54. See, also, Wouter Vandenhole, “Emerging Normative 
Frameworks on Transnational Human Rights Obligations”, (2012) EUI Working Papers, 
RSCAS 2012/17, p. 11 et seq.
31 Critical to the role of international law for the accountability gap, see Penelope Simons, 
“International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability for 
Violations of Human Rights”, (2012) 3 Journal of Human Rights and  Environment, p. 5.
32 See, for a detailed critique, Ibrahim Kanalan, “Horizontal Eff ect of Human Rights in the Era 
of Transnational Constellations: On the Accountability of Private Actors for Human Rights 
Violations”, (2014), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539110, p. 24 et seq.
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B. HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS DE LEGE 
FERENDA: GOING BEYOND CLASSICAL CONCEPTS 
AND APPROACHES
Against this background, we would like to off er a new concept for the horizontal 
eff ect of human rights and the accountability of private actors, which we will 
present in two steps. First, we would like to generalise the normative  idea of 
human rights and highlight the reason for the horizontal validity of human 
rights. And secondly, we will explain why private actors should be bound by 
human rights. We argue that, for a comprehensive and appropriate concept 
of horizontal validity, it is essential to go beyond classical patterns. First, it is 
necessary to base the validity of human rights in the private sphere on the 
normative  idea of human rights itself. Secondly, the horizontal validity requires 
a new understanding of human rights, that is, to conceive of human rights as 
a means by which to the regulate communicative processes of all functional 
systems with individuals. Consequently, the communication of functional 
systems has to be taken as the starting-point for the accountability of private 
actors.
1. Abstraction of the  Idea of Human Rights – Addressing the Roots of Human 
Rights
Th e main questions for the foundation of the eff ect of human rights in the 
private sphere are as follows: What is the normative  idea of human rights, for 
what do human rights stand? Th e origin and  idea of human rights is one of the 
most contested and disputed issues within a rights  discourse. Nevertheless, there 
is no universal valid foundation for human rights,33 and it would exceed the 
scope of this chapter to re-open this discussion. Consequently, in the following, 
we will solely outline the main points in order to be able to proceed properly.
Beyond most disputes, a historical consideration displays the formation 
of human rights as the result of societal struggles, even though it cannot 
be neglected that functional reasons are probably more decisive than the 
33 See, for example, Charles R. Beitz, Th e  Idea of Human Rights, (Oxford et al: Oxford University 
Press, 2009); Jerome J. Shestack, “Th e Philosophic Foundation of Human Rights”, (1998) 
20 Human Rights Quarterly, p.  201; Upendra Baxi, Th e Future of Human Rights, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006); Makua W. Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural 
Critique, (Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); Michael Freeman, “Th e 
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights”, (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly, p.  491; 
David Kennedy, “Th e International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?”, (2002) 
15 Harvard Human Rights Journal, p.  101; James W. Nickel, “Rethinking Indivisibility: 
Towards a Th eory of Supporting Relations between Human Rights”, (2008) 30 Human Rights 
Quarterly, p.  984. See, also, William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law 
from a Global Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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normative reasons for the formation of rights in general.34 In its normative 
conception, human rights are the outcome of diverse struggles, protests, and 
 resistance against injustice generally, and particularly against the absence 
of freedom, equality, and independence, as well as against imperialism, 
colonialism, oppression and humiliation, to name but a few.35 Briefl y, it can be 
said that, in their modern formation, human rights are responses to structural 
experiences of injustice.36 Consequently, they do not – in contrast to the claim 
of liberal theory – operate solely as defensive rights against the interference of 
the state, that is, the obligation to respect. Instead, they have to be conceived 
comprehensively, serving as pro-active or positive rights which enable the 
inclusion of individuals in diverse functional systems, that is, the obligation 
to protect and fulfi l (the inclusionary function).37 Th us, the accomplishment 
of human rights is not exclusively normative, but is also functional.38 Due to 
the inter-dependence of the structural experiences of injustice and societal 
expectations (normative reasons), on the one hand, and the formation and shape 
of human rights according to power formation (functional reasons), on the other, 
the positivisation of demands and interests is primarily caused by historical-
sociological circumstances. Th us, the demands and interests were initially 
focused on negative rights, and successively on positive rights, with both the 
elements of protection and fulfi lment. Th e codifi cation and evolution of rights 
in its progressive and emancipatory manner refl ects the needs and interests of 
the society in question.39 Th is process operates in a dialectical manner, and it 
34 Chris Th ornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011).
35 See, for example, the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See, also, José-
Manuel Barreto, “Imperialism and Decolonization as Scenarios of Human Rights History”, 
in: idem (ed), Human Rights from a Th ird World Perspective, (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2013), p. 140.
36 Winfried Brugger, “Menschenrechte im modernen Staat”, (1989) 114 Archiv des öff entlichen 
Rechts, p. 537; Barreto, note 35 above.
37 Gunther Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2012), 
p.  207 et seq; idem, “Transnational Fundamental Rights: Horizontal Eff ect?”, (2011) 40 
Rechtspilosophie & Rechtstheorie, p.  191, p.  200 et seq, & 203 et seq; Gert Verschraegen, 
“Systems Th eory and the Paradox of Human Rights”, in: Michael King and Chris Th ornhill 
(eds), Luhmann on Law and Politics, (Oxford-Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2006), p.  101; 
Niklas Luhmann, Grundrechte als Institution, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1965), p.  138. 
See, for the inclusionary function of (human) rights especially for the political system, 
Chris Th ornhill, “Th e Future of the State”, in: Poul F. Kjaer, Gunther Teubner and Alberto 
Febbrajo (eds), Th e Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: Th e Dark Side of  Functional 
Diff erentiation, (Oxford-Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 377, at 381; Chris Th ornhill, 
“Re-conceiving Rights Revolutions: Th e Persistence of a Sociological Defi cit in Th eories of 
Rights”, (2010) 31 Zeitschrift  für Rechtssoziologie, p. 109.
38 Accordingly, Th ornhill emphasises the inclusionary function of (human) rights as well. He 
even argues that the formation of (human) rights are primarily functionally conditioned; see 
Th ornhill, note 34 above.
39 In general, in respect to human rights, see Th omas H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social 
Class”, in: Th omas H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class, 
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has to be stressed – in contrast to the common notion of liberal theory – that 
there is no lucid distinction between the exclusionary and inclusionary function 
of human rights, and that there is no linear process of the formation and shaping 
of human rights as the traditional concept asserts. One of the fi rst human rights 
documents of modernity, namely, the French constitution of 1789 and the 
subsequent constitution of 1848 aft er the revolution that year, already codifi ed 
human rights in “negative” and “positive” forms. Human rights as a whole had 
exclusionary and inclusionary functions. Th e fact that the endangerment of 
human rights was originally caused essentially by the state is due to the fact 
that the political system with the state at its centre was the most diff erentiated 
system of society at the time.40 On the other hand, this is a very narrow liberal 
European narrative of human rights. From the perspective of the Th ird World, 
there has hardly been a clear distinction between the state and private actors. 
States and corporations were both the actors of colonisation and oppression 
together.41 Th us, human rights have not only been a means against the  violence 
of the state, especially the home state, but also a means for indigenous groups, 
social movements and the struggles of peoples in the Global South to take action 
against (imperial) host states as well as against the policies of international 
institutions and transnational corporations.42 Th ese struggles were not confi ned 
to a mere historical moment in the past, but continue to take place as struggles 
for transnational social rights against national states, international institutions 
and transnational corporations to this very day.43
Th us, the  idea of human rights is comprehensive as asserted and cannot be 
limited to the endangerment exclusively caused by one particular system. Th e 
normative idea behind the purpose of human rights was the prevention and 
elimination of injustice in all its forms, independently of the source of danger, 
which threatens individuals in their integrity, vis-à-vis their lives, their freedom, 
their interests, etc. Th is is the reason why human rights do not operate as “pre-
legal absolute” rights, but rather as “pre-political” and “pre-legal latent rights” 
which both arise out of and are shaped by confl icts both within and between 
diverse systems, such as politics, morals, religion(s), law, the economy, science, 
etc.44 Th e normative basis of human rights lies in its universal demand for 
social justice; justice within each diff erent functional system and between both 
(London: Pluto Press, 1992). See, also, Chris Th ornhill, “Towards a Historical Sociology of 
Constitutional Legitimacy”, (2008) 37 Th eory and Society, p. 161.
40 Gunther Teubner, “Th e Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by ‘Private’ 
Transnational Actors”, (2006) 69 Modern Law Review, p.  327 & 336 et seq; Christoph Beat 
Graber and Gunther Teubner, “Art and Money: Constitutional Rights in the Private Sphere”, 
(1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, p. 61, at 64 et seq.
41 Janet McLean, “Th e Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today?”, (2004) 79 
Indiana Law Journal, p. 363.
42 Barreto, note 35 above, p. 140–141 & p. 159 et seq.
43 See Fischer-Lescano and Möller, note 7 above.
44 See Teubner, note 40 above, p. 336 et seq.
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the systems and their  environment. Th us, it is not only within the jurisdiction 
of states and thus at national level, but also within world society and thus at 
transnational level. Human rights are also intended to prevent all conditions 
and circumstances that threaten and endanger human beings in their vital 
interests and fundamental rights globally. It is thus not the source of danger that 
is crucial, but rather the existence of danger itself. Th us, the prevention of danger 
has to be considered as a central point. Hence, all actors who could possess the 
potential to cause threats and danger for human rights have to be addressed. 
Th e link (connectivity point) for binding any actor to human rights has to be 
the potential that these actors possess and the possibility that they will endanger 
or threaten human rights.45 Since the important fact is the violation of human 
rights, the challenge is hence to identify the actors that cause the violations and 
to hold them accountable.
2. Th e Foundation of Human Rights Obligations for Private Actors
With this premise in mind, that the reason for binding all actors to human 
rights stems from the normative power of human rights, we now turn to analyse 
whether, and, if so, why private actors should be bound by human rights.
At the beginning of the codifi cation of human rights in the eighteenth 
century, it was the state that was powerful and it was the state that constituted 
the most important actor which caused the most danger or posed the greatest 
threat to human rights. However, the evolution of society has involved and seen 
signifi cant changes. Th e diff erentiation and fragmentation of society creates new 
functional systems and thus new diverse actors.46 Having previously been under 
the dominance of political power (the state), the diverse functional systems 
began to become independent and autonomous systems, even though they still 
remained within the shadow of the political system.47 Accordingly, the  systems-
theory approach for the horizontal eff ect of human rights is based upon this 
diagnosis, and enters a new terrain in the  discourse of the binding of private 
actors to human rights.48
Niklas Luhmann had already diagnosed that the maximisation of the 
intrinsic rationality of diverse function systems, which is caused by  functional 
diff erentiation, brings an enormous potential of danger both to society and 
45 See, also, Ratner, note 10 above, p. 512 et seq., 524 et seq., & 540.
46 See Fischer-Lescano and Möller, Chapter I in this volume. In detail, Andreas Fischer-
Lescano and Gunther Teubner, “Regime-Collisions: Th e Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law”, (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 999–
1045.
47 See Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente, note 37 above, p. 179 et seq.
48 In  general, see Teubner, Fundamental Rights, note 37 above; idem, Verfassungsfragmente, note 
37 above, p. 189 et seq; idem, note 40 above. For the fi rst approaches, see, also, Graber and 
Teubner, note 40 above.
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to human beings.49 In line with this diagnosis, Gunther Teubner claims that 
“it is the fragmentation of society that is today central to the human rights 
question”.50 In relation to this, the large number of expansionist systems 
with their sub-systems, organisations and institutions, on the one hand, and 
the diverse interactions, on the other, entails large numbers or quantities of 
communications. Simultaneously, these communications have enormous 
potential to endanger human rights. Teubner articulates this concisely:
“Th ere is not just a single boundary concerning political communication and 
the individual, guarded by human rights. Instead, the same problems arise in 
numerous social institutions, each forming their own boundaries with their human 
environments: not only politics/individual, but also economy/individual, law/
individual, science/individual, medicine/individual (never as a whole/part relation, 
but understood as diff erence between communication and mind/body).”51
Th ese communications not only bring advantages, they are also able to threaten 
the integrity of individuals or even to terminate their existence.
Th e traditional concepts, based upon the supremacy or primacy of the 
state, were able to off er a solution only as long as the political system was able 
to be identifi ed with the society in which it ruled, and was perceived as an 
essential actor in that society. But the collapse of this concept occurs as result 
of the fragmentation of society, causing a multiplication of the boundary 
zones of the autonomous communication-matrices for individuals.52 Th e 
consequence of these events is that the danger does not exclusively result from 
the communications of the political system and thus does not concern the 
relation between the state and individuals, but rather concerns the relation 
between individuals and all functional systems with their diverse sub-systems, 
which, in turn, can be characterised through expansionist tendencies.53 
Hence, the new constellation with regard to the accomplishment (function) 
of human rights is: functional system X versus the individual. Th e danger and 
thus the subsequent violation do not result from a single process with a single 
source and actor (for example, the state), but rather from a large number of 
anonymous and autonomous globalised communication processes of diverse 
functional systems.54 Th erefore, and due to the multiplicative systems and the 
new constellation with its diverse actors, both institutions and communications 
49 Niklas Luhmann, Gesellschaft  der Gesellschaft , Vol 2, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1997), p. 1088 et seq. See, also, Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, note 46 above, p. 25 et seq.
50 Teubner, note 40 above, p. 339.
51 Ibid., p. 339.
52 Ibid., note 40 above, p. 338 et seq; see, also, idem, “Fundamental Rights”, note 37 above, pp. 
209–212.
53 Idem, Verfassungsfragmente, note 37 above, p.  213; idem, “Fundamental Rights”, note 37 
above, p. 211.
54 Idem, Verfassungsfragmente, note 37 above, p. 215 et seq; idem, note 40 above, pp. 339–341.
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require new solutions, “new types of guarantees”, which “limit the destructive 
potential of communication”.55 What is necessary is a concept that is sensitive 
and responsive to modifi cations of this kind, and one which considers this 
diagnosis as a starting-point.
Th e  ecological concept of fundamental rights observes precisely this 
diversifi cation and attempts to off er an adequate solution.56 According to this 
concept, the question of human rights should not be understood as the tradition 
assumes, as a balance between society both as a whole and its various parts, but, 
instead, as a question of the expansive functional systems to their social, human, 
and natural ecologies.57 Simultaneously, human rights are conceptualised as 
a “response to problems that transcend society” and “demand an ecological 
sensitivity of communication”.58 Human rights, as “intrinsic rights” have the 
function of constraining communications;59 that is, to safeguard the “boundary 
relations” between the functional systems and their  environment.60 However, 
the function of human rights does not exist exclusively in its negative dimension 
to prevent exclusion, but also exists in its positive dimension in order to enable 
inclusion (rights to access).61 Even if this function is gradually neglected,62 
human rights serve as means to acquire access to diverse functional systems, 
their institutions and their goods in order to enable them de facto to exercise 
human rights. Ultimately, under these circumstances, the question no longer 
concerns the access to political systems, but instead concerns the access to all 
functional systems.63
Consequently, human rights have to be conceived as a concept which includes 
all societal institutions and actors that are able to communicate and thus possess 
the potential to violate human rights. Provided that the problem of human rights 
always occurs consequentially in relation to communicative processes, that is, 
whenever a communication is performed, boundaries are transcended and 
rights are violated.64 In other words, the matter concerns the re-formulation of 
55 Idem, note 40 above, p. 339.
56 Ibid., note 40 above, p. 333 et seq; idem, Verfassungsfragmente, note 37 above, p. 189 et seq; 
idem, “Fundamental Rights”, note 37 above, p. 199 et seq.
57 See idem, note 40 above, p. 330 et seq.
58 Ibid., note 40 above, p. 333.
59 Ibid., p. 334; Graber and Teubner, note 40 above, p. 68 et seq.
60 Similar, with regard to the function of the constitution, see Gunther Teubner, “Globale 
Zivilverfassung: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie”, (2003) 63 Zeitschrift  
für ausländisches Recht und Völkerrecht, p. 1, at 10 et seq.
61 See Teubner, “Fundamental Rights”, note 37 above, pp. 202–206; idem, Verfassungsfragmente, 
note 37 above, p. 202 et seq; Niklas Luhmann, note 38 above, p. 42. See, also, Verschraegen, 
note 37 above.
62 See Teubner, “Fundamental Rights”, note 37 above, p. 202 et seq; idem, Verfassungsfragmente, 
note 37 above, p. 207 et seq.
63 Idem,”Fundamental Rights”, note 37 above, pp. 204–205; idem, Verfassungsfragmente, note 
37 above, p. 208 et seq; Verschraegen, note 37 above, p. 107 et seq, & 120 et seq.
64 Teubner, note 40 above, p. 336 et seq.
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human rights from confl icts of individuals within society to “confl icts between 
society and its ecologies”, or, respectively, a transformation “from the paradigm 
of interpersonal confl icts between individual bearers of fundamental rights to 
that of ecological confl icts between anonymous communicative processes, on 
the one hand, and concrete people on the other”.65 Examples of this constellation 
would include human rights violations by business corporations, or by private 
associations, for instance, religious or sports associations, hospitals, universities, 
schools, NGOs, etc.66 Translated into legal language, the result is individual 
lawsuits against private actors concerning the structural  violence and exclusion 
from the systems and their institutions through diverse actors, on the one hand, 
and the claim to obtain access to diverse systems, institutions and goods, on the 
other.67
Th e ensuing question is what does this concretely entail for the question of 
binding private actors to human rights. Considering this from the viewpoint 
of the new concept of human rights, we are able to draw the following 
conclusion concerning the accountability of private actors. Th e necessity to 
bind private actors to human rights results from the diff erentiation of the 
societal systems. According to the new concept of human rights, private actors 
are bound by human rights because they participate as subjects of rights68 
in the communicative processes, which are of relevance for human rights. 
Being able to participate in communicative processes admits the potential for 
violating human rights and causing danger. Th erefore, it is not crucial whether 
these actors possess enormous power – even though power is important 
for all functional systems as well69 – what is central is their participation in 
communications, and thereby the possibility of violations of human rights.
As far as the content and extent of the obligations of the new actors is 
concerned, it is important to avoid the categorical error of other approaches 
and not to attempt to transform, even with a modifi cation, “state human 
rights and obligations” to the other functional systems. Instead, it is suggested 
that the details be determined according to the specifi cs of the concrete 
functional system-regime (regime-specifi c determination).70 In other words, 
65 Ibid., p. 342. See, also, Teubner, “Fundamental Rights”, note 37 above, p. 210 et seq.
66 See, also, Teubner, note 40 above, p. 344.
67 See Teubner, note 40 above, pp. 343–344; Teubner, “Fundamental Rights”, note 37 above, 
p. 212 et seq.
68 See, generally, for the term “subject of rights”, Teubner, “Globale Zivilverfassung”, 
note 60 above, p.  4 et seq; Andreas Fischer-Lescano, “Globalverfassung: Verfassung der 
Weltgesellschaft ”, (2002) 88 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, p. 349. Similarly, Ruggie 
does not operate with the traditional concept of  subjects of international law. He argues, 
instead, with the concept of “participants”; see Ruggie, note 12 above, (2007) UN Doc A/
HRC/4/035 para. 20;  John Ruggie, “ Business and Human Rights: Th e Evolving International 
Agenda”, (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law, p. 819 & 824.
69 Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente, note 37 above, p. 175 et seq.
70 Idem, ”Fundamental Rights”, note 37 above, p. 195 et seq., 201 et seq.
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this is a re-formulation of the concept of human rights for the relationship 
of individuals with other societal institutions.71 With this premise in mind, 
the content and extent of the obligations can be determined and defi ned 
more precisely in accordance with the following principles. First of all, it 
is important to conceptualise human rights as provisions with obligations 
to respect, protect and fulfi l. Subsequently, it is necessary to determine the 
system-specifi c details and, not repeating the reductionism of the liberal 
theory, to focus and consider only the preventive function of human rights (the 
obligation to respect),72 on which the representatives of this theory constantly 
insist.73 Contrary to the reductionist approach, human rights can impose 
comprehensive obligations on private actors. As the  UN Norms stated, human 
rights encompass the obligation “to promote, secure the fulfi lment of, respect, 
ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized international as well 
as national law”.74 To sum up, it is not only the obligation to respect, which is 
valid for private actors, but also the obligations to protect and fulfi l. Th is is not 
limited to particular circumstances, but has, instead, to be seen as rule.75 As 
Teubner states, beyond the obligation to respect, the principle of inclusion has 
to be generalised in such a manner that “access to the communicative media in 
all function systems is not only permitted, but is actually guaranteed by means 
of fundamental rights”.76 Th us, this also applies to business corporations since 
“the  functional diff erentiation of the societal system, the regulation of the 
relationship of inclusion and exclusion is transferred to function systems and 
there is no longer any central authority […] to supervise the subsystems in this 
regard”.77
71 Ibid., p.  195–198; see, also, Gunther Teubner, “Das Projekt der Verfassungssoziologie”, 
(2011) 32 Zeitschrift  für Rechtssoziologie, p.  189 in the context of a new concept of the 
constitution.
72 Critically, see, also, Teubner, “Fundamental Rights”, note 37 above, p. 201.
73 Recently, the concept of the Special Represantative  John Ruggie was generally focused 
primarily on the obligation to respect even though he alludes the obligation of corporations 
to protect; Ruggie, note 29 above, (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/13 paras. 56 et seq.
74 Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business 
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights”( UN Norms) (2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/
Rev.2, para. 1; see, also, the preamble.
75 Paul Hunt appears to tend to this opine as well, see Paul Hunt, “Special Rapporteur on the 
Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health – Mission 
to GlaxoSmithKline”, (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/12/Add.2, especially para. 17.
76 Teubner, “Fundamental Rights”, note 37 above, p. 204 (footnote omitted).
77 Niklas Luhmann, Die Politik der Gesellschaft , (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), p. 427, 
quoted in Teubner, “Fundamental Rights”, note 37 above, p. 205.
Chapter 6. Horizontal Eff ects of Human Rights 
Intersentia 123
III. THE PRACTICE TEST: TRANSFERRING 
THE CONCEPT INTO EFFECT?
To exemplify our theoretical approach, we now wish to analyse the recently 
adopted EU legislation on non-fi nancial reporting,78 which has attracted 
widespread attention.
For the purpose of this chapter, we defi ne non-fi nancial reporting as a 
process of communicating information on both the social and environmental 
impact and the eff ects of business conduct. Non-fi nancial reporting in general 
has its origin in the concept of  Corporate Social Responsibility and traditional 
fi nancial reporting.79 Th ere are many global initiatives that deal with non-
fi nancial reporting,80 and some of them off er reporting schemes81 which can be 
used by companies or groups to report on non-fi nancial matters.82 While these 
initiatives are strictly “voluntary”,83 there are many countries that have passed 
more or less mandatory non-fi nancial reporting-legislation.84
78 Also known as social accounting, social and environmental accounting, corporate social 
reporting,  corporate social responsibility reporting, non-fi nancial accounting.
79 For further information on origin, main actors and used terminology, see Katelijne von 
Wensen, Wijnand Broer, Johanna Klein and Jutta Knopf, “Th e State of Play in Sustainability 
Reporting in the EU”, 2011, available at: www.ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6727&l
angId=en, p. 14 et seq.
80 At global level, there are initiatives, off ered by International Organisations (IOs) and Non-
governmental Organisations (NGOs), which are completely voluntary like the  OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the ISO 26000,  ILO Tri-partite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policies, the UN “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework on  Business and Human Rights proposed by the 
UN-Special-Representative  John Ruggie, the  Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the 
UN  Guiding Principles Reporting Framework off ered by the Human Rights Reporting and 
Assurance Frameworks Initiative (RAFI).
81 Also called reporting standards, guidelines or reporting frameworks.
82 Th e most used reporting schemes are the Guidelines of the GRI and the  United Nations 
Global Compact Communication on Progress (UNGC COP). Beside that, there are many 
other standards which partially only refer to special business sectors like the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) and the Connected Reporting Framework (CRF) (for further 
Initiatives see von Wensen, Broer, Klein and Knopf, note 79 above, Appendix C, p.  135 et 
seq.).
83 At international level, there are voices that, on the one hand, demand universal initiatives 
and, on the other hand, strive for legally binding approaches and standards. At UN level, 
the outcome document of the UN Conference on  Sustainable Development (Rio+20) calls 
for a universal framework on non-fi nancial reporting (General Assembly (2012) UN Doc A/
RES/66/288, para. 47.), and the latest report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-
level Panel on Global Sustainability argues for a mandatory reporting framework (General 
Assembly, (2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/700, para. 166.). Th e International Integrated Reporting 
Committee (IIRC), i.e., is a global initiative of all kinds of actors (i.e., the  Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) or UN representatives), which aims to create a universally accepted reporting 
framework (see www.theiirc.org).
84 For example, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Finland, Spain, 
France and Sweden. For a brief summary on the recent developments in some of these 
Member States, see European Commission, Impact Assessment – Accompanying the 
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Th e reason why we chose non-fi nancial reporting to exemplify our theoretical 
approach is that it has certain characteristics that make this approach diff erent 
from others, which aim to hold multinational corporations liable for human 
rights violations. In addition, the EU’s legislation is of exceptional relevance, 
because this non-fi nancial reporting-legislation implies obligations for a high 
number of the world’s biggest and most infl uential MNCs.
Th e corresponding supranational or national level85 regulation of MNCs 
implies legal obligations with regard to their activities abroad, without creating 
immediate accountability for human-rights-related actions. In this respect, 
non-fi nancial reporting does not principally refer to compensation for human 
rights violations, but instead aims to establish human rights protection as a core 
business concern.86 Upon this basis, we want to propose the following question: 
Does the EU’s non-fi nancial reporting framework have the potential to promote 
the accountability of MNCs eff ectively and signifi cantly strengthen the spaces of 
societal autonomy towards the economic system?
We begin the following section with an introduction to the topic of non-
fi nancial reporting and the legislation within the EU in general.  Aft er this, 
we wish to review the EU’s non-fi nancial reporting framework, ask about the 
European Union’s and Member State’s international human rights obligations in 
the fi eld of non-fi nancial reporting and put our fi ndings in the context of our 
theoretical framework.
A. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DIRECTIVE 
ON NON-FINANCIAL REPORTING
Within the EU, the idea of non-fi nancial reporting is rooted in the EU’s 
activities concerning CSR and in the legislative practice of some Member 
States. Th e European Parliament recently adopted two resolutions87 in which 
document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of non-fi nancial and 
diversity information by certain large companies and groups, SWD (2013) 127 fi nal, 16 April 
2013, Annex III, p.  49 et seq; For references to the corresponding legislation see European 
Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), “Principles & Pathways: Legal opportunities to 
improve Europe’s corporative accountability framework”, November 2010, available at: www.
corporatejustice.org/IMG/pdf/eccj_principles_pathways_webuseblack.pdf, p. 11, fn 5.
85 While there a several states that already passed non-fi nancial reporting legislation (see notes 
84 above and 106 below), a EU legislation with regard to a mandatory reporting system 
expands corresponding obligations to a wider scope. In so far, the research on the EU 
legislation is exemplary for the concept of non-fi nancial reporting in general.
86 Daniel Augenstein, “Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the  Environment 
Applicable to European Enterprises Operating Outside the European Union”, 2010, p.  75, 
para. 232.
87 European Parliament Resolution, Report on  Corporate Social Responsibility: Accountable, 
Transparent and Responsible Business Behaviour and Sustainable Growth, A7–0017/2013, 
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it acknowledged the importance of transparency. Furthermore, the European 
Commission announced regulation regarding non-fi nancial reporting 
in the Single Market Act88 with the communication entitled “A Renewed 
Strategy 2011–2014 for  Corporate Social Responsibility”.89 Th e Accounting 
Directives90 already dealt with reporting on environmental- and employee-
related matters.
On 11  November 2014, the European Union fi nally adopted Directive 
2014/95/EU91 that explicitly concerns non-fi nancial reporting. Directive 
2014/95/EU amends Directive 2013/34/EU on fi nancial reporting (Accounting 
Directive).92 Th e purpose of Directive 2014/95/EU is to harmonise the existing 
national non-fi nancial information legislation and to establish it where Member 
States have not enacted regulation in this fi eld.93 It aims to increase the number 
of reporting companies and the relevance, consistency and comparability of the 
information disclosed by large companies.94 With regard to the EU’s strategy on 
CSR, the Recital states:
“disclosure of non-fi nancial information is vital for managing change towards a 
sustainable global economy by combining long-term profi tability with social justice 
and environmental protection.”95
28  January 2013 and European Parliament Resolution, Report on  Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Promoting Society’s Interests and a Route to Sustainable and Inclusive 
Recovery, A7–0023/2013, 29 January 2013.
88 European Commission Communication, Single Market Act – Twelve levers to boost growth 
and strengthen confi dence, COM (2011) 206 fi nal, 13  April 2011; see, also, European 
Commission Communication, Single Market Act II – Together for new growth, COM (2012) 
573 fi nal, 3 October 2012, pp 15 et seq.
89 European Commission Communication, A renewed EU strategy 2011–14 for  Corporate 
Social Responsibility, COM (2011) 681 fi nal, 25 October 2011.
90 Company reporting under the legislation of the EU is covered by the Directive 2013/34/EU of 
the European Parliament and the Council on the annual fi nancial statements, consolidated 
fi nancial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings of 26  June 2013, 
OJ L 182, 29.6.2013, pp. 19–76, which amends the Directive 2006/43/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts 
of 17 May 2006, OJ L 157, 17.06.2006, pp. 87–107, and repeals the 4th and 7th Company Law 
Directives (Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25  July 1978, OJ L 222, 14.8.1978, pp. 
11–31 and Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983, OJ L 193, 18.07.1983, pp. 
1–17).
91 European Parliament and the Council, Directive 2014/95/EU amending Directive 2013/34/
EU as regards disclosure of non-fi nancial and diversity information by certain large 
undertakings and groups, 2014 O.J. L 330/1, 11 November 2014.
92 See note 90 above.
93 Recital 4 and 5 Directive 2014/95/EU; European Commission, Impact Assessment, note 84 
above, p. 23.
94 Recital 21 Directive 2014/95/EU.
95 Recital 3 Directive 2014/95/EU.
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It is therefore an important tool to measure, monitor and manage the 
performance of companies and their impact on society.96 Regarding the 
objectives of non-fi nancial reporting, besides the demand for transparency of 
all aff ected individuals, communities and NGOs, the interests of the investors, 
consumers and the companies themselves all play an important role. Th e 
European Commission argues that better integration and assessment of non-
fi nancial risks in business strategies would enhance the overall perfomance 
of companies; increased transparancy is expected to enhance consumer and 
investor trust.97 Disclosure of non-fi nancial information therefore allows 
companies to allocate more capital, and helps investors to integrate non-
fi nancial matters into their investment decisions.98 To sum up, besides 
accountability and transparency, the effi  ciency of capital markets and the 
performance of companies are the main concerns of the EU’s non-fi nancial 
reporting legislation.
In the following section of this chapter, we wish to take a closer look at the 
European Union’s Directive on non-fi nancial reporting. For every relevant 
aspect, we initially want to highlight the possible features of non-fi nancial 
reporting in general before describing and critically reviewing the arrangement 
of the Directive.
1. Obligated Actors
Firstly, which companies or groups are aff ected by the non-fi nancial reporting 
legislation? Most “non-binding” concepts or standards simply refer to 
“companies”.99 Consequently, it oft en remains unclear which private actors 
are covered by the specifi c terms. While it is not necessary for a “voluntary” 
framework to specify clearly to whom it applies, for a legally-binding duty at 
national or European legislative level, it is essential to defi ne the bearers of a 
statutory duty.
Concerning the size of legally-obliged entities, the main concern raised on 
this issue is that the duty constitutes an undue administrative and fi nancial 
burden on small companies.100 As a result, the Directive covers only “large” 
96 Ibid.
97 European Commission, Impact Assessment, note 84 above, p. 23 et seq, p. 37 et seq.
98 Ibid.
99 Some reporting initiatives do not even restrict the participation on companies or business 
actors. Th e GRI for example enables all organisations to report.
100 See Positionspapier der Bundesregierung zur Mitteilung der Europäischen Kommission, 
“Eine neue EU-Strategie (2011–14) für die soziale Verantwortung der Unternehmen (CSR)”, 
(KOM 2011) (681endg.), 18 November 2011.
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undertakings and groups of “public interest”101 (Art.  19a (1) and 29a (1) 
Directive 2013/34/EU). To defi ne the term “large undertakings and groups”, the 
Directive refers to the total number of employees and likewise to the total assets 
and/or annual turnover. According to this, the Directive provides that only 
undertakings or groups with more than 500 employees, a balance sheet total of 
20 million euros or a net turnover of 40 million euros should be subject to new 
requirements.102 On the whole, this would approximately cover about 6,000 out 
of 42,000 “large” companies operating in the EU.103
Since the European Union expects non-fi nancial reporting to enhance the 
overall performance of a company, the criticism can be made that the Directive 
only covers large companies. Besides this, it has to be emphasised that the 
Directive only determines a minimum requirement regarding the scope of 
the application. Recital 14 Directive 2014/95/EU states that Member States are 
free to expand the reporting obligation to a wider scope of companies. But, 
at the same time, Recital 14 Directive 2014/95/EU stresses the importance 
of exempting small- and medium-sized companies from the reporting 
requirement in order to save them from an undue administrative and fi nancial 
burden. Member States should still consider whether it would be adequate to 
diverge from the minimum requirements regarding the net turnover, balance 
sheet and amount of employees. Th ey also should consider implementing 
mechanisms and policies that aim to encourage small- and medium-sized 
companies to report on non-fi nancial matters, for example, by explicitly 
leaving it up to these companies themselves to decide whether to comply with 
the reporting requirement while making it mandatory for large companies. 
Th is could be an option to stimulate and raise the awareness of small- and 
medium-sized companies regarding human rights and CSR matters.
2. Design and Content
Another important point is the legal design of a reporting framework and 
the content of the reports. Th ere are diff erent ways of shaping a non-fi nancial 
reporting-framework and each has diff erent eff ects on the quantity and quality 
of the reports.
101 Th e term“public interest” is defi ned in Art. 2 (1) Directive 2013/34/EU (note 90 above). Th e 
defi nition covers, i.e., companies that are both governed by the law of a Member State and 
listed on a regulated market, all credit institutions in the EU, all insurance undertakings in 
the EU and companies that are of signifi cant public relevance because of the nature of their 
business, their size, or number of employees.
102 See Art.  19a, 29a in conjunction with Art.  3 and 4 Directive 2013/34/EU. Undertakings 
which are subsidiary undertakings shall be exempted from the obligation to report if these 
undertakings and their subsidiary undertakings are included in the report of another 
undertaking (Art. 19a (3) and Art. 29a (3) Directive 2013/34/EU).
103 Daniel P. Kinderman, “Th e Struggle Over the UN Non-Financial Disclosure Directive”, 
WSI-Mitteilungen 8/2015, pp. 613–621, at 616, available at SSRN: www.ssrn.com/
abstracht=2614983.
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Regarding the legal design, there are two relevant questions: the fi rst 
concerns the form of the disclosure and the second concerns its legal nature.
a. Th e Form of the Report
With regard to the fi rst question, the reports could be designed in the form of 
a statement as a part of the annual report,104 or as a stand-alone non-fi nancial 
report which could be annexed to the annual report or published separately.
Th e Directive leaves reporting companies a wide margin of appreciation on 
how to present the required information. It is left  to the companies to decide as 
to whether they integrate the non-fi nancial information in the annual report or 
whether they prepare a stand-alone report, as long as the stand-alone report is 
published together with the annual report or is made publicly available on the 
parent undertaking’s website, and is referred to in the annual report, Article 19a 
(4) and Article 29a (4) Directive 2013/34/EU.105
b. Legal Nature
Concerning the legal nature of the disclosure, there are three possible variations: 
initially, the disclosure could be upon a “voluntary” basis or strictly mandatory. 
Many non-fi nancial reporting frameworks have established a third, allegedly 
more fl exible, approach, namely, the “report or explain” (also “comply or 
explain”) framework.106 Th is framework requires companies to report. Failing 
that, a clear and reasoned explanation of why this is the case must be given.
104 An annual report is a report on a company’s activities and fi nancial performance throughout 
the preceding year. Th e Accounting Directive uses the term “management report”, or, with 
regard to groups, “consolidated management reports” (see Articles  19 and 29 Directive 
2013/34/EU).
105 Th e European Commission opted for the integration of a statement into the annual report 
and therefore argued that the involvement of the non-fi nancial reporting in the established 
reporting system, on the one hand, minimises the administrative burden on the aff ected 
companies and, on the other, is of advantage compared to the stand-alone-report model, 
because it ties in with already established proceedings. (European Commission, Impact 
Assessment, note 84 above, p. 25 et seq). Th e Commission also refers to the estimated costs 
of compliance in terms of administrative burden, and points out that a disclosure included 
in the annual reports would cost 600 to 4,300 euro while detailed reporting in the form of a 
separate document or as an annex to the annual report would require approximately 33,000 
to 604,000 euro (European Commission, Impact Assessment, note 84 above, p. 10 & 35).
106 Th e GRI (see GRI, G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, www.globalreporting.org/
resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf, p.  13) 
as a non-state initiative eg uses the report or explain approach. Furthermore, many states 
refer to this approach in their non-fi nancial reporting legislation: While for example in 
Sweden state-owned companies are obliged to report, the Swedish legislation refers to the 
GRI Guidelines which again use a report or explain approach (see the Swedish Ministry of 
Finance, Guidelines for External Reporting by State-owned Companies, 11  December 2007, 
available at: www.government.se/content/1/c6/09/41/25/56b7ebd4.pdf, with references 
to the relevant Swedish legislation). For the Danish experiences with a report or explain 
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Th e Directive uses the “report or explain” model. Choosing the option to 
“explain” is only permitted if the company has no policy on or activity in the 
required matter. Th is means that, as long as the company practises a policy or 
activity relevant under the reporting requirement, it is obliged to report on these 
matters. Article 19a (1) Directive 2013/34/EU107 formulates the requirements as 
follows:
“Where the undertaking does not pursue policies in relation to one or more of those 
matters [the companies are ordered to report on108], the non-fi nancial statement shall 
provide a clear and reasoned explanation for not doing so.”
Th e European Commission considered a mandatory option to be more 
eff ective, but, at the same time, argued that the “report or explain” option 
“has the potential to create peer pressure and provide an eff ective incentive for 
companies”.109 Furthermore, the European Commission points out that this 
model would off er “appropriate fl exibility to those companies that do not have a 
specifi c policy in place in one or more of the above-mentioned areas”.110
Closely linked to the “report or explain” approach is the exception for the 
disclosure of information under Article  19a (1) and Article  29a (1) Directive 
2013/34/EU that prescribes that:
“Member States may allow information relating to impending developments or 
matters in the course of negotiation to be omitted in exceptional cases where, in 
the duly justifi ed opinion of the members of the administrative, management and 
supervisory bodies (…) the disclosure of such information would be seriously 
prejudicial to the commercial position of the group, provided that such omission 
does not prevent a fair and balanced understanding of the group’s development, 
performance, position and impact of its activity.”
Th e purpose of this exception is to protect the commercial interests of a 
company in cases where there is the justifi ed assumption that a disclosure of 
certain information would impede actual negotiations or weaken the bargaining 
positions of the reporting company.
Th e problem with the “report or explain” approach and the exceptions under 
Articles  19a (1) and 29a (1) Directive 2013/34/EU is that these features give 
companies the opportunity to exclude information that may be of special interest 
approach, see the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency,  Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Reporting in Denmark: Impact of the Th ird Year Subject to the Legal Requirements 
for Reporting on CSR in the Danish Financial Statements Act, 2013, available at: csrgov.dk/
fi le/358879/csr_rapport_2013_eng.pdf; see, also, European Commission, Impact Assessment, 
note 84 above, p 25, Annex VI, p. 67 et seq.
107 See, also, Art. 29a (1) Directive 2013/34/EU.
108 For the required content of the reports, see Section II.1.b.iii.
109 European Commission, Impact Assessment, note 84 above, p. 29.
110 European Commission, Impact Assessment, note 84 above, Annex VI, p. 61.
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for “an understanding of the (companies) development, performance, position 
and impact of its activity” from the reports. With regard to the objectives, spirit 
and purpose of the Directive, it is necessary that the legislation in the Member 
States specify the precise requirements regarding the explanation or justifi cation 
for not reporting on specifi c matters. Th is would include requiring companies to 
point out explicitly the omitted disclosure in the report and describe as precisely 
as possible the content and the context of the omitted disclosure. Th is includes 
a formal duly-justifi ed explanation of why and for what reason the information 
had not been disclosed and should, in particular, apply to the requirement in the 
context of the exceptions of Articles 19a (1) and 29a (1) Directive 2013/34/EU.
c. Content
Besides the legal design, the content of the disclosure is of signifi cant relevance. 
At fi rst, there is no universal defi nition of the term “non-fi nancial information”. 
While the Accounting Directive, before its amendment by Directive 2014/95/
EU, referred to environmental and employee-related concerns,111 most voluntary 
frameworks refer to human rights, social and environmental impact, anti-
corruption, governance, diversity, and conditions of employment.112
Th e Directive now names environmental, social and employee matters, 
respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters, as the minimum 
of the themes to be covered by the reports (Art.  19a (1) and 29a (1) Directive 
2013/34/EU). Relating to these matters, the report is to provide suffi  cient 
information to furnish an understanding of a companies development, 
performance, position and the impact of its various activities, as per Articles 19a 
(1) and 29a (1) Directive 2013/34/EU. In this regard, the reports shall include:
“(a) a brief description of the undertaking’s business model;
(b)  a description of the policies pursued by the undertaking in relation to those 
matters, including due diligence processes implemented;
(c) the outcome of those policies;
(d)  the principal risks related to those matters linked to the undertaking’s operations 
including, where relevant and proportionate, its business relationships, products 
or services which are likely to cause adverse impacts in those areas, and how the 
undertaking manages those risks;
(e) non-fi nancial key performance  indicators relevant to the particular business.”
111 See Art. 19 Abs. 1 Directive 2013/34/EU.
112 Th e UNGC’s Ten Principles, for example, cover Human Rights (Principle 1 and 2), conditions 
of employment (Principles 3–6),  environment (Principles 7–9) and anti-corruption 
(Principle 10) and the G4 reporting scheme of the GRI contains to the categories economic, 
 environment and social, with sub-categories like human rights, labour practices, society and 
product responsibility.
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Th us, the Directive instructs companies to provide information on their specifi c 
characteristics, their general governance, and typical risks regarding their 
activities. Moreover, the relevant information has to cover a description of a 
company’s policies and risk-management strategies regarding the non-fi nancial 
aspects of the company’s activities as well as the methodology used to assess 
the relevant information and implement its fi ndings in its further strategies 
and decisions.113 It is in this context in particular that the “report or explain 
approach” reveals its purpose because it off ers companies the possibility of 
reporting on relevant areas, whereas it does not oblige them to report on areas 
that they do not wish to pursue.
Even though the requirements give brief instructions on which matters and 
which fi elds of a company’s activities and structures to report on, compared to the 
currently available reporting guidelines, the instructions and requirements of the 
Directive remain very vague. In praxis, for reporting companies, it poses a major 
challenge to identify the relevant and required information and to present it in a 
manner which is consistent with the provisions of the Directive. For these reasons, 
companies oft en rely on reporting guidelines off ered by IOs or NGOs such as the 
UN Global Compact (UNGC) or the  Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) in order 
to prepare their reports. Options on the methodology of the disclosure regarding 
these guidelines vary from narrative-based concepts (in which each company has 
a lot of freedom) to models with more or less strictly-framed  indicators (i.e., in the 
form of a questionaire) to which companies have to comply.114
Th e Directive itself contains no such  indicators or guidelines on which 
companies can orientate themselves. However, it recognises that an EU-standard 
would maximise the comparability of the gained information.115 But, since the 
creation of reporting guidelines takes time and it is necessary to consult the 
relevant stakeholders, the Directive refers to the existing reporting standards 
while at the same time advising the European Commission to prepare 
non-binding guidelines on the methodology for reporting non-fi nancial 
information.116 Until then, Articles  19a (1) and 29a (1) Directive 2013/34/
113 See European Commission, Impact Assessment, note 84 above, p. 25.
114 Th e minimum requirements to the UNGC COP (see UNGC, “Basic Guide to the 
Communication on Progress, 2012”, available at: www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/
communication_on_progress/Tools_and_Publications/COP_Basic_Guide.pdf) leave 
companies a wide latitude on the way they report on the UNGC Ten Principles while the G4 
reporting scheme of the GRI uses  indicators (for example, human rights or  environment) 
and specifi cations to guide companies’ reports (see GRI, “G4 Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines”, www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-Principles-
and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf, p. 47 et seq.).
115 See, also, European Commission, Impact Assessment, note 84 above, p. 29. Concurrently, the 
European Commission argued that this option would aff ord “the completion of a long and 
uncertain process of development and implementation of such standards”. Furthermore, it 
would be a considerable administrative burden for companies and would lack the suffi  cient 
fl exibility as it would oblige companies to report on this regionally-defi ned standard.
116 See Art. 2 Directive 2014/95/EU.
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EU instruct Member States to provide that reporting companies may rely on 
national, Union-based or international reporting guidelines,117 and, if they do 
so, they are to specify upon which guidelines they have relied.
Financial Reporting in practice demonstrates that a smart mixture of 
governmental and private control in the form of an interlegal approach that 
leaves it up to the supranational and national level to implement reporting 
obligations and monitoring mechanism, and up to the “transnational” level to 
create the reporting standards can be the key to a proper reporting framework. 
However, in support of an EU-based reporting guidelines, it can be argued that 
common schemes (such as those of the GRI or the UNGC) leave companies too 
much room for “green washing” and their own estimation of to what extent they 
report.118 Accordingly, reports are oft en very short and cursory and/or include 
information on “green” programmes and technologies instead of information on 
high-risk activities or incidents with impact on the  environment or on human 
rights. NGOs inter alia legitimately demand information on all the actual 
impact of the company’s operations.119 Besides this, the requirements oft en 
do not consider the impact of third-country subsidiaries and the suppliers of 
the European companies that are covered by the proposal, even though these 
117 Th e Directive specifi cally names the United Nations (UN) Global Compact, the  Guiding 
Principles on  Business and Human Rights implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the  International Organization for 
Standardization’s ISO 26000, the International Labour Organization’s Tripartite Declaration 
of principles concerning multinational enterprises and  social policy and the  Global Reporting 
Initiative (see Recital 9 of the Directive).
118 William S. Laufer, “Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing”, (2003) 43 Journal of 
Business Ethic, pp. 253–261; Craig Deegan and Michaela Rankin, “Do Australian companies 
report environmental news objectively? An analysis of environmental disclosures by fi rms 
prosecuted successfully by the Environmental Protection Authority”, (1996) 9 Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, pp. 50–67 et seq; O. Boiral, for example, argues that 
sustainability reports (in this case under the A and A+ GRI standard which generally is said 
to be the strictest scheme in the fi eld of reporting standards) “can be viewed as simulacra 
that camoufl age real sustainable-development problems, presenting an idealized version 
of company situations” (Olivier Boiral, “Sustainability Reports as Simulacra? A Counter-
Account of A and A+ GRI reports”, (2013) 26 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, p. 1036-1071). For defi ciencies in the UNGC COP-framework, see, also, Surya Deva, 
Regulating Corporate Human Rights Violations: Humanizing Business, (London-New York: 
Routledge, 2012), p. 96 et seq.
119 See Amnesty International, “Corporate non-fi nancial reporting: Amnesty International 
position paper”, April 2013, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/001/2013/
en/f3dae509-bd55–46ae-aad7–2c909ef97771/pol300012013en.html: “Reports on all actual 
(major/severe) impacts of the business operations (…) should include both the incidents of 
negative impact that the company accepts occurred and issues consistently raised by local 
communities and civil society groups, even if the company disputes the allegation. (…) 
Impact reports should state: location of event, what happened, who was aff ected, what was 
aff ected (specifi cally land, food, water, etc.). Where the incident involves disputed allegations, 
the company should set out the position of the aff ected people, as well as the reasons why the 
company disputes the allegations made.”
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parts of their business activities provide a high-risk-potential for human rights 
violations.120 Th us, it is now up to the European Commission to create reporting 
guidelines that take the above-mentioned shortcomings of the actual reporting 
guidelines into due consideration. Regarding the convergence with human 
rights standards in the fi eld of  business and human rights, initiatives such as the 
Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative (RAFI), which 
tries to create a reporting standard that aims to put the  Guiding Principles into 
practice and thereby directly refers to actual human rights standards, can serve 
as a role model.
d. Provisional Conclusion
For a provisional conclusion, one could state that the form and the content of the 
disclosure need to be clearly defi ned to assure that companies both know and are 
able to inform in a comprehensive, reliable and homogeneous way.
3. Monitoring, Evaluation, Enforcement Mechanisms and Sanctions
Furthermore, questions of implementation and enforcement are of exceptional 
relevance. Th ere are many ways of shaping the corresponding mechanisms. 
Conceivable practices vary from models with no enforcement, verifi cation 
or evaluation, to strict models with “eff ective, proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions”,121 and evaluation and verifi cation by independent bodies.122
On matters of implementation and enforcement, the European Commission 
distinguishes between monitoring and evaluation. During the legislative 
process, the European Commission suggested that, in the fi eld of monitoring, 
the Member States be required to gather the reports and information through 
special agencies or Securities Markets’ Regulators.123 For the purpose of 
sharing the gained information, the European Commission also proposed that 
the  Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC),124 an institution set up by the 
European Commission with the function of advising in matters of fi nancial 
reporting, be provided as a forum with the mandate to examine the statements 
120 See Augenstein, note 86 above, p.  75, para. 232; Th e ECCJ criticises that the reqirement to 
report on supply chains is only required “if relevant and proportionate” without further 
specifi cation (European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), Assessment of the EU 
Directive on the disclosure of non-fi nancial information by certain large companies, May 
2014, available at: www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/fi les/media/documents/eccj-
assessment-eu-non-fi nancial-reporting-may-2104.pdf, p. 3.
121 ECCJ, note 84 above, p. 13.
122 Ibid., p. 12.
123 European Commission, Impact Assessment, note 84 above, p. 43.
124 Th e  Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC) has been set up by the European Commission, 
and is composed of representatives from Member States and chaired by the European 
Commission. It has the regulatory function to provide an opinion on the Commission 
proposals to adopt an international accounting standard in the area of fi nancial accounting.
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and reports in order to ensure compliance, compare the information provided by 
companies with similar operations, and ensure that aff ected companies report 
in a consistent manner.125 With regard to content, the evaluation suggested by 
the European Commission would aim to see to what extent the pursued impacts 
actually materialise.126 Th is would cover, on the one hand, matters of quantity 
(more reports), and, on the other, the quality of the reports, which would at 
best lead to improved transparency.127 In sum, the proposals of the European 
Commission ramain very vague; they do not contain a co-ordinated monitoring 
or evaluation mechanism that is aimed at responding to the individual reports.
Th e Directive itself does not contain specifi c provisions regarding the 
monitoring and evaluation of the reports. Under Article  3 Directive 2014/95/
EU, the European Commission is advised to “submit a report to the European 
Parliament and to the Council on the implementation of this Directive, 
including, among other aspects, its scope (…), its eff ectiveness and the level of 
guidance and methods provided”. Sanctions or other enforcement or monitoring 
mechanisms are not foreseen in the Directive.
Only the tenth recital refers to monitoring and enforcement, by emphasising 
that Member States should ensure that adequate and eff ective means exist to 
guarantee disclosure of non-fi nancial information.
“To that end, Member States should ensure that eff ective national procedures are in 
place to enforce compliance with the obligations laid down by this Directive, and that 
those procedures are available to all persons and legal entities having a legitimate 
interest, in accordance with national law, in ensuring that the provisions of this 
Directive are respected.”
It remains unclear how the “national procedures” should be shaped and when 
such a procedure should be initiated. Nevertheless, the tenth recital clarifi es that, 
on the one hand, Member States are expected to set up a form of monitoring and 
enforcement mechanism, while, on the other, they are free to decide on how to 
shape these mechanisms.
It is quite clear that a reporting obligation without proper monitoring and 
enforcement mechanism can hardly achieve its objectives. In the context of 
fi nancial reporting, Hong Phu Dao very rightly pointed out that “a high quality 
fi nancial reporting requirement […] requires also a mechanism to oversee the 
appropriate application” because “in the absence of adequate enforcement, the 
accounting rules may remain simply requirements on paper”.128
125 European Commission, Impact Assessment, note 84 above, p. 43.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 T.H.P. Dao, “Monitoring Compliance with IFRS: Some Insights From the French Regulatory 
System”, (2005) 2 Accounting in Europe, p. 107 & 108.
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For the objective of implementing human rights matters in the internal 
structures and everyday decisions of a company, it is necessary set up a 
monitoring and verifi cation system which can directly respond to the company’s 
reports. Th ere are several reasons for such an approach, which will be highlighted 
very briefl y:
First, a proper monitoring and enforcement mechanism could help to 
instruct companies to live up to their obligations or commitments regarding 
human rights. Even though preparing a report leads (at least in some way and 
to some extent) to a process of evaluation of the activities and the internal 
structures of a company, without a monitoring there is no guarantee that the 
implied strategies, policies and risk-assessment mechanisms are effi  cient and/
or satisfy human-rights standards. In this regard, NGOs, for example, revealed 
that nearly 80 per cent of the surveyed companies that are obliged by US-law to 
report on their activities regarding minerals, did not fully comply with the legal 
requirements and that the majority of the reporting companies did not report on 
the country of origin for their minerals.129
Second, the monitoring and enforcement mechanims could serve as a 
platform for an ongoing dialogue about the implementation of human rights 
within the internal structures of a company. A monitoring body could help 
to instruct a company on how to internalise human rights obligations and 
commitments. At the same time, civil society could actively be included into the 
monitoring and enforcement procedure by giving them, for example, the right 
to initiate a procedure or to submit their own reports on a company’s activities 
(so-called shadow-reports). By doing so, reporting companies could be made to 
face specifi c incidents, negative business-impacts or business-activity-related 
issues. In turn, the monitoring body could respond to the information provided 
by the companies and the NGOs by issuing recommendations or guidelines for 
the further implementation of the reporting obligations and human rights in 
general. Regarding the afore-mentioned example, a monitoring mechanism, in 
this case, could guide and instruct companies to comply with their reporting 
obligations under US-law and include the NGO’s suggestions on how to improve 
the reporting praxis.130
Th ird, the monitoring mechanism could serve as a platform to put business-
related human-rights provisions into practice. Th e major problem with the 
implementation of human rights in the context of business is that, while there 
are many standards, commitments,  codes of conduct, policies and strategies 
regarding human rights, there are only few mechanisms that are able to put them 
129 Amnesty International and Global Witness, “Digging for Transparency: How U.S. companies 
are only scratching the surface of confl ict minerals reporting”, April 2015, available at: www.
amnestyusa.org/sites/default/fi les/digging_for_transparency_hi_res.pdf, p.  15 et seq, 27 et 
seq.
130 Th e report contains a seperate section on how companies can improve future reports (see 
Amnesty International and Global Witness, note 129 above, p. 29 et seq.
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into practice. Th erefore, human rights standards oft en remain “reqirements 
on paper”. Th e  Guiding Principles, for example, contain a lot of specifi c 
responsibilities for companies to respect human rights. Of exceptional relevance 
are procedural responsibilities such as the creation of a policy commitment, 
a strategy for due dilligence processes, a strategy to assess and address risk 
(and impact), processes to remediate human rights impacts and reporting 
requirements.131 Human rights related procedures, for example, contained in the 
 Guiding Principles 15 et seq., are the basis for unfolding and putting substantive 
human rights standards into practice. To review and follow the way in which 
companies implement these procedural and substantial responsibilities, it is 
necessary to install mechanisms that are able to monitor these responsibilities 
and give general guidance on how to put them into practice.
Fourth (and directly linked to the problem of putting (procedrual) 
responsibilities into praxis), a monitoring mechanism that responds to the 
reports of companies would be able to evaluate and consider the ways in which 
the internal structures of a company can be adjusted to the requirements of 
the Directive and of the  Guiding Principles. Monitoring bodies would not 
only have to consider shortcomings with regard to a specifi c case, but would 
also have to focus on the internal structures, policies and strategies, and the 
overall performance of a company in the context of human rights. Compared 
to individual complaint procedures, the monitoring procedure could therefore 
continuously react and give guidance on structural shortcomings.
In the end, without any mechanism to review the reports and address any 
specifi c defi cits, there is no guarantee that the reports are exhaustive and there 
is no possibility of following up and effi  ciently supporting further actions. In 
addition, the “report or explain” approach and the exceptions under Article 19a 
(1) and Article  29a (1) Directive 2013/34/EU allow companies to desist 
completely from reporting on non-fi nancial matters or to neglect specifi c topics 
or fi elds within their operational operations. Even if a company or group fails to 
explain why it has not reported or why it has neglected specifi c aspects covered 
by the Directive, there are no judicial instruments to sanction such conduct. 
In particular, the possibility of omitting – deliberately or through oversight – 
some topics or operational processes from the disclosure leaves the door open to 
companies simply to avoid or to omit to report on specifi c themes, incidents or 
structures. Th e obligation to explain why no information has been provided is 
very indefi nite and, above all, not enforceable, which makes it an inadequate tool 
if there are no mechanisms for verifying the explanations furnished.
To compensate for this quality defi cit or to extend a proper non-fi nancial 
reporting framework, the actual practices of, for example, European and 
German monitoring and enforcement bodies in the fi eld of fi nancial reporting 
131 See  Guiding Principles 15 et seq.
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could serve as a role model or even a point of contact.132 In the case of Germany, 
there are two bodies that monitor and enforce the reporting obligation. A body 
of the fi rst instance is set up as a private association, composed of specialised 
representatives of all the relevant stakeholders in the fi eld of fi nancial reporting 
who are competent to carry out the actual monitoring and evaluation process. 
Th e body of the second instance is governmental and capable of imposing 
sanctions and other mandatory orders on a reviewed company. A concrete 
monitoring and enforcement procedure will be launched on two occasions: fi rst, 
there is an ad-hoc procedure that begins when a stakeholder informs the body 
about a specifi c instant or form of misconduct. Second, there is a progressive 
procedure of randomly evaluating reports of the obligated companies.
B. TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND MEMBER STATE 
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
Th e non-fi nancial reporting framework presented in the Directive has to be seen 
as another step to achieve the goals of the European Union’s CSR-strategy. It is 
therefore set to be continuously refi ned, especially in the light of “best practices” 
with regard to Member State approaches to the implementation of the provisions 
in their national legislation. Nevertheless, it is deplorable that the European 
Commission did not explicitly consider and discuss its own legal human rights 
obligations and those of the Member States suffi  ciently to prevent European 
companies from violating transnational social rights abroad. Neither the 
Directive itself, nor the published legislative material, in particular the European 
Commission’s Impact Assessment, refer to actual human rights obligations.
Th e  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( CESCR) 
repeatedly stated, that states have an extraterritorial obligation to protect 
foreign individuals or communities eff ectively against infringements of their 
transnational social rights with regard to the activities of companies which 
have their main seat within the jurisdiction of that state.133 States are obliged to 
132 For the organisation of the German fi nancial supervisory system, see R. Bockmann, 
Internationale Koordinierung nationaler Enforcement-Aktivitä ten: Eine kritische Analyse 
unter besonderer Berü cksichtigung der Deutschen Prü fstelle fü r Rechnungslegung, 
(Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag, 2012). For the European fi nancial supervisory system, see E. 
Wymeersch, “Th e Reforms of the European Financial Supervisory System: An Overview”, 
(2010) 7 European Company and Financial Law Review, p. 240 et seq.
133  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( CESCR), “Statement on the 
Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and  Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights”, UN Doc E/C.12/2011/1, 11  May 2011; see, also,  CESCR, GC No. 14, UN 
Doc E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 39; for the extraterritorial obligations of Germany 
with respect to investments of german companies abroad see  CESCR, UN Doc CO, E/C.12/
DEU/CO/5, 12 July 2011, para. 10; Th e Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations 
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establish appropriate laws and regulations, as well as monitoring, investigation 
and accountability procedures to set and enforce standards for the performance 
of companies.134 As elaborated above, proper non-fi nancial reporting, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms would aim to assess, monitor and 
improve the human-rights performances of companies.
Th e  Guiding Principles confi rm the practice of the Committee ( CESCR). Th e 
fi rst principle clearly states that states “must protect against human rights abuse 
within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business 
enterprises. Th is requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, 
punish and redress such abuse through eff ective policies, legislation, regulations 
and adjudication”. Principle 3 points out that states should “provide eff ective 
guidance to business enterprises on how to respect human rights throughout 
their operations” and “encourage, or where appropriate require, business 
enterprises to communicate how they address their human rights impacts” to 
comply with their duty to protect human rights.
In sum, a brief review of international human rights law leads to the 
assumption that the EU Member States135 are obliged to take eff ective legislative 
steps to regulate the conduct of corporations with regard to the progressive 
realisation of rights, i.e., as recognised in the  CESCR. On the one hand, it can 
be argued that the EU and its Member States in some respect have a margin of 
appreciation in the area of extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporate human 
rights abuses and, therefore, the boundaries between what is legally-binding and 
what is “politically opportune” are oft en blurred.136 On the other hand, there is 
clearly a lack of regulation in this fi eld. Th e brief examination of the Directive 
in the area of ESC rights (Olivier De Schutter, Asbjørn Eide, et al., “Commentary to the 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights“, (2012) 34 Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 1084–1169) refer to the 
practice of the Committee and other human rights bodies when stating a state obligation to 
regulate private conduct (Principle 24) and states must adopt and enforce measures to protect 
 economic, social and cultural rights “as regards business enterprises, where the corporation, 
or its parent or controlling company, has its centre of activity, is registered or domiciled, 
or has its main place of business or substantial business activities, in the State concerned” 
(Principle 25).
134  CESCR, “Statement on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and 
 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, note 133 above.
135 For the question of whether EU is obliged by international human rights codifi cations, see 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Human Rights in Times of Austerity Policy: Th e EU Institutions and 
the Conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2014), p. 22 
et seq. On the relationship between the EU and Member States international human rights 
obligations, see Tawhida Ahmed and Israel de Jesús Butler, “Th e European Union and Human 
Rights: An International Law Perspective”, (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law, 
pp. 771–801; Th e Regional Offi  ce for Europe of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, “Th e EU and International Human Rights Law”, 2008, available at: www.europe.
ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/EU_and_International_Law.pdf.
136 Augenstein, note 86 above, p.  77, para. 240; Michael Krennerich, Soziale Menschenrechte – 
Zwischen Recht und Politik, (Schwalbach: Wochenschau Verlag, 2013), p.  106 & 361 et seq; 
 CESCR, “Statement on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and 
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demonstrates that there is no doubt that non-fi nancial reporting can be rated as 
an eff ective tool to improve the behaviour of corporations with regard to human 
rights. At the same time, legislative measures in this fi eld tend to have very little 
intensity as they only burden the companies and groups aff ected with fi nancial 
and administrative costs, while completely omitting any regulation of their 
commercial activities. Regarding fi nancial and administrative costs, it is hard to 
understand why companies or groups which are considered as “large” and which 
exceed either a balance sheet total of 20 million euros or a net turnover of 40 
million euros should be fi nancially or administratively unburdened in a fi eld 
which is accentuated not only as a main objective of the EU,137 but also enhances 
the companies’ overall performance and the effi  ciency of capital markets.138 To 
date, the EU and some Member States in particular, such as Germany,139 have 
not taken adequate legal or political steps to prevent their own citizens and 
national entities from violating economical, social and cultural rights in other 
countries. Appropriate and eff ective legislative steps, for example, non-fi nancial 
reporting equipped with a proper monitoring and enforcement mechanism, are 
long overdue.
Th e European Commission has invested a lot of eff ort in trying to appease 
companies and opposing groups by focusing on investors’ interests and stressing 
the “business case”140 of non-fi nancial reporting. Th e human rights of the 
aff ected individuals and communities, and the obligations of both the EU and 
the Member States with regard to these rights, seem to play only a minor role in 
the European Union’s legislative intentions. In any case, the European Union’s 
and the Member States’ extraterritorial obligations were not explicitly refl ected 
during the legislative process. For these reasons, the European Union should 
explicitly consider international human rights obligations when considering 
ways for a further development of its non-fi nancial reporting framework, and 
the Member States should consider their human rights obligations with regard to 
the implementation of the Directive by creating both reporting obligations that 
narrow the possibilities of “green washing”, and monitoring and enforcement 
 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, note 133 above;  CESCR, GC No. 14, note 133 above, 
para. 54.
137 Art. 2 EUV.
138 European Commission, Impact Assessment, note 84 above, p. 23.
139 Germanwatch and Miseror, for example, demand the German Government to comply 
with the EC’s request (Communication “A renewed EU strategy 2011–14 for  Corporate 
Social Responsibility”, COM (2011) 681 fi nal, 25  October 2011) to establish a plan for the 
implementation of the UN- Guiding Principles on  Business and Human Rights (Germanwatch 
and Miseror, “Nationaler Aktionsplan zur Umsetzung der UN-Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft  
und Menschenrechte – Anforderungen an den Umsetzungsprozess in Deutschland”, July 
2012, available at: www.germanwatch.org/de/download/6648.pdf).
140 It is oft en argued that CSR pays off  in general (see Jeff rey Unerman and Brendan O’Dwyer, 
“Th e Business Case for Regulation of  Corporate Social Responsibility and Accountability”, 
(2007) 31 Accounting Forum, pp. 332–353; Phillip Schreck, Th e Business Case for  Corporate 
Social Responsibility, (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2009).
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obligations that are eff ectively able to enforce compliance with the obligations 
laid down by the Directive.
IV. CONCLUSION
To return to the further elaborated approach to corporate accountability and to 
switch the focus to the potential eff ects of a sustainable non-fi nancial reporting 
framework, we now wish to put our fi ndings on the EU’s non-fi nancial reporting 
framework into the context of our theoretical approach by referring to the 
question established above: Does the EU’s non-fi nancial reporting framework 
have the potential to promote the accountability of MNCs eff ectively and 
signifi cantly strengthen spaces of societal autonomy towards the economic 
system?
Non-fi nancial reporting has the potential to preserve the autonomy of 
social systems or regimes against the expansive drive of the economic system in 
diff erent ways. Besides the fact that it could serve as a source of information for 
the victims of human rights violations by MNCs and therefore could prepare the 
ground for countering economic forces that restrain or block the fulfi lment of 
transnational social rights,141 there could be eff ects of a more general character 
that would signifi cantly strengthen spaces of societal autonomy towards the 
economic system and contribute to the enforcement of human rights against 
economic actors.
It can be argued that only the economic system and the business actors 
can decide whether to adjust their communications in favour of their social 
 environment. Because the system remains autopoietic,142 and, therefore, internal 
communications only refer to previous internal communications, the diffi  cult 
task of reciprocally harmonising the function of a social system with its output 
can only be accomplished by a system-intern refl exion, which can be initiated 
from the outside of a system, but cannot be replaced.143 Gunther Teubner states 
that these initiations can only be successful if they orientate themselves on the 
system’s ways or modes of self-change and aim to give impulses that can be 
translated into inner growth processes.144 Th e task would be to combine massive 
external pressure and irritation with intrinsic changes.145
Based upon our theoretical approach, under which human rights regulate 
communicative processes of all functional systems and, therefore, also have to 
141 See Michael Freeman, “Conclusion: Refl ections on the Th eory and Practice of Economic and 
Social Rights”, in: Lanse Minkler (ed), Th e State of Economic and Social Human Rights: A 
Global Overview, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 386.
142 Luhmann, note 49 above, p. 757.
143 Teubner, note 37 above, p. 134.
144 Ibid., p. 134 et seq.
145 Ibid., p 135.
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regulate the communicative processes of the economic system with regard to 
its social  environment, the starting-point for strengthening the enforcement of 
human rights against economic actors has to be located within the economic 
system itself. To determine the further embodiment of human rights and to 
make human rights protection a core business concern regarding the every day 
decision-making, i.e., to adjust internal communications in favour of human 
rights, it is necessary to evaluate how human rights matters are currently 
implemented in the internal structures of the economic system and by the 
economic actors. In this regard, proper non-fi nancial reporting, is a vital tool 
that can institutionalise a mandatory framework not only to initiate, but also 
to enhance and guide, the process of self-evaluation in terms of system internal 
self-refl exion.146 By establishing proper non-fi nancial reporting, monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms that directly respond to the reports, internal 
learning eff ects could be combined with external pressure, guidance and 
assistance. Companies could be faced with internal structural shortcomings, and 
monitoring bodies could point out ways to abolish these shortcomings. In order 
to increase the extent or reach of external pressure, it is important to include 
civil society in the reporting, monitoring and follow-up process. To avoid a 
replication of factual positions of power in negotiating positions – which can be 
observed in the actual non-fi nancial reporting frameworks (“greenwashing”) – 
it is essential to empower the under-privileged positions by mandatory legal 
mechanisms.147 Spaces of autonomy have to be legally-assured by legally-framed 
negotiating positions.148 In this sense, the participation of civil society in the 
monitoring of non-fi nancial reporting has to be seen as the implementation of 
the function of human rights to enable inclusion.
146 See David Hess, “Social Reporting: A Refl exive Law Approach to Corporate Social 
Responsiveness”, (1999) 25 Journal of Corporation Law, pp. 41–84; Gunther Teubner, 
“Substantive and Refl exive Elements in Modern Law”, (1983) 17 Law and Society Review, pp. 
239–286.
147 See Ingeborg Maus, “Perspektiven ‘refl exiven Rechts’ im Kontext gegenwärtiger 
Deregulierungstendenzen”, (1986) 19 Kritische Justiz, pp. 390–405.
148 Ibid., p. 404.
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CHAPTER 7
LABOUR RIGHTS AND 
THE  ILO: THE CHALLENGE OF 
TRANSFORMING INFORMAL 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES TO PROMOTE 
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS
Domestic and  Care Work as Core Issues
Eva Senghaas-Knobloch
INTRODUCTION
At its one hundredth session in June 2011, the International Labour 
Conference  – the tripartite plenary (comprising government, employers’ and 
workers’ delegates) of the International Labour Organization ( ILO) – adopted 
Convention 189 on  Decent Work for  Domestic Workers, together with the non-
binding Recommendation 201 on the same subject.1 Juan Somavía, the then 
General Director of the International Labour Offi  ce, noted with satisfaction on 
this occasion that:
“We are moving the standards system of the  ILO into the  informal economy for the 
fi rst time, and this is a breakthrough of great signifi cance. History is being made.”2
Surprisingly, the Convention had already come into force in 2013 aft er 
ratifi cation by Bolivia, Guyana, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, Mauritius, 
1 For the legal characterisation of the diff erent  ILO instruments, the obligations of the 
members states and the system of supervision, see Anne Trebilcock, Chapter 8, Section IV.2 
in this volume. For the procedures of the  ILO, see, also,  ILO, Rules of the Game, A Brief 
Introduction to International Labour Standards, (Geneva:  ILO 2009 rev’d ed., Chapters 3 
and 4).
2  ILO, Th e  Informal Economy and  Decent Work. A Policy Resource Guide Supporting Transitions 
to Formality, (Geneva: UN and  ILO, 2013), Chapter 4, “Th e Regulatory Framework and the 
 Informal Economy”, p. 8. All documents are available at: www.ilo.org.
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South Africa, the Philippines, Italy and Germany – far more than the two states 
required for its enforcement.
It was, indeed, Juan Somavía, who came into offi  ce in 1999 as the fi rst 
Non-Westerner, who had alerted the constituents of the  ILO (governments’, 
employers’ and workers’ representatives) to the highly-vulnerable circumstances 
of the majority of people in the contemporary world of work. It was he who 
promoted the new  Decent Work Agenda, an integrated programme to improve 
internal co-ordination between the organisation’s diverse activities in standard-
setting and capacity-building, and to strengthen the voice of the  ILO in global 
governance institutions, particularly vis-à-vis the dominant international 
fi nancial agencies, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and 
the World  Trade Organization (WTO). With this new emphasis, he sought to 
revitalise the spirit of the  ILO  Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944 (which 
today is part of the  ILO Constitution) with its primacy on freedom and the 
principles of social justice for all;3 and he was able to rely on the activities and 
the experiences within the organisation4 that went back to the 1960s, when, in 
the wake of de-colonisation, new states were founded and became  ILO Member 
States with socio-economic and socio-political structures that were very diff erent 
from those of the early industrialised countries. Th e universal promotion of 
gainful work under free and equal conditions for all became a central topic at 
that time, and slowly helped the new states to overcome the colonial vestiges of 
 forced labour which had prevailed within the former colonies of the Member 
States of the organisation since its foundation in 1919 as part of the Peace Treaty 
of Versailles.5
Aft er the period of de-colonisation in the1960s, the challenge of transforming 
former Communist state economies into market-oriented states in the 1990s 
once again underlined the necessity to understand the structural relationship 
between the formal and the  informal economy, and to reach out to those working 
people who are not recognised, registered or counted in national  statistics, who 
3 In the  Declaration of Philadelphia, which was adopted during the 26th Session of the 
International Labour Conference, it is stated: “Th e Conference reaffi  rms the fundamental 
principles on which the Organization is based and, in particular, that labour is not a 
commodity; freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained progress; 
poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere; the war against want 
requires to be carried on with unrelenting vigor within each nation, and by continuous 
and concerted international eff ort in which the representatives of workers and employers, 
enjoying equal status with those of governments, join with them in free discussion and 
democratic decision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare.”
4 See Gerry Rodgers, Eddy Lee, Lee Swepston and Jasmien van Daele, Th e  ILO and the Quest for 
Social Justice, 1919–2009, (Geneva:  ILO, 2009), p. 222 et seq. See, also, Alain Supiot, Th e Spirit 
of Philadelphia: Social Justice vs. the Total Market, (London-New York: Verso Books, 2012).
5 See Daniel Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization: Th e International 
Labour Organization, 1940–70, (Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2012); Eva Senghaas-
Knobloch, Reproduktion von Arbeitskraft  in der Weltgesellschaft . Zur Programmatik der 
Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation, (Frankfurt aM: Campus Verlag, 1979).
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lack  social protection, protection by labour legislation and protective measures 
at the workplace. In 2002, not least because of the vast increase in insuffi  ciently-
protected working people even in the core industrialised countries, the  ILO 
constituents adopted the broader concept of the  informal economy, which 
also takes into account the grey areas between formal and informal economic 
activities, and includes what had hitherto been understood as the “informal 
sector” in developing countries. Th e  ILO Resolution on  Decent work and the 
 Informal Economy of 2002 states:
“Th e term ‘ informal economy’ is preferable to ‘informal sector’ because the workers 
and enterprises in question do not fall within any one sector of economic activity, 
but cut across many sectors. …Th e term ‘ informal economy’ refers to all economic 
activities by workers and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not 
covered or insuffi  ciently covered by formal arrangements. Th eir activities are not 
included in the law, which means that they are operating outside the formal reach 
of the law; or they are not covered in practice, which means that – although they are 
operating within the formal reach of law, the law is not applied or not enforced; or 
the law discourages compliance because it is inappropriate, burdensome, or imposes 
excessive costs.”6
With its impetus to include all working people, the  Decent Work Agenda 
fostered a fresh look into the Conventions and Recommendations of the 
 ILO; evidence shows that it may not be deduced from the lack of concrete 
protection at work in many states that the scope of  ILO standards is limited to 
formal employment only. Contrary to a widespread misconception, as a recent 
publication by the International Labour Offi  ce (the administrative staff  of the 
 ILO) on the application of international labour standards (ILS) emphasises,
“the  ILO’s mandate is not limited to workers in the traditional meaning of the word; 
it extends to all human beings. Th ere is a common misconception that ILS are not 
applicable to the  informal economy when in fact, most ILS are applicable to all 
workers, dependent and independent, and are as relevant to the  informal economy as 
to the formal economy.”7
6  ILO 2002 Resolution and Conclusions Concerning  Decent Work and the  Informal Economy, 
International Labour Conference, 90th session, 2002 Geneva, para 3, available at: www.
ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc90/pdf/pr-25res.pdf. It is also emphasised 
that activities for legal goods and services that are not in conformity with registration 
requirements or immigration formalities should be distinguished from criminal and illegal 
activities which it would not be appropriate to protect. See the assessment of the then Deputy 
Director, Policy Integration Department of the International Labour Offi  ce: Anne Trebilcock, 
“ Decent Work and the  Informal Economy”, Discussion Paper Nr.  2005/04, United Nations 
University, World Institute for Development Economic Research.
7  ILO, Th e  Informal Economy and  Decent Work. A Policy Resource Guide, Geneva 2013, Section 
4.2, p.  7. Th is guide draws from Anne Trebilcock, “International Labour Standards and 
the  Informal Economy”, in: Jean-Claude Javillier and Bernard Gernigon (eds), Les normes 
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Th is statement alludes to a relatively new approach to understanding 
international labour standards in the light of the indivisible human rights 
within which, as Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller are arguing, one 
can identify distinct kinds of social rights;8 at the same time, it addresses the 
potential tension between national and international law and transnational 
social rights.
Th e following deliberations intend to shed light on the long-standing issues 
related to the intricacies and dynamics of the  informal economy as well as to 
the challenges that have to be faced in the endeavour to make international and 
transnational social rights a reality for all working people. Th e chapter focuses 
on the new  ILO Convention 189 on  Decent Work for  Domestic Workers in order to 
exemplify the related issues.  Domestic work encompasses a range of noumerous 
informal activities; the Convention covers activities that are of vital necessity to 
people and societies, but are traditionally considered to be outside the scope of 
labour law and not contributing to societal development or public welfare. In 
the following, the fi rst two sections address the diverse phenomena of  informal 
work, the problems of measurement and the diff erent analytical approaches to 
explaining the persistence of the  informal economy. Th e third section outlines 
the framework of the  ILO Agenda of  Decent Work and its relevance for tackling 
informality, whereas the fourth section discusses the policy issues of domestic 
and  care work in relation to the  ILO Convention 189 on  Decent Work for 
 Domestic Workers. Th is is followed by a brief look at a political initiative for 
the Recommendations on  Care of the Social Platform (an NGO network in the 
European Union) and some concluding remarks.
I. THE MEANING AND MEASUREMENT 
OF THE “INFORMAL SECTOR” AND 
THE “ INFORMAL ECONOMY”
Th e phenomenon of  informal work was fi rst recognised in the 1960s. In the 
context of the  ILO World Employment Programme under the leadership 
of Louis Emmerij,9 the International Labour Organization initiated the 
so-called Employment Strategy Missions to Brazil, Sudan and Kenya, with the 
participation of other special UN organisations and the World Bank. Th e reports 
of these missions demonstrated that it would not be possible to absorb all labour 
internationales du travail: un patrimoine pour l’avenir: Mélanges en l’honneur de Nicolas 
Valticos, (Geneva:  ILO, 2004), pp. 585–613.
8 See Chapter 2, Section IV.1 in this volume.
9 Louis Emmerij, “A New Look at Some Strategies for Increasing Productive Employment in 
Africa”, (1974) 110 International Labour Review, pp. 199–218. See, also, David A. Morse, “Th e 
World Employment Programme”, (1968) 97 International Labour Review, pp. 517–524.
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power into the modern urban capitalist economy in the foreseeable future. At 
the same time, it was evident that there was no unemployment in the European 
sense of the word, but that migrants from rural to urban areas with no  social 
protection needed to carry out diverse activities in order to survive. Contrary 
to the then prevailing theory of a dualist character of the economy in these 
countries, such activities could not be categorised as traditional.  Repair work 
and other small handicraft  work, petty  trade with industrial goods, vending 
home-made food on the street, etc., are all activities related to the modern formal 
sector and to urban living, albeit without being part of the modern sector.10 
Th e authors of the Kenya report recommended “new policies for promoting the 
informal sector and linking it with the formal sector”.11
Th e term informal sector was fi rst used in the Kenya report to describe 
such economic survival activities. Th e informal sector there was characterised 
by self-employment as the specifi c form of production and operation, the use 
of very simple means of production and an unregulated market; the working 
poor were emphasised as an attendant social fact. Interestingly, at the time, 
there were endeavours in the World Bank to defi ne the informal sector by the 
social vulnerability of those working in that sector;12 however, in the 1980s, the 
conceptional hegemony of neo-liberalism gained the upper hand. Th e lending 
practices of the two Washington-based international fi nancial institutions 
were determined by the de-regulation of international  trade, loans that were 
conditional on privatisation and the removal of state regulations such as 
 minimum  wages or even the elimination of  trade unions, which were deemed 
to impede investments (this was the so-called Washington Consensus). Th e  ILO 
became increasingly marginalised within this transnational constellation.13
In 1991, the  ILO put  informal employment as a major item on the agenda of its 
annual International Labour Conference for the fi rst time. In his report, the then 
General Director Michel Hansenne described it as a “dilemma of the informal 
sector”, in as much as it provided employment and income, but, at the same 
10  ILO, Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment 
in Kenya, (Geneva:  ILO, 1972), p. 503 et seq.
11 Hans Singer and Richard Jolly, “Unemployment in an African Setting. Lessons of the 
Employment Strategy Mission to Kenya”, (1973) 107 International Labour Review, p.  107 
as cited in Rodgers, Lee, Swepston and van Daele, note 4 above, p.  190. See, also,  ILO, 
Employment, Incomes and Equality. A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in 
Kenya, (Geneva:  ILO, 1972).
12 Th ese early insights were not further pursued for the time being, however. Th e  ILO’s World 
Employment Programme fostered the strategy of supporting small-scale self-employed 
producers and people working on their own account primarily through qualifi cation 
and appropriate loan conditions and co-operatives, without a strong emphasis on  social 
protection and rights. In the subsequent decades, the World Bank and the IMF, which had 
meanwhile adopted a neo-liberal agenda, forestalled any endeavours to implement minimum 
social standards.
13 Th e features of this transnational constellation are outspelled by Andreas Fischer-Lescano 
and Kolja Möller, Chapter 2 in this volume.
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time, lacked labour and social standards as well as protection from harassment 
and arbitrary actions of state representatives.14 In 1993, the International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) adopted a defi nition of the informal 
sector that was subsequently integrated into the revised international System 
of National Accounts (SNA). From the very beginning, however, the defi nition 
agreed upon, which referred to economic units, was deemed inadequate to 
cover the true diversity of economic activities carried out. It was feared – and 
correctly so – that many self-employed or own-account workers, of whom 
a very large number are women, did not defi ne themselves as businesses or 
economic units or that some forms of employment, for example contract work, 
would fall into a grey area between self-employment and wage labour. Th e 
failed attempts in 1997 and 1998 to set up a new  ILO Convention on Contract 
Labour (referring to workers dependent on one employer but not declared as 
employees) highlights the diffi  culties of defi ning criteria which establish whether 
an employment relationship exists or not. In 2006, the Employment Relationship 
Recommendation (Recommendation 198) was adopted to provide clarifi cation 
and promote national protection standards.
Against the background of these issues, the statisticians of the so-called 
Delhi Group (the Indian government had the presidency), together with the 
global network WIEGO (Women in  Informal Employment: Globalizing and 
Organizing) and the  ILO Department of  Statistics, formed a working group that, 
in 2002, drew up a defi nition of  informal employment that was also accepted by 
the 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) the following 
year.15 According to this defi nition,  informal employment can exist both in 
the informal and in the formal sector. While the term informal sector refers 
to business units, the term  informal employment is concerned with forms of 
employment. Both concepts imply an understanding of the  informal economy in 
times of globalisation. Th e issue of  informal employment and  informal economy 
was placed in the context of the new  ILO agenda for worldwidedecent work, 
which emphasises that the “commitment to  decent work is anchored in the 
 Declaration of Philadelphia’s affi  rmation of the right of everyone to ‘conditions of 
freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity’”.16 Th e term 
 informal economy was therefore central to the 90th session of the International 
Labour Conference in 2002. According to this new consensus, the term  informal 
economy encompasses “all economic activities that are, in law or in practice, not 
14  ILO, Th e Dilemma of the Informal Sector, Report of the Director General, International 
Labour Conference, 78th Session, Geneva 1991; Paul Bangasser, “Th e  ILO and the Informal 
Sector. An Institutional History”, Geneva,  ILO Employment Paper 2000/9.
15 For details, see Ralf Hussmanns, “Measuring the  Informal Economy. From Employment in 
the Informal Sector to  Informal Employment”,  ILO Policy Integration Department, Bureau 
of  Statistics, International Labour Offi  ce, Working Paper 53, Geneva, 2004.
16  ILO 2002 Resolution and Conclusions Concerning  Decent Work and the  Informal Economy, 
para. 1, note 4 above.
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covered or insuffi  ciently covered by formal arrangements”; it “includes wage 
workers and own-account workers, contributing family members and those 
moving from one situation to another, it also includes some of those who are 
engaged in new fl exible work arrangements who fi nd themselves at the periphery 
of the core enterprise or at the lowest end of the production chain; there may be 
grey areas where the economic activity involves characteristics of both formal 
and  informal economy”.17
Th e broad spectrum of heterogeneous situations of workers with very varying 
social and legal standards, are described in the  ILO Policy Resource Guide on the 
 Informal Economy of 2013, which highlights governance defi cits:
– “unregistered workers (those in a genuine employment relationship but who do 
not enjoy any rights – the situation is worse if they are irregular migrants or if 
their employer is unregistered);
– under-registered workers (those who receive part of their earnings informally – 
they are registered as part-time workers but in fact work full-time – which means 
that less taxes are paid on their behalf);
– disguised workers (those who perform the same tasks as “regular” employees 
but oft en do not have the same rights because they are employed under diff erent 
contracts such as civil or commercial contracts);
– ambiguous workers (those about whom doubts are raised concerning whether 
they are employees or not);
– vulnerable own-account workers (those who are genuinely self-employed but 
vulnerable and exploited);
– employees in precarious situations (fi xed-term, part-time or temporary workers 
who may not enjoy the same rights as “regular” workers, or do not enjoy the same 
rights in practice);
– special cases ( domestic workers, home workers, and other types of workers who 
are not always covered by employment laws); and
– workers in triangular relationships (oft en, one does not know who the employer is 
because of the involvement of one or more third parties in the relationship; this 
includes situations where one resorts to an employment agency, or in which there 
is franchising).”18
In qualitative studies and narratives, the workers living in these diff erent 
situations are given a face:
17 International Labour Organization, “Th e  Informal Economy. Enabling Transition to 
Formalization”. Tripartite Interregional Symposium on the  Informal Economy. Geneva, 
27–29 November 2007, p. 3.
18  ILO, Th e  Informal Economy and  Decent Work: A Policy Resource Guide, (Geneva:  ILO, 2013), 
Chapter 4, pp. 4–5.
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“Anuja sells fi sh in the street. Oft en police offi  cers demand payments from her, 
because she has no licence and does not know how to get one.”19
Anuja is thus a vulnerable own-account worker, at the mercy of the goodwill of 
potentially corrupt representatives of the state.
Maria, 48 years old, living in the North of Lima is a disguised worker:
“I knot bracelets, sew beads onto jumpers and bags, do whatever comes my way. 
Th e enterprises don’t give women like us permanent employment because they say 
we are too old. Th at’s why we work at home on our own account. Th is means that 
the businesses don’t have to insure us. We have no employment contract and get no 
pension. We have no form of  social protection… if we have an accident or fall ill, 
nobody feels in the least responsible for us.”20
A much less visible, but recently publicly-debated fi eld of  informal work is that 
of the  domestic work of undocumented workers.  Domestic work is a domain 
for irregular female workers, frequently undocumented migrant workers or 
recently-immigrated citizens. In Germany, they oft en come from East Europe 
or from Latin American countries. Paula represents a case of an unregistered 
irregular migrant worker:
“Paula bore eight children, two died and four live in Ecuador. Aft er her separation 
from her husband, Paula came to Hamburg with her youngest daughter, where 
another of her daughters was already living illegally with her husband and their 
three-year-old  child. …In order to pay the fares she took out a loan at an interest 
rate of 12 per cent per month, which she is still paying off . In Hamburg, Paula 
is struggling to survive, as she now only has two cleaning jobs aft er two of her 
employers moved away.”21
Th e rise in  informal work in Europe came mainly in the wake of the end of 
the East-West confl ict, the shock strategies of marketisation in the former 
Communist countries and the general policies of privatisation, liberalisation, 
de-regulation and the fl exibilisation of the labour market by the international 
fi nancial agencies and national governments.  Informal work is therefore 
oft en linked with labour migration from South to North and East to West. In 
Germany, this can be observed on construction sites, in agriculture, the catering 
19 Ingeborg Wick, Frauenarbeit im Schatten. Informelle Wirtschaft  und Freie Exportzonen, 
(Siegburg-Munich: Südwindinstitut für Ökonomie und Ökumene, 2009), p. 18, (translation 
from German).
20 Ibid.
21 Maria S. Rerrich, Die ganze Welt zu Hause. Cosmobile Putzfrauen in privaten Haushalten, 
(Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006), p. 87 et seq., (translated from German).
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 trade, abattoirs,22 and in the case of the so-called 24-hour  care-workers. Workers 
from Poland, Bulgaria and Rumania work as posted workers, sometimes without 
contracts at all; or with labour contracts but without compulsory social security 
contributions; or as self-employed/own-account workers upon the basis of 
services and work contracts. For many years, workers from East European 
countries have been given placements under the EU Posting of Workers Directive. 
Th ese workers are hired in various forms of the so-called triangular employment 
relationships.
Th ese portrayals and descriptions illustrate how workers in the  informal 
economy are ensnared in very unequal power relations and thus become 
highly vulnerable in social terms and with regard to their fundamental rights 
at work. Since the adoption of the Resolution on  Decent Work and the  Informal 
Economy at the International Labour Conference in 2002, the insight has gained 
ground that the issues pertaining to the  informal economy are governance 
issues and that it is necessary to address the wide range of vulnerabilities under 
which working people may suff er.23 Th e Resolution refers in paragraph 14 to 
“inappropriate, ineff ective, misguided or badly implemented macroeconomic 
and social policies”, including structural adjustment programmes, privatisation 
and re-structuring without an explicit employment-creation policy. It is also 
noted that “women and youth make up the bulk of workers in the  informal 
economy” (para. 17), whereby women “generally have to balance the triple 
responsibilities of breadwinning, domestic chores, and elder  care and childcare” 
(para. 20).
Despite “predictions to the contrary, employment in the  informal economy 
has risen rapidly in all regions of the developing world, and various forms of non-
standard employment have emerged in most regions of the developed world”.24 
Th is statement by Marilyn Carr and Martha Alter Chen at the beginning of this 
century is even more valid 10 year later. Th e  informal economy has continued to 
22 See the weekly Der Freitag, 8 April 2011, p. 15. Not until September 2013 did employers in the 
meat industry (Schlachtindustrie) in Northern Germany fi nally, under substantial political 
and public pressure, declare their willingness to bargain collectively with the food union 
(NGG Nahrung Genussmittel Gaststätten) on minimum labour conditions and  wages.
23 See the two background documents for the Conference:  ILO,  Decent Work and the  Informal 
Economy, (Geneva:  ILO, 2002) and  ILO, “Women and Men in the  Informal Economy. 
Statistical Picture”, Geneva, International Labour Offi  ce, Employment Sector, 2002.
24 Marilyn Carr and Martha Alter Chen, “Globalization and the  Informal Economy. How 
Global  Trade and Investment Impact on the Working Poor”, International Labour Offi  ce, 
Employment Sector, Working Paper on the  Informal Economy Nr 1, 2002, 1. Statisticians at 
the 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) corroborated that  informal 
employment comprises the total number of informal jobs, whether carried out in formal 
sector enterprises, informal sector enterprises, or households; including employees holding 
informal jobs; employers and own-account workers employed in their own informal sector 
enterprises; members of informal producers’ co-operatives; contributing family workers in 
formal or informal sector enterprises; and own-account workers engaged in the production of 
goods for their own end use by their household. See  ILO, Th e  Informal Economy and  Decent 
Work: A Policy Resource Guide, (Geneva:  ILO, 2013), Chapter 2, p. 5.
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grow. It is meanwhile obvious that the majority of all working women and men 
earn their living under very vulnerable, insecure conditions in both rural and 
urban areas. Th e share of  informal employment can only be estimated, mainly 
upon the basis of household surveys: “Th e  informal economy around the world 
today represents 52.2 per cent of total employment in Latin America, 78.2 per 
cent in Asia and 55.7 per cent in Africa”,25 with substantial diff erences between 
North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. In the developed regions,  informal work 
is estimated at less than 10 per cent but increasing.26Th e grand promise of global 
prosperity and welfare under the prevailing conditions of economic globalisation 
has not come true.
II. ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO EXPLAINING 
THE PHENOMENON OF  INFORMAL 
EMPLOYMENT
With the acknowledgement, fi rst, of the phenomenon of the working poor in the 
informal sector, then of  informal employment and its gradual expansion, there 
was an increased interest in analytical explanations and policy options. Both 
within and outside the  ILO, various analytical and political approaches were 
initiated.27
Th e traditional economic theory of dualism that was conceived in the 1950s 
referred to developing countries only; this theory assumed the co-existence of 
a modern economy alongside a traditional sector with a surplus rural labour 
force that could be regulated through measures to encourage rural-urban 
migration.28 Th e relationship structure between the metropoles of the global 
economy and their peripheries was not taken into account.
Th e steady growth of zones of working poor in the urban regions of the 
Th ird World gave rise to a defi nition of the term informal sector by the  ILO 
Employment Strategy Missions (of which the mission to Kenya was already 
mentioned) that constituted a kind of neo-dualist perspective. It acknowledged 
that the informal economic activities in the small-scale production of goods 
25 See Globalization and Informal Jobs in Developing Countries, a joint study of the 
International Labour Offi  ce and the Secretariat of the World  Trade Organization, Geneva, 
2009, p. 27.
26 Alejandro Portes and William Haller, “Th e  Informal Economy”, in: Neil J. Smelser and 
Richard Swedberg (eds), Handbook of Economic Sociology, (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), pp. 403–422, at 404 et seq.
27 Dharam P. Ghai (ed),  Decent Work: Objectives and Strategies, (Geneva:  ILO, 2006). See, 
also, Caroline E.N. Moser, “Informal Sector or Petty Commodity Production: Dualism or 
Dependence in Urban Development?”, (1978) 6 World Development, pp. 1041–1064.
28 Arthur W. Lewis, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour” (1954, 
reprinted) in: A.N. Argawala and S.P. Singh (eds), Th e Economics of Underdevelopment, (New 
Delhi-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 400–449.
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and in petty  trade in urban regions could be described as neither traditional 
nor modern work activities, but constituted a distinct economic form. Low 
productivity in this area is brought about by diffi  culties in gaining access to the 
necessary material and immaterial resources. Th e prevailing growth strategies 
for the formal sector alone were considered inadequate to promote national 
development.29
Once it had been acknowledged that, even with high growth, the informal 
sector of the economy in developing countries does not inevitably shrink but can 
even expand, there arose a need for further explanation. One explanation, taking 
a judicial perspective, focused on regulatory frameworks. Particular signifi cance 
was attached here to obstacles which prevent small and micro-businesses from 
registering with the various pertinent state authorities and to a lack of property 
rights.30
In a pointedly neo-liberal, micro-economic approach, the existence of 
informal self-employed workers in all regions of the world (but especially in 
highly developed countries) is regarded as a deliberate, oft en justifi ed decision 
made by women and men working on a tight budget to circumvent legal 
regulations because of the high costs and low returns involved, because they 
prefer self-employment to dependent work, and because they know that they 
have the social support that they can fall back on if needs be, without formalised 
measures such as contribution-based minimum  social protection.31
Th e structural-systemic approach, by contrast, points to asymmetric global 
economic interdependencies and power relations. As early as 1971, Aníbal 
Quíjano from Peru formulated a path-breaking theory focusing on political and 
economic dependency structures between and within countries. According to 
this theory, the modern economic sector in peripheral capitalist (developing) 
countries is dominated by external economic forces and is, at the same time, 
externally oriented, which inhibits the growth of coherent internal macro-
economic cycles, and gives rise to structural heterogeneities and the hierarchical 
stratifi cation of diff erent modes of production: local small-producers of 
consumer goods are increasingly driven out of the market by cheap imports 
from capitalist mass production, thereby creating a marginalised economic pole 
and marginalised labourers with extremely low incomes at subsistence levels and 
no prospect of upward social mobility.32 Th is theory of structural heterogeneity, 
29 Salem V. Sethuranam, “Th e Urban Informal Sector. Concept, Measurement and Policy”, 
(1976) 114 International Labour Review, pp. 69–81.
30 Hernando de Soto, Th e Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else, (New York: Basic Books, 2000). Victor E. Tokman, “Modernizing the 
Informal Sector”, in: José Antonio Ocampo and Jomo K.S. (eds), Towards Full and Decent 
Employment, (Hyderabad: United Nations, 2007), pp. 255–276.
31 William F. Maloney, “Informality Revisited”, (2004) 32 World Development, pp. 1159–1178.
32 Aníbal Quijano, “Marginalisierter Pol der Wirtschaft  und marginalisierte Arbeitskraft ”, 
in: Dieter Senghaas, (ed), Peripherer Kapitalismus. Analysen über Abhängigkeit und 
Unterentwicklung, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974), pp. 298–341. See, also, Anibal 
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which focuses on predatory and exploitative relations between diff erent modes 
of production both within and between countries, has been taken up again in 
a new endeavour to explain the continued expansion of informal economic 
activities in all regions of the world (for example, by Marilyn Carr and Martha 
Alter Chen),33 with special emphasis on power imbalances in gender relations.
Already since the 1970s, more and more multinational and transnational 
corporations with headquarters in the industrialised countries (and more 
recently also in Asian threshold countries) have invested in Southern countries 
not only in the extraction of raw materials and the production of agricultural 
goods for export, but have also built plants all over the world for the production 
of industrial goods or industrially-manufactured foodstuff s. Th eir aim is 
not only to open up new local markets, but also to reduce costs for the supply 
of goods in their own domestic markets. Th ese cost-cutting strategies are 
particularly rife in the numerous “Export Production Zones” (EPZs). EPZs 
are intended to attract foreign capital with special labour legislation and tax 
incentives (with tax rates below the respective national standard rates), and the 
recruitment of primarily young women at very low wage-rates. A more recent 
trend can be seen in the outsourcing strategy and the consequent expansion of 
transnational production and  trade chains for clothing, electronic components, 
and traditional (for example, shea butter) and non-traditional (for example, roses 
and other fl owers) agricultural produce under sub-standard labour conditions, 
which also draw particularly on the labour force of young women.34 Th ese  trade 
chains are controlled by a handful of  trade groups. Large corporations also 
invest substantial amounts of their profi ts in speculative businesses that have 
no real economic relevance, but nevertheless have an impact on the material 
circumstances of working people.
As a consequence of this structural asymmetry of globalisation, and contrary 
to the promises of prosperity that  trade liberalisation and the de-regulation 
of capital transfer would bring, between 1960–62 and 2000–02, the income 
gap between the richest and the poorest countries increased signifi cantly, and 
inequality has also widened within countries.35 Wage diff erentials worldwide 
Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America”, (2000), manuscript 
available at: www.unc.edu/~aescobar/wan/wanquijano.pdf, last accessed 18 June 2014.
33 See note 24 above.
34 See, for instance, Leonhard Plank, Cornelia Staritz and Karin Lukas, Labour Rights in 
Global Production Networks: An Analysis of the Apparel and Electronics Sector in Romania, 
(Vienna: Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, 2009). Th e denial of even the 
most rudimentary work protection standards was made public to a broad audience in 
connection with the large number of deaths through fi res and suicide in Bangladesh and 
China.
35 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization: Creating 
Opportunities for All, (Geneva:  ILO, 2004), p.  36. Hamish Jenkins, Eddy Lee and Gerry 
Rodgers, Th e Quest for a Fair Globalization Th ree Years on: Assessing the Impact of the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, (Geneva: International Institute for 
Labour Studies, 2007), p. 17.
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have increased dramatically, albeit with regional variations. In the wake of tax 
reductions, especially relating to capital income, state expenditure on education, 
health and other public goods and services plummeted in many countries as 
tax revenues shrank.36 Since the beginning of the still ongoing bank and debt 
crisis in 2008, this situation has deteriorated further in many places. Th is has 
particularly aff ected women.
In developing countries, women suff er, for example, from the elimination 
of smallholder livelihoods through imports of subsidised agricultural products 
from industrialised countries (i.e., the USA and the EU). At the same time, they 
experience constraints on the labour market, not least because the provision 
of domestic- care activities is traditionally deemed to be the responsibility 
of women. Th ere is a strong correlation between disregard and contempt for 
domestic- care work arising from hierarchical gender relations and the rise in 
 informal employment.37
Th is attitude towards  care work applies also to Europe, albeit with diff erent 
features. For competitive reasons EU employment policy endeavours to ensure as 
high an employment ratio of women as possible. Th e new target of the European 
Commission for 2020 is a 75 per cent employment rate for men and women.38 
However, the new, individualistically oriented “adult worker model”39 has no 
place for vital  care activities, and a growth in atypical,  informal employment 
is the result. In this way, EU policy has appropriated the aspirations of women 
to attain economic independence without implementing the necessary socio-
political measures to satisfy their emancipatory demands: the adult worker 
model of the EU does not take into account that a complete commodifi cation 
of all vital necessary physical and mental  care activities is impossible, and it 
ignores the structural contradictions between the fl exibility demands of  care in 
the domestic area and the fl exibility demands in paid work.
Th e increased employment of women in the Global North means that they 
have less time to devote to unpaid family tasks, while men’s time budgets have 
hardly changed at all. Th is has given rise to a growing demand for aff ordable 
 care work. Th e decisive element here is the socio-structural basis upon which 
this demand for domestic services arises and is responded to. Put simply, there 
36 In Bangladesh, for example, primary school education for informally working children is 
largely dependent on intermittent project funding through which civil society workers are 
paid. See Andrea Schapper, From the Global to the Local: How International Rights Reach 
Bangladesh’s Children, (London-New York: Routledge, 2014).
37 Maria Floro and Mieke Meurs, “Global Trends in Women’s Access to ‘ Decent Work’”, in: 
 ILO-FES Dialogues on Globalization, Occasional Papers, Geneva, 2009.
38 European Commission, Communication from the Commission, “A Strategy for Smart, 
Sustainable and Inclusive Growth”, Brussels, 3 March 2010.
39 On the defi nitions, see Susy Giullari and Jane Lewis, “Th e Adult Worker Model Family: 
Gender, Equality and  Care”, in: UNRISD,  Social Policy and Development Programme 
Paper Nr. 19, April 2005; for a general outline, see Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical 
Refl ections on the “Postsocialist” Condition, (New York-London: Routledge, 1997).
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are two opposing political strategies: Scandinavian countries tend to take the 
socio-politically more ambitious “high road”, while Great Britain (like the USA) 
has chosen a development path that is criticised as the “low road”.40
Th e “low road” develops in a socio-political context in which a high degree 
of social inequality tends to be tolerated, and well-off  families or women 
in paid employment are able to aff ord to pay  domestic workers or informal 
domestic help to provide the necessary  care. Th e underlying policy is to try 
and keep public social expenditure as low as possible. Th is is the main reason 
for the recent growth of international or transnational “ care chains”41 as a type 
of “international division of reproductive labour”,42 in which female migrants 
are paid to carry out the necessary domestic- care activities in high-income 
households. Th is current trend has been mainly observed in the USA and in 
many European countries. In the wake of the state debt crisis, the provision of 
public social services has been further reduced. Th e more ambitious “high road”, 
by contrast, implies a relatively low degree of social inequality, which is primarily 
achieved by means of a well-funded public sector, in which  decent work in the 
social services – mostly provided by women here too – is possible.43
Women’s participation in the labour market has grown worldwide. Between 
1980 and 2008, it grew from 50.2 to 51.7 per cent, while that of men sank from 
82.0 to 77.7 per cent; these aggregate fi gures contain large regional disparities, 
however.44 Th e increase in female employment under precarious conditions is 
40 As termed by Steff en Lehndorff , Das Politische in der Arbeitspolitik: Ansatzpunkte für eine 
nachhaltige Arbeits- und Arbeitszeitgestaltung, (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 2006).
41 For this concept, see Arlie R. Hochschild, “Global  Care Chains and Emotional Surplus 
Value”, in: Will Hutton and Anthony Giddens (eds), On Th e Edge: Living with Global 
Capitalism, (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000); and Helma Lutz (ed), Gender Mobil? Geschlecht 
und Migration in transnationalen Räumen, (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfb oot, 2009).
42 Th e original insight behind the concept of “ care chains” was  developed by Rhacel Parrenas, 
“Migrant Filipina  Domestic Workers and the International Division of Reproductive 
Labor”, (2000) 14 Gender and Society, pp. 560–580. See, also, Fiona Williams, “Towards 
a Transnational Analysis of the Political Economy of  Care”, in: Rianne Mahon and Fiona 
Robinson (eds), Feminist Ethics and  Social Policy: Towards a Political Economy of  Care, 
(Vancouver-Toronto: University of British Colombia Press, 2011), pp. 21–38. Empirical 
analyses of the situation of irregular female labour migrants in Europe (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain) can be found in Anna Triandafyllidou (ed), Irregular 
Migrant  Domestic Workers in Europe. Who Cares?, (Farnham-Burlington VT: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2013).
43 See, for example, Hildegard Th eobald, “ Care-Politiken,  Care-Arbeitsmarkt und Ungleichheit: 
Schweden, Deutschland und Italien im Vergleich”, (2008) 18 Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 
pp. 257–281. See, also, Cornelia Heintze, “Auf der Highroad – der skandinavische Weg zu 
einem zeitgemäßen Pfl egesystem. Ein Vergleich zwischen fünf nordischen Ländern und 
Deutschland”, Expertise im Auft rag der Abteilung Wirtschaft s- und Sozialpolitik der 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stift ung, Bonn, 2012. available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-fi les/wiso/09243–
20120730.pdf, last accessed 6 June 2013.
44 Shara Razavi, Cammilla Arza, Elissa Braunstein et al., “Gendered Impacts of 
Globalization. Employment and  Social Protection”, United Nations Research Institute 
for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva 2012, p.3, available at: www.unrisd.
org/80256B3C005BCCF9/search/6E16D1DC33F5D82BC12579D000478859?OpenDo
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particularly high both in the European Union and in Latin America. Th e gap 
between regions and countries has triggered the widescale migration of an 
unprecedented proportion of women, particularly domestic and  care workers. 
In 2013, the number of  domestic workers on a global scale was estimated at 50 
to 100 million; “one in every 13 female wage workers is a domestic worker (or 
7.5 per cent), and the ratio is as high as one in four in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (26.6 per cent) and almost one in three in the Middle East (31.8 per 
cent).”45  Domestic work is thus a prominent example of  informal work.
III. THE  ILO AGENDA OF  DECENT WORK AND 
THE ISSUE OF DOMESTIC AND  CARE WORK
To counter the trends towards unprotected labour, the  Decent Work Agenda 
is built on four interdependent pillars. Th ese are: rights at work, promotion of 
employment,  social protection, and  social dialogue. “Th e essence of the  decent 
work approach is to maximize the synergies among its diff erent elements and 
fi nd policy and institutional options to overcome confl icting relationships 
and constraints.”46 Th ese strategic aims were consolidated at the International 
Labour Conference in 2008 by adoption of the Declaration on Social Justice for a 
Fair Globalization.47
For a long time, discourses in the fi elds of labour law and human rights were 
disconnected, although as early as 1944 the constitutionally-enshrined  ILO 
 Declaration of Philadelphia used a rights-based language which was later largely 
adopted for the formulation of social rights in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1949 and the International Covenant on Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights48 of 1966. In response to the shortcomings of member states in 
adhering to and implementing its standards (of which 76 Conventions were (still) 
considered up-to-date in 2013), the International Labour Conference adopted 
the  ILO Declaration on  Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998. Th e 
ground for this was prepared by the International Social Summit in Copenhagen 
in 1995. Th is Declaration consolidated four internationally recognised norms, 
the principles of which are binding for the Member States of the  ILO under their 
cument, last accessed 10  August 2012. See, also, Fiona Robinson, “ Care Ethics and the 
Transnationalization of  Care”, in: Mahon and Robinson (eds), note 42 above, pp. 127–144.
45  ILO,  Domestic Workers across the World: Global and Regional  Statistics and the Extent of 
Legal Protection, Geneva 2013, p. 19 et seq.
46 Ghai, note 27 above, p. 22.
47 Available at: www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/campaigns/voices-on-social-justice/
WCMS_099766/lang--en/index.htm, last accessed 16  June 2014. Th is is also the basis for 
ongoing  ILO initiatives to formalise the  informal economy.
48 Rodgers, Lee, Swepston and van Daele, note 4 above, p. 44. See Eddy Lee, “Th e  Declaration of 
Philadelphia. Retrospect and Prospect”, (1994) 133 International Labour Review, pp. 467–484.
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constitutional obligations. Th ese are: (a) freedom of association and the eff ective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms 
of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the abolition of  child labour; and (d) the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Th e 
Declaration underscores that “it is urgent, in a situation of growing economic 
interdependence, to reaffi  rm the immutable nature of the fundamental principles 
and rights embodied in the Constitution of the Organization and to promote 
their universal application”.49
Th e rationale behind the promotion of fundamental principles and rights 
lies in the underlying conviction of the  ILO, formulated at the beginning of the 
Declaration, that:
“the  ILO should, now more than ever, draw upon all its standard-setting, technical 
cooperation and research resources in all its areas of competence, in particular 
employment, vocational training and  working conditions, to ensure that, in the 
context of a global strategy for economic and social development, economic and 
social policies are mutually reinforcing components in order to create broad-based 
 sustainable development.”
Th e complementarity of economic and social development must be considered 
a principal axiom of the  ILO.50 It includes the necessity of continuous critical 
assesssments of those economic and fi nancial policies which reinforce socially 
destructive trends. Th e reports for the follow-up processes of the Declaration of 
1998 and the Declaration of 2008 are standing topics on the agenda of the yearly 
International Labour Conference with a view to monitoring trends and progress. 
Besides dealing with compliance issues, these reports also testify to the  ILO’s 
activities in capacity-building and in technical co-operation for the promotion 
of compliance. It is clear from this approach that human rights and workers’ 
rights are indivisible. Human rights cannot be considered as “primarily oriented 
toward limiting the power of state”, while “labor rights are primarily oriented 
toward limiting the power of private actors in the market” as Kevin Kolben 
suggests.51 Rather, states have to provide laws and institutional means to protect 
workers’ rights as human rights.
Th e fundamental rights of the 1998 Declaration alone do not guarantee 
substantial protection in terms of either a suffi  cient livelihood, healthy 
working-conditions, or social security; they are insuffi  cient to improve the 
living conditions of workers. Yet, to promote  human dignity at work they are 
49 See the text available at: www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/
index.htm, last accessed 25 October 2013.
50 Markus Demele, Entwicklungspolitik als Arbeitspolitik, (Marburg: Metropolis, 2013), p. 92 et 
seq.
51 See the arguments of Kevin Kolben, “Labor Rights as Human Rights?”, (2010) 50 Virginia 
Journal of International Law, pp. 450–484.
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incontestable. Th e rights correspond to eight fundamental  ILO Conventions, 
which are today understood as the core labour norms (these are: C 87 and C 
98 on freedom of association and the protection of the right to organise, and 
the right to organise and collective bargaining respectively; C 29 and C 105 on 
 forced labour and its elimination; C 138 and C 182 on the elimination of  child 
labour and particularly its worst forms; and C 100 and C 111 on the abolition 
of discrimination in employment). Th e most important gaps in adherence and 
implementation still prevail with respect to C 87 und 98, regrettably in the 
large economies of China, India and the USA. Despite the broad international 
consensus on fundamental rights, the international fi nancial institutions only 
reluctantly changed their declared policy. Th e World Bank eventually changed 
its Standard Bidding Documents in 2007, and, besides the conditions relating 
to  child labour and  forced labour, also included conditions with respect to 
workers’ associations and discrimination. However, these changes have still not 
been incorporated into the “harmonised” SBDW framework (Standard Bidding 
Documents for the Procurement of Works).52
Th e applicability of international labour standards in the  informal economy 
is not restricted to fundamental rights. A close scrutiny of the wording of 
the recommendations and conventions and the reports of the independent 
supervising mechanisms of the Committee of Experts for the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations (CEARC) demonstrates the relevance of the 
international labour standards also for the  informal economy. Anne Trebilcock53 
provides detailed evidence that many Conventions either include workers in the 
 informal economy or explicitly address them. Th e fi rst group of Conventions is 
exemplifi ed by the Employment Policy Convention 122 of 1964, which requires 
ratifying states to “declare and pursue, as a major goal, an active policy to 
promote full, productive and freely chosen employment” (Art. 1.1), taking into 
account national conditions and practices and consulting the “persons aff ected 
by the measures taken” (Art. 3). Workers in the  informal economy are aff ected, 
and therefore included. In its review of the application of this Convention, 
the supervising Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations referred to these workers as the most vulnerable and worst 
protected, and underscored the high concentration of  child labourers and 
and women workers in the  informal economy.54 Convention 150 on Labour 
Administration of 1978, as an example of the second group of Conventions, 
52 International Labour Conference, Report VI:  Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
From Commitment to Action, (Geneva:  ILO, 2012), available at: www.ilo.org/washington/
resources/selected-ilo-publications/WCMS_176149/lang--en/index.htm, p. 94, footnote 23.
53 See, for this section, particularly, Anne Trebilcock, “International Labour Standards and the 
 Informal Economy”, in: Javillier and Gernigon (eds), note 7 above, pp. 425–613; see, also, 
Werner Sengenberger, Globalization and Social Progress: Th e Role and Impact of International 
Labour Standards, (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stift ung, 2002).
54 See Trebilcock, note 53 above, p. 593.
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directly refers to informal workers. It calls for the gradual expansion of labour 
administration functions to cover “workers who are not, in law, employed 
persons, such as … self-employed workers…occupied in the informal sector” 
(Art. 7).
Th e Convention on Employment Policy of 1964 is of direct relevance for the 
second pillar of the  Decent Work Agenda: the promotion of employment and 
gainful work. When, in 1969, the  ILO entered the arena of development policy 
with its World Employment Programme, it represented a dissident voice against 
the – still dominant – notion of simply equalising development with economic 
growth. It was the legacy of this notion, which is blind to the lessons of history,55 
that employment and  decent work were not incorporated as sub-goals of Goal 
1 (poverty reduction) into the Millennium Development Goals of the United 
Nations until 2005.
Th e third pillar,  social protection, is of particular urgency for the majority 
of people working in the  informal economy.56 Upon the basis of fi eld studies in 
several countries, Michael Cichon and Krzysztof Hegemejer were able to make 
calculations which demonstrated that these countries could improve  social 
protection for a large number of working people considerably by investing only a 
small share of their GNP.57 Th e  ILO promotes a re-evaluation of  social protection 
in terms of investment in the future for social coherence and development rather 
than a cost factor.58 In this respect, the signifi cance of co-operatives, self-help 
organisations for micro-insurance and similar instruments cannot be overstated.
 Social Dialogue, the fourth pillar of the  Decent Work Agenda, underscores 
the  ILO’s unique tripartite policy process aimed at consensus upon the basis 
of collective self-organisation and dialogue as strategic objectives. A collective 
voice for workers (as for employers) is a creed of the  ILO. It pre-supposes the 
right to free association and a representative voice in all decisions aff ecting 
working and living conditions. It encompasses deliberations at international 
level as in the  ILO, nation-state level and regional and local levels, and also 
within specifi c industries.59 Aft er years of reluctance and decline in membership, 
unions and international union federations now promote and support union-
55 Dieter Senghaas, Th e European Experience: A Historical Critique of Development Th eory, 
(Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1985) original: Von Europa lernen: Entwicklungsgeschichtliche 
Betrachtungen, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982).
56 Ashwani Saith, “ Social Protection,  Decent Work and Development”, in: Ghai (ed), note 27 
above, pp. 127–173.
57 Michael Cichon and Krzysztof Hegemejer, “Changing the Development Policy Paradigm. 
Investing in a Social Security Floor for All”, (2007) 60 International Social Security Review, 
pp. 169–196.
58 Dev Nathan and V. Kapalna, “Issues in the Analysis of Global Value Chains and their Impact 
on Employment and Incomes in India”, (Geneva:  ILO, 2007), available at: www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---inst/documents/publication/wcms_193512.pdf.
59 See Konstaninos Papadakis (ed), Cross-Border  Social Dialogue and Agreements: An Emerging 
Global Industrial Relations Framework? (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 
2008).
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building among the informally employed or their integration into their own 
organisations. Th e largest organisation of indigent, self-employed women 
workers is the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA)60 in India, registered 
in 1972, on the initiative and under the leadership of lawyer and parliamentarian 
Ela Bhatt. In recent years, powerful associations and unions of  domestic workers 
have also been set up in Latin America and have played a crucial role in the 
adoption of C 189.
With Convention 189, together with Recommendation 201,61 the  ILO 
responded to the increasing number of vulnerable  domestic workers, who are 
mostly informal workers and oft en also migrants. Over a number of years, 
reports of  violence and abuse, human traffi  cking and forced prostitution, 
especially among minors, have generated widespread publicity on the critical 
situation of women and girls providing domestic services abroad or in the cities 
of their own countries. In 2008, in the light of this situation, the Governing Body 
of the  ILO put the issue of “ decent work for  domestic workers” on the agenda 
for the International Labour Conference in 2010 und 2011. Th is set the  ILO’s 
standard political debating and voting procedure in motion for the adoption 
of new internationally-binding labour norms.62 Upon the basis of two reports 
submitted by the International Labour Offi  ce on the situation of  domestic 
workers in law and in practice,63 along with a survey of the member countries, 
the fi rst plenary debate took place in June 2010,64 and a preliminary draft  for an 
instrument under international law was dispatched to all member states with a 
request for comments. As required in the  ILO with its tripartite membership, 
comments were submitted by governments, employers’ associations and  trade 
unions.65 In addition, replies were received from the International  Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC), the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) and 
the International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies. Observations 
on the proposed text were sent by several UN institutions such as the  Committee 
60 Nalini Nayak, “Organizing the Unorganized Workers: Lessons from SEWA Experiences”, 
(2013) 48 Th e Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, pp. 402–414.
61 Retrievable on the  ILO webpage at: www.ilo.org/global/standards/lang--en/index.
htm. On background and procedures, see Eva Senghaas-Knobloch, “Beispiellos und 
herausfordernd – ein neuer internationaler Arbeitsstandard für menschenwürdige Arbeit 
von Hausangestellten”, (2012) 29 Feministische Studien, pp. 119–127, which includes valuable 
information by Hildegard Hagemann from Justitia et Pax and Karin Pape from IUF.
62 See the materials on the  ILO homepage at: www.ilo.org, under the heading International 
Labour Conference.
63  ILO,  Decent Work for  Domestic Workers, Report IV (1) and Report IV (2), International 
Labour Conference, 99th Session, Geneva 2010;  ILO. See, also,  ILO, Expanding the Scope 
of Application of Labour Laws to the  Informal Economy. Digest of Comments of the  ILO’s 
Supervisory Bodies Related to the  Informal Economy, (Geneva:  ILO, 2010).
64 Th e documentation of the debate of the pertinent committee can be found under: www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_145507.pdf, 
last accessed 27 December 2013.
65  ILO,  Decent Work for  Domestic Workers. Report IV (2A), International Labour Conference, 
100th Session 2011.
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on the Rights of the  Child, and also civil society stakeholders such as Anti-
Slavery International, Human Rights Watch, RESPECT Network,66 the Migrant 
Forum in Asia, and a number of  domestic workers’ associations. Th ese comments 
were taken into consideration in the second draft s for the Convention and the 
Recommendation, which, aft er revision during the Conference, were adopted on 
the 16 July 2011.
For the three constituent groups of the  ILO, the whole process was a 
challenge. Th e government representatives were required to comment on two 
international legal instruments (a convention which, aft er ratifi cation, would be 
binding under international law, and a recommendation on specifi c measures) 
for a group of workers predominantly employed in the  informal economy, and 
consequently outside of regular employment. Th e employers’ associations at this 
point had hardly any associations for  domestic work or similar organisations 
within their ranks because they did not consider themselves responsible for the 
so-called domestic sphere. As for the  trade unions and international  trade union 
federations, these had only begun 10 or 15 years previously to open up generally 
to informal employees, and particularly employees in private households.
IV.  DOMESTIC WORK AND THE RENEWAL 
OF  SOCIAL DIALOGUE
For the fi rst time in its history, the  ILO opened up its tripartite deliberations 
in the Conference to representatives of workers who did not meet the usual 
credentials for delegates. Th is was made possible by workers’ representatives at 
the International Conference including representatives of  domestic workers 
in their delegations as technical staff , holding briefi ngs with them and giving 
them a voice at special group meetings. Th e author of the International Labour 
Offi  ce’s Law and Practice Report for the issue of domestic labour, Adelle 
Blackett,67 regards this procedure as an expression of a “renewal of tripartism”.68 
Using a concept of Markus Demele69 it can be understood as “tripartism plus 
 social dialogue”, by which he means the inclusion of representatives of social 
movements for hitherto unrepresented workers at all levels: this concept 
highlights the importance of institutionalised, inclusive  social dialogue.
66 Th e European Respect Network was established in 1997 and comprises female  domestic 
workers’, migrant and support organizations from eight EU states (Britain, Belgium, France, 
Holland, Italy, Spain, Greece and Germany). Th e name is an acronym of Rights, Equality, 
Solidarity, Power, Europe Corporation Today.
67 Th is section draws heavily on Adelle Blackett, “Th e  Decent Work for  Domestic Workers 
Convention and Recommendation”, (2011) 106 Th e American Journal of International Law, 
pp. 778–794.
68 Ibid., pp. 790.
69 Demele, note 50 above, p. 426.
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Taken as a whole, the various commentaries submitted clearly demonstrated 
the extreme heterogeneity of the legal and factual circumstances of  domestic 
work. Th e governments of industrial countries (for example, France) pointed 
out that, for certain occupational groups such as childminders and professional 
outpatient nurses, there already existed specifi c national regulations. Article 2.3 
of the Convention stipulates:
“Each Member which avails itself of the possibility aff orded in the preceding 
paragraph shall, in its fi rst report on the application of the Convention under 
Article 22 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation [sic], indicate 
any particular category of workers thus excluded and the reasons for such exclusion 
and, in subsequent reports, specify any measures that may have been taken with a 
view to extending the application of the Convention to the workers concerned.”
Th e fact that Convention 189 on  Decent Work for  Domestic Workers was 
adopted by far more than the necessary two-thirds majority of all delegates of 
the International Labour Conference (the employers’ and employees’ delegates 
are not bound to the votes of the government representatives of their countries) 
was, in no small part, thanks to a broad alliance of organisations working to 
this end. In particular, the Latin American  domestic workers’ associations 
and their regional network (CONLACTRAHO)70 as well as strong  domestic 
workers’ unions in South Africa, India and Hong Kong, in combination 
with European national  trade unions71 such as UNITE in the UK and FNV-
Bondgenoten in the Netherlands as well as the International Union of Food 
and Allied Workers (IUF), joined forces with broad women’s support networks 
such as the IDWN72 and WIEGO,73 civil society and church organisations, 
with the backing of the International Labour Offi  ce-staff  as well as the group of 
workers’ representatives74 at the annual International Labour Conference. Th is 
was a lesson that can be drawn from the history of the Convention’s adoption 
by the International Labour Conference: It is precisely the co-operation 
between collective organisations working in the interest of their members, on 
the one hand, and the advocacy activities of associations and groups in social 
70 “La Confederación Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Trabajadoras del Hogar” includes 14 
countries in that region. I am grateful to Karin Pape for her draft  text,  ILO Convention C 
189 – A Good Start for the Protection of  Domestic Workers, which will shortly appear in the 
International Labour Review, for this and other information on the organisation.
71 Th e ILC had been preceded by conferences of the European  Trade Union Confederation in 
Brussels in 2005 and Amsterdam in 2006.
72 IDWN (International  Domestic Workers Network) is a support network for  domestic workers 
that was established by lobbyists campaigning for Convention 189 and became an offi  cial 
organisation in October 2013 at its founding congress in October 2013.
73 WIEGO (Women in  Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing) is a global network 
combining  trade unions, co-operatives and development organisations. See its homepage at: 
http://wiego.org/wiego/about-wiego.
74 Th e three constituent groups of the  ILO have their own forms of organisation.
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movements forging alliances, on the other, which give recognition and voice 
to the hitherto unrecognised, vulnerable and individualised workers.75 Th e 
experience underscores the necessary struggle for transnational social rights in 
adequate fora.76
Th e aim of Convention 189 is the protection of all  domestic workers (Art. 2.1). 
 Domestic workers are any persons “engaged in  domestic work within an 
employment relationship” (Art. 1b), whereby the term  domestic work is defi ned 
as “work performed in or for a household or households” (Art. 1a). “A person 
who performs  domestic work only occasionally or sporadically and not on an 
occupational basis is not a domestic worker” (Art.  1c). By this defi nition, an 
employment relationship can exist between a worker and the representative 
of a private household or between a service agency and a domestic worker. 
Th e defi nition of  domestic work deliberately lacks an enumeration of specifi c 
activities. Th e defi ning characteristic is the work location; whereas traditionally 
the household was separated as a private sphere from the public sphere (to 
which employment belonged), this defi nition emphasises that activities carried 
out upon an occupational basis within a household are of the same character 
as when carried out outside the household, i.e., in institutions. Th is defi nition 
might help to expose disguised employment relationships.
Th e main philosophy behind this defi nition is the conviction that there “is 
no fundamental distinction between work in the home and work beyond it, and 
no simple defi nition of public-private, home-workplace and employer-employee. 
Caring for children and the disabled or elderly persons in the home or in a 
public institution is all part of the same regulatory spectrum, wherein a range 
of migration and other policies shape both the supply of and the demand for 
 care services,” as Blackett states.77 Equal treatment of  domestic workers implies 
that also those who work upon a part-time basis for more than one household 
fall within the scope of the Convention, as are those employed in an agency 
which places or posts them. Such workers are in typical triangular employment 
relationships.
Article  2 provides exemptions from the scope of the Convention. Aft er 
consultation with the competent organisations,  ILO Member States which 
ratify it may wholly or partly exclude a) “categories of workers who are otherwise 
provided with at least equivalent protection” (i.e., nurses), and b) “limited 
categories of workers in respect of which special problems of a substantial nature 
arise”. In subsequent reports, these  ILO Member States are held to “specify any 
measures that may have been taken with a view to extending the application of 
the Convention to the workers concerned”. Since self-employed  domestic workers 
75 Kolben, by contrast to this assessment, (see note 51 above) emphasises the diff erences in 
organisational culture between unions and social movement groups.
76 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller, Chapter 2 in this volume.
77 Law and Practice Report, para. 38, Blackett, note 67 above, p. 783.
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are by defi nition not “in an employment relationship”, they are not covered, and 
the challenge will be to fi nd ways and means also to protect those in pseudo self-
employment.
With the formulation in Article  3, “to respect, promote and realize the 
 fundamental principles and rights at work”, the Convention adopts the language 
of the  ILO’s Declaration on the  fundamental principles and rights at work 
of 1998, in which, of all international standards in paid labour, four groups 
were particularly emphasised as so-called core labour standards. Th e special 
emphasis of these fundamental rights at work and the reference to a number 
of related UN conventions in the preamble of the new  ILO Convention makes 
it quite clear that any form of domestic employment of girls and boys, women 
and men that is reminiscent of feudal and/or colonial relations or  forced labour 
has no legitimation whatsoever and constitutes a violation of human rights. 
Th is eliminates the legal and moral basis for the denomination and practice of 
servants in (quasi-) feudal relationships and provides for the abolition of any 
type of  forced labour and bonded labour or similar forms comprising traditional 
and modern forms of unfree labour in the domestic realm.78
With regard to  child labour, the Convention responded to fi gures collected 
by the  ILO’s Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on  Child 
Labour, according to which at least 15.5 million children aged 5–17 years 
old were engaged in  domestic work worldwide in 2008. Th e number of  child 
 domestic workers aged 5–14 years old is estimated at 7.4 million, with girls by far 
outnumbering boys.79 Accordingly, Article 4 of the Convention is very explicit. 
Th e  ILO-Members have to set a minimum age for  domestic workers which 
should not be less than 18 years old and, in any case, not below statutory school-
leaving age.80 Article 6.2 of Recommendation 201 further stipulates that:
“Members should give special attention to the needs of  domestic workers who 
are under the age of 18 and above the minimum age of employment as defi ned by 
national laws and regulations, and take measures to protect them, including: (a) 
strictly limiting their hours of work to ensure adequate time for rest, education 
and training, leisure activities and family contacts; (b) prohibiting night work; (c) 
placing restrictions on work that is excessively demanding, whether physically or 
psychologically; and (d) establishing or strengthening mechanisms to monitor their 
working and living conditions.”
78 A biographical book of a Nepalese girl gives evidence of deep-rooted ethnic discrimination: 
Urmila Chaudhary, Sklavenkind. Verkauft , verschleppt, vergessen. Mein Kampf für Nepals 
Töchter, (Munich: Knaur, 2011).
79  ILO, Domestic Works across the World, (Geneva:  ILO, 2010), pp. 23–24.
80 Th e International Labour Offi  ce estimates that there are at least 15.5 million  child  domestic 
workers. See www.ilo.org. See, also, Giuseppe Nesi, Luca Nogler and Marco Pertile (eds), 
 Child Labour in a Globalized World: A Legal Analysis of  ILO Action, (Geneva-Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2008).
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Article 5 of the Convention addresses the widespread mistreatment of  domestic 
workers. It requires measures by the member states to protect  domestic workers 
“against all forms of abuse, harassment and  violence”. Equal treatment of 
 domestic workers with all other workers according to national law is the main 
philosophy of the Convention. Yet, there are situations that diff er from those of 
other workers, namely, when  domestic workers live in the households in which 
they work – a widespread phenomenon in countries with feudal or neo-feudal 
state orders, but also in industrialised democratic countries. Article 6 therefore 
requires that:
“each Member shall take measures to ensure that  domestic workers, like workers 
generally, enjoy fair terms of employment as well as decent  working conditions and, 
if they reside in the household, decent living conditions that respect their privacy.”
Article  7 provides for “information in an appropriate, verifi able and easily 
understandable manner and preferably, where possible, through written 
contracts in accordance with national laws, regulations or collective 
agreements”, in particular: the name and address of the employer and of the 
worker; the address of the usual workplace or workplaces; the starting date; 
the type of work to be performed; the remuneration, the method of calculation 
and the periodicity of payments; the normal hours of work; paid annual leave, 
and daily and weekly rest periods; the provision of food and accommodation (if 
applicable); the period of probation or trial period (if applicable); the terms of 
repatriation (if applicable), and terms and conditions relating to the termination 
of employment.
Article 10 refers specifi cally to the regulation of working hours and requires 
 ILO Member States to take measures:
“towards ensuring equal treatment between  domestic workers and workers generally 
in relation to normal hours of work, overtime compensation, periods of daily and 
weekly rest and paid annual leave in accordance with national laws, regulations or 
collective agreements, taking into account the special characteristics of  domestic 
work.”(Art. 10.1)
“Weekly rest shall be at least 24 consecutive hours.” (Art. 10.2)
Of critical importance is the provision that:
“periods during which  domestic wo rkers are not free to dispose of their time as they 
please and remain at the disposal of the household in order to respond to possible 
calls, shall be regarded as hours of work to the extent determined by national laws, 
regulations or collective agreements, or any other means consistent with national 
practice.” (Art. 10.3).
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Th e ongoing struggle within the European Union over the issues of  working 
time and time on call – i.e., among medical doctors – conveys an idea of the 
confl icts that are foreseeable.
Articles  11 and 12 provide for decent  wages, Article  13 for a secure and 
healthy working  environment, Article  14.1 for social security, and Article  14.2 
for maternity protection. While Article  8 requires emigration states to ensure 
by law that  domestic workers emigrating to other countries are informed about 
 working conditions, labour contracts and the right to be repatriated, Article 15 
requires the inspection of private employment agencies also in receiving 
countries.
Articles  16 and 17 stipulate the establishment of eff ective, accessible 
complaint mechanisms as well as a type of  labour inspection – which is sensitive 
to the character of private homes – to ensure that all  domestic workers, either 
by themselves or through a representative, have eff ective access to courts, 
tribunals or other dispute-resolution mechanisms under conditions that are 
not less favourable than those available to workers generally.  Labour inspection 
(regulated in the socalled governance  ILO Convention No. 81 from 1947 and the 
Protocol to this Convention from 1995) is certainly a very important issue.
Th e Convention lays the foundation, based upon human rights, for the right 
to  decent work for all  domestic workers under international labour law. Th e 
implementation and enforcement of the Convention has yet to take place. It 
is the task of the alliances to accomplish this through women’s human rights, 
labour law, and development networks in each country contacting  trade unions 
that are open to their concerns, government administrations and also, where 
possible, the relevant employers’ associations fi rst to overcome the worst forms 
of indecent  working conditions ( forced labour and  child labour) for  domestic 
workers, and then, in a second step to promote the respective national and local 
economic, cultural and legal frameworks for the  eff ective implementation of the 
Convention.
Th e spectrum of work activities covered by the Convention is broad and 
involves diff erent regulations and established routines in diff erent countries. 
In Germany, the “Tagesmütter” or “Tagesväter” model (a  child-minder who 
works in his or her own home) oft en entails self-employment under precarious 
conditions. Verbal or irregular agreements concerning domestic cleaning are 
very widespread, particularly where the work is carried out on an hour-by-hour 
basis in diff erent households. Here, it is essential to establish forms of work 
organisation which, on the one hand, fulfi l the obligation to adequate social and 
work protection, and, on the other, are easily accessible, do not push the cost of 
employment above that of possible demand, and leave room for the trust and 
confi dentiality required for employment in private households.81
81 Manuela Tomei, “ Decent Work for  Domestic Workers. Refl ections on Recent Approaches to 
Tackle Informality”, (2011) 23 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, pp. 185–211.
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Th e Convention recognises that those who are engaged in paid  domestic 
work oft en have commitments in their own family networks, and oft en must 
provide unpaid  care for their own relatives.  Working time, its limitation, and 
consideration of the needs of those dependent on vital  care are, therefore, all 
core issues of any form of  domestic work, particularly  care work. Migrant  care 
workers who are mostly women oft en leave their own families to earn money 
for them by caring for members of other families. Th e lack of income on their 
side and the lack of time to provide  care on the part of their employers both 
serve to produce the migrant  care-work constellation that only superfi cially 
seems to benefi t both sides. Yet, the migrant  care workers do have their own 
 care obligations. Th ey oft en leave a  care defi cit in their home country since men 
rather seldom take over the respective tasks when women go abroad to earn a 
living. Apparently, the culturally-based gender division of labour is not easily 
changed even if it is under stress.
Th e transnational  care worker constellation is based upon a vast income gap 
and vast economic discrepancies at global level, and is in danger of exacerbating 
the disparities between the sending and receiving countries. Th e transnational 
division of reproductive or  care labour is clearly not a sustainable path towards 
overcoming these disparities or  care defi cits. To address the  care crisis in the 
EU, the receiving countries of  care workers in Europe need to reverse their 
dominant policy priorities and regulate the  working time in a “ care-sensitive” 
(“pfl egesensibel”) way in order to provide adequate time for unpaid  care 
activities.82 As signifi cant as the Convention 189 is for improving the living and 
 working conditions of domestic and  care workers, it is not suffi  cient to overcome 
the worldwide  care defi cits.
Despite the strong demand for  care workers, economic disparities both 
between and within states, and the material needs of immigrant women, 
in combination with hierarchical gender relations, give rise to low-paid, 
irregular employment and adverse  working conditions,83 thereby exposing the 
shallowness of the market rhetoric. Th e provisions of Convention 189 refl ect 
82 See the studies in Germany: Stefan Reuyß, Svenja Pfahl, Jürgen Rinderspacher and Katrin 
Menke, Pfl egesensible Arbeitszeiten. Perspektiven der Vereinbarkeit von Beruf und Pfl ege, 
(Berlin: Sigma, 2012); and Jürgen Rinderspacher, Irmgard Hermann-Stojanov,Svenja Pfahl 
and Stefan Reuyß, Zeiten der Pfl ege. Eine explorative Studie über individuelles Zeitverhalten 
und gesellschaft liche Zeitstrukturen in der häuslichen Pfl ege, (Berlin: Sigma, 2009); since 
a  care-sensitive  working time also applies to the  working conditions of professional  care 
worker in institutions, some contradictions regarding priorities between paid  care work 
and unpaid  care activities will probably remain unresolved. For the lack of recognition and 
appreciation, see, also, the results of an empirical study in Germany hospitals and institutions 
for long-term  care in: Christel Kumbruck, Mechthild Rumpf and Eva Senghaas-Knobloch 
(with a contribution by Ute Gerhard), Unsichtbare Pfl egearbeit. Fürsorgliche Praxis auf der 
Suche nach Anerkennung, (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010).
83 Agnieszka Satola, “Ausbeutungsverhältnisse und Aushandlungsprozesse in der Pfl ege- und 
Haushaltsarbeit von polnischen Frauen in deutschen Haushalten”, in: Ursula Apitzsch 
and Marianne Schmidbaur (eds),  Care und Migration. Die Ent-Sorgung menschlicher 
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these underlying global macro-economic imbalances. Its enforcement thus 
faces daunting challenges. Its  eff ective implementation requires a renunciation 
of deep-seated convictions, routines and policies relating to governance and 
the legal system, macroeconomic policies, representation and voice, and 
skill formation. Th e report of the outgoing Director General in 2011 to the 
100th Session of the International Labour Conference, entitled A New Era of 
Social Justice, underscored the necessity for new macroeconomic policies. To 
accentuate the need for transition, in 2015, the International Labour Conference 
adopted Recommendation 124 Concerning the Transition from the Informal to 
the Formal Economy, urging all members to identify the nature and extent of the 
 informal economy in their territory. In so doing, they should make use of the 
participation of representative collective actors in the  informal economy.
V. THE “RECOMMENDATIONS ON  CARE” 
OF THE EU-BASED SOCIAL PLATFORM AND 
THE PROMOTION OF A “CARING SOCIETY”
Th e whole set of issues outlined above is the key concern of the European 
Social Platform too. Th is is a platform of forty-six European rights and value-
based NGOs working in the social sector. While the activities of the Social 
Platform concentrate on the European Union level, it also supports the 
promotion of these values at global level. At its annual convention in 2011, 
the Social Platform adopted the Recommendations on  Care (hereaft er referred 
to as the Recommendations) which aim at a “caring society”. Th ese address 
the issue of support both for unpaid  care-givers/providers and for skilled 
professional workers within the whole spectrum of assistance for people in 
need of  care.
As with the Convention and the pertinent Recommendation of the 
 ILO, rights – in particular human rights – are the point of reference of the 
Social Platform’s Recommendations. Unlike the  ILO, however, which deals 
exclusively with paid occupation in an employment relationship, the Platform 
defi nes its approach as holistic and includes all aspects of occupational, as well 
as non-occupational,84  care work. It covers all general and specifi c situations 
in which people are reliant on  care work in the course of their lives – in 
childhood, if they have disabilities, are ill or frail, in old age and in special 
cases of need.
Reproduktionsarbeit entlang von Geschlechter- und Armutsgrenzen, (Opladen-Farmington 
Hills MI: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2010), pp. 177–194.
84 Unfortunately, the Recommendations adopt a language in which unpaid, non-occupational 
 care work for family and relatives is called “informal  care”. Th is leads to misunderstandings 
in the international discussion.
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“Our starting point is that  care is a human right: the right to  care and to be cared for 
is a fundamental part of our lives as everyone is a  care giver or  care receiver at some 
point and potentially at multiple stages throughout life.”85
With its emphasis on human rights on both sides of a  care relationship (that 
of  care receivers and of  care givers), in private and in occupational  care, the 
Platform’s Recommendations primarily aim at normative, human rights based 
policies for a societal development concerned with improving social standards 
and the quality of life. Its holistic approach includes the consideration of the 
rights of those in need of  care, the quality of  care activities, and the rights and 
 working conditions of the carers, regardless of whether they carry out  care work 
in gainful employment or not.
Th e Recommendations cut across four policy areas, and address the challenges 
posed by contemporary developments in European societies that make political 
re-orientation essential. Th ese four areas are: social and demographic changes; 
the increased participation of women in gainful employment; “individualisation 
processes”; and the general fact that too little public money is invested in the 
provision of high-quality  care and support. Th e Social Platform points out that, 
currently throughout the EU, around 20.5 million people – of whom 78 per cent 
are women, are registered as employed in this sector (not taking unregistered 
workers into account). Th e proportion of part-time and fi xed-term employment 
and the disparity between male and female earnings here are both above average.
Parallel to the  ILO strategy for  social protection, the Social Platform 
considers a socio-political paradigm shift  to be essential. Decent social services 
should thus no longer be regarded as a cost factor, but as a “social investment” 
in the future on which social integration and cohesion, anti-discrimination 
and gender equality all depend. It calls for the development of  indicators for 
the measurement of social returns on such an investment. At the same time, it 
points to the danger that the investment metaphor might detract attention from 
the fact that  care activities are not just services provided in the general interest, 
but are also a human right.
Th e fi rst policy area addressed in the Social Platform’s Recommendations on 
 Care concerns the fundamental rights of  care users. Th ese include the guaranteed 
right to a private and family life, equality in the choice of  care provision and 
universal access to aff ordable  care. Th e practice of separating parents and 
children on the grounds of poverty alone, for example, unacceptable living 
conditions, should be overcome. In this respect, the Recommendations refer to 
Articles 19 and 21 of the Treaty of Lisbon, in which the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is made binding; the EU should accede to the Council of Europe and UN 
85 See the document at: www.socialplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/20121217_Social 
 Platform_Recommendations_on_CARE_EN1.pdf, last accessed 8 April 2015.
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human-rights treaties and implement the Beijing Platform for Action; and the 
EU Structural Funds should be used to help fi nance such measures.
Th e second policy area discussed in the Recommendations is the 
reconciliation of the  care activities, the work and the private lives of non-
occupational carers in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
including the right to gender equality (Art. 23), the right to fair and just  working 
conditions (Art.  31), and the right to public service provision (Art.  36). Th e 
objective is to ensure that responsibilities86 for  care activities are fairly shared 
both between men and women and between generations, and to guarantee the 
fundamental rights of family carers and voluntary  care workers. Around 80 per 
cent of  care and support work in the EU is provided by relatives, two thirds of 
whom are women, whereby the participation of mothers in paid employment 
is on average around 11.5 per cent lower than that of women without children, 
while that of fathers is about 8.5 per cent higher than that of men without 
children. Decision-makers at EU level are reminded, in this connection, of the 
European Pact for Gender Equality (2011–2020), of the Directive on Maternity 
Leave, the European Directive on  Care Leave, the need to acknowledge the 
new diversity of family structures, as well as pension entitlements from non-
vocational  care work and the provision of other kinds of support and assistance.
Th e third policy area of the Recommendations is concerned with the quality, 
accessibility, aff ordability and availability of  care services for all in need across 
Europe. Th is is in response to the demographic ageing processes in Europe and 
the frequently expressed opinion that long-term  care in old age is no longer 
aff ordable, especially in the light of the austerity measures particularly in the 
social services sector. Th e Social Platform re-iterates the view that the provision 
of such services should not primarily be for the purpose of generating profi ts. 
Decision-makers at EU level are called upon to guarantee that the austerity 
measures imposed in the wake of the fi nancial and debt crisis are reconcilable 
with Article 9 of the Treaty of Lisbon. A coherent package of policy measures is 
called for that will carry weight in the  care sector in the EU and in the individual 
Member States.
Th e fourth policy area dealt with in the Recommendations concerns decent 
 working conditions and quality employment for  care workers, including 
vocational training and equal treatment at work, particularly with respect to the 
status of migrant  care workers. Th e Recommendations point to the still glaring 
disparity of  wages particularly in the  care and support sector even though equal 
pay is one of the oldest contract obligations of the EU. At the same time, the 
problem of recruitment and migration of qualifi ed  care-workers from the new 
eastern Member States into western EU states is addressed – again, in the area of 
86 See Mechthild Rumpf, “Häusliche Pfl egearrangements und ihre Zukunft sfähigkeit”, in: 
Kumbruck, Rumpf and Senghaas-Knobloch, note 82 above, pp. 152–163; see, also, Part III of 
Kumbruck, Rumpf, Senghaas-Knobloch, note 82 above, pp. 346–352.
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institutional long-term  care and domestic  care. Th e Social Platform recommends 
that all EU Member States ratify  ILO Convention 189.87 A comprehensive 
revision of the EU  Working Time Directive is considered to be of particular 
urgency with a view to regulating compensatory rest time and recognising 
on-call duty. Migrant  care-workers from outside the European Union should 
have the same guaranteed rights as EU citizens, and those with irregular 
residence status should be legalised. Th e Recommendations of the Social 
Platform demonstrate that “the time has come for the creative legal forces of civil 
society around the world to overcome the impasses of transnationalisation”, as 
Fischer-Lescano and Möller argue.88
VI. OUTLOOK
With their orientation towards human and fundamental rights,  ILO Convention 
189 and the Recommendations of the European Social Platform stand in 
stark opposition to pre-dominant economic thinking. Th ey both refl ect the 
discrepancy between the normative commitments made by the states and the 
prevailing economic policy, which contradicts people’s expectations of public 
welfare provision, especially within the EU. At the same time, the campaign 
argues pragmatically, with its utilitarian, social investment approach.
It thus becomes apparent that the policy of the International Labour 
Organization, geared to the concept of  decent work, and the Social Platform’s 
political vision of a “caring society” complement each other. Th e central 
objective of both programmes is a radical transformation that generates greater 
public awareness of the essential everyday  care activities that have hitherto 
remained concealed. Th e Social Platform is even more radical in as much as it 
also addresses unpaid essential  care activities as public “relational goods”.89 Th is 
concept refers to the fundamental human condition of relating to other humans 
and being existentially dependent on each other’s help. Striving for autonomy 
and reliance on others are not mutually-exclusive opposites, but are both part 
of people’s lives. Th is perspective ties in with the proposal of growing numbers 
of initiatives, movements of thought, and innovators of new ways of living and 
working, that “caring for others” should be seen as a right that must re-defi ne the 
relationship between labour and  social policy.90
87 While the EU may make recommendations on the ratifi cation, it is not a member of the  ILO 
and therefore not entitled to make ratifi cations.
88 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller, Chapter 2 in this volume.
89 Social Platform, Recommendations on  Care, note 84 above, p.  12, available at: http://cms.
horus.be/fi les/99907/MediaArchive/Events/111020_SP%20recommendations%20on%20
Care_fi nal.pdf.
90 On the term “caring for others”, see Ute Gerhard, “Sorgen für andere als Maßstab für eine 
neue Sozialpolitik”, in: Kumbruck, Rumpf and Senghaas-Knobloch, note 82 above, pp. 63–84.
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 ILO Convention 189 highlights the necessity for  care and support provided 
against remuneration to be also possible without coming into confl ict with the 
applicable labour and social rights. Th is will require intensifi ed  social dialogue 
at all levels, and, above all, it requires the universal enforcement of the freedom 
of association. Convention 189 became possible because of an extraordinary 
alliance of organised  domestic workers with unions, NGOs and other advocacy 
groups. Th e same or a similar alliance is needed for its practical implementation. 
In this context, the establishment of complaint mechanisms is crucial.  In 
addition, the regulatory gap in the case of dependent self-employed workers91 
shows that this group of  care workers needs new forms of organisation, where 
possible in co-operative form.  ILO Recommendation 193 on Promotion of 
 Cooperatives from 2002 is to be used as a guide to the means for strengthening 
voluntary democratic associations to pursue common aspirations.92
Th e prevailing world economy is still largely blind to the elementary tasks 
of social reproduction and social cohesion, because, until now, it has been able 
to ignore the essential tasks of  care and attendance – traditionally carried out, 
without pay, by women. Th e backlash of this neglect now manifests itself in 
the form of worldwide, yet unevenly distributed,  care defi cits. If a normative 
consensus could be reached that those providing essential  care activities – and 
this includes women migrants from low-income countries – should be given 
citizenship rights in the countries in which they do  care work,93 this would be an 
extraordinary step on the way to more equal gender relations, to solidarity in the 
world of work, and to the promotion of universal social rights.
91 See Eva Kocher, “Die Grenzen des Arbeitsrechts. Der rechtliche Schutz der Erwerbsarbeit 
außerhalb von Arbeitsverhältnissen”, (2013) 46 Kritische Justiz, pp. 145–155.
92 See Anne Trebilcock, Chapter 8, Section IV.2.a in this volume.
93 See, also, Joan Tronto, “Feminists Democratic Ethics of  Care and Global  Care Workers. 
Citizenship and Responsibility”, in: Mahon and Robinson (eds), note 42 above, pp. 162–177, at 
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CHAPTER 8
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS: INTER-LINKAGES IN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE  RIGHT TO FOOD
1
Anne Trebilcock
I. INTRODUCTION – WHAT IS MEANT BY THE 
“ RIGHT TO FOOD” AND WHY FOCUS ON IT?
A substantial body of international law, not all of it well known, already exists in 
relation to the  right to food. “International law” is taken here to incorporate both 
“hard” law, enshrined in treaties that normally create binding obligations on 
states when they ratify them, and “soft ” law, i.e., non-binding instruments that 
provide guidance and usually refl ect expertise and political will. Th is chapter 
recalls the classical framework surrounding the  right to food, enshrined above 
all in the International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
while highlighting linkages to lesser known sources, particularly in relation to 
labour and gender issues. It is situated within a much larger discussion around 
transnational legal norms, which are “dynamic, multi-layered and complex”.2 
Th e  right to food concerns both consumers and all those involved in food 
production and distribution. While inter-connections exist among various 
international social rights, these linkages could be much better exploited to 
strengthen more eff ective action in relation to the  right to food.
Although the focus here is largely positivist, looking at norms generated 
through primarily inter-governmental processes, non-state actors have obviously 
played a critical role in shaping and vindicating the  right to food. Th e launch in 
2013 of the Global Network for the  Right to Food and Nutrition, which brought 
together numerous NGOs and social movements long active in the fi eld, marked 
1 Th is manuscript was fi nalised on 20 May 2015.
2 Kyriaki Topidi and Lauren Fielder (eds), Transnational Legal Processes and Human Rights, 
(Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), p. 4.
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a milestone in strengthening joint action.3 Th e growing phenomenon of private 
norm creation is also important and oft en intersects with public international 
law standards.4 How international organisations, states, enterprises, civil society 
groups and individuals use various legal norms in practice shapes international 
social law relating to the  right to food. Particularly since the nomination by a UN 
Secretary General of a  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, both awareness 
and understanding of the  right to food have increased considerably.5
As part of transnational law, which recalls the contested character, 
constituencies and communities of law,6 the  right to food displays elements of 
both traditional international law and counter-hegemonic challenges7 to it. As 
such, “the  right to food can be mapped on two levels: on one, as a formal, legal 
obligation of states under international law; and on another, as a popular demand 
for access to food as a means of survival”.8 According to Susan Randolph and 
Shareen Hertel, a purely state-centric approach is problematical because (a) it 
fails to address the responsibilities of actors such as transnational corporations 
or international fi nancial institutions, (b) it defi nes state responsibilities too 
narrowly, and (c) it does not acknowledge the complicity of those who benefi t 
from an unjust global economic order.9 And as the new  Special Rapporteur 
on the  Right to Food, Hilal Elver, has asserted, “To treat the concept of law as 
being entirely dependent on the State is to overlook the unique nature of social 
norms”.10
Furthermore, pressure is growing on corporations for greater accountability, 
as refl ected in the UN  Guiding Principles on  Business and Human Rights of 
3 Th e Food First Information and Action Network serves as facilitating secretariat of the 
network. See www.fi an.org, for a copy of the network’s Charter.
4 See, for example, the Report of the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, Olivier De 
Schutter: “Agribusiness and the  Right to Food”, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/33 (22 December 2009).
5 Numerous resolutions of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, along with resolutions 
and decisions of the  Human Rights Council and of human-rights treaty bodies, have kept 
the  right to food in the eye of policy-makers. A list of these appears on the website of the 
 Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, available at: www.ohchr/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/
FoodIndex.aspx.
6 See Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Law, Evolving”, in: Jan M. Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia 
of Comparative Law, 2nd ed. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), pp. 898–925, 
and Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Müller, “Struggle for Transnational Social Rights”, 
Chapter 2 in this volume. As an example of how such contestation plays out in practice in 
relation to legal strategies for the vindication of labour rights, see Ashwini Suktankar, “Global 
Organizing and Domestic Constraints”, (Chapter 2), in Adelle Blackett and Anne Trebilcock 
(eds), Transnational Labour Law, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), pp. 37–50.
7 See, for example, Topidi and Fielder, note 2 above, and the introductory chapter of this 
volume.
8 Susan Randolph and Shareen Hertel, “Th e  Right to Food: A Global Perspective”, in: 
Lanse Minkler (ed), Th e State of Economic and Social Human Rights: A Global Overview, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 22.
9 Ibid., pp. 26–27.
10 Report of the  Special Rapporteur on the  right to food, Hilal Elver, “Access to Justice and the 
 Right to Food: Th e Way Forward”, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/65 (12 Jan. 2014), para. 64.
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2011.11 Th e  Guiding Principles, which emerged aft er extensive multilateral 
consultation involving civil society and business, include the rights captured 
in the ESC Covenant, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1998 
 ILO Declaration on  Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (described 
below). Th e follow-up mechanisms put in place under the  Guiding Principles, at 
both international and national levels, could serve as fora for civil society to raise 
food-rights issues in relationship to enterprise behaviour. More importantly, 
embedding respect for human rights into business practices will be necessary for 
lasting change in fi rms’ behaviour.12 All the same, past experience with purely 
voluntary unilateral initiatives has left  many activist groups deeply suspicious 
of corporate capture of regulatory and participatory processes in relation to the 
 right to food.13
Moreover, structural problems in the international system certainly do 
persist, undermining the realisation of the  right to food. In particular, the 
rules governing international  trade and national agricultural policy, along 
with economic incentives along the transnational food-production chain, 
prevent fulfi lment of access to adequate food for all. Stronger accountability 
mechanisms in relation to the  right to food are also required in several 
respects: taking the gender dimension more seriously into account, enhancing 
monitoring and available remedies for violations, and strengthening systemic 
policy coherence. Emerging initiatives around the  right to food off er some 
promise for improvement in the situation, but they are no substitute for more 
far-reaching reforms. Th ese are needed because, among other reasons, “current 
food systems are deeply dysfunctional”.14 Th is is a major reason why some 805 
million people – one in nine worldwide – are still chronically undernourished.15 
11 UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011), endorsed by the  Human Rights Council in Res. 17/4 
on 16 June 2011. Th e Council has also set up a Working Group to examine the feasibility of 
adopting a legally-binding instrument on the subject; see Doc. HRC/26/L.22/rev.1, adopted 
26  June 2014. See, also, Olivier De Schutter, “Corporations and  Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights”, in: Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (eds),  Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 192–
224. (De Schutter, who succeeded Jean Ziegler, is former  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to 
Food.).
12 See, for example, Peter Utting and José Carlos Marques (eds),  Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Regulatory Government: Towards Inclusive Development?, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), and Stepan Wood, “Th e Case for Leverage-based Corporate Human Rights 
Responsibilities”, in: Wesley Cragg (ed),  Business and Human Rights, (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2012), pp. 135–77.
13 For some civil society views, see Civil Society Synthesis Paper, “Ten Years of the  Right to 
Food Guidelines – Progress, Obstacles and the Way Ahead”, (FIAN, 2014), available at: www.
fi an.org/library/publications.
14 Report submitted by the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/19/59 (26 December 2011), para. 48.
15 Food and Agricultural Organization, “Th e State of Food Insecurity in the World: 
Strengthening the Enabling  Environment for  Food Security and Nutrition”, (Rome:  FAO, 
2014).
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Of these, 70 per cent are women,16 making it imperative to strengthen the 
gender dimension in realisation of the  right to food. Th e pernicious eff ects of 
undernourishment in infants and children (especially early death or stunting) 
are especially dramatic, as noted in the 2014 Rome Declaration on Nutrition.17
What is meant by the  right to food? Th e Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 enshrined everyone’s right to “a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and his family, including food…” (Art. 25(1)).18 
Th e International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, 
which entered into force in 1976, incorporated it in “the right of everyone to 
an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate 
food…” (Art. 11(1)). Th e Covenant further recognised “the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger”, and spelt out measures to improve methods 
of production, conservation and distribution of food and to ensure an equitable 
distribution of world food supplies in relation to need (Art. 11(2)).
To this end, the parties to the Covenant are to take steps to ensure the 
realisation of the  right to food, recognising “the essential importance of 
international co-operation based on free consent”. Th e Covenant referred, in 
particular, to making use of scientifi c knowledge, disseminating knowledge 
about nutrition, and developing or reforming agrarian systems in order to 
achieve the most effi  cient development and utilisation of natural resources. 
(Th is last element would today need to be read in the context of the principles 
of  sustainable development.) Th e fi rst paragraph of Article  11 can be seen 
as establishing an objective which states should strive to achieve, while the 
second paragraph sets the minimum standard that is immediately applicable, 
i.e., freedom from hunger and the means to achieve it.19 While attention has 
traditionally focused on an insuffi  cient quantity of food, the qualitative nature 
inherent in the right to “adequate” food also extends to contemporary concerns 
over obesity linked to calorie-rich, but unbalanced, diets. Th is is refl ected in the 
Rome Declaration on Nutrition, which reaffi  rmed “the right of everyone to have 
access to safe, suffi  cient, and nutritious food consistent with the right to adequate 
food”.20 As explored below, other international instruments also address the 
 right to food, and it is important to recognise their inter-linkages.
16  Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, Study on Discrimination in the Context of the 
 Right to Food, UN Doc. A/HRC/AC/6/CRP.1 (2010), para. 38.
17  FAO/ WHO, Rome Declaration on Nutrition, 2nd International Conference on Nutrition, 
(Rome, 19–21 November 2014), ICN2 2014/2, para. 12.
18 Th is right is generally seen as including the right to clean water. However, since the right to 
water has its own legal regime, it is not treated here other than incidentally.
19 Christophe Golay, “Droit à l’alimentation et accès à la justice: Exemples au niveau national, 
regional et international”, in:  FAO, Études sur le droit à l’alimentation, (Rome:  FAO, 2009), 
pp. 10–13. See, also, Philip Alston and Katerina Tomasevski (eds), Th e  Right to Food: Towards 
a System for Supervising States’ Compliance with the  Right to Food, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff , 
1984).
20 Rome Declaration, note 17 above, para. 3.
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II. WHAT IS THE BACKGROUND OF 
THE  RIGHT TO FOOD?
Th e roots of the modern concept of rights trace back to the eighteenth century.21 
In the more recent past, the background to the emergence of the  right to food 
included the development of humanitarian law in the context of  armed confl ict, 
early concerns of the International Labour Organization (founded in 1919) 
in relation to the welfare of workers, migrants and their families,22 the 1941 
Atlantic Charter’s call for “freedom from want”, the experiences of prisoners 
of war, occupied populations and displaced persons both during and aft er two 
world wars,23 and the adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945. Moreover, 
the  ILO’s  Declaration of Philadelphia, adopted in 1944 and soon thereaft er 
incorporated into its Constitution, speaks directly to “the war against want”, 
“the raising of standards of living”, “a minimum living wage”, and “the provision 
of adequate nutrition”.24
With the creation of other UN Specialized Agencies and Funds, the 
centre of gravity on food and nutrition issues naturally moved to the Food 
and Agriculture Organization ( FAO) of the UN, the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development, the World Food Programme and the  World Health 
Organization (without taking into account developments in the realm of 
humanitarian law or environmental law). Today, the Committee on World  Food 
Security (a multi-stakeholder forum hosted by the  FAO), the United Nations 
 Human Rights Council and its Advisory Committee, the Committee on ESC 
Rights (Economic, Social and Cultural), and the Special Rapporteur are the 
main public international law actors in relation to the normative aspects of the 
 right to food, with  WHO active on nutrition issues, UNICEF on  child nutrition, 
21 See, for example, Daphne Barak-Erez and Aeyal M. Gross, “Introduction: Do we Need Social 
Rights: Questions in the Era of Globalisation, Privatisation, and the Diminished Welfare 
State”, in: Daphne Barak-Erez and Aeyal M. Gross (eds), Exploring Social Rights: Between 
Th eory and Practice, (Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2007), p. 1.
22 A review of the  ILO’s engagement on legal issues relating to  agricultural and rural workers 
appears in Jennie Desrutins, “Les travailleurs agricoles et ruraux”, in: Jean-Marc Th ouvenin 
and Anne Trebilcock (eds), Droit International Social, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2013), vol 1, pp. 
1110–1128.
23 For a fascinating account of disputes that arose over the type of food being provided to 
displaced persons and the occupied population in post-WWII Germany (the Europeans did 
not appreciate peanut butter, for instance), see Atina Grossmann, “Grams, Calories and Food: 
Languages of Victimization, Entitlement, and Human Rights in Occupied Germany”, in: 
Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde and William I. Hitchcock (eds), Th e Human Rights Revolution: An 
International History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 113–132.
24 Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organization 
(also called the  Declaration of Philadelphia), adopted on 10 May 1944, annexed to the  ILO 
Constitution and incorporated into it by Article 1 (Instrument of Amendment of 1945, which 
entered into force on 26  September 1946). Th e Preamble to the  ILO Constitution, which 
formed Chapter XIII of the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War, states that 
“universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice”.
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and the  ILO on relevant international labour standards. Multi-institutional and 
multi-stakeholder initiatives are contributing to the development of the  right to 
food and its application in practice (see Section V. below).
Th e historical (and artifi cial) division between socio-economic rights and 
civil and political rights25 has implied that,
“questions of distribution are excluded from the rights  discourse twice over: by both 
the exclusion of social rights [from the mainstream] and the exclusion of distribution 
concerns from the realm of civil rights.”26
Fortunately, a unitary approach to human rights has gained ground, in 
recognition that all of them have some distributive implications.27 Positive 
rights and positive duties exist in the context of several socio-economic rights, 
including the  right to food.28 Although economic and social rights are now 
accepted as part of the international legal obligation of states, backed up by 
international supervisory bodies, there is still some  resistance to the recognition 
of established international social rights,29 particularly when they challenge a 
liberal economic order.
III. IS IT A SOCIAL OR AN ECONOMIC RIGHT? 
OR A SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHT?
While the Covenant does not identify which rights are considered under it 
to be economic, social or cultural, it is commonly held that Article  11 on an 
adequate standard of living is one of the “economic” rights.30 Th is is also the 
case for Article  6 on the right to work, Article  7 on conditions of work and 
remuneration, Article  8 on organisation in  trade unions, Article  9 on social 
security, and the provisions of Article 10 that address maternity protection for 
working mothers and protection of children from economic exploitation. Today, 
the rights refl ected in the ESC Covenant have, perhaps aside from its provisions 
on culture, become agglomerated as “international social rights”. However, if 
25 For a fuller discussion, see Stefan Lorenzmeier, Chapter 5 in this volume.
26 Barak-Erez and Gross (eds), note 21 above, p. 7.
27 Ibid., at 7–9, and Upendra Baxi, “Failed Decolonisation and the Future of Social Rights: Some 
Preliminary Refl ections”, in: Barak-Erez and Gross (eds), note 21 above, pp. 41–55.
28 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 129–132.
29 For a description, see, for example, Manisuli Ssenyonjo,  Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in International Law, (Oxford-Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2009), pp. 14–17. For an 
example of the controversy, see Conor Gearty and Virginia Mantouvalou, Debating Social 
Rights, (Oxford-Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2011).
30 See, for example, Gerald J. Beyer, “Economic Rights: Past, Present and Future”, in: Th omas 
Cushman (ed), Handbook of Human Rights, (Oxford: Routledge, 2012), p. 291.
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one looks at what is generally considered “ international economic law”, none 
of these elements is included within its scope. Rather, distinct and more robust 
transnational legal regimes have arisen in relation to  trade, investment, fi nance 
and commodities.31 Th is disjunction lays bare structural problems that remain 
to be resolved.
Th e categorisation has several implications. As a social right, the  right to 
food is refl ected as importantly in soft  law instruments as in treaty provisions. 
Th e quest for more eff ective means of its implementation is constantly being 
pursued, since the current ones are clearly inadequate.32 As Manisuli Ssenyonjo 
notes,
“Social rights are also artifacts of political struggles, the product of a time- and 
place-specifi c consensus about the requirements of social peace and economic 
progress.”33
Th e combination of these characteristics implies the involvement of non-
state actors, a topic that continues both to bedevil and to enrich the public 
international law debate.34 Th is is partly for theoretical reasons, since the system 
is based upon state sovereignty. But practical challenges also play a role, since 
these actors – ranging from peasant groups to multinational corporations – can 
have very diff erent interests and capacities to exert power in the development 
and implementation of transnational norms.
Kerry Rittich has observed that,
“What most distinguishes social rights is the decision to … intervene in the 
structure of social and economic inequality. It is this aspiration from which the 
policy consensus has most clearly retreated… Social rights and  social policy have 
traditionally been motivated by the desire to mitigate the eff ects of market forces on 
both individuals and society at large…”35
Th is makes social rights particularly vulnerable to a paradigm in which self-
regulating markets and a reduced role for the state are in vogue. Yet, the social 
31 Th ese regimes are usefully summarised in Commission on Human Rights, Globalization and 
its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10, (2 August 
2001).
32 Anne Trebilcock, “Spécifi cités quant aux techniques de la mise en oeuvre et de contrôle: à 
la recherche de nouveaux chemins”, in: Th ouvenin and Trebilcock (eds), note 22 above, pp. 
106–146.
33 Ssenyonjo, note 29 above, p. 112.
34 See, for example, Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “Non-State Actors and Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights”, in: Mashood A. Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds),  Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Action, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 109–138.
35 Kerry Rittich, “Social Rights and  Social Policy: Transformations on the International 
Landscape”, in: Baderin and McCorquodale (eds), note 34 above, p. 133.
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dimension remains, since “distributive justice and social concerns are in play at 
virtually every level of the economic and regulatory order”.36
IV. THE “HARD” AND “SOFT” LAW OF THE  RIGHT 
TO FOOD
Th e  right to food is refl ected in both the “hard” law of treaties, which create 
binding obligations, and “soft ” law. Soft  law can take the form of declarations, 
resolutions, recommendations, guidelines, codes of practice and the like. It can 
be derived from hard law, and deepen it, but it should not rewrite it. As explored 
below for legal instruments concluded primarily under the auspices of the UN 
and some specialised agencies, a large body of international law already exists 
on the  right to food. What is needed is a greater appreciation of how the various 
elements fi t together, alongside civil society’s insistence on more vigorous 
monitoring mechanisms and remedies for rights violations, as a basis for more 
eff ective action.
A. TREATIES CONCLUDED UNDER UN AUSPICES: 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOTION OF THE  RIGHT 
TO FOOD
Th e  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( CESCR), established 
in 1989 as the monitoring body under the Covenant, set out the nature of the 
obligations of States Parties to the Covenant in its General Comment No. 3. Th e 
principal obligation under Article 2 of the Covenant is for a state to take steps 
to achieve progressively the full realisation of a right set out in the Covenant, 
both by appropriate means and by utilising “maximum available resources”.37 
Employing the now well-established UN human-rights framework of “respect, 
protect and fulfi l”, the  CESCR, in its General Comment No. 12, has explained 
this in the context of the  right to food as follows:
“Th e obligation to respect existing access to adequate food requires States parties not 
to take any measures that result in preventing such access;
Th e obligation to protect requires measures by the State to ensure that enterprises 
or individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to food;
36 Ibid., p. 121.
37  CESCR, General Comment 3, Th e Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (14 December 1990) 
UN Doc E/1991/23, Annex III, recalled in General Comment No. 12, Right to Adequate Food 
(12 May 1999), UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5, para. 14.
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Th e obligation to fulfi ll (facilitate) means the State must pro-actively engage in 
activities intended to strengthen people’s access to and utilization of resources and 
means to ensure their livelihood, including  food security; …
Whenever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, 
to enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at their disposal, States have the 
obligation to fulfi ll (provide) that right directly.”38
Th e General Comment also addressed implementation issues, including 
monitoring and remedies.39
In General Comment No. 12, the Committee stated that the core content of 
the right implies:
“the availability of food in a quantity and quality suffi  cient to satisfy the dietary 
needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given 
culture; [and] the accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that do 
not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights.”40
Th e notion thus incorporates food safety. “Sustainability” entails the idea of 
long-term availability and accessibility, which encompasses both economic and 
physical aspects.41 As “core” content, these aspects of the  right to food are non-
derogable, even in times of disaster, confl ict or economic crisis. According to 
Manisuli Ssenyonjo, this means that:
“even in times of severe resource constraints the State must protect the most 
disadvantaged and marginalized members or groups of society by adopting relatively 
low-cost targeted programmes.”42
Following the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on 5 May 
2013, the Committee may also now have the opportunity to examine the  right to 
food more closely in the context of an individual or a group communication.
In addition, other widely-ratifi ed international treaties also recognise the 
 right to food. Th e most developed of these is the  Convention on the Rights of 
the  Child, which contains a number of provisions relevant to the  right to food: 
Art.  6(2) on survival and development, Art.19(1) on protection from neglect, 
Art.  24(2)(c) on health, including provision of adequate nutritious foods to 
combat malnutrition, and Art.  27(3) on parental responsibility, with support 
38 General Comment No. 12, para. 15; see, also, www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/
FoodIndex.aspx.
39 See Stefan Lorenzmeier, Chapter 5 in this volume.
40  CESCR, General Comment No. 12, para. 8.
41 Ibid., para. 13.
42 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “ Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Examination of State 
Obligations”, in: Sarah Joseph and Adam McBeth (eds), Research Handbook on International 
Human Rights Law, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), pp. 36–70, at 56.
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to be provided under particular conditions, including with regard to nutrition. 
Furthermore, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(2006) recognises the right of such persons to an adequate standard of living 
for themselves and their families, including adequate food (Art.  28). And the 
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), which cuts across the range of issues necessary for the empowerment 
of women, off ers an excellent platform for exploring the gender dimension of 
the  right to food. Without being acknowledged as such, thinking around this 
instrument43 appears to have informed the former Special Rapporteur’s report 
on women’s rights and the  right to food.44
Expert committees established under various other global treaty regimes 
have mentioned the  right to food in connection with those instruments, 
although, of course, like the ESC Committee, their views are not binding on the 
states parties. Th e  Committee on the Rights of the  Child ( CRC) has explored the 
importance of adequate nutrition in several of its  general comments. General 
Comment 7 on  child rights in early childhood recalled the responsibility of 
states to ensure access to good nutrition, in order to combat both malnutrition 
and obesity (Para. 27(a)).45 It also pointed out the importance of breastfeeding, 
and cross-referenced the guarantees provided by the  ILO’s Maternity Protection 
Convention, 2000 (No. 183).46 Th is comment also brought out the importance 
of the right to  non-discrimination guaranteed by Article  2 of the Convention, 
noting that girls and indigenous children are at special risk of reduced levels of 
nutrition. In its General Comment on the  right to health,47 the  CRC re-iterated 
the link between maternal and infant health, and provided more detailed 
guidance on direct nutritional interventions, the promotion of breastfeeding, 
school feeding, measures against obesity, and education on healthy eating (paras. 
35, 43 to 47 and 59). It again urged compliance with the International Code of 
Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes and later relevant  WHO resolutions (paras. 
44 and 81). Th e  CRC also highlighted  food security in its General Comment 
on state obligations regarding the impact of the business sector on children’s 
rights.48
43 See, for example, Marsha A. Freeman, Christine Chinkin and Beate Rudolf (eds), Th e UN 
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: A Commentary, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
44 Report submitted by the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter: 
“Women’s Rights and the  Right to Food”, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/50, (24 December 2012).
45 General Comment No. 7 (Rev.) on Implementing  Child Rights in Early Childhood,  CRC/C/
GC/7/Rev.1, (20 September 2006).
46 Earlier  ILO instruments contained similar but weaker provisions; they remain in force for 
many countries that have not ratifi ed the more recent standard.
47 General Comment No. 5 (2013) on the Right of the  Child to the Enjoyment of the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 24), CRC/C/GC/15, (17 April 2013).
48 General Comment No. 16, CRC/C/GC/16, (17 April 2013).
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Th e CEDAW Committee is considering a general comment on the rights of 
rural women under Article  14 of CEDAW, which refers to equal treatment in 
land and agrarian reform, and access to agricultural credit, important factors 
for food production (see Art. 14(2(g)). Article 13 also refers to forms of credit, 
access to which is critical in agricultural production. In comments to states 
parties, the Committee, citing various Articles, has addressed the equal access 
of women to food in emergency situations, the right of rural women to food, 
adequate nutrition during pregnancy, and lactation and malnutrition as aspects 
of women’s health.49
All of the UN Conventions mentioned have optional protocols under which 
individuals and groups can fi le communications; these can reinforce future 
action in national courts. Th is is important, since “the ability of the international 
normative frameworks, policies and mechanisms to protect victims from 
violations of  economic, social and cultural rights depends ultimately on how 
they are implemented at national level as well as on the degree to which they 
reach individuals in their context”.50
B. RELEVANT  ILO CONVENTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
While other UN specialised agencies such as the  FAO and the  WHO primarily 
rely on soft  law instruments, such as those highlighted in Section V. below, the 
 ILO’s mandate to set international labour standards has been primarily, but 
not exclusively, expressed through the adoption by the International Labour 
Conference of Conventions (treaties) and Recommendations (non-binding 
instruments). A number of them either directly address the production or 
provision of food, or tackle issues that have an important bearing on the 
enjoyment of the  right to food by workers and their families. In some cases, 
this has included rights relating to land. Th e problems of poverty, low income, 
inequality and disempowerment form the sad nexus between these instruments 
and people’s  right to food. Aside from the fundamental Conventions (see below), 
most of the relevant  ILO instruments are relatively unknown. To his credit, the 
Special Rapporteur has referenced the protection of workers in the agricultural 
sector in his reports,51 but there are other pertinent standards as well. Th e 
 ILO’s Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183), for instance, which 
49 See Beate Rudolf, “Article 13”, in: Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf, note 43 above, pp. 342–343.
50 Christophe Golay, Irene Biglino and Ivona Truscan, “ Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 
(2013) 2 European Journal of Human Rights, p. 296.
51 See note 4 above, paras. 10–20. Ganesh has also argued in favour of linking food producers’ 
welfare to their  right to food. Aravind R. Ganesh, “Th e  Right to Food and Buyer Power”, 
(2010) 11 German Law Journal, pp. 1190–1244.
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encourages breastfeeding, was mentioned in the Framework for Action adopted 
alongside the Rome Declaration on Nutrition.52
A unitary system of supervision of obligations under the  ILO Constitution 
applies to all ratifi ed Conventions. Only the International Court of Justice can 
give an authoritative  interpretation of  ILO Conventions, but a supervisory 
system has been established in the  ILO to provide for a non-binding review. 
Th e independent, high-level Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) examines government reports, 
along with possible observations from workers’ and employers’ organisations, 
on the eff ect given to a ratifi ed Convention by a ratifying member state. Th e 
CEACR traditionally meets each year with the  CESCR, thus reducing the risk 
of divergence on issues of mutual concern. Th e Applications Committee of the 
annual Conference, at which the representatives of employers and workers sit 
alongside governments, permits a more political discussion of selected cases. 
Th e  ILO Governing Body can also request reports on non-ratifi ed Conventions 
and Recommendations which are then synthesised by the CEACR; this so-called 
general survey by the CEACR is also discussed by the Applications Committee. 
Constitutionally provided procedures for fi ling representations and complaints 
are also available, although less oft en used.53
Not long aft er the ESC Covenant was adopted, an analysis compared its 
provisions with  ILO instruments then in existence, identifying only a handful 
of them in relation to Article  11.54 Today, a more integrated analysis would 
highlight more Conventions and Recommendations, some adopted later, that 
are of particular relevance to the realisation of the  right to food. In addition, 
follow-up under  ILO Declarations adopted in 1998 and 2008 provide an 
additional lens for looking at this question. Th e relevant instruments can be 
grouped under  fundamental principles and rights at work,  social protection 
and governance, and instruments relating directly to food: its production, 
its provision, or earning  wages suffi  cient to purchase it, including by specifi c 
categories of persons such as agricultural workers or  indigenous peoples.
52  FAO/ WHO, Framework for Action, Second International Conference on Nutrition, (Rome, 
19–21 November 2014), ICN2 2014/3 Corr. 1, p. 5, n 8.
53 For an overview of the system, see  ILO, Rules of the Game: A Brief Introduction to 
International Labour Standards, 2nd rev’d. ed., (Geneva:  ILO, 2014).
54 Comparative analysis of the international human rights Covenants and international labour 
Conventions,  ILO, LXIX Offi  cial Bulletin (1969) 151, paras. 84–86. It highlighted only the 
 Social Policy Convention (Non-Metropolitan Territories) Convention, 1947 (No. 82), the 
 Social Policy (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1962 (No. 117), the Plantations Convention, 
1958 (No. 110), and the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107), along 
with several Recommendations. Of these, only Convention No. 110 and its accompanying 
Recommendation (No. 110), along with the Workers’ Housing Recommendation, 1961 (No. 
115; see its paras. 7(e), 8(f), 15(c)), and the Tenants and  Sharecroppers Recommendation, 1968 
(No. 132), are still considered by the  ILO to be up-to-date. Th e Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, 1989 (No. 169) replaced C. 107, which nevertheless remains in force for some 
States.  ILO instruments are available at www.ilo.org in the NORMLEX database.
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1.  Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
As one outcome of the so-called “social clause” debate in  trade negotiations in 
the 1990s, the International Labour Conference adopted the  ILO Declaration on 
 Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998.55 Under it,  ILO members 
are obligated, by virtue of  ILO membership, to respect, promote and realise four 
principles relating to  freedom of association and collective bargaining, and to the 
elimination of  child labour,  forced labour and discrimination in employment/
occupation. Th e  ILO has identifi ed eight fundamental Conventions relating to 
these principles, all of which are now almost universally ratifi ed.56 Each has 
relevance to the realisation of the  right to food.
Th e  ILO reported in 2010 that 69 per cent of all  child labour occurs in 
agriculture, oft en under hazardous conditions.57 While progress has been 
made in reducing it, the young age of the children involved, ingrained attitudes 
and perceptions about the roles of girls and boys, denial of education, a lack 
of regulation and its enforcement, along with inadequate income-earning 
options for their parents, all serve to make tackling rural  child labour especially 
challenging.58 As one response, the  ILO instituted a new multi-stakeholder 
initiative to target the elimination of  child labour in the context of support for 
small farmers, as part of eff orts to break the cycle of poverty.
Children and adults alike may be subject to  forced labour, especially in the 
form of bonded labour, as a means to avert acute poverty or starvation.59 In 
addition, excessive charges imposed for food and drink, among other items, also 
form part of the pattern of debt bondage involving rural  forced labour,60 labour 
traffi  cking, and exploitation by some labour migration recruitment agencies.
55 A legal analysis of the Declaration is provided by Claire La Hovary, Les droits fondamentaux 
au travail: Origines, statut et impact en droit international, (Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France, 2009). A brief description appears in Anne Trebilcock, “Th e  ILO Declaration on 
 Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: A New Tool”, in: Roger Blanpain and Chris 
Engels (eds), Th e  ILO and the Social Challenges of the 21st Century: Th e Geneva Lectures, (Th e 
Hague: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 105–116.
56 Th ese are the  Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), the Abolition of  Forced Labour 
Convention, 1957 (No. 105), the Freedom of Association and Right to Organise Convention, 
1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 
98), the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100), the Discrimination (Employment 
and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), the Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) 
and the Worst Forms of  Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). Almost all states have 
ratifi ed the vast majority of these instruments. Ratifi cation information is available in the 
NORMLEX database on the  ILO website, www.ilo.org, under labour standards.
57  ILO, Accelerating Action against  Child Labour, Global Report under the follow-up to the  ILO 
Declaration on  Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, (Geneva:  ILO, 2010), p. 56.
58  ILO, Promotion of Rural Employment for Poverty Reduction, International Labour 
Conference, 97th Session, Report IV (Geneva:  ILO, 2008), pp. 89–90.
59  ILO, A Global Alliance against  Forced Labour, Global Report under the follow-up to the  ILO 
Declaration on  Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, (Geneva:  ILO, 2005), p. 31.
60 Ibid., p. 41.
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Th e  right to food, like other ESC rights, is accompanied by a general 
prohibition on discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, age, 
religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.61 Inequality – whether due to sex, race, social origin, migrant 
status or other situation – is closely associated with poverty and limitation of 
the  right to food.  Ethnicity-based discrimination plays a very detrimental 
role in some countries. Th e former Special Rapporteur’s Report on Women’s 
Rights and Food casts light on the many facets of gender-based discrimination 
that are involved, from the home, to education, to the labour market. An 
 FAO/IFAD/ ILO report focused on the serious gender-based discrimination 
which permeates agricultural work.62 Disadvantages relating to denial of 
access to land, other property and credit, as well as to discrimination in job 
opportunities, remuneration, education and training, combine in a vicious circle 
of disempowerment, with consequences in relation to food.63 In some countries, 
women need their husband’s permission to join a co-operative or  trade union, or 
to sign a contract to buy land. Th ese are all practices condemned by international 
law, under both CEDAW and  ILO Conventions64 as well as the Covenants.
 Freedom of association and collective bargaining play a key role in ensuring 
respect for the  right to food. Th e chief  ILO Conventions on this topic are the 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 
1948 (No. 87), which is mentioned in Article 8(3) of the ESC Covenant, and the 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). Th ey 
provide the essential guarantees for workers and employers to form and join 
associations of their own choice and for these organisations to engage in their 
activities without previous government authorisation or interference.
An early  ILO instrument, the Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention, 
1921 (No. 11), had already affi  rmed that all those engaged in agriculture have 
the same rights of association and combination as industrial workers (Art.  1). 
Th e  Rural Workers’ Organisations Convention, 1975 (No. 141) spelt out in more 
detail how persons engaged in agriculture, handicraft s or a related occupation in 
a rural area can be guaranteed the right of association free from all interference, 
coercion or repression (Art. 3). Th e contribution that such organisations make 
to improving employment opportunities, general conditions of work and life in 
61 ESC Covenant, Art. 2; see, also, General Comment No. 12, para.18, and General Comment 
No. 20 concerning  non-discrimination in economic, social, and cultural rights, E/C.12/
GC/20 (2 July 2009).
62  FAO/IFAD/ ILO, Gender Dimensions of Agricultural and Rural Employment: Diff erentiated 
Pathways out of Poverty – Status, Trends and Gaps, (Rome:  FAO, 2010).
63  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, Women’s Rights and Food, para.5;  ILO, “Gender at 
the Heart of  Decent Work”, (Geneva:  ILO, 2011).
64 See, especially,  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (Arts. 2, 5, 11, 13 and 14),  ILO Conventions No. 100 and 111, the Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Recommendation No. 111, and the Workers with Family 
Responsibilities Convention, 1975 (No. 156) and Recommendation (No. 165).
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rural areas, as well as increasing the national income and achieving its better 
distribution, is recognised in Article  6. Th e accompanying Recommendation 
(No. 149) highlights the role such independent, non-discriminatory 
organisations can play in programmes of agricultural development and agrarian 
reform (para. 5).
Unfortunately, even with these legal protections,  freedom of association 
and collective bargaining are still too oft en denied to workers in the 
agricultural sector. As the  ILO Committee of Experts has pointed out,  rural 
workers, especially those in agriculture, face both legal impediments and 
practical challenges to exercising these rights.65 Th e same is true for workers 
in many export-processing zones, in which food is oft en transformed before 
marketing.
Collective bargaining, through which representative organisations of 
workers reach collective agreements with employers or their associations, also 
plays a role in the realisation of the  right to food. In addition to their important 
function of agreeing on wage levels that permit the purchase of adequate food 
for families, such accords may also provide for standards for food and catering 
made available at the workplace.
In addition, the  Cooperatives Recommendation, 2002 (No. 193) is relevant 
to both food producers and consumers. Under it, a co-operative is defi ned as “an 
autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through jointly owned 
and democratically controlled enterprise”. (para. 2). Th e Recommendation 
sets out several means of strengthening co-operatives and some measures that 
governments can take to provide a supportive policy and legal framework for 
them.
Strengthening organisations such as farmers’ unions, rural women’s 
associations, co-operatives and  trade unions along the food-supply chain 
could create a more level playing-fi eld for the realisation of the  right to food. 
Hard law instruments and soft  law initiatives support the creation of eff ective, 
free, democratic institutions that are accountable to their members, and their 
implementation should be encouraged. Th ey provide the legal protection for 
eff ective participation – a factor stressed as critical in numerous reports of the 
Special Rapporteur.66
2.  Social Protection
Th e Universal Declaration of Human Rights affi  rms the  right to social security 
in the context of the realisation of rights indispensable for a person’s dignity 
65 See  ILO, 2008, note 58 above, pp. 87–88.
66 See, for instance, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/50, para. 38.
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(Art. 22).67 In his analysis of Article 11 of the Covenant, Asbørn Eide has pointed 
out that an adequate standard of living is to be realised as a right or claim in 
the context of  human dignity, not as an act of charity.68 It is thus not surprising 
to see that light has been cast on social security and  social protection measures 
as critical means for ensuring enjoyment of the  right to food.  Social protection 
can be seen as the other side of the coin of  food security, since it guards against 
shocks caused by famine or natural disasters. According to the High Level Panel 
of Experts on  Food Security and Nutrition,  social protection (which they take 
to mean agricultural input subsidies, public-works programmes, food price 
stabilisation and subsidies and social transfers) plays a key role in ensuring  food 
security.69 Th e Rome Declaration on Nutrition called for women’s full and equal 
access to  social protection.70
Th e  ILO’s approach to  social protection grows out of experience under the 
Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1951 (No. 102), which, 
among other things, covers family benefi ts as well as maternity allowances. 
Family benefi ts can be in the form of payment, provision of necessities such as 
food, or a combination of these (Art.  42). In part because this Convention is 
geared mainly to the formal economy, the  ILO decided to adopt the  ILO  Social 
Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202). It sees  social protection as 
“an important tool to prevent and reduce poverty, inequality, social exclusion 
and social insecurity”.71 Th e instrument calls for minimum national guarantees 
of access to essential health  care and to basic income security which together 
secure eff ective access to goods and services defi ned as necessary at national 
level (para. 4). It specifi cally highlights maternity protection and “basic income 
security for children, at least at a nationally defi ned level, providing access to 
nutrition…” (para. 5(b)). Th e Recommendation also contains provisions on 
governance aspects and strategies to support such guarantees. It serves as a 
platform for multi-stakeholder initiatives,72 and has received support from the 
 Human Rights Council upon the basis of a report by the Special Rapporteur 
on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights.73 Th e instrument foresees attention 
67 Janelle M. Diller, Securing Dignity and Freedom through Human Rights: Article  22 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff , 2012), pp. 85–89 and 140–
144.
68 Asbjørn Eide, “Human Rights-Based Development in the Age of Economic Globalization: 
Background and Prospects”, in: Bard A. Andreassen and Stephen P. Marks (eds), Development 
as a Human Right: Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions, (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), Chapter 11.
69 High Level Panel on  Food Security and Nutrition,  Social Protection for  Food Security, (Rome: 
CFS/HLPE, 2012).
70 Rome Declaration, note 17 above, para. 13(j)).
71 Th e preamble refers to Article 11 of the ESC Covenant.
72 A wide range of international institutions are involved; at national level, initiatives are 
country-led. See www.socialprotectionfl oor.org.
73 Final draft  of the  guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights, submitted by the 
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/21/39, (18 July 2012), para. 20.
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to gender equality, which is critical in the design and implementation of social-
protection measures in the context of the  right to food.74
3. Governance (including Terms of Employment and Conditions of Work)
In its approach to international labour standards today, the  ILO Governing 
Body has identifi ed what were referred to in the 2008 Declaration on Social 
Justice for a Fair Globalization as “governance” Conventions: those dealing with 
employment policy,  labour inspection, and tripartite consultation. In the context 
of the  right to food, the  Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention, 1969 (No. 
129) and the Recommendation that complements it (No. 133), deserve particular 
mention. Th ey set out the functions of  labour inspection in this area and provide 
for organisational and other measures to ensure its expertise, independence and 
effi  cacy in enforcing the law, providing advice and reporting.
Th e notion of governance can be interpreted more broadly, to extend, for 
instance, to arrangements for ensuring that  wages are suffi  cient to cover the 
cost of food. Aside from Convention No. 98 on collective-bargaining, the 
leading instrument on this is the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 
131), which calls for establishing a consultative system to set the level of legal 
 minimum  wages in a way that takes into account the needs of workers and their 
families, in particular the cost of living, as well as other economic factors (Art. 3). 
Th e Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) Convention, 1951 (No. 99) 
takes a similar approach for workers employed in agricultural undertakings and 
related occupations. Here, partial payment of  minimum  wages in the form of 
allowances in kind may be permitted, if the allowances are appropriate for the 
use and benefi t of the worker and his or her family, and if the attributed value is 
fair and reasonable (Art. 2).
Th e link between earnings and the prices of goods and services was 
refl ected in the  ILO’s earlier statistical database, LABORSTA, which has now 
been replaced by ILOSTAT. Among the topics covered were consumer-price 
indices, including retail prices of selected food items, and household income 
and expenditure in relation to  wages. In 2003, the International Conference of 
Labour Statisticians adopted resolutions on the technical aspects of both. Th e 
Labour  Statistics Convention, 1985 (No. 160) sets out minimum standards, 
supplemented by guidelines in a Recommendation (No. 170). Th e Convention 
foresees progressive expansion of the  statistics that member states are to 
collect, compile and publish, including  statistics on consumer-price indices 
and household expenditures (Art.  1(f) and (g)). Th e Recommendation refers 
specifi cally to food in relation to consumer prices (para. 7(2)). Convention No. 
160 provides for the collection, compilation and publication of data by ratifying 
states on not only a range of labour issues, but also consumer-price indices 
74 Women’s Rights and the  Right to Food, note 63 above, paras. 22–28.
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(Art.  1(f)) and household or family expenditures (Art.  1(g)). For countries 
accepting the obligation in relation to consumer price indices, they are to 
be computed in order to measure variations over time in the prices of items 
representative of the consumption patterns of signifi cant population groups or 
of the total population. In the accompanying Recommendation (No. 170), food 
is, of course, included among important consumption items to be covered by 
consumer-price indices (para. 7(2)). Such data can be read alongside the  FAO’s 
Food Price Indices. Th ese track changes in international prices of major food 
commodities and prices of a basket of food commodities.
In a broad sense of governance, rules on  working time – which, together with 
hourly or daily  wages, will determine a worker’s gross earnings – can also be 
relevant to his or her enjoyment of the  right to food. “Time poverty” aff ects poor 
working-women in particular, with hours spent in obtaining and preparing food 
for the family not captured by economic data. In formal employment, breaks 
that are too short to permit the consumption of nutritious meals can also play a 
role in undermining the  right to food. Th e Welfare Facilities Recommendation, 
1956 (No. 102) provides that “special consideration should be given to providing 
shift  workers with facilities for obtaining adequate meals and beverages at 
appropriate times” (para. 13). Th is Recommendation makes a number of other 
detailed suggestions about workplace canteens (paras. 4 to 15). It encourages the 
provision of advice on types of meals, nutrition and hygiene standards, and the 
accommodation aspects of canteens. It notes that trolleys off ering packed-meals 
and beverages for sale should not be used in workplaces “in which dangerous 
or harmful processes make it undesirable that workers should partake of food 
or drink there” (para. 10(2)). In a more limited sense, the  Working Conditions 
(Hotels and Restaurants) Recommendation, 1991 (No. 179), which supplements 
Convention No. 172 of the same name, calls for the number and length of meal 
breaks to be determined in the light of the country’s customs and traditions 
(para. 9).
Finally, the comparative analysis of  ILO instruments carried out shortly 
aft er the ESC Covenant was adopted identifi ed the comprehensive  Social Policy 
(Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962 (No. 117) as most relevant. While 
this Convention is no longer promoted for ratifi cation, perhaps because it rests 
on a model of planned development, it remains in force for 32 states and could, 
therefore, be the object of procedures under the  ILO Constitution. Article 4 of 
the Convention highlights measures for the promotion of productive capacity 
and the improvement of the standards of living of agricultural producers. Th ese 
include eliminating the causes of chronic indebtedness and “the control, by 
the enforcement of adequate laws and regulations, of the ownership and use 
of land resources to ensure that they are used, with due regard to customary 
rights, in the best interests of the inhabitants of the country”. Further measures 
include the supervision of tenancy arrangements and the encouragement of 
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the formation of co-operatives. Moreover, measures are to be taken “to secure 
for independent producers and wage earners conditions which will give them 
scope to improve living standards by their own eff orts and will ensure the 
maintenance of minimum standards of living…” (Art. 5(1)). Here, account is to 
be taken of “such essential family needs of the workers as food and its nutritive 
value…” (Art. 5(2)). Convention No. 117 also addresses remuneration, as well as 
 non-discrimination and migrant workers.
4. Categories of Workers and the  Right to Food
Other  ILO Conventions and Recommendations address the  right to food 
directly in relation to particular categories:  agricultural and rural workers in 
various situations,  seafarers and fi shers aboard vessels, some other categories in 
which the place of work may also impose special constraints ( domestic workers, 
construction workers, miners), and  indigenous peoples.
a. Agricultural and Rural and Other Workers
As noted by the UN  Human Rights Council, “70 per cent of hungry people 
live in rural areas and 50 per cent are small-scale farm-holders” who are 
highly vulnerable to food insecurity.75 Agriculture provides a livelihood for 
more people, as producers or wage labour, than any other sector, but features 
a productivity level that is ten times lower than for services and industry.76 
Not surprisingly, then, agricultural wage-labourers are found at the extreme 
lower end of income distribution,77 and face special challenges in relation to 
the  right to food.78 Several  ILO instruments provide elements for improving 
their conditions, to be accompanied by deeper reforms. Th ese will be necessary 
if the contribution of agricultural workers to sustainable agriculture is to be 
enhanced.79
Th e Plantations Convention, 1958 (No. 110), whose defi nition of plantation 
was amended by a Protocol, addresses the engagement and recruitment of 
migrant workers for plantation operations, contracts of employment, the 
abolition of penal sanctions, the protection of  wages and fi xing their minimum, 
weekly rest, annual holidays with pay, maternity protection, compensation 
to workers’ in case of occupational injury, freedom of association, the right to 
75 Resolution on the  right to food, UNDoc. A/HRC/RES/28/10 (2 April 2015), para. 19.
76 David Cheong, Marion Jansen and Ralf Peters (eds), Shared Harvests: Agriculture,  Trade and 
Employment, (Geneva:  ILO/UNCTAD, 2013), p. 13.
77 Ibid., p. 9.
78 Report of the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, Agribusiness and the  Right to Food, 
UN Doc.A/HRC/13/33, paras.10–27.
79 Peter Hurst et al., Agricultural Workers and their Contribution to Sustainable Agriculture 
and Rural Development, (Geneva:  FAO/ ILO/IUF, 2007).
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organise and collective bargaining,  labour inspection, housing (including the 
provision of cooking facilities) and medical  care. Aside from the provisions 
aimed at the payment of  wages suffi  cient to obtain food, Article  27(3) 
stipulates, “Where food… or other essential supplies and services form part 
of remuneration, all practicable steps shall be taken to ensure that they are 
adequate and their cash value properly assessed”. A similar provision appears in 
Article 4 of the Protection of  Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95), which is much 
more widely ratifi ed than Convention No. 110.80 Th e provision of food and the 
monetary value that may be attributed to it is an issue also addressed by the 
 Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) (see its Arts. 7(h) and 12(2)). 
Th is Convention, incidentally, forms an important part of the puzzle of the  care 
economy that is a key aspect of gendered labour, also in relation to the  right to 
food.81
In addition, the generally applicable Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention, 1981 (No. 155) has been supplemented by a more specifi c 
instrument, the Safety and Health in Agriculture Convention, 2001 (No. 184). 
It aims at avoiding on-the-job accidents and occupational diseases which can 
severely curtail a worker’s ability to work and access adequate food. Th e newer 
instrument is complemented by Recommendation No. 192, which calls on 
employers to provide workers in agriculture with an adequate supply of safe 
drinking-water and facilities for eating meals (para. 10).
Finally, the Tenants and  Sharecroppers’ Recommendation, 1968 (No. 132) 
encourages the progressive increase in their well-being, facilitating their access 
to land and the voluntary establishment of representative organisations, and the 
effi  cient use of natural and economic resources, ideally as part of a comprehensive 
national agrarian reform plan (paras. 4 to 9). Th e Recommendation addresses 
both the production and consumption perspective. Th us, rents should be set at 
a level that permits a standard of living for the occupant “which is compatible 
with  human dignity”, and “promotes progressive husbandry” (para. 10(a)(i) and 
(iii)). Rent payments should be postponed or reduced in the event of crop failure 
or other unforeseeable disasters (para. 11). Contracts should “encourage good 
agricultural practices” (para. 14(1)(c)). Furthermore, “[w]here appropriate  … 
tenants,  sharecroppers and similar categories of agricultural workers should 
be authorized to use some land for producing food for themselves and their 
families” (para. 19). Th ese groups should also be protected against the risks of 
loss of income resulting from drought, fl oods, animal and plant diseases and 
the like (para. 20(1)). Co-operative institutions among these workers are also 
encouraged (para. 21).
80 Convention No 95 has been ratifi ed by 98 countries, whereas Convention No 110 is in force 
for only 12 States.
81 Women’s Rights and the  Right to Food, note 63 above, paras. 3–5.
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 ILO Conventions on the rights and  working conditions of  seafarers and 
fi shers also contain provisions relating to these workers’  right to food. Th e 
Maritime Labour Convention 2006, which entered into force in 2013 for 
the majority of the world’s shipping, includes food and catering among the 
necessary decent working and living conditions on board vessels (Art. IV and 
Regulation 3.2). As under earlier  ILO standards in this fi eld,  seafarers are to 
be provided with food free of charge during their engagement, and the food 
must be of “appropriate quality, nutritional value and quantity that adequately 
covers the requirements of the ship and takes into account the diff ering cultural 
and religious backgrounds” of the crew (Regulation 3.2, detailed further in 
Standards A3.2 and B3.2). Similarly, the Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 188), 
which will revise earlier instruments once it enters into force, calls for national 
legislation requiring that the food on board ship be of suffi  cient nutritional 
value, quality and quantity and provided at no cost to the fi sher unless permitted 
by a collective agreement (Art. 27; see, also, Annex III, paras. 78–79). Guidelines 
recently adopted under the auspices of the  FAO, in relation to the entire fi sh 
production chain, do not mention this instrument, but they do contain a general 
reference to “relevant  ILO Conventions”.82
Other occupations are also targeted by  ILO instruments. Depending on 
the duration of the work and its location, and the number of construction 
workers, adequate facilities for obtaining or preparing food and drink nearby 
should be provided for them if not otherwise available (Safety and Health 
in Construction Recommendation, 1988 (No. 175), Para. 51(1)). A similar 
provision appears in the Safety and Health in Mines Recommendation, 1995 
(No. 183). Th e  Domestic Workers Recommendation, 2011 (No. 201) also 
stipulates that when food is provided, it should include “meals of good quality 
and suffi  cient quantity, adapted to the extent reasonable to the cultural and 
religious requirements, if any, of the domestic worker concerned” (para. 17(d)).
b.  Indigenous Peoples
Th e  Human Rights Council recently called upon states to take special action 
to combat the root causes of the disproportionately high level of hunger and 
malnutrition among  indigenous peoples.83 While the non-binding Declaration 
on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
2007 and the World Conference on Indigenous People, held in 2014, may be 
more widely known, the only binding treaties in this area are the Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), and the instrument it 
82  FAO, “Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of 
 Food Security and Poverty Eradication”, (Rome:  FAO, 2015), para. 6.12.
83  Human Rights Council, Resolution on the  Right to Food, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/L.16 (15 March 
2013), adopted on 21 March 2013.
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revised, the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107).84 
Convention No. 169 promotes the full realisation of  indigenous peoples’ social, 
economic and cultural rights, and provides for consultation, participation and, 
in some cases, decision-making in areas which concern (see especially Art. 6). 
In particular, governments are to take measures in co-operation with these 
peoples “to protect and preserve the  environment of the territories they inhabit” 
(Art. 7(4)).
Part II (Arts. 13 to 19) of the instrument, on land, contains a number of 
guarantees. In direct protection against land-grabbing, Article. 14(1) provides in 
part,
“Th e rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands 
which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized.”
As necessary, Governments are to take steps to identify these lands and to 
“guarantee eff ective protection of their rights of ownership and possession” 
(Art. 14(2)), including adequate procedures to resolve land claims (Art. 14(3)). 
Th e Convention also contains protection against removal from the lands that 
 indigenous peoples occupy (Art. 16) and against unauthorised intrusion or use 
(Art.  18). Consultation is required “whenever consideration is being given to 
their capacity to alienate their lands or otherwise transmit their rights outside 
their own community” (Art.  17(2)). National agrarian programmes are to 
secure these peoples equivalent treatment to other sectors of the population 
with regard to the provision of land “for providing the essentials of a normal 
existence” (Art.  19(a)). Th e  ILO Committee of Experts has, on a number of 
occasions, called on governments to give eff ect to such provisions. Its detailed 
comments are, in some cases, informed by observations submitted by workers’ 
or employers’ organisations about specifi c confl icts. Recently, the Committee 
has raised issues about land demarcation and titling under Article  14 with 
the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Peru.85 Among its 
most frequent comments are those reproaching inadequate consultation by 
many governments, oft en in connection with development projects or mining 
concessions.
84 Convention No 169 has been ratifi ed by 22 states, while Convention No 107, which is closed to 
further ratifi cation, remains in force for 17 states.
85 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 102nd session, 2013, Report III (Part 
IA), p. 819 et seq.
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V. MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT FROM 
VARYING PERSPECTIVES
Explicitly or implicitly, the international law of the  right to food underpins many 
of the institutional initiatives, some involving multiple stakeholders, taken in 
relation to hunger, nutrition and other aspects of the  right to food. Over the past 
several decades, the international community’s reliance on global summits and 
their follow-up has been relevant to the development of soft  law in relation to the 
 right to food. In 1995, the World Social Summit and its follow-up highlighted the 
need for complementarity between social and economic goals. Th e World Food 
Summits, the most recent one convened in 2009, have produced declarations 
addressing it, especially relating to  food security. Th e World Food Summit of 
1996 stated that  food security existed “when all people, at all times, have physical 
and economic access to suffi  cient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary 
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.86
In June 2012, the United Nations Conference on  Sustainable Development 
agreed on a framework for development that includes three interconnected 
objectives: economic development, social inclusion, and environmental 
sustainability.87 Th is Conference saw the launching of the Zero Hunger 
Challenge; it called for universal access to adequate food year-round, the 
prevention of  child stunting, the sustainable transformation of food systems, 
increasing both the productivity and the incomes of smallholder farmers, and 
reduction in food loss and waste. More broadly, the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration (2000) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have 
focused attention on the  right to food, by setting, as the fi rst goal, “[the] 
eradicat[ion of] extreme poverty and hunger”. Target 1C for this goal was 
halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of the population who suff er 
from hunger. Under the same goal, Target 1B was to “achieve full and productive 
employment and  decent work for all, including women and young persons”. Th e 
MDGs have catalysed agencies across the UN system to think about how their 
missions relate to them and stimulated public-private partnerships on several 
issues. It is now anticipated that the UN General Assembly will adopt a set of 
 Sustainable Development Goals and targets in 2015. Proposed Goal 2 is to end 
hunger, achieve  food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable 
agriculture. A separate Goal 8 would associate sustained, inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth with full and productive employment and  decent 
86 World Food Summit Plan of Action, World Food Summit, Rome, 13–17  November 1996, 
para. 1.
87 As characterised in Report of the Secretary-General, “A Life of Dignity for All: Accelerating 
Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and Advancing the United Nations 
Development Agenda beyond 2015”, UN Doc. A/68/202 (26 July 2013), para. 74.
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work.88 Such a reshuffl  ing of goals would not remove the link between work and 
the  right to food, but it would circumscribe it more narrowly to those active in 
food production as part of “sustainable agriculture”. As urged by UN Women 
(the lead UN unit on gender issues), a stand-alone goal on gender equality and 
empowerment of women is also proposed.
In relation to the  right to food, the restructured Committee on World 
 Food Security (CFS) serves as a key global forum for debate aimed at policy 
convergence on  food security issues, agriculture and nutrition (the  FAO, the 
IFAD and the WFP serve as the CFS Secretariat). Th e CFS brings together 
governments, civil society organisations, private sector entities and foundations. 
In 2012, the CFS approved the Voluntary  Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National 
 Food Security. It now intends to build on the Principles for Responsible 
Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources, 
developed earlier by the  FAO, the IFAD, the UNCTAD and the World Bank.89 
Th e “Scaling up Nutrition” movement, a public-private partnership, aims to 
reduce malnutrition and  child stunting. Another example is the IFAD’s Value 
Chain Development Programme, which focuses on cassava and rice, and 
involves producers, processors and their organisations, public and private 
institutions, service providers, road builders, policy developers and regulators.90 
In addition, the member organisations of the UN High-Level Task Force on 
the Global  Food Security Crisis are collaborating with the G20 on agricultural 
productivity growth, and in the context of the Agricultural Market Information 
System (AMIS). Th e AMIS is intended to enhance transparency in global 
markets for wheat, corn, rice and soya beans.
Th ese multi-institutional eff orts can complement important steps taken 
in individual organizations, such as the  FAO. In 2004, the  FAO adopted the 
Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to 
adequate food in the context of national  food security, known as the RtAF 
Guidelines.91 Inspired by the ESC Committee’s General Comment No. 12, they 
have been described as “a landmark commitment” and “a clear roadmap for 
human rights-based development”.92 Th e guidelines take a holistic approach, 
covering, among many topics, good governance, market systems, labour, food 
safety, nutrition and the international dimension. On the tenth anniversary of 
the RtAF Guidelines, civil society groups called for them to be reaffi  rmed, while 
88 See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgsproposal.
89 IFAD, Annual Report, Doc. AR/2012/e/5, p. 35. See, also,  Human Rights Council, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/28/10, (2 April 2015).
90 Ibid., pp. 37–38.
91 See www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/y9825e/y9825e00.HTM. Th e guidelines were 
mentioned as a practical tool in the resolution on the  right to food adopted on 19 December 
2011 by the UN General Assembly; A/RES/66/158, (27 March 2012).
92 Eide, note 68 above, p. 247.
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insisting on improved accountability and monitoring, democratisation of the 
food system and creation of space for real participation.93 Th ey, along with other 
guidelines, were included in recommendations contained in the Framework for 
Action under the Rome Declaration on Nutrition.
Some initiatives related to the  right to food are not new. Th e path-breaking 
 WHO International Code of Marketing Breast-milk Substitutes, developed 
together with UNICEF, was adopted in 1981 and highlighted by the Special 
Rapporteur.94 An even older arrangement is the  Codex Alimentarius, consisting 
of standards based upon scientifi c evidence provided through independent 
expert meetings convened by the  FAO and the  WHO. Since its creation in 1963, 
the  Codex Alimentarius Commission has adopted several hundred standards on 
the quality and nutritional value of foods, as well as on safe food production.95 
Th e series of  WHO guidelines on food safety and nutrition, some developed with 
the  FAO, should also be mentioned.
Whether captured in “hard law” treaties or “soft  law” tools such as guidelines, 
greater accountability for realizing the  right to food is needed. One important 
trend has been the development of a series of  indicators against which various 
attributes of a right can be measured. Th e  CESCR has suggested means of 
 interpretation in order to overcome the diffi  culty posed by the relative vagueness 
of the “right to an adequate standard of living”. In particular, it has emphasised 
the use of  indicators and benchmarks as a means of measuring progress over 
time.96 As Asbjørn Eide (who has taken a leading role on this issue) has pointed 
out, the Committee has oft en asked for detailed information, with particular 
attention to especially vulnerable or disadvantaged groups.97 In several 
conclusions and recommendations addressed to member States in relation to 
their reports, the  CESCR has looked at the  indicators that they use, such as the 
cost of the monthly “food basket”.98
While the use of  indicators has been justifi ably criticised and faces practical 
obstacles, such measurement can be helpful in certain instances in relation to 
the  right to food.99 Th e Offi  ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
93 See 10 Years of the  Right to Food Guidelines, note 13 above.
94 Report submitted by the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, Doc. 
A/HRC/19/59, (26 Dec. 2011), paras. 50–51.
95 Christopher Wanjek, “Food at Work: Workplace Solutions for Malnutrition, Obesity and 
Chronic Diseases”, (Geneva:  ILO, 2005), pp. 384–387.
96 Yuval Shany, “Stuck in a Moment in Time: Th e International Justiciability of  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights”, in: Barak-Erez and Gross (eds), note 21 above, p. 77, at 81.
97 Asbjørn Eide, “Economic and Social Rights”, in: Janusz Symonides (ed), Human Rights: 
Concepts and Standards, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing and UNESCO, 2000), p. 131.
98 Ibid., p. 86.
99 Randolph and Hertel, note 8 above, Eide, note 68 above, pp. 211–215, and Maarten Immink 
and Margret Vidar, “Monitoring the Human Right to Adequate Food at Country Level”, in: 
Gudmundur Alfredsson, Jonas Grimheden, Bertrand G. Ramcharan and Alfred de Zayas, 
International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff , 2009), 
pp. 313–323, at 319–320.
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led consultations in 2006–2007 that produced illustrative  indicators, including 
on the right to adequate food. Th ey contain structural, process and outcome 
elements.100 Structural  indicators refl ect ratifi cation or adoption of legal 
instruments and establishment of essential mechanisms. Process  indicators 
link state policy instruments with development milestones, such as on land 
tenure, land reform or percentage of the population covered by food subsidies.101 
Outcome  indicators refl ect attainment at the individual and collective level, such 
as caloric intake. Th e identifi cation of  indicators and their priority of application 
must involve participation of those aff ected as well as of experts. Th e Framework 
for Action under the Rome Declaration calls on national governments to 
establish nutrition targets and immediate milestones, using agreed international 
 indicators for nutrition outcomes.102
Each agency, of course, approaches the issues using the lens of its own 
mandate. Th rough its “ Decent Work Agenda”,103 the  ILO looks at the  right to 
food across the value chain, from production to consumption. Poor diet in the 
forms of malnutrition in some countries and obesity in others has been linked to 
lost productivity. An  ILO study on food at work concluded that:
“Too oft en, food at work is seen as an aft erthought or a hindrance by employers and 
is oft en a ‘missed opportunity’ to increase productivity and morale. Canteens, if 
they exist, routinely off er an unhealthy and unvaried selection. Vending machines 
are regularly stocked with unhealthy snacks. … Street foods can be bacteria-laden. 
Workers sometimes have no time or place to eat or no money to purchase food.”104
Th e study showcased practical initiatives that can improve the situation in 
relation to the  right to food in a work setting.
In 2011, the  ILO Governing Body endorsed a strategy for the  Decent Work 
for  Food Security Programme.105 It aims to promote sustainable livelihoods 
and  food security of small-scale producers and agricultural workers and their 
families through  decent work in agro-food value chains with high employment, 
income generation and productivity potential.  Th e links in the chain are 
agriculture, fi shing and aquaculture production, food manufacturing and 
packaging, transport and storage,  trade and retail distribution, food services and 
100 Report on  Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights, 
HRI/MC/2008/3, 6 June 2008, p. 24.
101 Eide, note 68 above, pp. 213–214.
102 Framework for Action, note 52 above, p. 7.
103 Th e  Decent Work Agenda, pursued by the  ILO since 1999, focuses on fundamental rights 
at work, decent employment,  social protection and  social dialogue. Its aim is to promote 
opportunities for all women and men to obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of 
freedom, equity, security and  human dignity.
104 See Wanjek, note 95 above (press summary).
105  ILO, GB.312/POL/7 and Record of Decisions (November 2011).
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consumption. Key  decent work defi cits are identifi ed for each, with low pay or 
income a common thread.
Initiatives of this type, oft en involving multiple stakeholders, are a clear trend 
in food-related transnational work. In a positive sense, they open up engagement 
to a wider range of actors, and push diff erent parts of the UN system and beyond 
to comprehend issues better and act in greater synergy. Common frameworks 
permit re-focusing each agency’s particular lens from another angle, such as 
the  right to food. On the other hand, there are many of such frameworks and 
agendas, each competing for resources and media attention. And, regrettably, 
few suffi  ciently embed gender in their design, implementation or monitoring. 
In light of the stronger emphasis on gender in more recent soft  law tools such 
as the Rome Declaration and Plan of Action, it is hoped that this situation will 
improve.
VI.  SYSTEMIC ISSUES REMAIN TO BE TACKLED
Th e proposed  Sustainable Development Goals currently under discussion could 
play a useful role in moving the  right to food forward. In his recent report, the 
UN Secretary-General identifi ed four building-blocks: a vision for the future 
“fi rmly anchored in human rights and universally accepted values and principles, 
including those encapsulated in the Charter, the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights and the Millennium Declaration”; a new set of goals and 
targets; a global partnership for development; and a participatory monitoring 
framework “for tracking progress and mutual accountability mechanisms for 
all stakeholders”.106 Among the related actions identifi ed are the empowerment 
of girls and women, the addressing of climate change and environmental 
challenges, the promotion of inclusive and sustainable growth and decent 
employment, the fostering of a renewed global international development 
co-operation framework, and the end of hunger and malnutrition. Th e latter will 
require “a combination of stable and adequate incomes for all, improvements in 
agricultural productivity and partnership, strengthen sustainability,  child and 
maternal  care and strengthened  social protection for vulnerable populations”.107 
Each of these is relevant to an integrated appreciation of the  right to food and its 
legal underpinnings.
Taking gender seriously implies creating accountability for gender outcomes. 
For this reason, UN Women, the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women, has backed the stand-alone gender goal for the post-
MDG framework. A fair amount is already known about the dynamics of gender, 
106 UN Doc A/68/202 (26 July 2013), para. 75.
107 Ibid., para. 91.
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land reform, and access to fi nancial empowerment for women.108 Th e same is 
true of the inter-generational gender/malnutrition nexus.109 Th e former Special 
Rapporteur thus suggested that,
“the outcomes to be achieved should be defi ned through  indicators based on the 
normative components of the  right to food, and disaggregated by  ethnicity, age and 
gender… [so that] a gender-sensitive approach will be adopted in all sectors… [and] 
tracked and addressed eff ectively.”110
Th e current Special Rapporteur is continuing to stress the key role of women’s 
empowerment in relation to realisation of the right to adequate food.111 Th is 
analysis needs to take macroeconomic factors on board as well.112
In short, a more integrated approach is needed. In the human rights area, 
both the  CRC and the  CESCR have generally done a good job in picking up 
the elements of hard and soft  law from the Specialized Agencies, and pushing 
the international fi nancial institutions to respect ESC rights. In its General 
Comment No. 12, the  CESCR noted that the right to adequate food requires the 
adoption of an appropriate economic, environmental and  social policy.113 In the 
Secretary-General’s proposed framework for  Sustainable Development Goals, 
the  right to food is covered by virtue of the mention of the Universal Declaration. 
Th e risk of fragmentation of international law here relates not to collision, but to 
omission and failure to capitalise on all existing standards.
Th is process will necessarily entail going beyond the scope of what is normally 
considered international social law. Today, “new factors are contributing to 
a rapidly changing and globalizing political economy of agriculture. Th ese 
include an increasing role of  trade in agriculture, population growth, high 
unemployment rates, expansion of biofuel production, market speculation, 
changing nutrition in emerging markets, food insecurity, land-grabbing and 
climate change”.114 A multi-sector approach is needed. Climate change will 
108 See, for example, lessons set out in Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Making 
the Law Work for Everyone, vol. II (Working Group Reports) (New York: UNDP, 2008) 7, 
83, 91–92; L. Cotula, Gender and Law: Women’s Rights in Agriculture, (Rome:  FAO, 2006); 
 FAO/IFAD/ ILO, Gender Dimensions of Agricultural and Rural Employment: Diff erentiated 
Pathways out of Poverty: Status, Trends and Gaps (Rome:  FAO, 2010); and Mayra Buvinic, 
Rebecca Furst-Nichols and Emily Courey Pryor, A Roadmap for Promoting Women’s 
Economic Empowerment, (New York: UN Foundation/Exxon Mobil, 2013).
109 See, for example, Women’s Rights and the  Right to Food, note 44 above, para. 4.
110 Ibid., para. 48. See, also, the illustrative  indicators on the right to adequate food, which 
called for disaggregation by prohibited grounds of discrimination, including sex. See note 99 
above.
111 See, for example, her recommendations in A/HRC/28/65, note 10 above, para. 72(e).
112 See, for example, UNRISD, Gender Equality: Striving for Justice in an Unequal World, 
(Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2005), Chapters 2 to 4.
113  CESCR, General Comment No. 12, para. 4.
114 Cheong et al., note 76 above, p. 1.
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inevitably play a role in the realisation (or not) of the  right to food, since it 
threatens to harm the natural resource base of agriculture. Transformation of 
agriculture away from “conventional, industrial, monoculture-based production 
highly dependent on external inputs” could turn it from being part of the 
problem to contributing to a solution.115 Treaties such as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture are therefore also of direct relevance to realisation of the 
 right to food.
Addressing the issues within the UN system alone, without structural 
changes in  international economic law, will not be suffi  cient. As long ago as 1944, 
this was recognised in the  ILO’s  Declaration of Philadelphia, which provides 
that international economic and fi nancial policies should be accepted only in 
so far as they promote – and do not hinder – the goals of social justice (which 
includes the  right to food).116 Its principles were recalled in the 2008 Declaration 
on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, which also echoed the call for greater 
policy coherence made by the World Commission on the Social Dimension 
of Globalization.117 Th e  International Finance Corporation’s Sustainability 
Framework and Performance Standards are a noteworthy development in 
this direction.118 In a similar spirit, the  CESCR and the HRC have urged the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to pay greater attention to 
the protection of the  right to food in their lending policies, credit agreements 
and other measures, and to avoid any action that could have a negative impact 
on the realization of the  right to food.119 In 2011, the former Special Rapporteur 
submitted  guiding principles to the  Human Rights Council on human-rights 
impact assessments of investment and  trade agreements.120 Principles for 
Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems were then sent to the 
 FAO for consideration.121
115 Ibid., p. 8.
116  Declaration of Philadelphia, note 24 above, para. II.
117 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, Fair Globalization: Creating 
Opportunities for All, (Geneva:  ILO, 2004) 133–135. Various outcome documents of the G20 
have also called for greater policy coherence.
118  International Finance Corporation, Th e International Bill of Rights and  IFC Sustainability 
Framework (1 January 2012), 21, available at: www. ifc.org. Various performance standards 
cross-reference Article 11 of the ESC Covenant and Article 25 of the Universal Declaration.
119 General Comment 12, para. 41. See, also, Fons Coomans, “Application of the International 
Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Framework of International 
Organisations”, (2007) 11 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, pp. 367–375.
120 Report of the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, addendum:  Guiding Principles 
on Human Rights Impact Assessments of  Trade and Investment Agreements, UN Doc. A/
HRC/19/59/Add.5, (19 December 2011).
121 See Doc. A/HRC/RES/28/10, p. 3.
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Th e role that  trade can play in all of this remains complex,122 and it, too, 
has a gender dimension.123 On several occasions, the  Human Rights Council 
has called for a successful, development-oriented outcome of the Doha Round 
of  trade negotiations as a condition for permitting full realisation of the  right 
to food. It has also urged states to ensure that their international political and 
economic policies, including  trade agreements, do not have a negative impact 
on the  right to food.124 Choices made in relation to  trade policy should better 
refl ect the possible impacts on the realisation of the  right to food and on the 
people involved in its production, processing and distribution. Linkages 
between the  trade law regime, although trapped within a traditional paradigm, 
and elements of the  right to food also off er an avenue to explore. An example 
is the  Codex Alimentarius in relation to international  trade law. As the  WHO 
notes,
“While Codex standards are non-mandatory, they gained the status of international 
benchmarks for food safety under the World  Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in 1995. 
Th is has resulted in a marked increase in the global relevance of the standards, 
which have been used on several occasions by WTO to fi nd a solution for  trade 
confl icts.”125
As the former  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food urged,
“combating the diff erent faces of malnutrition requires … reforming agricultural and 
food policies, including taxation, in order to reshape food systems for the promotion 
of sustainable diets. Strong political will, a sustained eff ort over a number of years, 
and collaboration across diff erent sectors, including agriculture, fi nance, health, 
education and  trade, are necessary for such a transition.”126
122 See Cheong et al., note 76 above, pp. 13–26. See, also, Matias E. Margulis, “Th e World  Trade 
Organization and  Food Security aft er the Global Food Crises”, in Daniel Drache and Lesley 
A. Jacobs (eds), Linking Global  Trade and Human Rights, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), pp. 236–255, and Holger P. Hestermeyer, “Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
in the World  Trade Organization”, in: Riedel et al., (eds), note 11 above, pp. 260–285, esp. pp. 
278–279 and 294, in relation to invocation of the  right to food in the context of the General 
Agreement on Tariff s and  Trade (GATT) and the  Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS).
123 See Gunselierik, “Gender Aspects of  Trade”, in: Marion Jansen,  Trade and Employment: From 
Myths to Facts, (Geneva:  ILO/EC, 2011), pp. 171–211.
124 See, for example,  Human Rights Council, Resolution on the  Right to Food, UN Doc. A/HRC/
RES/22/9, adopted on 21 March 2013, paras. 24–25.
125 See  Codex Alimentarius – Protecting Consumers’ Health through Safe and Nutritious Food – 
Th e First 50 Years, www.who.int/features/2013/codex_alimentarius/en/index.html.
126 Report of the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, on the Right to 
an Adequate Diet: Th e Agriculture-food-health Nexus, presented to the UN  Human Rights 
Council (A/HRC/19/59, 26 Dec. 2011), para. 49.
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To these could be added labour and the  environment,127 among others, in moving 
towards a more transformative approach to achieving the  right to food. Above 
all, stricter accountability, including the gender dimension, through monitoring 
and greater access to eff ective remedies, is needed across the spectrum of sectors 
and international actors – public and private.128 Drawing on a widened range 
of international law instruments, and spurred on by civil society, the Special 
Rapporteur and others should continue to raise  systemic issues.129 Without their 
resolution, it is unlikely that the  right to food enshrined in international law will 
ever be fully realised in practice. Th e transnationalisation of social rights, with 
new actors and new tools building on those that exist, off ers fresh perspectives 
for coming closer to its achievement.
127 Stéphanie Chuff art and Jorge E. Viñuales, “From the Other Shore: Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights from an International Environmental Law Perspective,” in: Riedel et al. (eds), 
note 11 above, pp. 286–307, inviting analysis of how the Aarhus Convention might serve as 
useful inspiration in relation to, inter alia, the  right to food (see pp. 289–90 and 305–307).
128 See  CESCR, General Comment No 12, para. 20. Th e new Special Rapporteur has so far put 
the accent on enhancing access to justice in the context of the  right to food.
129 See, for example, Olivier De Schutter, International  Trade in Agriculture and the  Right to 
Food, Occasional Paper No. 46, (Geneva: Friedrich Ebert Stift ung, 2009).
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CHAPTER 9
 AGROENERGY AND THE  RIGHT 
TO FOOD: THE EU BIOFUEL MANDATE 
AND TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS
Steff en Kommer
INTRODUCTION
Th is chapter explores the potential and limits of Transnational Social Rights 
with a view to the adverse eff ects of global biofuel markets. Th e increasing use of 
crops for energy production is blamed for driving up international agricultural 
prices, replacing food production and causing local “land and water grabs” in 
developing countries. Until now, only few lawyers have framed the “fuel versus 
food” debate in a human rights  discourse. In 2007, Jean Ziegler, the former 
Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, started to call for a general moratorium on 
agrofuels.1
Emphasising the emancipatory potential of Transnational Social Rights, 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möllers cite the global food crises as an 
example of interactions between diff erent transnational crises, such as climate 
change, fi nancial speculation, and migration.2 Th ey encourage social movements 
to draw attention to injustice by intervening in legal processes. However, they 
leave open the question of Transnational Social Rights could be operationalised 
in legal proceedings. Th e global “biofuel boom” illustrates that  Economic, 
Social and Cultural rights (ESC rights), especially the  right to food, need to be 
re-thought in transnational constellations. I will analyse to what extent biofuel 
projects and the support policies could result in violations of the  right to food. As 
Audrey R. Chapman already pointed out in 1996, a “violation approach” could 
1 Jean Ziegler, Report of the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, Protecting the  Right to 
Food in Biofuel Production, UN Doc. A/62/289 (22 August 2007), para. 22.
2 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller, Th e Struggle for Transnational Social Rights, 
Chapter 2, Section II.
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be a useful strategy to enhance the eff ectiveness of ESC rights.3 While Chapman 
especially focused on violations by state actions at national level, this case-study 
focuses on the extra-territorial responsibility of the European Union (EU).
Th e fi rst section starts with a defi nition of agrofuels (Section I.A) and 
gives a short overview of the economic, social and environmental impact on 
“ food security” at global level (Section I.B). While most studies weigh the 
risks and benefi ts of  biofuels, transnational peasant movements emphasise the 
contradiction between large-scale monocultures for energy production and the 
ideal of “ food sovereignty” (Section I.C). Th e second section describes the EU 
biofuel policy and highlights its external eff ects (Section II). To comply with the 
biofuel target of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED),4 EU Member States 
need to import feedstock from third countries. Th e third section addresses the 
normative collision between the EU biofuel target and Transnational Social 
Rights (Section III). It will be asked whether the RED encourages “land and 
water grabs” in developing countries which result in violations of individual 
rights (Section III.B). Moreover, the confl ict between the RED and the collective 
dimension of the  right to food will be explored (Section III.C).
I. IMPACTS AND CONFLICTS AT GLOBAL LEVEL
More than 60 countries around the world have mandatory blending quotas for 
 biofuels or similar supporting mechanisms in place.5 As a pioneer, Brazil started 
to promote  biofuels from sugar cane in the 1970s, as a reaction to high oil and 
low sugar prices on international markets.6 Besides Brazil, the United States is 
the main producer of ethanol  biofuels made from maize.7 Th e EU is the largest 
global market for biodiesel mostly from rapeseed.
A. AGROFUELS
In the following, I will use the concept of “agrofuels” instead of the commonly-
used term of “ biofuels” to point out the specifi c spatial confl ict between 
bioenergy and food production. While the generic term “bioenergy” stands for 
3 Audrey R. Chapman, “A ‘Violation Approach’ for Monitoring the International Covenant on 
 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 22–66.
4 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.
5 See HLPE.  Biofuels and  Food Security. A Report of the High Level Panel of Experts on  Food 
Security and Nutrition (June 2013), available at: www.fao.org/fi leadmin/user_upload/hlpe/
hlpe_documents/HLPE_Reports/HLPE-Report- 5_Biofuels_and_food_security.pdf, pp. 32–33.
6 Ibid., pp. 31–32.
7 Ibid., pp. 28–29.
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all energy produced from biomass,8 the sub-topic of “ agroenergy” refers only 
to energy generation from feedstock cultivated on land. While “conventional 
 biofuels” are produced from plants traditionally used for food or feed production 
(especially oil crops, cereal and sugar crops), “second-generation  biofuels” 
could be generated from biological wastes, agricultural residues or algae.9 But 
even “advanced biofuel technologies” could be labelled as agrofuels if they are 
produced from non-food crops (for example, grasses and miscanthus) which 
need fertile soils to produce signifi cant yields. However, in 2011, “fi rst-generation 
 biofuels” represented 99.85 per cent of global consumption.10
B. IMPACTS ON  FOOD SECURITY
In principle, all governments, international bodies and expert groups agree that 
 food security should not be threatened by increasing agrofuel production.11 Th is 
concept was developed at the level of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
( FAO) in the 1970s.12 According to the Rome Declaration of the World Food 
Summit in 1996, the paradigm of  food security is accomplished:
“when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to suffi  cient, safe 
and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life.”13
Governments expect agrofuels to promote rural development, energy 
independence and greenhouse gas savings. However, the “biofuel-boom” tends 
to aggravate the existing global hunger crises with more than 805 million people 
suff ering from under-nourishedment or malnutrition.14 Several expert bodies, 
such as the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) of the  FAO Committee on 
World  Food Security, have recommended the abolition of biofuel targets and all 
other forms of subvention.15
8 Compare defi nition of “biomass” in Art. 2 (c) Directive 2009/28/EC.
9 See, inter alia, European Commission,  Biofuels in the European Union: A Vision for 2030 and 
Beyond, Final Report of the  Biofuels Research Advisory Council (2006).
10 See HLPE  Biofuels 2013, note 5 above, p. 45.
11 See, inter alia, High-Level Conference on World  Food Security, Th e Challenges of Climate 
Change and Bioenergy, (5 June 2008), No. 7 (f).
12  FAO,  Trade Reforms and  Food Security: Conceptualizing the Linkages, Food and Agriculture 
Organization, (Rome:  FAO, 2003), available at: www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4671e/y4671e00.
htm, p. 26.
13 World Food Summit, Rome Declaration on World  Food Security, (Rome, November 1996).
14  FAO, WFP and IFAD, Th e State of Food Insecurity in the World: Strengthening the enabling 
 environment for  food security and nutrition, 2014, (Rome,  FAO, 2014), available at: www.fao.
org/3/a-i4030e.pdf, p. 8.
15 HLPE, Price Volatility and  Food Security. A Report of the High Level Panel of Experts on  Food 
Security and Nutrition, (Rome:  FAO HLPE, 2011), available at: www.fao.org/fi leadmin/user_
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1. Global Food Prices
Th e “ global food crisis” in 2007/2008, characterised by rapidly soaring 
international food prices, pushed up the number of chronically hungry people by 
75 million.16 Th e High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) estimates that agricultural 
prices will continue to fl uctuate and increase in the near future.17 An inter-
agency report of the leading international bodies, such as the  FAO and the World 
Bank, identifi es  biofuels as a “signifi cant factor” in price volatility.18 According 
to the study, during the 2007–2009 period,  biofuels accounted for a signifi cant 
share of the global use of several crops (20 per cent for sugar cane, 9 per cent 
for vegetable oil and coarse grains, and 4 per cent for sugar beet). In a recent 
study on bioenergy, the HLPE asserts that “the steeply rising demand for the 
production of  biofuels was identifi ed as an important factor by many observers 
and a wide range of organizations”.19
In terms of  food security, rising food prices threaten the economic access to 
adequate food for low-income households. According to the  FAO, the majority of 
rural dwellers in developing countries are net purchasers of food.20 Th ese persons 
are landless labourers, pastoralists, fi sher-folk, and forest users or smallholders 
who do not own suffi  cient land to produce enough food for their families, and 
represent 80 per cent of the hungry people in the world.21 Hence, the urban poor 
represent only 20 per cent of the chronic under-nourished persons who spend 
more than half of their income on food.
2. Food Production
Expanding energy crops compete with food production. In terms of  food 
security, the dimension of availability is threatened by agrofuels, to the extent 
that productive resources are diverted away from food production. While the 
demand for energy is potentially infi nite, natural resources such as land and 
water are scarce. Today’s biofuel production already mobilises around 2–3 per 
upload/hlpe/hlpe_documents/HLPE-price-volatility-and-food-security-report-July-2011.pdf, 
recommendations 4a, 13 and 40; Interagency Report, Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural 
Markets: Policy Responses, Policy Report including contributions by  FAO, IFAD, IMF,OECD, 
UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, the WTO, IFPRI and the UN HLTF (2  June 2011), 
Recommendations 6 and 27.
16  FAO, Th e State of Food Insecurity in the World: High Food Prices and  Food Security – 
Th reats and Opportunities, 2008, (Rome:  FAO, 2008), available at: www.fao.org/docrep/011/
i0291e/i0291e00.htm, p. 6.
17 HLPE, Price Volatility, note 15 above, p. 21.
18 Interagency Report, Price Volatility, note 15 above, para. 19.
19 HLPE  Biofuels 2013, note 5 above, p. 13.
20  FAO, Th e State of Food and Agriculture,  Biofuels: Prospects, Risks and Opportunities, 2008, 
(Rome:  FAO, 2008),available at: www.fao.org/docrep/011/i0100e/i0100e00.htm, pp. 75–79.
21 See UN Millennium Project 2005, Halving Hunger: It can be Done, Task Force on Hunger, pp. 
3–4.
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cent of arable lands globally.22 Th e Organisation of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) calculated that the US, Canada and the EU would 
require between 30 and 70 per cent of their respective current crop areas to 
cover only 10 per cent of their transport fuel consumption with internal 
agrofuel production.23
On the other hand, by the year 2050, increasing populations and incomes are 
expected to require 70 per cent more food production globally compared to 2009 
levels.24 Today’s population of around 7 billion is expected to increase to about 
9 billion by the year 2050.25 At the same time, in the course of the economic 
growth in countries undergoing economic transformation such as China and 
India, a more vegetarian diet is gradually being replaced by a diet containing 
more meat and dairy products.26 Hence, the German Advisory Council on 
Global Change (WBGU) warns that the worldwide bioenergy boom “could 
become a critical factor for global food and feed production”.27
3. Resource Depletion
Th e intensive production of agrofuels could have an impact on natural 
resources, resulting inter alia in loss of soil quality, erosion and large 
requirements of water and chemical inputs.28 Industrial production depends on 
high input rates (fertiliser agro-chemicals and irrigation), monocultures and 
mechanisation. Agriculture is already responsible for 13.5 per cent of global 
emissions.29 Agriculture makes use of 70 per cent of all water withdrawn from 
aquifers, streams and lakes.30 As the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology states, agriculture has become “a major 
contributor to natural resource depletion and degradation, acting through 
habitat loss and fragmentation, invasive alien species, unsustainable use (over 
22 HLPE  Biofuels 2013, note 5 above, p. 82.
23 OECD, Agricultural Market Impacts of Future Growth in the Production of  Biofuels, Working 
Party on Agricultural Policies and Markets, (Paris: OECD, 2006), p. 31.
24  FAO, Th e State of World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture: Managing 
Systems at Risk, (Rome,  FAO, 2011), available at: www.fao.org/docrep/017/i1688e/i1688e.pdf, 
p. 9.
25 Ibid., p. 4.
26 WBGU, Future Bioenergy and Sustainable Land Use, German Advisory Council on Global 
Change, (Berlin, 2009), No. 5.2.3.
27 Ibid., No. 5.2.1.
28 See D. Diop, M. Blanco, A. Flammini, M. Schlaifer, M.A. Kropiwnicka and M. Mautner 
Markhof, “Assessing the Impact of  Biofuels Production on Developing Countries from 
the Point of View of Policy Coherence for Development”, Final Report for the European 
Commission, (February 2013), pp. 72–89, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid.
29 IPCC, Synthesis Report, An Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
(Valencia 2007), Figure 2.1.
30  FAO, Th e State of World’s Land and Water Resources 2011, note 24 above, p. 9.
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harvesting), pollution (especially of aquatic systems) and, increasingly, climate 
change”.31
C. AGROFUELS AND  FOOD SOVEREIGNTY
While the concept of  food security represents an “analytic tool” to evaluate the 
impact of  biofuels, the paradigm of  food sovereignty stands for the ideal of self-
determination in local food systems and a general scepticism against agrofuels. 
In 2007, at a meeting of representatives from diff erent organisations of small-
scale farmers, artisanal fi sher-folks, indigenous people, landless, rural workers, 
pastoralists, and forest communities in Nyéléni, the concept of  food sovereignty 
was declared as:
“the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through 
ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to defi ne their own food 
and agriculture systems.”32
1. Smallholders and Industrial Agriculture
Th e ideal of  food sovereignty stands for a focus on “the aspirations and needs of 
those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems 
and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations”.33 Today, a 
broad consensus exists that the marginalisation of smallholders is a major reason 
for the global hunger crises.34 For instance, the Global Strategic Framework for 
 Food Security recommends increasing “smallholder-sensitive investments” 
in agriculture.35 Th e Framework was developed by the Committee on World 
 Food Security as an overarching framework and a single reference document 
for  food security and nutrition strategies. Nearly 90 per cent of more than 500 
million farms are small, defi ned as having less than two hectares of land.36 
Th ey contribute substantially to global food production and are mainly situated 
in East and South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the smallholders are 
predominantly subsistence-oriented and represent half of all the hungry people 
in the world.
31 Beverly D. McIntyre, inter alia (ed), Global report, Agriculture at a Crossroads, International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), 
(2009), No. 7.1.1.
32 Declaration of Nyéléni (Nyéléni Village, Sélingué, Mali, February 2007), available at: www.
nyeleni.org.
33 Ibid.
34 Interagency Report 2011, note 15 above, Annex B, para. 4.
35 Committee on World  Food Security, Global Strategic Framework for  Food Security and 
Nutrition, CFS 2012/39/5 Add.1 (Rome October 2012), lit. B, paras. 37–41.
36 IAASTD Agriculture at a Crossroads 2009; see note 31 above, pp. 5–8.
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Th e question remains as to whether traditional agriculture should be 
integrated in value chains or promoted with the aim of sustainable local food 
systems. According to the “classical model”, economic development increases 
worker productivity, and consequently results in reduced employment rates in 
the agrarian sector.37 In other words, smallholders have “either to grow in size 
or to disappear”.38 Th e struggle to protect their livelihoods could be perceived as 
the last  resistance of socially “embedded” agriculture against the delayed “Great 
Transformation” in the Global South, which transforms land, labour and money 
into “fi ctitious commodities”.39 But this pathway is increasingly criticised. In 
contrast to the period of industrialisation in Europe, job opportunities in the 
cities (or other countries) are not suffi  ciently available to absorb the rural poor.40 
Moreover, the industrialisation of agriculture is connected to large ecological 
impacts.41
2. Land Concentration
Since 2007, the EU biofuel policy has been criticised for promoting the dominant 
agro-industrial model and resulting in the marginalisation of smallholders.42 
In 2011, a coalition of social movements and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) demanded a general ban on land deals.43 Asbjørn Eide states that “the 
long-range consequences of monoculture production for agrofuels in developing 
countries can be even more serious than the impacts of the soaring food 
prices”.44 Evidence from Brazil shows that expansion of agrofuel crops tends 
both to stabilise existing land concentration and to hinder the implementation of 
agrarian reforms.45 Because biofuel mandates focus only on quantity objectives, 
37 HLPE, Investing in  Smallholder Agriculture for  Food Security. A Report of the High Level 
Panel of Experts on  Food Security and Nutrition, (Rome,  FAO HLPE, 2013), available at: 
www.fao.org/fi leadmin/user_upload/hlpe/hlpe_documents/HLPE_Reports/HLPE-Report-6 
_Investing_in_smallholder_agriculture.pdf, p. 21.
38 Ibid., p. 54.
39 Karl Polanyi, Th e Great Transformation: Th e Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 
(Boston MA: Beacon Press, 1944).
40 HLPE, Investing in  Smallholder Agriculture for  Food Security, note 37 above, p. 54.
41 See Section I.B.3 above.
42 See World Rainforest Movement, We want  Food Sovereignty, Not  Biofuels, Open Letter to the 
European Parliament (2007); Econexus, Call for an Immediate Moratorium on EU Incentives 
for Agrofuels, EU imports of Agrofuels and  Agroenergy Monocultures (2007).
43 International Land Coalition, Tirana Declaration. Securing Land Access for the Poor in 
Times of Intensifi ed Natural Resources Competition, (2011) www.landcoalition.org; World 
Social Forum, Dakar Appeal against the land grab, (March 2012).
44 Asbjørn Eide, Th e  Right to Food and the Impact of Liquid  Biofuels (Agrofuels),  FAO  Right to 
Food Studies (Rome:  FAO, 2008), available at: www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap550e/ap550e.pdf, 
p. 17.
45 Pastoral Land Commission,  Agroenergy: Myths and Impacts in Latin America, (2007), p. 17 
et seq.
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large-scale plantations have a comparative advantage.46 Th e HLPE concludes 
that “the bio-energy market tends to promote large industrial plantations with 
effi  cient crop handling and processing”.47
II. THE EU BIOFUEL MANDATE
While the fi rst section provided an overview of the global scenario, this section 
describes the eff ects of the EU biofuel policy.
Th e Renewable Energy Directive (RED) entails a binding mandate which 
requires all EU Member States to source 10 per cent of all energy used in the 
transport sector from renewable sources by the year 2020.48 Although this 
target could, theoretically, be fulfi lled through the promotion of electric cars 
(combined with solar and wind energy) or any other alternative energy, it was 
always predicted that  biofuels would account for the major part of all renewable 
energy consumption in transport by 2020.49 Th us, the RED establish a de facto 
biofuel mandate of up to 10 per cent in the transport sector.
Although the EU has  trade restrictions in place, the Member States have 
become dependent upon biofuel imports.50 Th e EU has a traditional dependence 
on oil crop imports. In 2010, around 40 per cent of biodiesel and 20 per cent of 
bioethanol were imported.51 Th e EU Commission expects that about half of the 
 biofuels consumed in the EU by the year 2020 will be domestically produced, 
with rapeseed being the main feedstock.52
In addition, biomass plantations on land in the EU previously used for 
other domestic purposes such as food and feed could worsen agricultural  trade 
defi cits.53 For instance, the increased rapeseed oil diversion into biodiesel 
46 Ben White and Anirban Dasgupta, “Agrofuels Capitalism: A View from Political Economy”, 
(2010) 37 Journal of Peasant Studies, pp. 593–607.
47 HLPE, Land Tenure and International Investments in Agriculture 2011, a Report of the 
High  Level Panel of Experts on  Food Security and Nutrition, (Rome,  FAO HLPE, 2011), 
available at: www.fao.org/fi leadmin/user_upload/hlpe/hlpe_documents/HLPE-Land-tenure-
and-international-investments-in-agriculture-2011.pdf, p. 21.
48 Compare Art. 3 (4) Directive 2009/28/EC.
49 European Commission, Renewable Energy: A Major Player in the European Energy Market, 
communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, (June 2012).
50 HLPE,  Biofuels 2013, note 5 above, No. 1.2.
51 Ecofys, Frauenhofer, BBH, EGG, Winrock International, Renewable Energy Progress and 
 Biofuels Sustainability, Report prepared for the European Commission, Tender No.: ENER/
C1/463–2011-Lot2 (September 2012), p. 33.
52 European Commission, Commission Staff  Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
COM(2012) 595 fi nal, p. 21.
53 See UK renewable Fuels Agency, Th e Gallagher Review of the indirect eff ects of  biofuels 
production, (July 2008), p. 36.
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within the EU results in signifi cant “indirect land use changes” (ILUCs) because 
the demand for vegetable oil must be covered by imports of palm oil from 
Indonesia.54 Th us, even the domestic production of agrofuels in the EU could 
have external eff ects on the agriculture of third countries. Th e HLPE asserts that 
the EU biofuel policy has “triggered the creation of an increasingly globalised 
 biofuels and  biofuels feedstock market, involving a key role for developing 
countries’ agriculture”.55
In 2007, the Commission estimated that the rising biofuel demand in the 
EU would cause a total land use change of 17.5 Mha by the year 2020.56 Th e 
Commission expects that half of all the raw materials used as  biofuels in the EU 
will be imported.57
III. THE CONFLICT WITH THE TRANSNATIONAL 
SOCIAL RIGHTS
Th e external eff ects of the EU biofuel mandate (direct imports and indirect land-
use changes) lead to the question of whether the EU could be held responsible for 
violations of the  right to food in third countries. Th is section addresses a specifi c 
normative collision between the EU biofuel target and Transnational Social 
Rights.
A. THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL DIMENSION 
OF THE  RIGHT TO FOOD
Th e  right to food is explicitly recognised as a fundamental right in various 
regional and universal human-rights treaties.58 Th e  right to food was fi rst 
mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and aft erwards 
codifi ed in the International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
( ICESCR) as part of the broader right to an adequate standard of living (Art. 11 
(1)  ICESCR).59 While all 28 EU Member States signed and ratifi ed the covenant, 
the EU is not a party to the  ICESCR. However, it seems convincing that, beside 
54 See Mark Harvey and Scott Pilgrim, “Th e New Competition for Land: Food, Energy, and 
Climate Change”, (2011) 36 Food Policy, p. 543.
55 HLPE,  Biofuels 2013, note 5 above, No. 1.2.
56 European Commission, Th e impact of a minimum 10% obligation for biofuel use in the 
EU-27 in 2020 on agricultural markets, 30.04.2007, AGRI G-2/WM D(2007), p. 8.
57 European Commission, Impact Assessment 2012, note 52 above, p. 21.
58 See overview of Bart Wernaart, “Th e Plural Wells of the  Right to Food”, in: Otto Hospes 
and Irene Hadiprayitno (eds), Governing  Food Security: Law, Politics and the  Right to Food, 
(Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2010), pp. 43–79.
59 Art.  25 of Universal Declaration of Human Right, Resolution 217 (III), UN GA, Offi  cial 
Records third Session (part I) Resolutions (Doc. A/810), 71; International Covenant on 
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the Member States, the EU as a whole has a general duty to respect and protect 
the enjoyment of the  right to food. First, the EU is bound by the  right to food via 
international customary law.60 Second, the EU is bound by its own Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Although the Charter does not recognise the  right to food 
explicitly, it could be argued that the  right to social security (Art. 34), the right 
to (land) property (Art. 17), and the right to respect for private and family life 
(Art. 7) contain at least some dimensions of the  right to food.
1. Th e  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Already in its General Comment No. 12 (1999) the  Committee on  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights ( CESCR) acknowledged a transnational dimension 
of the  right to food. Th e  CESCR is a quasi-judicial body of 18 international 
human-rights experts, the main function of which is the periodical supervision 
of the reports of state parties. Since 1990, the  CESCR has published non-binding 
 General Comments, which clarify the normative content of ESC rights. General 
Comment No. 12 is called “the currently most authoritative  interpretation” of 
the  right to food.61
In this commentary the Committee fi rst describes some basic elements as 
structural features which determine the individual enjoyment of the  right to 
food. Th e term “availability” refers to the quantitative dimension of a right, 
in particular the underlying infrastructure, goods and/or services which are 
needed for the satisfaction of basic needs protected by an ESC right. In its 
General Comment No. 12, the Committee asserts that food must be available 
at any time “in a quantity and quality suffi  cient to satisfy the dietary needs 
of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given 
culture”.62 Th e term “accessibility” contains a physical and an economic aspect. 
Access must be given for physically vulnerable individuals (for example, 
infants and elderly people) and disadvantaged groups (including the victims 
of natural disasters).63 In addition, adequate food (or other basic goods or 
services) must be aff ordable. Th is means that “the fi nancial costs associated 
with the acquisition of food for an adequate diet should be at a level such that 
the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or 
compromised”.64 In point of fact, these defi nitions are almost identical to the 
 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN. Doc. A/RES/21/2200A, 16 December 1966, 993 
UNTS 3.
60 See Smita Narula, “Th e  Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under 
International Law”, (2006) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, p. 691.
61  CESCR , General Comment No. 12 (1999): Th e Right to Adequate Food (Art.11), UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/5, see Sven Söllner, “Th e ‘Breakthrough’ of the  Right to Food”, (2007) 11 Max 
Planck Yearbook Volume, p. 396.
62  CESCR, General Comment 12, note 61 above, para. 8.
63 Ibid., para. 13.
64 Ibid.
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main dimensions of “ food security”.65 Actually, the concepts of availability and 
accessibility represent a collective good which could have local, national or even 
global dimensions.
Moreover, the  CESCR points out two diff erent types of state duties. While 
the focus lies on obligations at national level, the Committee also described basic 
duties at international level. Th e Committee affi  rms that states parties “should 
take steps to respect the enjoyment of the  right to food in other countries, to 
protect that right, to facilitate access to food and to provide the necessary aid 
when required”.66 Th e negative dimension of the extra-territorial obligation 
to respect requires state parties to refrain at all times from food embargoes or 
similar measures which endanger conditions for food production and access 
to food in other countries.67 In its General Comment on the Right to Water 
(No. 15), the  CESCR clarifi es that:
“international cooperation requires States parties to refrain from actions that 
interfere, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to water in other 
countries. Any activities undertaken within the State party’s jurisdiction should not 
deprive another country of the ability to realize the right to water for persons in its 
jurisdiction.”68
2. Th e Maastricht Principles
In 2011, a group of experts in international law adopted the Maastricht Principles 
on Extra-territorial Obligations in the area of  Economic, Social and Cultural 
rights (the ETO Principles).69 According to the ETO Principles, states have to 
respect, protect and fulfi l ESC rights extra-territorially. Th ese general standards 
are to be applied in relation to the confl ict between the EU biofuel policy and the 
 right to food.
B. THE INDIVIDUAL DIMENSION
In this section, I will ask whether the EU could be held responsible for individual 
violations of the  right to food in third countries.
65 See Section I.B above.
66  CESCR, General Comment 12, note 61 above, para. 36.
67 Ibid., para. 37.
68  CESCR, General Comment 15 (2002): Th e right to water, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, para. 31.
69  Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic Social 
Cultural Rights (September 2011), available at: www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/humanrights.
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1.  Land Grabbing
Large-scale land acquisitions for biomass plantations in developing countries 
which are encouraged by the EU biofuel demand could displace local 
smallholders and thereby lead to “land and water grabs”. For millions of small-
scale producers, it is only access to fertile soil, fresh water, seeds and other 
resources that can guarantee them a life without hunger. While the phenomenon 
of high investments in farmland is not entirely new, it has accelerated since the 
start of the “ global food crisis” in 2007/2008.70 Th e World Bank estimates that 
investors expressed interest in more than 50 million hectares of land globally 
between October 2008 and August 2009,71 and demand for biofuel feedstocks 
has become a major factor for land investments.72 According to the Land Matrix 
Database of the International Land Coalition there have been more than 1,000 
fi nalised land deals since the year 2000, which represent an area of more than 38 
million hectares of land.73
Th e potential impact and benefi ts of large-scale land deals in developing 
countries are highly debated. Th e World Bank points out the potential chances 
for innovations in the agricultural sector.74 Land investments could create 
employment opportunities and smallholders could benefi t as integrated contract 
farmers. For other authors, the central issue in sub-Saharan Africa would be to 
strengthen access to land and the ability to exploit available unutilised land by 
the majority of the rural poor.75 Ironically, with regard to its own case studies, 
the World Bank concludes that “the expectations of local populations were 
oft en frustrated and, instead of generating sustainable benefi ts, contributed to 
asset loss and left  local people worse off  than they would have been without the 
investment”.76
2.  Right to Land
Th e question remains as to whether single “land and water grabs” could be 
labelled as human rights violations. National courts around the world have 
70 Olivier De Schutter, Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases: A Set of Minimum Principles 
and Measures to Address the Human Rights Challenge, a Report of the  Special Rapporteur on 
the  right to food, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/33/Add.2 (2009), para. 12.
71 Klaus Deininger and Derek Byerlee, “Rising Global Interest in Farmland, Can it Yield 
Sustainable and Equitable Benefi ts?”, (World Bank Report, 2011), p. 67.
72 Ibid., p. 11 and 51.
73 Th e Land Matrix Global Observatory, International Land Coalition (ILC), available at: www.
landmatrix.org (January 2015).
74 Ibid., p. 34.
75 T.S. Jayne, J. Chamberlin and M. Muyanga, Emerging land Issues in African Agriculture: 
Implications for  Food Security and Poverty Reduction Strategies, Stanford Symposium Series 
on Global Food Policy and  Food Security in the 21st Century (2009).
76 Deininger and Byerlee, note 71 above, p. 71.
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recognised the  right to food as a minimum condition for a dignifi ed existence.77 
But should the existing access to land of smallholders be seen as being protected 
by human rights? As Denise González Núñez argues, the recognition of a  right 
to land would be necessary to fi ll the existing gaps in international human 
rights law.78 Millions of small-scale farmers, pastoralists and herders are only 
holders of “traditional  land rights”, which might not be recognised by national 
constitutions.79 In fact, every year millions of people are forcibly evicted due to 
development projects.80
In 2008, the transnational social movement  La Via Campesina launched a 
campaign for an  International Declaration of Peasants’ Rights, which attempts 
to translate the ideal of  food sovereignty into the language of human rights.81 
Th e text represents only a fi rst draft  for a UN Declaration and is still being 
discussed in the  Human Rights Council. It contains a broad list of ambitious 
peasants’ rights, including the freedom to determine the price and the market 
for agricultural production (Art.  8).82 However, I will argue that the declared 
 right to land and territory in its negative dimension represents a valuable 
 interpretation of existing human rights. As Article 4.5 of the Draft  Declaration 
stipulates:
“Peasants have the right to security of tenure and not to be forcibly evicted from 
their lands and territories. No relocation should take place without free, prior and 
informed consent of the peasants concerned and aft er agreement on just and fair 
compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.”
In the view of Poul Wisborg,  land rights cannot be human rights because they 
are “not universally necessary to protect the existence of dignity of human 
beings”.83 But this perspective ignores the special connection between existing 
77 See Christophe Golay, Th e  Right to Food and Access to Justice: Examples at the National, 
Regional and International Levels,  Right to Food Studies, (Rome,  FAO 2009), available at: 
www. fao.org/docrep/016/k7286e/k7286e.pdf, pp. 29–58.
78 See Denise González Núñez, “Peasants`  Right to Land: Addressing the Existing 
Implementation and Normative Gaps in International Human Rights Law”, (2014) 14 Human 
Rights Law Review, p. 602.
79 See Lorenzo Cotula, Moussa Djiré and Ringo W. Tenga, Th e  Right to Food and Access to 
Natural Resources,  Right to Food Studies, (Rome,  FAO, 2008), available at: www.fao.org/
docrep/016/k8093e/k8093e.pdf, p.  21; Olivier De Schutter, “Th e Emerging Human  Right to 
Land”, (2010) 12 International Community Law Review, p. 314 et seq.
80 See Núñez, note 78 above, p. 591 et seq.
81 Declaration of Peasants’ Rights – Women and Men,  La Via Campesina, International Peasant 
Movement available at: http://viacampesina.net/downloads/PDF/EN-3.pdf.
82 UN  Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, eighth session, Final study on the 
advancement of the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas, UN Doc. A/
HRC/AC/8/6 (18 January 2012), Annex.
83 Poul Wisborg, “Human Rights Against  Land Grabbing? A Refl ection on Norms, Policies, and 
Power”, (2013) 26 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, p. 4.
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land use and the  right to food.84 As the  CESCR proclaims, states have the 
primary duty to respect and protect the existing access to food, which refers 
to “any acquisition pattern or entitlement through which people procure their 
food”.85 One possibility is explicitly mentioned as the opportunity to feed oneself 
from “productive land or other natural resources”.86 In its landmark decision in 
the Ogoni case, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held 
that:
“the minimum core of the  right to food requires that the Nigerian Government 
should not destroy or contaminate food sources. It should not allow private 
parties to destroy or contaminate food sources, and prevent peoples’ eff orts to feed 
themselves.”87
In the words of Jean Ziegler, the  right to food should, above all, entail “the right 
to be able to feed oneself in dignity”, which includes the right to “ensure and 
produce one’s own subsistence”.88 But should all the production of every type 
of food be protected by the  right to food? Some authors argue that a right to 
produce should only be recognised if land use represents the only option to 
achieve adequate food.89 In other words, land use needs to be connected to 
local or household  food security. Following this point of view, a  right to land 
could be neglected if a realistic alternative to generate suffi  cient income (formal 
employment or off -farm business activities) exists,90 or if people have access to 
social security schemes. Indeed, 19 out of the 49 low-income countries did not 
have a single  social protection programme in place when the 2007/08 food crisis 
began.91
However, in my opinion, access to land and other productive resources 
should not be seen as a simple means to achieve  food security, but as a possibility 
or opportunity for individual and collective self-constitution. As the  CESCR 
states, natural resources, including land and water, should not primarily be 
treated as “economic goods”.92 In its General Comment No. 21 on the Right 
of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art.  15  ICESCR), the Committee 
stresses that “methods of production or technology” and even “food” should be 
84 Cotula, Djiré and Tenga, note 79 above, p. 27.
85  CESCR, General Comment 12, note 61 above, para. 13.
86 Ibid., para. 12.
87 ACHPRCom, SERAC, Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, 2001, para. 65.
88 Jean Ziegler, Report of the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, (January 2008), UN Doc. 
A/HRC/7/5, para. 18.
89 See Cotula, Djiré and Tenga, note 79 above, p. 23.
90 Ibid., p. 59.
91 HLPE,  Social Protection and  Food Security. A Report by the High Level Panel on Experts and 
Nutrition of the Committee on World  Food Security, (Rome:  FAO, 2012), Figure 1 (p. 23).
92 See  CESCR General Comment No. 15 (2002), Th e Right to Water, para. 11.
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recognised as cultural goods.93 In addition, everyone should have “the right to 
learn about forms of expression and […], to follow a way of life associated with 
the use of cultural goods and resources such as land, [and] water”.94 In the words 
of Olivier De Schutter, the former Rapporteur of the  Right to Food:
“For some of the groups that are the most vulnerable today, this means protecting 
existing access to land, water, grazing or fi shing grounds, or forests, all of which may 
be productive resources essential for a decent livelihood. In such cases […] the  right 
to food may complement the protection of the right to property or of  indigenous 
peoples’ relationship with their lands, territories and resources.”95
A right to produce food on land for smallholders (the right to self-supply) would 
acknowledge the socio-cultural dimension of land. Th is connection becomes 
apparent in the defi nition of a peasant in the Draft  Declaration as:
“a man or woman of the land, who has a direct and special relationship with the land 
and nature through the production of food or other agricultural products. Peasants 
work the land themselves and rely above all on family labour and other small-scale 
forms of organizing labour.”96 (emphasis added)
3.  Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure
Th is  interpretation of the  right to food is supported by the Voluntary  Guidelines 
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure, endorsed in May 2012 by the 
Committee on World  Food Security.97 Th e Guidelines were developed in a broad 
consultation process over three years with the participation of NGOs and social 
movements.98 Th ey recommend all governments to recognise the  tenure rights 
of  indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure systems, 
as well as of informal  tenure rights.99 Although, the Guidelines are not binding 
“hard law”, they do not represent just “soft  law” with no legal eff ects. Th ey 
provide guidance and information on internationally-accepted practices and 
93  CESCR, General Comment No. 21 (2009): Th e Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life, 
(Art. 15), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, para. 13.
94 Ibid., para 15 (b).
95 Olivier De Schutter, Report on Access to Land and Security of Tenure,  Special Rapporteur on 
the  Right to Food, (August 2010), UN Doc. A/65/281, para. 3.
96 Art. 1 (1) of  International Declaration of Peasants’ Rights.
97  FAO Voluntary  Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests in the Context of National  Food Security (9 March 2012); Council, Report of the 38th 
(Special) Session of the Committee on World  Food Security (11 May), Hundred and Forty-
fourth Session (Rome, June 2012).
98 See Philip Seufert, “Th e  FAO Voluntary  Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure 
of Land, Fisheries and Forest”, (2013) 10 Globalization, pp. 182–184.
99 VGGT 2012, note 97 above, Part 3: Legal Recognition and Allocation of  Tenure Rights and 
Duties.
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can be used inter alia by implementing agencies and judicial authorities.100 Th ey 
might even contribute to the creation of customary international law.
Th e right to self-supply implies primarily freedom from “forced evictions”. 
Complementing the right to adequate housing, a clear violation occurs 
when smallholders are removed from their lands (and homes) against their 
will, without appropriate forms of legal or other forms of protection.101 
In addition to this negative aspect, the right to self-supply could contain a 
positive dimension when “forced evictions” are committed by private actors. 
For instance, the Committee urged Paraguay both to prevent the eviction of 
peasant and indigenous families caused by soya expansion, and to address the 
claims made by peasant and indigenous families.102 In this situation, the right 
to self-supply corresponds with the “obligation to protect”. With regard to the 
“transfer of  tenure rights”, the Guidelines note that “investments should do no 
harm, safeguard against  dispossession of legitimate tenure right holders and 
environmental damage, and should respect human rights”.103
4. Justifi cation
A second argument against the recognition of a  right to land is that such a 
human right could sanction unjust land-tenure and hinder socially-important 
projects.104 However, the same argument could also be used as an objection 
against the right to property. But neither this civil right nor a social  right to land 
would be absolute.
First, the state or investor could seek the consent of the right holders. Th e 
concept of  Free, Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) was developed for consultations 
with indigenous people aff ected by extractive industry projects.105 Many 
states, including countries in sub-Saharan Africa such as Mozambique and 
Tanzania, recognise the principle of FPIC as a legal requirement for community 
consultations and hearings when land is transferred to new users.106 However, 
in practice, the implementation of FPIC rules is oft en defi cient due to an 
information gap, incomplete records and vague provisions on benefi t sharing.107 
100 Ibid., Part 1, No. 1.2.1 and 2.2.3.
101 See  CESCR, General Comment No. 7 (1997): Right to Adequate Housing (Art.  11.1): forced 
evictions, UN Doc. E/1998/22- E/C.12/1997/10, Annex IV, para. 3.
102  CESCR, Concluding Observation, Paraguay (January 2008), UN Doc. E/C.12/PRY/CO/3, 
paras. 17 and 28.
103 VGGT, note 97 above, Part 4, No. 12.4.
104 Wisborg, note 83 above, p. 4.
105 Art. 32 UN Declaration on Rights of Indigenous People. Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly, UN Doc. A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007).
106 Lorenzo Cotula, Sonja Vermeulen, Rebeca Leonard and James Keeley, Land Grab or 
Development Opportunity? Agricultural Investment and International Land Deals in Africa, 
 FAO, IFAD, IIED (Rome:  FAO, 2009), available at: www. fao.org/docrep/011/ak241e/ak241e00.
HTM, p. 70.
107 Ibid., p. 72.
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Th e CFS Guidelines include the principle of  consultation and participation,108 
but this principle demands only formal proceedings, and, in contrast to the 
concept of FPIC, does not necessarily require the consent of the aff ected 
community.109
Second, according to general human-rights standards, evictions can be 
justifi ed for a legitimate purpose, provided that they are not discriminatory, 
that they respect the requirements of due process, and are accompanied by fair 
compensation.110 Th e right to self-supply would require not only compensation 
based upon market value, but also adequate access to a food alternative, which, 
in most cases, can only be eff ectively guaranteed through land which provides 
equal productive value.111
5. De Facto Violations
Recent case studies on land acquisitions for agrofuels in sub-Saharan Africa 
illustrate that, even when the consent of local communities was achieved and all 
formal requirements of the FPIC process were respected, the implementation of 
the project could result in a de facto violation of the  right to food. As the NGO 
ActionAid points out:
“In 2009, Sun  Biofuels Ltd, a UK-registered biofuel company, began clearing land to 
establish an 8,200 hectare biofuel plantation in Kisarawe, Tanzania. By mid 2011, 
they had cleared some 2,000 hectares and replanted with jatropha. […] In August 
2011, like many biofuel companies before it, Sun  Biofuels went into administration 
and fi red almost all of the 700 local workers. Th e company was immediately sold 
[…]. Th e new owners decided to scale back the operations to a small pilot project […]. 
Only a handful of people are now employed, while the damage to the land is largely 
done already.”112
As a result, the agrofuel project violated the right to self-supply of the aff ected 
people because of the resulting less land available for food production.
6. Accountability
But even in clear cases of the forced eviction of subsistence farmers for agrofuel 
export projects, it would be diffi  cult to hold the importing state responsible. 
While the described duty to respect and protect  tenure rights primarily 
108 VGGT, note 97 above, Part 3, No. 3B.6; Part 3; 12.8.
109 Ibid., Part 3, No. 9.9.
110 See  CESCR General Comment No. 7, note 101 above, para. 3.
111 Cotula, Djiré and Tenga, note 79 above, p. 28.
112 Action Aid, Fuel for though: Addressing the social impacts of EU  biofuels policies (April 
2012), pp. 20–23 available at: www.actionaid.org.
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concerns the home state, the responsibility of the importing state requires the 
demonstration of a specifi c nexus. If the determinable criteria were the “eff ective 
control” over a private actor or special aid by a state, it would be impossible 
to hold the importing state responsible. A single “land grab” would only be 
attributable to a foreign state if it were directly involved, for instance, through 
the granting of a direct investment credit for a particular project.
In my opinion, it would be suffi  cient to demonstrate that a specifi c agrofuel 
project in a third country was planned for export to the EU. Th is would be the 
case if the agrofuel demand from the EU were a signifi cant investment factor. 
Th e EU could be held responsible because the extensive binding biofuel mandate 
creates an artifi cial demand for biomass imports. According to the progress 
study ordered by the European Commission, “possibly 10% of the biofuel 
production and new projects in regions with concerns on land-use rights could 
have eyed the EU market”.113 For example, the enterprise Sun  Biofuels has cited 
the EU biofuel policy and the prospects of export markets as an important 
reason for the development of jatropha and  biofuels in Tanzania.114 Th erefore, it 
could be concluded that the EU has the duty to compensate the people aff ected 
by the project.
C. THE COLLECTIVE DIMENSION
On the other hand, it could be argued that this single case approach is too 
restricted. Th e focus on concrete “land grabs” ignores the general impact 
of agrofuels on “ food security” and the confl ict with “ food sovereignty” 
as described in the fi rst part of Section I. Moreover, in practice, it would be 
diffi  cult to prove responsibility on the part of the EU for single violations. In 
the pilot phase, at the very least, most projects in Africa could be intended 
to produce for domestic markets. However, even with an initial export 
orientation, it would be diffi  cult to prove that the EU was foreseen as the main 
export market.
Instead of claiming compensation for single “land and water grabs”, 
EuropAfrica, a campaign that connects African farmers’ platforms and European 
civil society organisations, requests the complete removal of the RED biofuel 
target.115 Referring to the  right to food and the ETO principles, the network 
notes that the EU and its Member States have violated their international 
obligations. According to ETO Principle 13,
113 Ecofys et al., note 51 above, p. 302.
114 ActionAid, note 112 above, pp. 20–23.
115 EuropAfrica, (Bio)Fuelling Injustice? Europe’s responsibility to counter climate change 
without provoking  land grabbing and compounding food insecurity in Africa (2011).
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“States must desist from acts and omissions that create a real risk of nullifying or 
impairing the enjoyment of ESC rights extraterritorially.”116
Such impacts in third countries must be “a foreseeable result of their conduct”.117
EuropAfrica argues that the EU and its Member States could have anticipated 
the negative impact of their biofuel policy on human rights in sub-Sahara Africa. 
In a broad study, the network identifi es the link between the EU biofuel mandate 
and  land grabbing in Africa.118 Furthermore, the authors list all the impacts of 
agrofuel production, especially regarding  food security and sustainable small-
scale agricultural production.119
Similarly, De Schutter takes an overall view by criticising the EU biofuel 
policy for promoting land leases or acquisitions in sub-Saharan Africa, which 
increase the pressure on the natural resources needed for food production 
and inject signifi cant additional demand into the commodities markets, and 
therefore has a signifi cant impact on prices.120
Th is form of reasoning could be labelled as a holistic approach. In contrast 
to the single case approach, which has a compensatory character, the holistic 
approach takes a preventive view. Social and environmental impacts are 
considered as potential human-rights violations. Implicitly, these authors 
point to the collective dimension of the  right to food. Th is new perspective is 
convincing, because it focuses not only on single cases but also refl ects the 
confl ict between  biofuels and the  right to food as a transnational confl ict 
between the rising demand for modern bioenergy and  food security at local, 
national and global levels, and thus recognises the special relationship of land for 
smallholders and their struggle for  food sovereignty.
However, the question remains as to whether the assumptions made by 
EuropAfrica and De Schutter could actually be verifi ed by courts, at least with 
the help of expert evidence. Because the holistic approach takes into account all 
the forms of impact of agrofuels, the factual allegations appear to be too complex 
for legal proceedings.
1. Food Insecure Countries
Th e facts might be adequately reduced when viewed in the more focused context 
of a single country. In the extreme case of a very large “land grab” such as the 
Daewoo case in Madagascar, where about 1.3 million hectares were leased to 
116 ETO-Principles, note 69 above, No. 13 – Obligation to Avoid Causing Harm.
117 Ibid.
118 EuropAfrica, note 115 above, pp. 49–60.
119 Ibid., pp. 61–75.
120 Olivier De Schutter, Note on the Impacts of the EU  Biofuels Policy on the  Right to Food, 
Statement based upon letter sent to EU institutions (16 April 2013), available at: www.srfood.
org.
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a foreign company,121 this could even result in a violation of the right to self-
determination, codifi ed in Article  1 of the  ICESCR and the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).122 Section 2 states that “all 
peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence”. 
Th us, the EU could be obliged to avoid imports from countries with gross defi cits 
in food production or distribution. With this in mind, EuropAfrica states:
“Yet, it is striking to note that agrofuels are produced and/or planned to be produced 
in some of the most food insecure countries in Africa. For instance, in Mozambique, 
where approximately 35% of households are chronically food insecure, a mere 32,000 
hectares out of the 433,000 approved for agriculture investment between 2007 and 
2009 were for food crops.”123 (emphasis added)
It would be consistent to exclude all 34 countries which currently require 
external assistance for food.124 Th e  FAO uses three categories: exceptional 
shortfalls in food production/supplies, widespread lack of access, and severe 
localised food insecurity.125
In my opinion, it must be proved that the exportation of agrofuels or agrofuel 
feedstock to the EU at the very least worsen the  food security of a country to a 
signifi cant degree. Th is proof would require a broad study which considered all 
economic, social and environmental impacts and benefi ts of agrofuel production 
for export, including the creation of employment and tax revenues. In contrast, 
most studies highlight the gains of bioenergy as a contribution which could 
serve the country’s internal energy demand.126 From a national  food security 
perspective, it makes no diff erences whether food is imported or produced 
domestically, at least until food is available and accessible at all times to satisfy 
the needs of the population.127 Only the concept of  food sovereignty clearly 
stands for a priority of local food production.
However, even now it can hardly be proved that the EU biofuel mandate 
has contributed signifi cantly to national food insecurity in third countries.128 
121 See Olivier De Schutter, Mission to Madagascar, Report of the  Special Rapporteur on the 
 Right to Food (2011), para. 24.
122 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, A/RES/21/2200A, 16.12.1966, 999 UNTS 
171.
123 EuropAfrica, note 115 above, p. 62.
124  FAO, Crop Prospects and Food Situation, No. 3 (October 2013), available at: www.fao.org/
docrep/018/aq116e/aq116e00.htm, pp. 2–5.
125 Ibid.
126 See Irini Maltsoglou and Yasmeen Khwaja (eds), “Bioenergy and  Food Security, Th e BEFS 
Analysis for Tanzania”, “Th e Bioenergy and  Food Security Project Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations”, (Rome:  FAO, 2010), available at: www.fao.org/
docrep/012/i1544e/i1544e.pdf.
127 Cotula, Djiré and Tenga, note 79 above, p. 20.
128 With regard to Senegal and Tanzania, see Diop, Blanco et al., note 28 above, Annex 4 and 5.
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Agrofuels and feedstock were mostly imported into the EU from countries which 
have highly-competitive agricultural sectors, namely, Argentina, Brazil and the 
USA (soya), Brazil (sugar cane), USA (maize), and Indonesia and Malaysia (palm 
oil).129 Imports from the least developed countries were rather negligible.130 
Actually, EuropAfrica assumes that the precautionary principle should be applied 
in the context of agrofuels. It argues that there is a strong presumption that land 
expansion for biofuel production, including for EU imports, will largely take 
place in Africa.131
2. Land-Use Rights
It seems more precise to argue that the EU biofuel policy already threatens 
local  food security by creating a real risk for legitimate land-use rights in the 
Global South. As De Schutter rightly points out, the RED encourages land leases 
or acquisitions in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions, where the rights of 
the current land users are oft en inadequately protected and negative risks are 
particularly high.132 Actually, the case study on Kenya used by EuropAfrica 
to specify the implications of agrofuels at national level demonstrates only 
the adverse eff ects for smallholders, who lose access to land and water.133 
Moreover, the study entails a list of 15 agrofuel projects fi nanced by European 
investors which had negative impact on local  food security or ignored the right 
to consultation of the aff ected villages.134 As a recent study fi nanced by the 
European Parliament points out that Western companies have played a central 
role in land acquisition, particularly in biofuel investments, and particularly in 
Africa, and cites numerous examples.135
3. Social Sustainability Criteria
It could be argued that the EU has at least a duty to implement binding 
social sustainability criteria for agrofuel projects.136 Generally, the EU has a 
responsibility for the acts of corporations which have their head offi  ces in the 
Union. As Fons Coomans points out, the failure of the home state to regulate 
a corporation which is engaged in the forced evictions of small-scale farmers 
129 Ecofys et al., note 51 above, Table 44 (p. 231) and Table 45 (p. 232).
130 Diop, Blanco et al., note 28 above, p. 26.
131 EuropAfrica, note 115 above, p. 55.
132 De Schutter, note 120 above, p. 55.
133 EuropAfrica, note 115 above, pp. 45–48.
134 Ibid., Annex V, p. 117.
135 Lorenzo Cotula (2014): Addressing Human Rights Aspects of “ Land Grabbing”. European 
Union, EXPO/B/DROI/2014/06, pp. 13–15.
136 See Eide, note 44 above, pp. 46–47 and 49–51.
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abroad would result in a violation of the  right to food.137 As Sigrun Skogly states, 
international corporations which invest in export crops should be regulated in 
a manner that secures adequate compensation and safeguards for subsistence 
farmers.138 Th e  FAO Guidelines emphasise that states (especially the home states 
of transnational corporations) should provide access to eff ective remedies for 
all negative impact on human rights and legitimate  tenure rights by business 
enterprises.139
A recent impact study fi nanced by EuropAid recommends the implementation 
of safeguards for foreign direct investment in agricultural land and the inclusion 
of social criteria.140 As it stands, the RED entails only “sustainability criteria” 
which focus on minimum greenhouse gas saving thresholds.141 While even 
“land with high biodiversity value”142 is excluded, the question of which land 
could be designated with high economic, social or cultural value is left  open.
Th e EU should use existing social standards. Th e provisions on the large-
scale transactions of  tenure rights of the  FAO Guidelines urge prior independent 
assessments, including the identifi cation of the rights and livelihoods of the 
people aff ected by the investment, such as small-scale producers.143 In a positive 
sense, investment should at least “comply with national laws and international 
core labour standards”.144 In 2009, De Schutter listed eleven “Minimum human 
rights principles applicable to large-scale acquisitions or leases”.145 Besides the 
concept of Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), some of the most important 
criteria are benefi ts for the local population from the revenues generated by the 
investment agreement,146 the promotion of farming systems that are suffi  ciently 
labour intensive,147 and a clause which provides that a certain minimum 
percentage of the crops produced be sold on local markets.148
Nevertheless, as the Commission explicitly stated in relation to 
environmental standards, it would be problematical to monitor adequate 
implementation in third countries.149 According to the RED, equivalent norms 
137 Fons Coomans, “Th e Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in the Work of the United Nations  Committee on  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights”, (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review, p. 31.
138 Sigrun Skogly, “Th e Right to Adequate Food: National Implementation and Extraterritorial 
Obligations”, (2007) 11 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, p. 354.
139 VGGT, note 97 above, Part 2, No. 3.2.
140 Diop, Blanco et al., note 28 above, No. 7.2.1.1 and No. 7.2.8.
141 Art. 17 (2) Directive 2009/28/EC.
142 Art. 17 (3) Directive 2009/28/EC.
143 VGGT, note 97 above, No, 12.10.
144 Ibid., No. 12.4.
145 See Olivier De Schutter, note 70 above, Annex.
146 Ibid., principle 4.
147 Ibid., principle 5.
148 Ibid., principle 8.
149 European Commission, Annex of the Impact Assessment: Document accompanying the 
Package of Implementation measures for the EU’s objectives on climate change and renewable 
energy for 2020, SEC(2008) 85, VOL. II, 143.
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for agrofuel plantations in third countries should be integrated in subsequent 
bilateral or multilateral agreements with the main producing countries.150 
However, no such agreement has been concluded to date. At the very least, 
the EU should promote agreements which entail comprehensive binding 
sustainability criteria for agrofuels at international level.
4. Food Prices
Another main concern is the high risk of increased food prices due to biofuel 
expansion. In its Statement to the World Food Crisis, the  CESCR has urged all 
states:
“to take urgent action:, including by: …
Limiting the rapid rise in food prices by, inter alia, encouraging production of local 
staple food products for local consumption instead of diverting prime arable land 
suitable for food crops for the production of agrofuels, as well as the use of food crops 
for the production of fuel.”151
De Schutter states that biofuel policies aimed at promoting the use of agrofuels 
from feedstock represent “deliberately retrogressive measures”.152 Applying the 
corresponding  CESCR doctrine,153 he argues that these policies “could only be 
justifi ed under international law if very strong arguments are off ered, showing 
that the benefi ts from agrofuels outweigh the negative impacts”.154 He refers to 
several studies which evaluate the eff ects of the global demand for agrofuel on 
international food prices. But these studies consider the cumulative eff ect of 
all agrofuel support policies. Focusing on potential human-rights violations, it 
would be necessary to identify the infl ationary impact on staple foods, which 
could be attributable to certain forms of conduct.
While most studies assess the impact of the US  biofuels policy,155 a recent 
report by the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) focuses on 
the impact of the EU’s mandate on food prices by the year 2020.156 Th e IEEP 
reviewed several modelling studies which all suggest that the EU biofuel 
150 Art. 18 (4) Directive 2009/28/EC.
151  CESCR, Statement to the World Food Crisis, adopted on 19  May 2008 during its fortieth 
session (25th meeting), para. 11.
152 Olivier De Schutter, Building Resilience: A Human Rights Framework for World Food and 
Nutrition Security. Report of the UN  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, UN Doc. A/
HRC/9/23 (September 2008), Annex II, para. 5.
153  CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (1990): the nature of state parties obligation (Art.  2 (1)), 
para. 9.
154 Ibid.
155 See HLPE,  Biofuels 2013, note 5 above, No. 3.3.2.
156 Bettina Kretschmer, Catherin Bowyer and Allan Buckwell, EU Biofuel Use and Agricultural 
Commodity Prices: A Review of the Evidence Base, Institute for European Environmental 
Policy (June 2012), available at: www.ieep.eu.
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mandate would be responsible for basic food commodity price increases. Given 
the stronger reliance on biodiesel use in the EU, most signifi cant price increases 
are projected for oilseeds (up to 20 per cent) and vegetable oils (up to 36 per 
cent).157 Th is led the NGO Oxfam to conclude that:
“Given the importance of cooking oil in the preparation of the food eaten by billions 
of people every day, spikes in its price have a signifi cant impact on poverty and 
hunger, for people in both importing and exporting countries.”158
Th e NGO ActionAid (which ordered the study), like EuropAfrica, recommends 
removing the EU biofuel target.159 At the very least, the EU should demonstrate 
that the positive eff ects outweigh the negative impacts of its biofuel policy.
D. HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT
In order to evaluate all the positive and negative aspects of its biofuel policy, the 
EU should conduct a Human Rights Impact Assessment.160 In this regard, ETO 
Principle 14 reads:
“States must conduct prior assessment, with public participation, of the risks 
and potential extraterritorial impacts of their laws, policies and practices on the 
enjoyment of  economic, social and cultural rights.”161
Th e  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( CESCR) is of the 
opinion that rich state parties should evaluate the impact of policies promoting 
agrofuels for the enjoyment of the ESC rights of other countries. Within the state 
reporting procedure, the  CESCR was concerned about reports that Belgium’s 
new Agrofuels Act is likely to encourage large-scale cultivation of these products 
in third countries where Belgian fi rms operate and could lead to negative 
consequences for local farmers.162 In reaction to an NGO “shadow report”,163 the 
Committee recommended:
157 Ibid., p. 5.
158 Oxfam, “Th e Hunger Grains – Th e Fight is on. Time to Scrap EU Biofuel Mandates”, 
(September 2012), p. 14, available at: www.oxfam.org.
159 ActionAid, Biofuelling the  global food crisis: why the EU must act at the G20, (2012), 13, 
available at: www.actionaid.org.uk.
160 EuropAfrica, note 115 above, p. 89.
161 Maastricht Principles, note 69 above, No. 14 – Impact Assessment and Prevention.
162  CESCR, Concluding Observations – Belgium, 23 December 2013, E/C.12/BEL/CO/4, para. 22.
163 FIAN (2013): Response to Committee members’ questions related to FIAN Belgium’s 
Statement on Belgium’s fourth report to the UN  Committee on  Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (pre-Sessional Working group of the  Committee on  Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights – 21st of May 2013), September.
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“that the state party systematically conduct human rights impact assessments in 
order to ensure that projects promoting agrofuels do not have a negative impact on 
the  economic, social and cultural rights of local communities in third countries 
where Belgian fi rms working in this fi eld operate.”164
Although the European Union is not a party of the  ICESCR, even the EU is 
obliged to monitor the eff ects of its biofuel target. Actually, the RED explicitly 
states that the Commission is to report every two years on the impact of the 
Community biofuel policy on “the availability of foodstuff s at aff ordable prices”, 
on “respect of land-use rights”, and on “wider development issues” in third 
countries.165 Actually, the Commission should take into account the eff ects of all 
its  agroenergy support policies. Th e RED entails the general target of at least a 20 
per cent share of energy from renewable sources in the Community’s gross fi nal 
consumption of energy by the year 2020.166 In 2010, 62 per cent of all alternative 
energy produced in the EU came from bioenergy.167 While heat from wood and 
forest products represents the biggest share,168 food plants are not only used for 
agrofuel production but also used as a source for “green” gas and electricity.169
From a  right to food perspective, the eff ects of  agroenergy should not 
be evaluated only in terms of economics, but also with a focus on the most 
vulnerable. As Ann Sofi e Cloots points out:
“Many studies refl ect somewhat utilitarian cost-benefi t analysis, calculating how 
many people will benefi t and how many will be hurt, then simply off setting the one 
by the other. A genuine right-to-food analysis, however, should […] distinguish, for 
example, between the impact on rural and urban poor; farmers, processing fi rms and 
distributors; large scale producers and smallholders; and landowners and landless 
farmers.”170
In its fi rst Renewable Energy Progress Report (2013), the Commission highlights 
the positive eff ects of the EU biofuel policy.171 However, as the NGO ActionAid 
pointed out, the Commission limits itself to the analysis of the impact of the EU 
164  CESCR, Concluding Observations – Belgium, para. 22.
165 Art. 17 (7) Directive 2009/28/EC.
166 Art. 3 (1) Directive 2009/28/EC.
167 European Commission (2014): State of play on the sustainability of solid and gaseous biomass 
used for electricity, heating and cooling in the EU, Brussels, 28  July 2014, SWD(2014) 259 
fi nal, Annex 1 (p. 28).
168 Ibid., p. 29.
169 Ibid., p. 32.
170 Ann Sofi e Cloots, “ Biofuels and the  Right to Food: An Uneasy Partnership”, in: Olivier De 
Schutter and Kaitlin Y. Cordes (eds), Accounting for Hunger: Th e  Right to Food in the Era of 
Globalisation, (Oxford-Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 108.
171 European Commission, Report from to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Renewable Energy 
Progress Report.”, SWD(2013) 102 Final.
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consumption of  biofuels only up to the end of the year 2010.172 From a human 
rights perspective, it would be necessary to evaluate the general impact of the EU 
policy target of 10 per cent renewable energy in transport fuels by the year 2020.
1. Positive Eff ects
In its Progress Report, the Commission states that the EU biofuel policy created 
more than one million jobs abroad.173 Th is calculations seems a bit exaggerated. 
Actually, this number is based upon an impact study ordered by the bioenergy 
industry that calculated the employment eff ect of the global biofuel market.174
Moreover, it is highly disputed as to whether agrofuels have a green house gas 
saving potential.175 And the question of how indirect land-use changes (ILUCs) 
should be considered is particularly controversial.176
In October 2012, the Commission reacted to various expert reports on the 
negative eff ect of ILUCs on climate change, and released a proposal for emending 
the RED.177 Th e amount of food-crop-based  biofuels which have a higher ILUC 
potential is to be limited to the current consumption level of 5 per cent up to the 
year 2020. However, the proposal is still being debated.
2. Global Land Availability
According to the Commission, the worldwide biofuel expansion still seems to be 
far from reaching its spatial limits. In its impact study in 2012, the Commission 
refers to the results of a recent Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), which concluded that 780 million hectares of land are 
globally available for use for biomass production without impacting on global 
 food security.178
But this perspective confl icts with the telos of Article 11 (2) of the  ICESCR. 
Th is provision provides that states parties should take into account:
172 See Magdalena A. Kropiwnicka, Th e European Commission’s Renewable Energy Progress 
and  Biofuels Sustainability Reports 2013: A Critical Analysis of the Coverage of  Land Rights 
and Socio Economic Impacts, Briefi ng for ActionAid International, 03 May 2013, available at: 
www.actionaid.org.
173 European Commission, Progress Report, note 171 above, p. 12.
174 See Ecofys et al., note 51 above, p. 302 referring to J.M. Urbanchuk, Contribution of  biofuels 
to the global economy, CardnoEntrix, prepared for Global Renewable Fuels Association, 
3 May 2012, Table 4 (p. 17).
175 See HLPE,  Biofuels 2013, note 5 above, p. 49.
176 Ibid., p. 89.
177 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 98/70/EC and Directive 2009/28/EC, SWD(2012) 343 fi nal.
178 European Commission, Impact Assessment 2012, note 52 above, No. 2.2.3 referring to 
IPCC, Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation, Special Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (2012), 226, Table 2.3.
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“the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an 
equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.” (emphasis added)
Th e ideal of an “equitable distribution” could be extended to the idea of fair 
benefi t sharing of global land resources, independent of whether they are used for 
food, feed, fuel or any other reason. Whereas the  CESCR traditionally highlights 
that states parties are obliged to use all the resources available with a view to 
progressively achieving the full realisation of ESC rights (Art. 2 (1)  ICESCR),179 
the question would reverse from resource scarcity to resource suffi  ciency. Th e 
central question would not be whether the EU is using its resources in an effi  cient 
way, but rather whether the EU agrofuel policy could result in the illegitimate 
over-exploitation of global land and water resources. It could be stressed that 
the EU should not import more agrofuels or related feedstocks of energy crops 
than it exports. It should, at the very least, take the existing agricultural  trade 
balance into account. Th e EU is “virtually” importing land from third countries. 
According to an NGO study, “already in 2007, 40% of Europe’s land footprint – 
the land used for crop production and livestock farming which was required to 
satisfy the demand for products in Europe – was located in other regions of the 
world”.180
3. Land-Use Rights
Moreover the focus on “technical potentials” for biomass production is highly 
problematical, because it ignores the fact that supposedly “idle land” is oft en 
used by invisible users such as smallholders, pastoralists, herders and indigenous 
communities.181 Th e fi ndings about “available land” are based upon satellite and 
aerial photographs which cannot show the existing land-based social relations.182 
Although the IPCC stated that most potential land for biomass production is in 
Africa (35%) and Latin America (21%), the Commission ignores the fact that 
“there is rarely any valuable land that is neither already being used in some way, 
nor providing an important environmental service”.183
With regard to  land rights, the Commission stated that it is not yet clear 
whether the EU biofuel demand contributes to any abuse.184 Th is conclusion is 
extremely dubious. First, the Commission ignores the result of the background 
study, which claims that “land and water grabs”, which correspond to up to 
179 See  CESCR, General Comment 12, note 73 above, para. 21 and 25.
180 Global 2000 & SERI, Hidden Impacts, How Europe’s resource over-consumption promotes 
global land confl icts, February 2013, p. 3 available at: www.reduse.org.
181 See Cloots, note 170 above, p. 103.
182 HLPE, Land Tenure and International Investments in Agriculture, note 47 above, pp. 25–26.
183 Ibid.
184 European Commission, Progress Report, note 171 above, p. 11.
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160,000 hectares, can be linked to the rising EU biofuel market.185 Second, the 
Commission declined to undertake any fi eld study and did not evaluate any 
NGO reports about European biofuel companies involved in “land and water 
grabs”.
4. Food Prices
Th e European Commission has never calculated the expected price increases 
caused by the RED until the year 2020 at global level. In its impact assessment of 
2012, the Commission generally stated that:
“the expected increase in demand for biodiesel and bioethanol to 2020 will 
increase the pressure on global commodity markets, particularly for vegetable 
oil as the EU demand for biodiesel represents a more signifi cant share of the total 
production.”186
Th e Progress Report (2013) only calculated the EU contribution to historic price 
peaks. According to the Commission:
“grain use for bioethanol production constituted 3% of total cereal use in 2010/2011 
and is estimated to have minor (1–2%) price eff ect on the global cereals market. EU 
biodiesel consumption is greater, and the estimated price eff ect on food oil crops 
(rapeseed, soybean, palm oil) for 2008 and 2010 was 4%.”187
Already in its impact assessment of 2008, the Commission acknowledged 
potential negative impact, but very much stressed the fact that the increased 
prices would benefi t food producers and could re-vitalise rural areas globally.188 
In general, high food-prices could be seen as an opportunity for agrarian 
economies and farmers.189 At macroeconomic level, net food-exporting 
countries could benefi t from rising commodity prices. On the other hand, 
the current 66 Low-Income and Food Defi cit-Countries were immediately 
aff ected by price rises. Th ese countries depend on international markets for 
the importation of staple foods and have a very low per capita gross national 
income.190 Moreover, rising food prices are a serious danger for the poorest, 
which already face a “de facto discrimination” caused by social disadvantages.191 
185 Ecofys et al., note 51 above, p. 302.
186 European Commission, note 52 above, No. 5.2.4.
187 European Commission, note 171 above, p. 12.
188 European Commission, Impact Assessment 2008, note 148 above, pp. 130–131.
189 See WBGU, note 26 above, No. 5.2.5.2.
190  FAO, List of LIFDCs (2014), available at: www.fao.org/countryprofi les/lifdc/en.
191 See  CESCR, General Comment No. 20 (2009):  Non-discrimination in  Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Art. 2 II), para. 8.
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Today, approximately 1.21 billion people live below the poverty line (i.e., on an 
income of less than 1.25 US dollars per day).192
CONCLUSION
Th is case study illustrates the challenge of re-thinking the  right to food in 
transnational constellations. Although the case of  biofuels demonstrates the 
complexities of global agricultural markets, it seems possible to operationalise 
the  right to food to an extent which allows violations, responsibilities and right-
holders to be identifi ed.
From an individual perspective the emerging right to self-supply protects the 
existing access of smallholders to land and other productive resources. Th is right 
is violated when large-scale land acquisitions for agrofuel production result in 
forced evictions or local food insecurity. It seems to be arguable that even the 
EU, as an importing state, is responsible for single “land grabs” under the that 
the investment was mainly motivated by the possibility of exporting agrofuels or 
related feedstocks into the EU.
With regard to the collective dimension of the  right to food, it could be 
argued that the EU biofuel target represents a retrogressive measure because 
it causes higher world prices for oilseed and vegetable oils, incentivises “land 
and water grabbing” for plantations of energy crops in third countries, and 
aggravates the existing negative land footprint of the Union. Until today, the EU 
has not been able to prove that the benefi ts from its agrofuel policy outweigh 
the adverse eff ects. Comprehensive human rights impact assessments of its 
 agroenergy support policies are still missing.
192 UN Economic Commission for Africa, inter alia, Millennium Development Report 2013, 
Assessing Progress in Africa towards the Millennium Development Goals (2013), p. 1.
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CHAPTER 10
BETWEEN RIGHTS AND  POWER 
ASYMMETRIES: CONTEMPORARY 
STRUGGLES FOR LAND 
IN BRAZIL AND COLOMBIA
Maria Backhouse, Jairo Baquero Melo and Sérgio Costa
I. INTRODUCTION
Many factors explain the current increasing visibility of land confl icts in Latin 
America. To begin with, this intensifi cation involves a re-confi guration of 
confl icts that date back to the European colonisation of Latin America and to 
the expropriation from the original populations during this period. Over the 
centuries, these confl icts have taken on new forms, following the variations of 
capital accumulation dynamics and the changes in legislation and policies that 
regularise land ownership and use.
Th e recent re-positioning of Latin America within the global division of 
labour, marked by the growing importance of a new mix of commodities on the 
regional export agenda, aggravates these existing confl icts. Lands that previously 
had little value, and that are far away from the larger settlements, come to be 
disputed to such a degree that the exploration of their subsoil or surface to 
cultivate agricultural products has transformed them into a promising source of 
profi t.1
Additional reasons for these land confl icts are the search for new 
energy sources and the expansion of transportation and communication 
infrastructures. In this regard, the growing production of agro-fuels and the 
expansion of the areas occupied by hydro-electric dams, in addition to new 
highways, railroad lines, electrical transmission lines, etc., transform the way in 
which large extensions of land are used and in many cases lead to the removal 
of the traditional occupants from these areas. A similar process can be observed 
1 Eduardo Gudynas, “Estado compensador y nuevos extractivismos”, (2012) 237 Nueva 
Sociedad, pp. 128–146.
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in negotiations regarding climate change control or national/local initiatives 
to compensate for the environmental impact of human activities (through the 
creation of parks, protected areas, etc.). Th ese measures impose limits on land 
use and restrict opportunities for the survival of the resident populations. In 
other cases, these populations are transformed into guardians of the areas 
integrated to the imagined global environmental patrimony, and are fi nancially 
compensated to do so.2
Finally, the growing interest in the speculative use of lands should also be 
emphasised. It is well known that land is a traditional instrument of value – 
and not only in Latin America. In the conjunctures of the current economic 
crisis and the strong volatility of fi nancial applications, the importance of 
speculative investments in land has grown dramatically, aggravating local 
confl icts.
Th e exacerbation of land confl icts in Latin America takes place in a context 
marked by enormous growth at the international and local levels in the body of 
international law, as related to transnational social rights (see Andreas Fischer-
Lescano and Kolja Möller, Chapter 2 in this volume). A similar dynamic is also 
observed in case of the production and implementation of environmental law, 
involving the interplay of actions of governments, local communities, NGOs, 
environmental activists, and experts) and also in case of rights and guarantees 
established for cultural minorities. Th e issue of land titles is at the core of the new 
minority rights, as defi ned in a broad and bold way in 1989 by the International 
Labour Organization Convention 169, as well as the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of  Indigenous Peoples in 2007, and other international agreements. Latin 
America is the region of the world with the largest number of countries that have 
not only ratifi ed Convention 169 but also whose local laws have included legal 
protection for minorities ( ILO 2009).
In the Colombian case, the  ILO Convention 169 was ratifi ed through Law 21 
of 1991 and national regulations, especially Law 70 of 1993, which gave territorial 
rights to the Afro-descendant communities, as well as the right to prior, free, 
and informed consent in cases of development projects aff ecting their territories. 
In view of this fact, the local communities and NGOs cite the Article 7 of  ILO 
Convention 169 to demand the respect of communities’  land rights. In 2001, the 
Colombian Constitutional Court, bearing into consideration Law 70, claimed 
that Afro-Colombians are covered by the same international  ILO status as the 
indigenous people (Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2001).
In the Brazilian case,  land rights of Afro-descendant communities were 
recognised in the Constitution of 1988, Article  68. Th e process of titling is 
2 Astrid Ulloa, “Producción de conocimientos en torno al clima. Procesos históricos 
de exclusión/apropiación de saberes y territorios de mujeres y pueblos indígenas”, 
desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series 21/2012 (Berlin, desiguALdades.net Research 
Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America).
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defi ned by Decree 4.887, which was adopted in 2003. Th e  ILO Convention 169 
was ratifi ed through Decree (Decreto Legislativo) 143 in 2002. However, it has 
not been implemented yet.
Th e importance of granting land titles in order to protect cultural and ethnic 
minorities rests on the pivotal relationship between these minorities and their 
physical  environment. Th is relationship is central to the very idea of cultural 
minority in Latin America. It involves in most cases indigenous populations, 
such as the  Quilombo or Palenque communities; that is, settlements originally 
formed by peoples who had escaped slavery, in addition to other groups 
treated as traditional populations and who, in general, inhabit remote regions 
far from urban centres. Th e self-defi nition of these populations as minorities 
is fundamentally based upon the demand for recognition of certain distinct 
forms of land use and environmental resources, supposedly guided by the 
understanding of the  environment transmitted across many generations. In this 
sense, the land, or more suitably, the territory that carries the key to identity is 
represented as a central source of material and symbolic reproduction for these 
populations.3
From a geographical standpoint, lands that have won new economic and 
political meaning in recent years due to the re-positioning of Latin America as 
a supplier of commodities and as a global environmental reserve overlap with 
territories occupied by minorities.4 Th is causes the local land confl icts in Latin 
America today to be frequently marked by confrontation between seemingly 
irreconcilable rationalities, discourses, political strategies, and legal frameworks, 
such as:
a) Th e priority given to economic development and the need to use all available 
land surfaces for productive activities: agribusiness, mining, expansion of 
transportation infrastructure, diversifi cation of the energy matrix, etc.
b) Th e expansion of transnational legal instruments geared to assure minimal 
social standards as well as the dissemination in most Latin American 
countries of social policies designed to protect “vulnerable groups” such as 
poor peasants and “traditional populations”.
3 See José Maurício Arruti, Mocambo: antropologia e história no processo de formação 
quilombola, (São Paulo-Bauru, ANPOCS/EDUSC, 2006), Jan Hoff man French, Legalizing 
Identities: Becoming Black or Indian in Brazil’s Northeast, (Chapel Hill NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2009), and Diana Ojeda, “Green Pretexts: Ecotourism, Neoliberal 
Conservation and  Land Grabbing in Tayrona National Natural Park, Colombia”, (2012) 39 
Th e Journal of Peasant Studies, pp. 357–375.
4 Andrea Zhouri and Raquel Oliveira, “Development and Environmental Confl icts in Brazil. 
Challenges for Anthropology and Anthropologists”, (2012) 9 Vibrant, pp. 183–208, at 187 et 
seq.
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c) Appeal for moderate use or even a complete renunciation of the use of natural 
resources in order to compensate for the global climate and environmental 
impact of economic activities undertaken in other regions.
d) Th e need for the (re-) conversion of land into cultural territories to conserve 
traditional ways of life and the transmission of ancestral knowledge.
In Latin American countries such as Colombia, there are other processes in 
which communities – and supportive NGOs and activists – appeal to other 
instruments of international law. In cases of violent violation of human rights, 
communities can resort to instruments embedded within  International 
Humanitarian Law to protect civil populations from the eff ects of the wars. 
And considering the trend of countries to accept the jurisdiction of the  Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, there is an ongoing trend in which the 
communities, NGOs and activists appeal to this Court to denounce cases such as 
collective human rights violations, as in the case of the Colombian Afro-descent 
population. In this sense, the articulation of several instruments of international 
law, or the interplay of diff erent elements of the transnational social rights, can 
be taken as a contemporary form to halt land-grabbing processes occurring 
in local settings in Latin America. Th e extent of the success of these processes 
are to be evaluated in the mid- and long-term; but, at least in the short run, the 
instruments of international law provided elements to contend and resist land-
grabbing. Recent land-grabbing is a transnational social problem (Andreas 
Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller, Chapter 2 in this volume), because it is rooted 
in the food, fi nancial and energetic crises starting at least from 2008, which saw/
led to transnational actors (governments, transnational and national companies, 
investors, etc.) seeking to buy land in countries in Africa, Latin America and 
Asia.5  Land grabbing disrupts the food supply in the targeted countries because it 
is aimed to expand monocultures such as oil palm (see Andreas Fischer-Lescano 
and Kolja Möller, Chapter 2 in this volume). Th e World Bank has proposed the 
regulation of  land grabbing by off ering the advocacy of good governance, or 
Code of Conduct on  land grabbing. Th is proposal has been criticised because it 
does not have “a pro-poor orientation in the sense of proceeding a social-justice 
driven analysis of the causes of (rural) poverty and the need to protect and 
advance (rural) poor people´ s land access and property interests”.6 Given this 
lack of “pro-poor orientation” in  land grabbing, the communities in question 
resort to legal instruments, such as national and international law, in order to 
seek to protect their social rights.
5 GRAIN (2008). Seized: Th e 2008 Landgrab for Food and Financial Security. GRAIN Report, 
available at: www.grain.org/article/entries/93-seized-the-2008-landgrab-for-food-and-
fi nancial-security, last accessed 1 May 2015.
6 Saturnino Borras Jr. and Jennifer Franco, “From Th reat to Opportunity? Problems with the 
Idea of a ‘Code of Conduct’ for Land-Grabbing”, (2010) 3 Yale Human Rights & Development 
Law Journal, pp. 507–523, at 510.
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Th is is the broader political context in which the two case studies presented 
in this chapter take place. Our arguments are divided into four sections. Th e fi rst 
section briefl y discusses some of the current interpretations of the expansion 
of the rights of cultural minorities, and based upon this debate, it proposes an 
analytical framework in which social and/or minority rights are understood 
as relays in asymmetrical power structures. Th e second section presents a case 
study of land confl ict in the Pará State of the Brazilian Amazon, which involves 
the expansion of an area occupied by oil palm plantations for the production 
of biodiesel and its impact on negotiations of the  Quilombo territories in the 
region. Th e third section is dedicated to the study of confl icts observed in the 
lower Atrato region on the border between Colombia and Panamá, specifi cally 
the issues involving the expansion of the cultivation of African palm trees 
on lands whose control is disputed by traditional rural oligarchies, new 
agrarian entrepreneurs, paramilitary groups, and indigenous, mestizo, and 
Afro-descendent communities. Th e fi nal section explores diff erent elements 
of these three arguments in order to show how minority rights – as related to 
transnational social rights in the sense of Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja 
Möller, Chapter 2 in this volume – in some situations, can serve to strengthen 
the power of the local populations in their struggles to reach the guarantee of 
title and ownership of the lands that they occupy.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Th e scope of this chapter is certainly not broad enough to discuss the vast 
multiplicity of analyses available within the specialised scholarship on the 
recent expansion of minority rights in the international political agenda and 
their incorporation into national and local legal and political frameworks. 
Nevertheless, delineating the extremes of the spectrum of analyses is a 
worthwhile and relevant endeavour that will contextualise our analytical-
theoretical proposal within the existing debates. On the one hand,  liberal 
multiculturalism sees the protection of cultural minorities as a necessary 
extension of individual rights. On the opposite extreme of the spectrum of 
interpretations are  subaltern studies, which see social and minority rights as 
a dispositive that allows for the domestication and governmentalisation of 
diff erences.
Following the liberal multiculturalist position, as represented 
paradigmatically in the work of Will Kymlicka and his collaborators,7 cultural 
7 See, for example, Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, (Oxford-New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), idem, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Th eory of Minority 
Rights, (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), and idem, Multicultural Odysseys: 
Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, (Oxford-New York: Oxford University 
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belonging corresponds to a fundamental space for the formation of choices 
and personal judgements. In this sense, the protection of cultural minorities 
is indispensable to individual autonomy, and conforms, for this reason, to a 
necessary extension of contemporary citizenship.
Historically, the constitution of modern nation states has implied the 
oppression of cultural minorities, which justifi es, according to  liberal 
multiculturalism, contemporary eff orts to extend their rights:
“Th is conception of [multicultural] citizenship attempts to replace or supplement 
nation-building policies with those that explicitly recognise and accommodate 
groups whose cultural diff erences have been excluded from the national imaginary, 
whether they be  indigenous peoples, national minorities, racial groups, religious 
minorities, immigrants and refugees, or stigmatised groups such as gays and 
lesbians. Th is generates the familiar set of debates around minority rights and group 
representations that characterise multiculturalist literature.”8
In this sense, the incorporation of minority rights into international law and into 
the agenda of international organisations observed in the past three decades, a 
process described by Kymlicka as “multicultural odysseys”, represents what he 
considers to be a political and legal correction of the errors committed during 
the constitution of modern nation states.9
Th e analyses undertaken under  liberal multiculturalism contain various 
analytical-theoretical defi ciencies. Th ey essentially involve, as discussed at 
greater length in other contexts,10 the adoption of a pre-political and ahistorical 
concept of cultural identity, as if cultural belonging was constructed outside 
of the spaces of the dispute for resources and political and social power. 
Th ese theoretical defi ciencies aside, these analyses manifest a fundamental 
methodological limitation: in general, the studies linked to the fi eld of  liberal 
multiculturalism have a normative-prescriptive character. Th erefore, they do 
not provide the instruments that allow for a discussion on the existing processes 
of negotiation, and of the reconstruction of cultural belonging observed in the 
specifi c contexts in which the implementation of rights and policies aimed at the 
protection of cultural minorities take place.
Press, 2007). See, also, Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir, “Introduction”, in: idem (eds), Th e 
Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies, (Oxford-New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), pp. 1–24.
8 Kymlicka and Bashir, Th e Politics of Reconciliation, note 7 above, at 12.
9 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, note 7 above.
10 Sérgio Costa and Guilherme L. Gonçalves, “Human Rights as Collective Entitlement? Afro 
Descendants in Latin America and the Caribbean”, (2011) 2 Zeitschrift  für Menschenrechte, 
pp. 52–71. See, also, Sérgio Costa, “Freezing Diff erences: Politics, Law, and the Invention 
of Cultural Diversity in Latin America”, in: Kathya Araujo and Aldo Mascareño (eds), 
Legitimization in World Society, (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), pp. 139–156.
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Th e analyses of the expansion of minority rights located at the opposite 
extreme of  liberal multiculturalism,  subaltern studies, recuperate a fundamental 
aspect completely absent from the formulations of authors such as Kymlicka, 
namely the nexus between power and cultural diff erence.11 Th e work of Partha 
Chatterjee represents perhaps the broadest contemporary eff ort to build on the 
theoretical foundations off ered by Michel Foucault ;12 an innovative analytical 
perspective on the expansion of rights and public policies in contemporary post-
colonial societies. Based upon the concept of governmentality, as developed by 
Foucault in his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978, Chatterjee establishes 
the distinction between citizens and the bearers of rights on the one hand, and 
the population, that is, the target of control and of government policies and the 
bearers of entitlements, on the other:
“Rights belong to those who have proper legal title to the lands or buildings that the 
authorities acquire; they are, we might say, proper citizens who must be paid the 
legally stipulated compensation. Th ose who do not have such rights may nevertheless 
have entitlements; they deserve not compensation but assistance in rebuilding a 
home or fi nding a new livelihood.”13
Citizens and populations, according to Chatterjee, form two diff erent genealogies 
and refer to opposite practices of and narratives about politics and social policies. 
While the citizen-narrative relates to the nation state and to a correspondent rule 
of law, as well as to a demographically small civil society populations represent 
the bulk of inhabitants of post-colonial societies like India, who only relate to 
the state as the governed and who interact with the public agencies in search 
of benefi ts and security.14 Although the population groups constitute, from the 
perspective of governmentality, groups created by the administrative rationality 
of the state, their designation leads them to develop a correspondent collective 
identity:
“Although the crucial move here was for our squatters to seek and fi nd recognition 
as a population group, which from the standpoint of governmentality is only a 
11 Th is aspect is also emphasised by many Latin American authors identifi ed with the fi elds 
of cultural and postcolonial/decolonial studies, such as Diana Bocarejo, “Legal Typologies 
and Topologies: Th e Construction of Indigenous Alterity and its Spatialization within the 
Colombian Constitutional Court”, (2014) 39 Law and Social Inquiry, pp. 334–360; Arturo 
Escobar, Territories of Diff erence: Place, Movements, Life, Redes, (Durham NC: Duke 
University Press, 2008); and Eduardo Restrepo, “Ethnicization of Blackness in Colombia. 
Toward De-racializing Th eoretical and Political Imagination”, (2004) 18 Cultural Studies, pp. 
698–715, among others.
12 See Partha Chatterjee, “Beyond the Nation? Or within?”, (1998) 56 Social Text, 57–69, idem, 
Th e Politics of the Governed, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), and idem, “Aft er 
 Subaltern Studies”, (2012) 47 Economic & Political Weekly, pp. 44–49.
13 Idem, Th e Politics of the Governed, note 12 above, at 69.
14 Idem, “Beyond the Nation? Or within?”, note 12 above, at 61 et seq.
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usable empirical category that defi nes the targets of policy, they themselves have 
had to fi nd ways of investing their collective identity with a moral content. Th is is an 
equally crucial part of the politics of the governed: to give to the empirical form of a 
population group the moral attributes of a community.”15
Chatterjee’s reading of the relations between the state and the populations that 
are benefi ciaries of its policies helps us to understand the impact of measures 
intended to protect cultural and ethnic minorities, in so far as these minorities 
are only constituted in most cases as communities that bear a common identity 
aft er they become potential targets of entitlements.16 In addition, from a 
historical perspective, Chatterjee’s fi ndings apply to the important changes in 
the relationship between state and society observed in Latin America in recent 
decades. Th e national-populist import-substitution model which discursively 
integrated the entire population into universalising political categories of 
citizens and members of the nation, has disappeared. In its place emerges a 
heterogeneity of administrative categories that fragment citizenship into an 
endless set of groups of the governed and of benefi ciaries of specifi c programmes 
and policies.
Nevertheless, the rigid separation established by Chatterjee between 
government and governed, civil society and population, citizenship and 
governmentality, limits the understanding of the eff ective shift s in the power 
relations in the cases studied in this chapter. Th at is, cultural and ethnic 
minorities can eff ectively make use of the instruments that the new minority 
rights off er them to infl uence the pattern of state interventions. Th ese minorities 
come to relate not only to the agencies of the state as a target population for their 
benefi ts, but as citizens who demand rights and, in certain circumstances, who 
can initiate substantial changes in the quality of policies and of the state.
Th e less than rigid positions defi ned in distinct camps – on the one hand, 
the state and its citizens, on the other, the government and target groups – 
are borne out in the cases we studied, where we observe more dynamic power 
relations than a Foucauldian perspective would anticipate. Although new legal 
frameworks and policies do not in themselves immediately supersede brutal 
 power asymmetries constructed throughout history, these new instruments 
contribute, in some cases, to a re-confi guration of the ways in which power 
is negotiated and exercised. Th erefore, it is an imperative analytical task to 
understand the specifi c circumstances that lead to shift s in power relations and 
the role that new rights, such as minority rights, perform in these changes. Ran 
Greenstein’s tripartite distinction of powers is useful for the purposes of our 
15 Idem, Th e Politics of the Governed, note 12 above, p. 72, italics in original.
16 Andrew Canessa, “Who is indigenous? Self-identifi cation, Indigeneity, and Claims to 
Justice in Contemporary Bolivia”, (2007) 36 Urban Anthropology, pp. 14–48. See, also, 
Costa, “Freezing Diff erences: Politics, Law, and the Invention of Cultural Diversity in Latin 
America”, note 10 above.
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analysis. Studying the political transition in South Africa, the author highlights 
three of the most relevant dimensions of power:
“[S]ocial power (access by individuals and groups to resources and control over their 
allocation), institutional power (strategies employed by groups and institutions in 
exercising administrative and legal authority), and discursive power (shaping social, 
political and cultural agendas through contestations over meanings).”17
Th e struggles for land imply the exercise of – and disputes for – power on 
these three levels. However, the concrete results of the struggles always remain 
contingent. Th at is, the degree to which, for example, the exercise of discursive 
or institutional power can modify established forms of access to available 
resources, particularly land ownership, is something that cannot be pre-defi ned 
on a theoretical level. In addition, patterns of state intervention cannot be 
defi ned a priori. In some cases, the institutional power of the state is practically 
non-existent. Th ere are other actors, such as paramilitary groups or local chiefs 
or guerrillas who may exercise the role of a political authority and, to some 
extent, an administrative authority. In other cases, the state eff ectively appears 
as the government of populations, or in other situations even as a promoter of 
citizenship.
Th e place that the law – and more specifi cally minority rights – occupies in 
these shift s of power relations is variable. In the case of socio-economic rights 
in South Africa, Greenstein identifi es two distinct forms of mobilising the 
discourses and instruments off ered by the law: the legal route which “seeks to use 
the courts to enforce compliance by the state with its constitutional obligations”, 
and an activist route “that uses rights  discourse as a mechanism to force the 
state to change its policies, but again without challenging the role of the state 
as such”.18 According to Greenstein, eff ective changes in the state intervention 
pattern and in power relations only occur when legal and activist strategies are 
combined. Th at is, the struggles to make the state comply with its obligation 
to guarantee access to certain resources are only successful when popular 
mobilisations are accompanied by initiatives that activate the instruments of the 
legal system itself to pressure the state.19
For our case studies, it is crucial to maintain a high level of analytical 
openness in order to understand empirical situations that are quite diff erent 
from each other. In compliance with this open-mindedness, we do not pre-
17 Ran Greenstein, “State, Civil Society and the Reconfi guration of Power in Post-apartheid 
South Africa”, Centre for Civil Society Research Report 8, (Durban: Centre for Civil Society, 
2003), p. 1, italics in original.
18 Ibid., p. 37.
19 Ran Greenstein, “Socio-Economic Rights, Radical Democracy and Power: South Africa as a 
Case Study”, in: Neve Gordon (ed), From the Margins of Globalization: Critical Perspectives on 
Human Rights, (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 87–126, passim.
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establish a fi xed correlation between the strategic uses of the new rights and their 
impact on power relations on the three levels mentioned above (that is: social, 
institutional, and discursive power). We understand that, as in electrical circuits, 
rights may function as “relays”20 in circuits of political power. As such, they can 
operate in three alternative ways:
a) Rights serve as relays to modulate power, expanding the power of actors who 
previously had little political infl uence.
b) In extreme cases, rights, like electrical relays, can also function to block 
fl ows of power above the absorption capacity of a given circuit. Th is would 
be found, for example, in cases in which rights are mobilised to contain 
processes of violent removal of populations or those that protect the survival 
of a threatened group.
c) In other cases, neither the language nor the instruments associated with 
the new rights are mobilised, and therefore these remain innocuous, like 
electrical relays that are not activated if there is no electricity in the circuit.
III. COLLECTIVE TERRITORIAL RIGHTS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF GOVERNMENTAL AGROFUELS 
INITIATIVES – THE CASE OF THE QUILOMBOS 
IN PARÁ/BRAZIL
Th e high concentration of land property in Brazil, which began during Portuguese 
colonialism, was re-inforced aft er Brazil’s independence. For instance, according 
to Law No. 601 of 18 September 1850, known as the Law of Land (Lei de Terras), 
public land could no longer be appropriated for agricultural use as before, but had 
to be purchased, instead. Th is was only possible for a privileged social class that 
was already in possession of vast areas of land. Hence, the high concentration of 
land was re-inforced and a lasting supply of labour on the plantations ensured. 
When slavery was abolished in 1888, the former slaves or resisting Quilombolas 
had no legal access to land. Today, most of their rural descendants are considered 
as landowners without title (posseiros, i.e., occupiers).21
In the course of re-democratisation only 100 years later, the entitlement to 
land of rural Afro-descendant communities was recognised in Article  68 of 
20 Th e image of relays entered the fi eld of sociology through the work of Michel Crozier and 
Erhard Friedberg, L’acteur et le système: Les contraintes de l’action collective, (Paris: Éditions 
du Seuil [1977] 1996), who, upon studying organisations, identifi ed relays as intermediary 
actors between organisations and their surroundings. As used here, the relays do not refer to 
concrete actors but to rights that can impact on power relations.
21 Girolamo D. Treccani, “Regularizar a terra: um desafi o para as populações tradicionais de 
Gurupá”, [Dissertation] (Belem: UFPA, 2006).
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the 1988 Constitution.22 In the aft ermath, Brazilian black movements started 
fi ghting for the implementation of this law and the social recognition of cultural 
and territorial rights of Quilombolas. Th e new legal possibilities led to an ethnic 
re-identifi cation of numerous communities of smallholder farmers, who now 
emphasise their common history of  resistance against slavery in order to become 
legal owners of their land.23 Th e category  Quilombo implies a legal status: if 
their land is titled collectively, it cannot be commercialised and must be used 
in a “traditional manner”.24 Th erefore, titled  Quilombo territories have been 
eff ectively removed from the land market and are no longer available for agri-
industrial uses.
Aft er periods characterised by a noticeable growth of titles being issued to 
communities recognised as  Quilombo, title proceedings have recently stagnated. 
Th e Brazilian government has 3,524 offi  cially registered quilombos,25 but as of 
2012 only 192 communities had actually received their land titles, and in 2011 
and 2012 only one collective title was issued per annum.26
Th ere is considerable disenchantment among black movements. Political 
recognition of ethnic diff erence has been a critical milestone for the quilombos in 
terms of the re-construction of their missing history. But the legal enforcement 
of their territorial and political rights moves at a slow pace. Th e reasons are 
numerous: the ineffi  ciency of the respective agencies, complicated property 
rights, lack of political commitment, as well as attempts to de-legitimise 
 Quilombo communities with the allegation that rural black populations are 
falsifying their “real identities” as poor rural workers in order to profi t from 
new rights.27 In addition, agribusiness lobbying reaches into the parliament 
through the Bancada Ruralista,28 thereby infl uencing directly the national 
debate on collective territorial rights. Th is lobby challenges aggressively the 
alleged “privileges” of traditional communities which supposedly impeded the 
development of Brazil into a global agro-energy-power.29
22 See José Maurício Arruti, “Direitos étnicos no Brasil e na Colômbia: Notas comparativas 
sobre hibridização, segmentação e mobilização política de índios e negros”, (2000) 6 
Horizontes antropológicos, pp. 93–123, at 101–107; idem, note 3 above, at 66 et seq.
23 Arruti, note 3 above. See, also, French, note 3 above, and Sérgio Costa, “Au-delà du métissage. 
Antiracisme et diversité culturelle sous les deux gouvernements Lula”, (2010) 78 Problèmes 
d’Amérique Latine, pp. 91–112.
24 INCRA, “Territórios Quilombolas. Relatório 2012”, (Brasília: 2012), p. 5.
25 SEPPIR, “Programa Brasil Quilombola” (Brasília: 2013) at: http://bit.ly/10SG30U, last 
accessed 20 June 2014).
26 Bianca Pyl, “Governo federal titulou apenas uma terra quilombola em 2012”, (2012) Brasil de 
Fato, available at: http://bit.ly/QHnJ6s, last accessed 14 March 2013. See, also, Comissão Pró-
Índio de São Paulo, (2012) Terras Quilombolas, available at: http://bit.ly/Wqalo9, last accessed 
14 March 2013.
27 Arruti, note 22 above, p. 87.
28 Th is is a fraction of parliamentarians of various parties identifi ed with the interests of the 
agro-élites and agri-business.
29 Henri Acselrad, “Agronegócio e povos tradicionais”, in: Le Monde diplomatique Brasil, 
2  February 2012, available at: http://bit.ly/Z1Vs80, last accessed 14  March 2013. Arruti, 
Maria Backhouse, Jairo Baquero Melo and Sérgio Costa
250 Intersentia
THE GOVERNMENT FUNDED PALM OIL PROGRAMME 
IN THE AMAZON BASIN AND THE QUILOMBOLAS30
For several years, the Brazilian state has been promoting large infrastructural, 
mining and agribusiness projects in Pará. Th is includes the state “Programme 
for the Sustainable Production of Oil Palm” for the production of biodiesel.31 
Like the controversial Belo Monte mega-dam project, this programme resumes 
a large-scale project from the 1970s. Th e novelty here is the reframing of agro-
industrial palm oil production as a green climate protection measure. A binding 
zoning plan is to ensure that the programme involves only areas de-forested 
before 2008.32 Th e focus is supposed to be on the degraded grazing pastures in 
the north-east region of Pará and on capturing as much climate-harming carbon 
dioxide as possible in the growing oil palms. Th e programme has selected for this 
propose around six million hectares in 44 municipalities. Since the launching of 
the program in 2010, the area of oil palm plantations has been tripled to 180,000 
hectares. Th e corporation employees interviewed predict a further growth 
of the plantations to up to four million hectares in the coming decades. Th e 
reservations and territories of traditional communities within the plantations 
are not supposed to be aff ected by this.
However, these expansions have had a massive impact on the access to land 
and on the land use conditions of the  Quilombo communities. Th is accounts for 
the following:
(1) Th e issues of property rights remain mostly unresolved in the region.33 Th e 
palm oil corporation project has fuelled aggressive land speculation. Frequent 
land sales and purchases through front men cause rises in prices. Interviewed 
agro-experts speak of a de-coupling of prices on the informal land market. Th is 
increases the pressure on  Quilombo communities that have not yet obtained a 
land title to sell their land properties. For example, the Taperinha community 
note 22 above, pp. 90–91; Alfredo W.B. Almeida and Rosa Acevedo, “Strategien der 
Landenteignung in Amazonien. Agrobusiness und Bodenkonfl ikte”, in: Willi Bolle (ed), 
Amazonien. Weltregion und Welttheater, (Berlin: Trafo, 2010), pp. 151–170, and Alfredo W.B. 
Almeida, “Direitos territoriais e étnicos: as estratégias dos agronegócios na Amazônia”, in: 
Andréa Zhouri and Klemens Laschefski (eds), Desenvolvimento e confl itos ambientais, (Belo 
Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2010), pp. 382–387.
30 Th e section outlines the results of a qualitative survey on the impact of increasing palm oil 
plantations in two  quilombo communities – one with and one without collective land title – 
in the municipalities of Moju and São Domingos do Capim in the north-east region of Pará.
31 Rosa Acevedo, “Territórios Quilombolas Face à Expansão do Dendê no Pará”, in: Sandra 
Maria Franco Buenafuente (ed), Amazônia. Dinâmica do Carbono e Impactos Socioeconômicos 
e Ambientais, (Manaus: Editora da UFRR, 2010), pp. 165–184.
32 EMBRAPA, MAPA, “Zoneamento agroecológico do dendezeiro para as áreas desmatadas da 
Amazônia Legal”, (Rio de Janeiro: 2010).
33 In all of Pará there are four times as many land claims as real existing land, which is why the 
state is referred to colloquially as “the state with four fl oors” (Treccani, note 21 above).
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in the  Quilombo territory of Povos do Aproaga in the municipality of São 
Domingos do Capim has been waiting for years for the claimed collective land 
title, while they see themselves increasingly surrounded by the oil palm 
plantations of the Brazilian mining corporation Vale and the dominant 
transnational American agricultural company ADM (Archer Daniels Midland 
Company). Without this title and in the light of the continuously growing land 
prices, it will be diffi  cult for the 120 families to withstand the pressure from 
the growing oil palm plantations. Five families have already sold their parcels 
of land to a larger land owner. Th e  Quilombo representative is concerned that 
the titling will be delayed until so many parcels of land have been sold so that 
a collective title can no longer be issued due to the lack of connected territories. 
Even titled  Quilombo territories do not warrant a stop: the Quilombolas of the 
São Bernadinho community in the  quilombo territory Jambuaçu34 in the Moju 
municipality report attempts to purchase land belonging to single families. Th e 
promises of the corporations to use only degraded grazing pastures of large land 
owners thus hardly seem all too reliable.
(2) Th e expanding plantations aff ect the heterogeneous “traditional” systems of 
land use in the region. Th e region designated for oil palm plantations consists 
by no means merely of degraded grazing pastures. Since colonial times this 
has been namely one of the most populated and oldest settling regions in 
the Amazonian basin. In addition to various small farms and traditional 
communities, some untitled and 34 collectively titled35  Quilombo communities 
live there. Th e territories of the  Quilombo communities in São Bernadinho and 
Taperinha are located within the expansion areas of the oil palm plantations. 
Th e Quilombolas report deforesting initiatives in their neighbourhood for the 
conversion of these areas to homogeneous oil palm plantations. Th ey also report 
the socio-ecological36 impact of the plantations on their land and resources. Th e 
34 Jambuaçu is an interconnected  quilombo territory of 14 communities, of which 10 hold a 
collective land title. Joseline S.B. Trindade, “Território Quilombola de Jambuaçu: Confl itos 
socioambientais e as estratégias ‘participativas’ da mineradora Vale S.A.”, (2012) [Paper 
presented at the “XI Congresso Luso-Afro- Brasileiro de Ciências Sociais”], at: http://bit.
ly/13VsazR, last accessed 14  April 2013); Projeto Nova Cartografi a Social da Amazônia, 
“Fascículo 3 – Nova cartografi a social dos povos e comunidades tradicionais do Brasil. 
Quilombolas de Jambuaçu-Moju – Pará”, (Brasília: 2007).
35 Th ere are no reliable numbers regarding untitled Quilombos in the region. Th e number of 
titled communities is based upon an index by municipalities compiled by the NGO Pró-Índio 
(Comissão Pró-Índio de São Paulo 2012).
36 Th is term stems from political ecology, maintaining that the relations between society and 
nature are mutual, and that ecological experiences of crisis are always socially articulated 
and therefore embedded in power relations (Paul Robbins, Political Ecology: A Critical 
Introduction, 2nd ed., (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Raymond L. Bryant and Sinéad 
Bailey, Th ird World Political Ecology, (London: Routledge, 2005); Richard Peet and Michael 
Watts (eds), Liberation Ecologies:  Environment, Development, and Social Movements, 2nd ed., 
(London: Routledge, 2010).
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use of pesticides contaminates rivers: this causes the fi sh to die, as well as skin 
irritation for those living near to the rivers. Th e decrease in harvestable fruit 
is also attributed to the contamination of the ground soil and the groundwater 
with pesticides. Monocropping cultivation changes fl ora and fauna: local game is 
crowded out and the cultivation of bees impeded. Th e oil palm fruit lures in rats 
and snakes. Interfering with natural stream courses, for example, to construct 
roads or to irrigate plantations, impedes access to water and irrigation.
State offi  cials, in interviews, admit to the negative eff ects of the palm 
oil program. Nevertheless, they consider the palm oil programme to be a 
necessary development project for the region. Th ey point to the jobs created by 
the oil palm plantations, which off er the Quilombolas a way to escape poverty. 
Th e Quilombolas interviewed disagree. In their experience, the work in palm 
plantations is poorly paid and precarious. Most of the workers’ monthly salaries 
yielded less than the minimum wage (about 250 euros) – too little to sustain a 
family. Particularly young people whose land does not produce enough oft en 
have no choice. Th e Taperinha representative is quite clear on this point: “Th is 
is no development for us, this is semi-slavery”. According to him, instead of 
turning people back into “semi-slaves”, the government should protect and 
promote their land-use system:
“We did not fi ght slavery only to return to plantations to work as slaves.”37
(3) Th e Quilombolas hardly have a voice in the public debate on the palm oil 
programme. No studies have been commissioned to investigate their complaints. 
Th e reasons for this are complex. Socially, the quilombolas are marginalised 
throughout Brazil. Th ey have low monetary incomes and only have precarious 
access to education, health, and agricultural credits.38 In the case of Pará, 
numerous municipal offi  ces and single  trade unionists directly co-operate with 
the palm oil corporations. Unlike the situation in the 1980s, there are hardly 
any NGOs in the region today. Th e state palm oil programme has exacerbated 
their marginalisation. Not only the Quilombolas, but the entire rural population 
of the region has been circumvented by the programme implementation. As of 
today, the mandatory public hearings and environmental impact assessments for 
large-scale projects still have not been carried out.39 Instead, (state) agro-experts 
as well as the palm oil corporations have expanded the  discourse of degraded 
37 Interview conducted by Maria Backhouse in 2011. All interview and text excerpts from 
Portuguese and Spanish were translated by the authors of this chapter into English.
38 José Maurício Arruti,, “Políticas públicas para quilombos. Terra, saúde e educação”, in: 
Marilene de Paula and Rosana Heringer (eds), Caminhos Convergentes. Estado eSociedade na 
Superação das Desigualdades Raciais no Brasil, (Rio de Janeiro: Heinrich Böll Stift ung, 2009), 
pp. 75–110.
39 Resolutions CONAMA 01/86 and 009/87 mandate public hearings to enforce public 
participation in the process of environmental impact assessments. Th ese were ratifi ed in the 
state constitution of Pará in 1989.
Chapter 10. Between Rights and Power Asymmetries
Intersentia 253
grazing pastures by absorbing the old  discourse of degrading traditional 
cultivation culture (shift ing cultivation).40 According to these experts, the 
agro-industrial palm oil production is a climate-friendly alternative to the 
traditional cultivation of manioc – an important crop for the Quilombolas and 
other smallholder farming cultures and main staple in the region. Th us, the 
Quilombolas are not only being spatially encapsulated or marginalised by the 
rapidly growing plantations, even their so-called traditional practices of land 
use are being questioned because of their ecological impact. Th e ambiguity of 
the term “traditional practice” is now being used against them; they are accused 
of promoting a system dating from the Stone Age that supposedly leads to land 
degradation.
Even the international  environment politics closes the spaces of articulation 
for the so-called traditional communities, whose important impact on forest 
conservation is being emphasised in other contexts.41 Th e widely endorsed 
strategy of conserving valuable primary forests and the climate by intensifi ed 
monocropping of so-called degraded areas42 proves, in the case of the 
Quilombos, that what seems to be a climate protection strategy may further 
undermine the access of already marginalised groups to vital resources. Th rough 
the technocratic narrowing down of climate change policies into the estimation 
of carbon capture and storage, monocropping cultivation is reframed as green 
in a region that, at the same time, is made out to be degraded. Th rough the 
naturalising defi nition of an entire region as degraded, the existing land-use 
systems are de-legitimised and destroyed.
IV. COLOMBIA’S LOWER ATRATO REGION: 
TERRITORIAL RIGHTS,  POWER ASYMMETRIES, 
LAW AND  RESISTANCE STRATEGIES
Concentration of land is one of the dimensions of historical inequalities in 
Colombia, whose far-reaching consequences include  violence and social 
unrest. In this country, lands lend social prestige and regional political power. 
Historically, landowners have hoarded the best lands, in several cases even 
40 Regarding the deconstruction of the agro-economical homogenising  discourse and the 
supposedly degrading shift ing cultivation in the Amazonas areas: Francisco Assis de Costa, 
“Amazonien – Bauern, Märkte und Kapitalakkumulation”, (Saarbrücken: Spektrum, 1989); 
Th omas Hurtienne “Agricultura familiar e desenvolvimento rural sustentável na Amazônia”, 
(2005) 8 Novos Cadernos NAEA, pp. 19–71.
41 See, for example, Article 8 (j) of the Biodiversity Convention.
42 World Bank, “Th e World Bank Group Framework and  IFC Strategy for Engagement in the 
Palm Oil Sector”, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2011), available at: http://bit.ly/13VtfYa, last 
accessed 14 March 2013. See, also, Rhett Butler, “Could Palm Oil Help to Save the Amazon?”, 
(mogabay.com, 2011), available at: http://bit.ly/ihvJ4d, last accessed 14 March 2013.
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leaving them unproductive, unused or employed for livestock. Th ey have also 
refused to introduce agrarian reforms and resisted eff orts towards them by 
political or violent means. In 2009, the Gini co-effi  cient of land concentration in 
Colombia reached 0.86, one of the highest in the region.43 Land re-distribution 
has been demanded generally upon the basis of a class confl ict between 
landowners and peasants without land. However, since the 1990s, racial and 
ethnic ties to land and territories have gained visibility with the introduction of 
minority rights and policies. Indigenous people and  Afro-descendants inhabited 
mainly marginalised areas. Besides the struggles for land re-distribution 
demanded by peasants within the borders of the agrarian frontier, new territorial 
confl icts emerged as a consequence in the areas inhabited mainly by indigenous 
people and  Afro-descendants. New sources of pressure have emerged from 
landowners and governmental  neo-extractivist development policies, both of 
which aimed at grabbing land to expand agriculture frontiers and to exploit their 
resources. Th is has been the case of the lower Atrato region in Northwestern 
Colombia, near to the border with Panama. Th is region, inhabited mainly by 
 Afro-descendants and mestizos, was included within the  collective territories of 
black communities. It is also recognised at international and national level as a 
biodiversity hotspot. Its strategic location at the Darien Region has also attracted 
interest; the Americas Transversal Highway is planned to cross this area. Since 
1996, paramilitary and military groups have displaced thousands of people, 
grabbing lands to introduce monocultures of palm oil.
However, several  resistance strategies have been adopted by the communities, 
which now demand the recognition of their territorial rights and  restitution. 
Th ey have availed themselves of the new language and instruments supplied by 
Law 70 of 1993, demanding their minority rights to be respected, including their 
belief in the nexus between culture and nature.
A.  AFRO-DESCENDANTS’ TERRITORIAL RIGHTS (LAW 70 
OF 1993),  VIOLENCE AND  LAND GRABBING
Th e most important recent developments in the situation of the inhabitants 
of the Pacifi c region of Colombia, and specifi cally in the lower Atrato, were 
the legal advances since the 1990s which defi ned  collective territories of black 
communities and protected conservation areas. Th e Colombian government 
adopted institutional changes to grant rights to black populations. Th e 
Constitution of 1991 proclaimed Colombia to be a multicultural and pluri-ethnic 
nation. Social pressure and the support of several social sectors as well as of the 
43 UNDP, Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2011. Colombia Rural, Razones para la 
Esperanza. Naciones Unidas (2011), p. 197.
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indigenous representative at the Constitutional Assembly favoured the inclusion 
of the Transitory Article No.55 (AT-55).
Th e AT-55 forced the Colombian Congress to enact Law 70 of 1993, which 
defi ned territorial rights for black communities. Th us, the identities of these 
populations were, in certain way, essentialised, or “frozen”,44 by the Law. It 
defi ned “black communities”, as “the groups of Afro-Colombian families who 
have their own culture, a shared history and their own traditions and customs in 
the village-rural side (campo-poblado) relationship, revealing and maintaining 
awareness of identity to distinguish them from other ethnic groups”.45 Th ese 
populations lived in “collective occupations” among the river basins of the 
rural Pacifi c region, carrying out “traditional practices of production”. Law 
70 included aspects such as their cultural protection as an ethnic group and 
the promotion of their social and economic development, in respect of those 
traditional practices of production.46 In turn, Decree 1745 of 12  October 1995 
brought into eff ect Chapter 3 of Law 70 of 1993, which defi ned the process of 
recognition of their collective property rights, as well as the role of community 
councils (consejos comunitarios) as the local authorities in charge of the 
management of the collective territories.47
Th ese community councils are composed of a General Assembly and a Junta. 
In 2001, the Constitutional Court ruled that the black communities in Colombia 
have the same international  ILO status as indigenous populations.48 Under this 
status, black communities would be consulted before the undertaking of any 
projects that would aff ect these territories.
A nexus was established between the recognition of collective territorial rights 
and the environmental preservation of these territories.49 Th e black communities 
have lived mainly in areas with rich biodiversity, including conservation forests, 
rainforest, and wetlands. Th e legislation aimed to include the participation of 
these communities in the evaluation processes of economic projects planned for 
the region.50 Historically, the Pacifi c region’s use of its resources includes small-
44 Costa, “Freezing Diff erences: Politics, Law, and the Invention of Cultural Diversity in Latin 
America”, note 10 above.
45 Republic of Colombia, Law 70 of 1993 (1993).
46 Ibid.
47 See Republic of Colombia, Decree 1745 of 1995 (1995).
48 See Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision C-169 of 2001 on national special 
circumscription of ethnic groups, (2001).
49 Law 70 of 1993 includes as one of its principles “the recognition and protection of ethnic and 
cultural diversity and environmental protection, taking into account the relations established 
by black communities with nature”, (Republic of Colombia, Law 70 of 1993, Article 3).
50 For example, Article  35 of Decree 1745 of 1995 established that a technical commission 
must evaluate proposals of projects for environmental licenses, concepts, permissions, and 
contracts for the exploitation of natural resources. Article 44 of Law 70 of 1993 established 
that black communities must participate in the design, elaboration, and evaluation of the 
environmental impact studies of the planned projects. Article 76 of Law 99 of 1993 claimed 
that the exploitation of natural resources should be carried out without aff ecting the cultural, 
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scale mining, logging, fi shing, and gathering economies. Usually, megaprojects 
such as large-scale mining have been rejected by the respective communities, 
who garnered support from church representatives such as the Verbitas del Verbo 
Divino.51 Th e legislation provided clear defi nitions of the collective property 
rights for  Afro-descendants and mestizos, who had settled there decades and 
centuries ago.
Despite the recognition of territorial rights, these populations still have 
been aff ected by  dispossession, mainly caused by to the introduction of 
monocultures. Paramilitary and military attacks were carried out in the lower 
Atrato because the area was a hiding place for guerrillas. Counter-insurgency 
activity drew the lower Atrato into  armed confl ict, with severe consequences for 
its local communities. Th e “Genesis Operation”, which took place in February 
1997, marked a breaking-point in the levels of  violence. Th is “alleged” counter-
insurgency operation against the 57th Front of the guerrilla fraction FARC was 
carried out by the 17th Brigade of the national army. Attacks by land and air were 
supported by  paramilitaries of the Peasants’ Self-defence Armies of Cordoba 
and Urabá (ACCU). Aerial bombings forced the displacement of thousands of 
people from the basins of the rivers Cacarica and Salaquí into the basins of the 
Truandó, Jiguamiandó, Curbaradó, and Domingodó rivers.
Th ose who stayed in the territory were advised by the  paramilitaries to 
leave their lands because the war would continue and their lives would be at 
risk. However, those who returned found their lands cropped with oil palm 
monocultures.52 Aft er the people were forcibly displaced,  paramilitaries and 
entrepreneurs began to occupy these territories.53
 Dispossession and de-territorialisation have been introduced due to the 
asymmetries of power between external (military, paramilitary, and economic) 
actors and local communities. Governments, entrepreneurs, and  paramilitaries 
have used  violence to terrorise and displace communities, forcing them to 
accept the introduction of  agro-industries. Th e government also promoted the 
policy of “Strategic Alliances” to forge the association between entrepreneurs 
social, and economic integrity of indigenous people and black communities. In addition, 
Decree 1320 of 1998 enforced the process of prior consent from indigenous people and  Afro-
descendants to enforce Article 76 of Law 99 of 1993.
51 See Eduardo Restrepo, “Etnización y multiculturalismo en el bajo Atrato”, (2011) 47 Revista 
Colombiana de Antropología, pp. 37–68.
52 Th e oil palm also arrived to lower Atrato because the Uribe government championed this 
sector, responding to the rise of global raw material demand for  biofuels. See UNCTAD, 
Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Countries in Producing  Biofuels (2006), available 
at: http://bit.ly/XLSWad, last accessed 14 March 2013, pp. 3 & 25.
53 Th ere was a coalition between  paramilitaries, functionaries of the INCODER, banana 
entrepreneurs, cattle ranchers, high range militias, and local chiefs, as well as unemployed 
peasants, drug traffi  ckers, ex-guerrilla fi ghters, and retired soldiers. See Vilma Franco and 
Juan Restrepo, “Empresarios palmeros, poderes de facto y despojo de tierras en el Bajo 
Atrato”, in: Mauricio Romero (ed), La economía de los paramilitares: redes de corrupción, 
negocios y política, (Bogotá: Nuevo Arco Iris, 2011), pp. 269–410, at 283.
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and peasants to work for agribusiness, though the peasants could lose their 
property rights by being integrated as labourers in the plantations. In turn, agro-
entrepreneurs have used their economic power to take advantage of the poverty 
of local communities, and “buy” or co-opt community leaders to enable the 
introduction of megaprojects.54
B. LAW AND  RESISTANCE STRATEGIES AGAINST 
 DISPOSSESSION AND DE-TERRITORIALISATION
Th ere have been various social  resistance movements in the lower Atrato. 
Historically, regional organisations chiefl y demanded more adequate state 
attention and social policies as a response to the incursion of logging companies 
in the 1980s.55 Th e  resistance has also recently addressed  violence,  land grabbing, 
and the introduction of monocultures.
In the fi rst place, Law 70 produced a change in the character and language of 
social organisations. Before Law 70, organisations such as the OCABA (Peasant 
Organisation of Lower Atrato) emerged from the Community Action Boards and 
the ACAMURI (Peasant Association of Riosucio Municipality). Law 70 created 
a shift  in the identifi cation and  discourse of local populations. Struggles over 
the defence of forests were now subsumed under the notion of “territory”. Th e 
peasant identity was incorporated into that of “black communities”. Despite the 
partial victory that Law 70 embodied for the Afro-descendant rural populations, 
uncovering issues of discrimination and exclusion in urban populations,56 
one of its outcomes was the proliferation of social organisations in the rural 
Pacifi c, creating for the fi rst time in history legal opportunities for national 
social movements to sustain their claims.57 It also made social organisations 
established in the 1980s more visible.
Second, Law 70 gave the communities the possibility to achieve collective 
titling of the territories that they have inhabited for decades and centuries. In 
the lower Atrato, the populations were forcibly displaced before the achievement 
of collective titling between 1996 and 1997.58 Even amid the  violence, and 
as a defence strategy to preserve their rights, the communities applied for 
collective titling.59 In the lower Atrato and in the Darien region, more than 720 
54 Interview (J. Baquero), IIAP, October 2011 (all names of persons interviewed in Colombia are 
withheld for security reasons). Interviews translated from Spanish by J. Baquero.
55 Restrepo, note 51 above.
56 See Carlos Rosero, “Intervention”, [Foro Regional IIAP. El Chocó Biogeográfi co. 12 años 
después de la Ley 70 de 1993], IIAP 2005.
57 See Carlos Efren Agudelo, “Multiculturalismo en Colombia: política, inclusión y exclusión de 
poblaciones negras”, p. 133, available at: http://bit.ly/YbV2A0, last accessed 14 March 2013.
58 It is relevant to remark that since these fi rst episodes there have been several cases of forced 
displacement.
59 Interview (J. Baquero), inhabitant of Curbaradó, 2012.
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thousand hectares were collectively titled for approximately 24 communities 
or community councils between 1999 and 2001.60 Th e communities which 
benefi ted included the  Afro-descendants who have been living in the region 
for several decades, and the mestizo peasants that arrived in the 1970s, having 
been displaced from the Sinú region by cattle ranchers. Although mestizos are 
not “black”, as stated by Law 70, they have lived in harmony with the black 
communities. Th us, their collective rights have also been recognised, thanks to 
their productive practices and methods of land-use. In accordance with Law 70, 
they are “good faith occupants”.
Th ird, many people have returned to their lands and have been resisting 
the actions of the  paramilitaries and the agro-entrepreneurs. Th e populations 
created refugee areas such as the Humanitarian Zones, which are “fenced estates” 
that aim to provide security for the populations, upholding the  International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL).61 Th e local communities and NGOs cite the IHL in 
order to explain and point out that the Humanitarian and Biodiversity Zones are 
visibly marked with notices and warnings at their entrances, communicating to 
the armed actors the communities’ decision to be neutral in the  armed confl ict. 
Th us, they avoid allying or collaborating with any of the armed groups, and 
demand that the armed actors abstain from fi ghting in these demarcated areas.62
Aft er the international protest of several communities and NGOs, in 2003 
the  Inter-American Court of Human Rights granted the use of precautionary 
measures63 to protect several threatened local leaders. Following Article  63.2 
of the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights wrote on 5  March 2003 to the  Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, asking it to enact precautionary measures to protect 
the communities of Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó. Since 2003, the  Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has enacted several Resolutions. On 6  March 2003, 
the Court requested the state to adopt precautionary measures to protect the 
community councils and displaced families returning to the Humanitarian 
Zones. According to its requests, the Court:
“i) Requires the State of Colombia to adopt, without delay, the measures necessary to 
protect the life and personal integrity of all members of the communities comprising 
the Community Council and families of Jiguamiando and Curbaradó; ii) Requires 
60 Calculations made by Baquero (2012).
61 Th e  International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is defi ned as a “set of rules, established by 
treaties or custom, applicable in international and non-international armed confl icts, which 
are also known as the ‘law of armed confl icts’ or the ‘law of war’. Its goal is the reduction of 
the suff ering of victims and the protection of essential resources for their survival, through 
limiting the adversaries’ choice of war methods and means” (Peace Brigades International, 
2011: 7).
62 Interview (J. Baquero) member of the CIJP (2012).
63 See Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón, “Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights: Legal Status and Importance”, (2013) 20 Human Rights Brief, pp. 13–18.
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the State of Colombia to investigate the events that led to the adoption of these 
precautionary measures, in order to identify those responsible and impose the 
corresponding sanctions; iii) Requires the State of Colombia to adopt the necessary 
measures to ensure that the benefi ciaries of these measures can continue living in 
their place of residence, without any coercion or threat.”64
Furthermore, several resolutions were enacted to re-new those measures, some of 
them requesting the state of Colombia to maintain the precautionary measures 
in Curbaradó and Jiguamiandó: Resolution of 17 November 2004, Resolution of 
15 March 2005, Resolution of 7 February 2006, Resolution of 5 February 2008, 
Resolution of 30  August 2010, and Resolution of 25  November 2011. Also, the 
Resolution of 17 November 2009 established that the state should determine the 
number of protected families.
Th ese precautionary measures have been an important instrument for the 
protection of these communities. Nevertheless, this instrument is not infallible, 
and many risks remain in the region for many sectors of the communities that 
are not protected by these adoptions: “not all the people in the region are covered 
by those measures, and some of them have been murdered, including leaders 
that claim lands; several others have been displaced, or remain displaced”.65
In July 2013, the Inter-American Court eliminated the precautionary 
measures in Curbaradó and Jiguamiandó.66 In the Court’s eyes, the country’s 
government has made advances to ensure the rights of the local populations. 
However, the communities and NGOs have complained that the risks of being 
displaced or killed for demanding their rights still remain, due to the presence of 
 paramilitaries, other armed actors, and multiple economic interests. Th e actions 
of INCODER, the state agency responsible for lands and agriculture policies in 
Colombia, the Constitutional Court, and the legal system have made further 
advances. Th e Inter-American Court has also mentioned that, if necessary, 
precautionary measures can be implemented again.67
At the same time, other legal processes have been mediated by the Inter-
Ecclesial Commission of Justice and Peace NGO (CIJP), demanding, before the 
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that investigations be carried out for 
the murder of Marino López68 and for the Genesis Operation mentioned above.
64 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Resolution of 6 March 2003, p. 8.
65 See Inter-Ecclesial Commission of Justice and Peace, “Solicitud de precisión en el caso 
Curbaradó y Jiguamiandó”, (2013), 3 July 2013.
66 El Tiempo, “Colombia gana ‘round’ en la Corte Interamericana”, Bogotá, 2 July 2013.
67 See note 65 above.
68 Th is murder was particularly cruel. Th e  paramilitaries cut his body into pieces and played 
football with his head in front of the population. Th e Marino López´ s case was reviewed 
by the Inter-American Commission and by Inter-American Court on Human Rights. See 
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Informe No 64/111 Caso 12.573 Fondo, 
Marino López y Otros (Operación Génesis), Colombia (2011), Washington DC, March, 2011.
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Biodiversity Zones were also created to procure environmental protection 
and stable food supplies, and have also been physically accompanied by the CIJP 
and Peace Brigades International (PBI) NGOs. Th e communities have claimed 
their rights given by Law 70, carrying out actions, such as cutting down oil palm 
trees, to implement their rights de facto. Various fi elds formerly cropped with 
oil palm now look like a sort of “palm cemetery”.69 In addition, several hectares 
of oil palm plantations in the Lower Atrato were aff ected by Butt Rot Disease 
(BRD). Even so, the entrepreneurs continue their own “counter- resistance” by 
cropping new products such as the cassava and plantains, as new proposals for 
cropping oil palm continue to arrive in the area.
Fourth, the NGOs have also begun criminal cases against the companies 
that cropped oil palm in the area. An attorney from CIJP who represented the 
civilian parties in proceedings against the agro-entrepreneurs pointed out the 
fact that investigations initially were focused on environmental harm. Article 19 
of Law 70 stated that productive practices developed in these territories must 
guarantee the subsistence of populations instead of giving priority to agro-
industrial activities. Furthermore, the introduction of agro-industrial projects in 
the lower Atrato is illegal, because Article 15 of Law 70 prohibits the purchase 
of land owned by the collective territories by external parties.70 Accordingly, 
the Colombian Institute for Rural Development recognised the illegality of the 
plantations.71
INCODER stated that 93 per cent of areas with oil palm belonged to the 
collective territories of the black communities in Curbaradó and Jiguamiandó. 
Some companies showed purchasing contracts that they apparently signed with 
local people. Even so, the said contracts were illegal because they infringed 
Article  15 of Law 70. Th e companies tried to legalise their land-grabbing 
through several mechanisms. One of them was the enactment of false property 
titles, obtained from corrupt notaries; another was the enlargement of some 
estates that they bought from people that had legal titles before Law 70. Oil 
palm companies and cattle ranchers also bought private properties that were 
issued by the system of titling uncultivated land (adjudicación de baldíos) before 
the introduction of Law 70. Th ese properties were excluded from the collective 
titling.
69 Interview (J. Baquero), NGO volunteer working in the region (2012).
70 Article  15 states that ‘the occupation by parties external to the black communities of land 
issued as collective territories would not give these external parties the right to obtain titles 
or the recognition of improvements applied to the lands, and thus, they would be considered 
as “bad faith occupants”’. See INCODER, Los cultivos de palma de aceite en los territorios 
colectivos de las comunidades negras de los ríos Curbaradó y Jiguamiandó, en el departamento 
del Chocó (2005), Bogotá. Th e Law also states that areas could be sold, as a consequence of 
family dissolution, or depending on the procedures established by the communitarian 
councils. Privilege to sell the lands would be given to members of the same community or 
ethnic group.
71 INCODER 2005: 17. See note 70 above, at 17.
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Th e courts have sided with the communities, showing that even part of 
the Colombian state, the judicial system, considers the entrepreneurs to have 
obtained their lands illegally and by force. Th ese legal processes started aft er 
the accusations made by the local communities and the NGOs against oil palm 
companies. Aft er the investigations performed in 2005, INCODER enacted 
a Resolution “recommending the suspension of crops and the return of 14,881 
hectares, mostly cultivated with African palm, by ‘bad-faith occupiers’”.72 
By 2007, “a total of 23 entrepreneurs were charged with the crimes of land 
theft , forgery of public and private documents, harm to natural resources, the 
invasion of areas of ecological importance, and forced displacement”.73 Two 
agro-entrepreneurs of Antioquia (of the Pamadó S.A. Company) were recently 
sentenced to 10 years and fi ve months of prison “for the crimes of aggravated 
conspiracy, forced displacement, and land grabs”.74 Th ey were condemned 
for allying with  paramilitaries in order to expand industrial palm crops in 
territories of the black communities. In these legal struggles, the proceedings 
have been mainly based upon national laws and regulations.75
Several hectares still remain under dispute. Th e government has used 
the cases of Curbaradó and Jiguamiandó as a model for  restitution policies in 
Colombia. However, the government has been more focused on the “legal 
 restitution” than in the real “material  restitution”. Th is involves the recovery 
and re-adaptation (saneamiento) of territories and the guarantee of security for 
peasants who return. Th e government initially planned to return the lands in 
May 2010 by giving the territory to a false legal representative who supported 
the interests of the agro-entrepreneurs. Th e Constitutional Court stopped the 
 restitution by publishing the Decision of 18  May 2010, which forced the state 
to refi ne the process by conducting a population census within and outside 
the region, which would defi ne the General Assembly that elects the Legal 
Representative of the community council. Currently, the process is still at a halt 
while the Constitutional Court defi nes the constitutional character of the census 
concluded in 2012. In addition, confl icts concerning the rights of the mestizos 
within the territories have arisen, such as the right to vote and to be elected as 
members of the Assembly. Nevertheless, the division has been created “from 
above” by entrepreneurs that “support” a sector of the  Afro-descendants in the 
defence of their interests in the region.76 Today the enterprises still remain in the 
72 El Tiempo, “Es una investigación amparada en falsedades, dicen palmicultores”, Bogotá, 
22 December 2007.
73 Ibid.
74 Noticias Uno, “Empresarios de palma condenados por vínculos con paramilitares”, 4 August 
2013.
75 In a personal communication (Baquero, 2013) the CIJP was asked if they also invoked the 
international Law, but they did not respond. Th ey emphasised the use of national, mainly 
environmental law, as the main strategy in legal actions against the companies.
76 Interview (J. Baquero), Lands  Restitution Programme, Bogotá, 2012.
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area, controlling big extensions of territories by bringing foreign workers in to 
occupy these lands, or by putting up enclosures and introducing livestock.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Th e struggles for land discussed in this contribution have been developed within 
a context characterised by improvements in the laws and policies designed to 
protect the ethnic and cultural minorities in Brazil and Colombia, following 
the multicultural turn77 in international law. Th e studied cases of Brazil and 
Colombia reveal the interplay of resorting to diverse legal regimes in order to 
protect minority rights against processes of  land grabbing. In both countries, 
there has been articulation of the legal instruments of  ILO Convention 169 on 
 land rights, the  International Humanitarian Law, and cases presented before 
the  Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Th ese legal claims are part of 
the struggles of local communities, NGOs, activists, and some sectors of the 
government, to protect the rights of the Afro-descendant populations.
Th e contribution discussed to a greater extent the cases of Afro-descendent 
communities located in areas disputed by agri-industrial companies interested in 
expanding palm plantations for biodiesel production. In Brazil, the Constitution 
of 1988, as well as further legislation, has created the possibility to assign legal 
titles for the lands occupied by these communities. In the case of Colombia, the 
most important legal instrument has been Law 70 of 1993, which also prescribes 
the regularisation of lands occupied by the Afro-descendent communities.
Th e expansion of minority rights in the cases presented here does not have 
the impact described by  liberal multiculturalism, namely, the preservation 
of the pre-existing cultural identities of minorities, so that the individual 
members of these minorities can develop a sense of personal autonomy within 
a culturally intact and coherent context. What we observe in north-east region 
of Pará in Brazil and in the Colombian lower Atrato, is a process of ethnic 
re-identifi cation following the legal and political possibilities off ered by new 
minority rights: groups previously engaged in struggles for land such as poor 
 rural workers have re-articulated their interests as  Afro-descendants. By doing 
so, they oft en diff erentiate themselves from other peasants who actually share 
similar life-forms and strategic interests with them, as in the case of the mestizo 
communities of the lower Atrato. Classifi catory categories introduced by law 
and by policies have generated new loyalties and identifi cations, as suggested by 
Chatterjee in the passage highlighted in the fi rst section of this chapter.
77 See Diana Bocarejo, “Legal Typologies and Topologies: Th e Construction of Indigenous 
Alterity and its Spatialization within the Colombian Constitutional Court”, (2014) 39 Law 
and Social Inquiry, pp. 334–360, and idem, note 11 above.
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Nevertheless, what the studied cases show is that the situation of the 
communities covered by the legal shift  is more complex than the mere 
domestication and governmentalisation of diff erences as claimed by  subaltern 
studies such as Chatterjee’s. In Colombia as well as in Brazil, new minority rights 
have broadly re-confi gured local struggles for land. It is clear that the adoption 
of new rights does not abolish the existing  power asymmetries. However, these 
rights re-frame the conditions under which struggles for land are conducted 
and negotiated. We can schematically confi rm that the cases studied provided 
examples for all three types of impact produced by rights over power relations, as 
highlighted in the fi rst section of this chapter. Th ese are:
a) Minority rights serve to expand the discursive and institutional power of 
Afro-descendent communities and of their political allies, to the extent that 
claims for land, or better yet, cultural territories in both countries are now 
supported by the law and by specifi c policies. However, the impact of new 
rights over social power – i.e., access to land – of  Afro-descendants varies 
according to country and political circumstances. In Brazil, aft er a more 
favourable period during the 90s, when a considerable number of titles for 
the  Quilombo communities were issued, we have observed a recent discursive 
and political counteroff ensive of agri-industrial groups interested in using 
lands occupied by Quilombos. Th ese actors try to reduce the discursive 
power of Afro-descendant communities, accusing them of falsifying their 
ancestry and of applying environmentally hazardous production techniques. 
Th ese opponents also dispute the institutional power of the Quilombolas by 
working at parliamentary and governmental level to change legislations and 
policies that protect minorities. In Colombia, titling processes have been 
carried out since the middle of the 1990s, and, in the lower Atrato, took place 
amid  violence. However, representatives of agribusiness have not yet disputed 
the discursive and institutional power of the Afro-descendent communities, 
as observed in the Brazilian case. Th eir preferred methods are  violence and 
the co-optation of local leaders.
b) Minority rights functioned as a relay in the Colombian case, where oil palm 
farmers falsifi ed titles to expropriate the Afro-descendant communities 
illegally. As shown above, the abuse of power led to a blockade in the power 
circuit: the courts condemned the farmers and confi rmed the rights of the 
Afro-descendant to their territories.
c) In the case of extremely asymmetric power relations, minority rights cannot 
be implemented even if they exist formally. In the Colombian case, the 
application of minority rights had to be defended through the articulation of 
several international law regimes, such as  ILO Convention 169,  International 
Humanitarian Law, and the cases presented before the  Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights. Th is was observed in the lower Atrato during the military 
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and paramilitary off ensives between 1996 and 2004. Despite the legal 
protection guaranteed by Law 70, the local population was forced to leave 
their territories.
d) Th e cases studied in Brazil and Colombia show diff ering patterns regarding 
the interplay between national and international law.
What is particular about the case of the Brazilian Amazon region is that no such 
interplay takes place, due to the lack of political space and the lack of will to 
enforce the territorial rights of traditional communities.
In the case of the Colombian Lower Atrato region, on the other hand, diverse 
legal frameworks linked to national and international law are combined within 
the broader framework of transnational social rights. Communities and NGOs 
mainly used the expansion of  land rights, introduced through the recognition of 
cultural rights that benefi ted the  Afro-descendants and the mestizos, to demand 
the communities’ rights to recover their land, and to avoid the introduction of 
agribusiness and infrastructure projects without their previous freely informed, 
and prior consent as stated by the  ILO Convention 169 and the territorial rights. 
In this way, the communities defend their “lives, beliefs, institutions, and 
spiritual wellbeing” against the introduction of development projects.
Th e use of international law goes beyond the right to previous consent. Th e 
case before the Inter-American Court for the Genesis Operation in Colombia 
is another example of the use of the international law by local communities 
and NGOs to claim truth, justice, and reparation. Bearing in mind that the 
Colombian State ratifi ed the American Convention, the communities demanded 
the investigation of the state’s responsibility in forced displacement and the 
murders of local people.
In such cases, the Commission has remarked that the aff ected groups have 
been the  Afro-descendants to whom the Colombian state legally gave collective 
territorial rights, and, at the same time, ratifi ed the American Convention at 
international level. However, notwithstanding the potential positive eff ects of the 
Commission’s intervention, new challenges emerge from the local inter-ethnic 
confl icts, due to the various interpretations of the Multicultural Law. Some local 
groups have stated that only black people have  land rights, even though the 
mestizos have also inhabited and owned these lands. To date, the main mediator 
has been the Constitutional Court, which enacted the legislation defending the 
rights of the mestizos to the territory in question, despite the fact that the Law 
(national and international) addresses the black people.78
78 See Constitutional Court of Colombia (2013), Auto 096 of 2013.
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CHAPTER 11
THE ZAPATISTA STRUGGLE FOR 
THE  RIGHT TO LAND: BACKGROUND, 
CONTEXT AND STRATEGIES
Judith Schacherreiter and Guilherme Leite Gonçalves
I. INTRODUCTION
 Land rights are crucial factors in realising social rights. Th eir violation is a 
pre-requisite for the capital accumulation which precedes the expansion of 
capitalism and the emergence of new capitalist formations.1 According to Karl 
Marx, money and commodities can be only transformed into capital when the 
peasant is expropriated from his land, separated from the factors of production, 
and left  with nothing but his labour power to sell freely. In consequence, he is 
reduced to pauperism. Th is process is marked by expropriation, robbery and 
colonisation, all of which involve the integration of local, national or regional 
actors and areas into the global structures of domination.2 Such integration 
transforms the spectrum of the struggle for the  right to land: if  resistance to the 
commodifi cation of a particular territory is simultaneously an opposition to 
transboundary powers, then each peasant movement is part of a global process 
of critical meaning-making. Not only does this allow for the said movements 
to develop collective action connected to transnational networks, it also 
re-interprets the struggle for social rights as a struggle for transnational social 
rights.3
Under these circumstances, the pressure on land is increasing dramatically. 
As rural populations grow, cultivated plots are becoming smaller per capita 
1 David Harvey, “Th e ‘New’ Imperialism: Accumulation by  Dispossession”, (2009) 40 Socialist 
Register, pp. 64 et seq.
2 Th is description relates to the analysis of primitive accumulation: Karl Marx, Capital.  A 
Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, (London: Penguin Books/New Left  Review, 1982), 
p. 874 et seq.
3 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller, “Th e Struggle for Transnational Social Rights”, 
Chapter 2 in this volume, p. 15.
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and per household. Th e decline of the average farm size is combined with 
landlessness and compounded by erosion and soil depletion. In recent years, 
export-driven agricultural policies have further increased the pressure on land. 
In many regions, large-scale plantations have developed for the production of 
food, energy or cash crops. Th e switch to  biofuels in transport has increased 
both the competition among the various uses of farmland and the risk that 
poorer groups will lose access to the very land upon which they depend. Under 
the heading “ land grabbing”, large-scale land acquisitions have become a 
contentious topic.4
Th ese trends are linked with the food crises and threaten the right to adequate 
alimentation, as recognised by Article  25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948, and Article 11 of the International Covenant on  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 1966. In addition, they exacerbate confl icts over 
land and lead to the criminalisation of social movements that defend agrarian 
reforms from below. As a result, serious human rights violations occur, including 
the murders of the peasants connected to such activities.5
Since the 1990s, transnational fi nancial institutions have promoted the 
individual titling of land and the creation of marketable  land rights as the key 
to addressing rural poverty and food insecurity. According to this neo-liberal 
approach, land markets ensure effi  cient allocation and any land reform must aim 
to facilitate market transactions related to land.6  Mexico followed this approach, 
adopting an agrarian counter-reform that abolished the  agrarian law principles 
of the  Mexican Revolution. Along with other neo-liberal measures, this reform 
provoked the uprising of one of the most important contemporary social 
movements: the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional ( EZLN, also referred 
to as [Neo-] Zapatistas).
Against the backdrop of fi nancialisation and free market expansion, this 
chapter analyses the signifi cance of  land rights for the Zapatistas as well 
as the inter-relation between their demands and the transnational claims 
regarding land as a transnational social right. Section II proposes an analytical 
framework to understand the historical Mexican struggle for the  right to 
land, especially the Zapatista struggle, as an essential part of the struggle 
for transnational social rights. Section III describes the uprising of 1994 and 
the movement itself. Sections IV and V analyse the principles of Mexican 
revolutionary  agrarian law and the break with these principles by the neo-
liberal agrarian counter-reform. Finally, Section VI discusses the transnational 
dimension of the Zapatista struggle.
4 Olivier De Schutter, Interim Report of the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, submitted 
in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 64/159, 11 August 2010, p. 5 et seq.
5 De Schutter, note 4 above, p. 3 & 7; see the example below, Section IV.4.
6 Ibid., p. 9 et seq.
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II. ANALITICAL FRAMEWORK: 
TRANSNATIONALISING THE MEXICAN 
STRUGGLE FOR THE  RIGHT TO LAND
According to the hegemonic narrative of global history, all social innovations 
and evolutionary achievements are triggered by European peoples. Democracy 
was invented in Athens; bureaucracy in Rome; the modern state and the industry 
were invented in Western Europe. Th e list goes on and reveals a fi rm belief in 
Europeans “as the makers of history”.7 According to James M. Blaut, this belief 
is accompanied by the “super theory” of Eurocentric diff usionism.8 Given their 
rareness, inventions are seen by diff usionist anthropology as historical products 
of very few communities, and for this reason most societies change over time 
due to the spread of foreign inventions, rather than due to inventions of their 
own. Based upon such scientifi c treatment, the belief in the European historical 
prerogative acquires the condition of empirical truth. Th e resulting world model 
thus considers Europe to be the centre that transmits transformations to the rest 
of the world, which, in turn, is reduced to a receiving periphery. In this context, 
any account of the struggles of Mexican social movements must allocate them in 
a place of historical subalternity.
Th is background explains, for instance, how the  Mexican Revolution (1910–
1917), one of the main events in the history of social struggles, was converted 
into a caricature in which the protagonists are represented as bandidos.9 As 
part of his critique of Orientalism, Edward Said shows that this deformation 
is a European device to manufacture its own identity and superiority, which 
becomes a strategy of domination.10 A culturalist elaboration which is disguised 
as universal, Eurocentrism is nevertheless anchored in objective conditions, 
namely, modern colonialism.11 It is, as shown by Amin Samir, an ideology of 
world capitalism that allows for its expansion and occupation of regions across 
the globe.12 In this sense, the Eurocentric diff usionism is a coloniser’s model.13
7 James M. Blaut, Th e Colonizer’s model of the World: Geographical Diff usionism and 
Eurocentric History, (New York: Th e Guilford Press, 1993), p.  1 et seq. Th e expression 
“Europe” is used in the same sense as Blaut uses it, that is, as a representation of a world 
region that monopolises the notions of rationality, civilisation and democracy. In this sense, 
it evidently includes Canada and the United States. It is, in other words, a synonym for the 
“West”. Nevertheless, resorting to “Europe” is still valid for the purpose of binding or tying 
the image of the “West” to its historical-symbolic origin.
8 Ibid., p. 8 et seq.
9 Zuzana M. Pick, Constructing the Image of the  Mexican Revolution: Cinema and the 
Archive, (Austin TX: University of Texas Press, 2010), p. 50 et seq.
10 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 2 et seq.
11 Amin Samir, Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism 
and Culturalism, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009), p. 152 et seq.
12 Ibid., p. 239 et seq.
13 Blaut, note 7 above, p. 17 et seq.
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One version of Eurocentric diff usionism is the human rights paradigm. Its 
standard narrative describes a timeline of events in which Europe is the centre of 
legal innovation for the world:14 the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen and the French Revolution; the Holocaust and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights; the emergence of social human rights and the Constitution 
of Weimar; the liberal multi-culturalism of North America and cultural rights. 
Th is universalisation of a very specifi c experience is only possible because of 
the humanist  discourse that presents the cited events as inherent values of 
human nature. Notwithstanding its universal representation, the human rights 
paradigm refl ects the discursive framework of the nation state, which produces 
a provincial and nationalist  interpretation of global legal history. According to 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, this global legal history is intended to project a “hyperreal 
Europe”.15 Th erefore, even though the struggling experience of Mexican peasants 
and indigenous people is considered to be a human rights paradigm in several 
spaces,16 this projection of a hyperreal Europe erases or exoticizes their potential, 
because  Mexico is located beyond the frontiers of the European nation states. 
Allocated in a peripheral position, the non-European is thus locked in a “zone of 
non-being” of the global legal community,17 reduced to either applying the rights 
conveyed by Europe or reproducing a nativist or tribalist understanding.
Accordingly, the human rights paradigm is an ideology that conceals the 
protagonist role of the non-European in modern legal achievement and therefore 
erases the non-European agency from the global legal history.18 For this reason, 
as maintained by José-Manuel Barreto, human rights seem to arise solely from 
the  resistance of (European) citizens against the  violence of their national 
14 Antony Anghie, “Finding the Peripherie s: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-
Century International Law”, (1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal, p. 20 et seq; R.P. 
Arnand, Confrontation or Cooperation? International Law and the Developing Countries, (Th e 
Hague: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1987), p.  15 et seq; José-Manuel Barreto, “Decolonial 
Strategies and Dialogue in the Human Rights Field: A Manifesto”, (2012) 3 Transnational 
Legal Th eory, p.  3 et seq; Mohammed Bedjaoui, “Poverty of the International Order”, in: 
Richard Falk, F. Kratochwil, and S.H. Mendlovitz (eds), International Law: A Contemporary 
Perspective, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1985), p.  153 et seq; Surya Prakash Sinha, Legal 
Polycentricity and International Law, (Durham NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1996), p. 15 & 
35 et seq.
15 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Th ought and Historical 
Diff erence, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p.  27 et seq. Th is hyperreal 
Europe is projected both by the European imperialist historicism and by the nationalist 
narratives of the (former) colonies, which accept the idea of Europe as a bulwark 
of modernity and seek to establish national equivalents in their own countries (D. 
Chakrabarty, p. 7 et seq).
16 Paolo G. Carozza, “From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin America Tradition of 
the  Idea of Human Rights”, (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 304.
17 On the concept of “zone of non-being”, see Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, (New 
York: Grove Press, 1988), p. 2.
18 Samir, note 11 above, p. 180; B.S. Chimni, “Th ird World Approaches to International Law: A 
Manifesto”, (2006) 8 International Community Law Review, p. 15 et seq.
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states.19 As a result, the human rights paradigm renders invisible fi ve hundred 
years of legal knowledge and practice, from multiple source regions, of colonial 
domination, imperialism, hegemonic ethnicities, etc.20 From this perspective, 
such a paradigm becomes an instrument of modern colonialism: by proclaiming 
Europe’s alleged superiority on the civilising legal scale, and omitting the role of 
the non-European in the global repertoire of the struggle for rights, it produces 
the ideological conditions needed to expand the political and economic interests 
of the European élite.21
Among the instruments of  resistance to this expansion, social and economic 
rights as well as cultural and minority rights no doubt occupy a prominent place. 
Th ey are clearly part of the global fi ght against inequality. Yet their dominant 
account is not exempt from Eurocentric diff usionism: the second-generation 
human rights framework is attributed to the Weimar Constitution, while the 
consolidation of the said framework is associated with both the movement 
of European workers and the European welfare state.22 At the same time, the 
human rights of minorities are seen as a decision made by Western democracies, 
which “‘internationalize[d]’ the treatment of national minorities”23 in response 
to the ethnic wars in the post-Communist era. Th is line of thought ignores 
the fact that the Mexican Constitution of 1917 inaugurated the constitutional 
recognition of social and economic rights worldwide, decisively infl uenced the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (including Article 23), and inspired and 
still continues to inspire social constitutions in several countries.24 Likewise, the 
said argumentation fails to recognise that the indigenous movements in  Mexico 
played an important role in the development of  ILO Convention 169, and that 
its re-appropriation by Zapatismo against neo-liberal reforms converted the 
19 Barreto, note 14 above, p. 4.
20 Ibid., p.  3 et seq. See, also, Guilherme Leite Gonçalves and Sérgio Costa, “Th e Global 
Constitutionalization of Human Rights: Overcoming Contemporary Injustices or Juridifying 
Old Asymmetries?”, (2016) 64(2) Current Sociology, pp. 311-331.
21 On the relationship between Eurocentrism and the power of the European élite, see Blaut, 
note 7 above, p. 10.
22 Jürgen Habermas, “Th e Concept of  Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human 
Rights”, (2010) 41 Metaphilosophy, p.  468; idem, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”, in: 
Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum, and Agustín José Menéndez (eds), Developing a 
Constitution for Europe, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p.  21; Norberto Bobbio, Th e Age of 
Rights, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 66.
23 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.  52 et seq., and p.  61 et seq; Will Kymlicka, 
“Th e Evolving Basis of European Norms of Minority Rights: Rights to Culture, Participation 
and Autonomy”, in: John McGarry and Michael Keating (eds), European Integration and 
Nationalities Question, (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 36.
24 Carozza, note 16 above, p. 303 et seq; Fernando Yllanes Ramos, “Th e Social Rights Enshrined 
in the Mexican Constitution of 1917”, (1967) 96 International Labor Review, pp. 591–592.
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indigenous issue into a global issue, contributing to the defi nition of cultural 
human rights.25
Th e parochial and Eurocentric narratives are problematical for two reasons. 
On the one hand, they conceal collective actions, insurgencies and revolutions 
brought by issues of re-distribution and recognition. As exemplifi ed by the 
above-mentioned experience of Mexican people, these issues developed in non-
European spaces and are a part of the global legal culture, both for their impact 
on (global) spheres of power and for their intervention in creating transnational 
organisations and legal norms. On the other hand, parochial narratives disregard 
the entanglements between the inequalities and struggles present in Europe and 
in other world regions – Europe’s former colonies.26 In a fi eld as dependent 
on participation as that of social and cultural rights, Eurocentric diff usionism 
undermines any incentive for mobilisation in non-European sectors. Aft er 
all, it ascribes to these sectors a condition of backwardness in the scale of 
rights, condemning them to reproduce a set of prescriptions to reach the stage 
allegedly reached by Western countries exclusively due to their own (rational) 
eff orts. Further on, we will see that this is exactly the rhetoric employed by 
the neo-liberal ideology to set the (“rational”) recipe for development, using 
institutions such as the World Bank. In the Mexican case, this  discourse is used 
to undermine the alternative legal policies of peasants and indigenous people.
In order to render visible the decisive role of these Mexican struggles 
in building a global culture of social and cultural rights, it is necessary to 
adopt de-colonisation strategies that include the de-parochialisation and 
universalisation of the universal legal  discourse.27 Concretely, this de-colonising 
strategy of “universalising the universal”28 involves elucidating the role of the 
 Mexican Revolution and of Zapatismo in the global construction of social and 
cultural rights.
However, such an approach is conditioned to an analytical framework 
capable of overcoming the nationalist and provincial character upon which the 
legal Eurocentric diff usionism is based. Th is framework allows for the existence 
of a “hyperreal Europe” while simultaneously concealing the participation 
of non-European sectors – such as Mexican peasants and indigenous people – 
25 Alison Brysk, From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations 
in Latin America, (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 158–159; Courtney 
Jung, “Th e Politics of Indigenous Identity: Neoliberalism, Cultural Rights, and the Mexican 
Zapatistas”, (2003) 70 Social Research, p. 449 et seq.
26 Shalini Randeria, “Entangled Histories of Uneven Modernities: Civil Society, Caste 
Solidarities and Legal Pluralism in Post-colonial India”, in: Yehuda Elkana, Ivan Krastov, 
Elisio Macamo and Shalina Randeria (eds), Unraveling Ties: From Social Cohesion to New 
Practices of Connectedness, (Frankfurt aM: Campus Verlag, 2002), pp. 284–311. See, also, 
Sérgio Costa, “Researching Entangled Inequalities in Latin America. Th e Role of Historical, 
Social and Transregional Inequalities”, 9 DesiguALdades.net Working Paper Series, p. 6 et seq.
27 Barreto, note 14 above, p. 11 et seq.
28 Ibid., p. 12.
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in global legal policy. Its nationalist character appears both in universalist 
European narratives and in nativist projects from the rest of the world:29 in 
spite of the inverted signs (positive for the former, negative for the latter), 
both narratives relegate legal cosmopolitanism to the European spectrum. 
Th e question is therefore how to reverse this process and unveil the history of 
Mexican law in the global history of social and cultural rights.
Th e desired reversion can be off ered by the transnational approach.30 On 
the one hand, this approach implies a re-orientation of the observation fi eld 
for non-state actors with transboundary constitution and operation, such as 
the global networks of social movements, multinational corporations, global 
fi nancial systems and international institutions. On the other, it may allow 
a re- interpretation of the action of national governments in the light of their 
global interconnections. When it comes to the law, the transnational approach 
assumes that legal regimes are promoted from sector to sector by integrating 
several levels (from local to global), in multiple legal and political arenas that 
go beyond national frontiers.31 By questioning the naturalisation of the nation 
state as an analytical unit, the said approach breaks with the nationalism that 
fosters the Eurocentrism present both in European provincialism and in the 
rest of the world’s nativism.32 From this perspective, the historical struggle of 
Mexican peasants and indigenous people for rights ceases to be a nationalist 
account – it is no longer an import of European ideas or a manifestation of a 
particular culturalism. In the light of their global impact, the protagonists of 
these struggles re-emerge as transnational political actors participating in the 
global production of law.
Th e concept of transnational law derives from a broader understanding 
of globalisation, according to which the recent increase in social relationships 
generates a world social order with multiple centres and levels. Th ough this order 
amplifi es the importance of non-state actors and re-positions state actors as 
elements of global standardisation, the main players sustain their hegemony over 
the transnational legal policy, as shown by Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja 
29 Chakrabarty, note 15 above, p. 7 et seq.
30 Th is approach involves a multitude of schools of thought, such as dependency theory, 
world-system theory, post-colonial studies and theories of globalisation and world society. 
See, among others, Laura Briggs, Gladys McCormick and J.T. Way, “Transnationalism: A 
Category of Analysis”, (2008) 60 American Quarterly, pp. 625–648; Linda Basch, Nina Glick 
Schiller and Cristina Szanton Blanc, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial 
Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States, (New York: Gordon and Breach 
Publishers, 1994), p.  1 et seq; Sarah J. Mahler, “Th eoretical and Empirical Contributions 
Toward a Research Agenda for Transnationalism”, in: Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo 
Guarnizo (eds), Transnationalism from Below: Comparative Urban and Community Research, 
Vol. 6, (New Brunswick-London: Transaction Publisher, 2006), p. 64 et seq.
31 Fischer-Lescano and Möller, note 3 above, p. 24 et seq.
32 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism, the Social Science, 
and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology”, (2003) 37 International 
Migration Review, p. 576.
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Möller.33 Th is hegemony derives from legal arrangements (such as contracts 
signed under the Lex Mercatoria) and judicial forums (such as the IMF, the WTO 
and the World Bank) designed to protect the free market and its interests.34 In 
opposition to this scenario emerges the need for transnational social rights, that 
is, a counter-hegemonic agenda that creates alternative institutions and mobilises 
the available body of transnational social norms – such as the UN covenants and 
the Core Labour Standards of the  ILO – to confront the inequalities infl icted by 
the liberal market regime.35
From the perspective of non-European peoples, this transnational context 
is hardly new. Instead, it occupies a determining space in the history of 
modern (neo-) colonialism. According to José-Manuel Barreto, non-state 
actors (such as enterprises) and their cross-border legal commitments have 
been “key fi gures” of this history.36 While the occupation and looting of the 
colonies would not have been possible without conquerors and pirates acting 
as “quasi one-man enterprises”, investor associations – such as the East India 
Companies or the East Africa Companies – truthfully inaugurated the colonial 
empires.37 Th ese companies were active in the global markets of spices, 
precious metals, opium, and human beings, establishing transnational rules 
invoked to promote  trade wars and genocides.38 Today, private conglomerates 
continue to be the key players in the expropriation of peasants and indigenous 
communities from their land, including the exploitation of natural resources.
Th ese conglomerates are entirely committed to the neo-liberal accumulation. 
Since 1982, neo-liberal policies in  Mexico have increased the concentration 
of wealth, eroded the purchasing power of workers and destroyed the peasant 
agriculture model of the 1917 Revolution.39 Th is process is motivated by interests 
of US fi rms in  Mexico as well as by the consolidation of  NAFTA.40 By opening 
the Mexican market to the US agribusiness,  NAFTA led to the dismantling of 
the Mexican organism for coff ee market control (INMECAFE), the withdrawal 
of subsidised corn prices and the erosion of the market power of the peasants’ 
products.41 When it comes to coff ee, a sector in which 70 per cent of the 
producers were small farmers, the price fell by 50 per cent.42 In the case of corn, 
the rise in input prices was accompanied by a fall in rural credits.43 Th ese eff ects 
33 Fischer-Lescano and Möller, note 3 above, p. 24-25.
34 Ibid., p. 16.
35 Ibid., p. 13-14.
36 Barreto, note 14 above, p. 14.
37 Ibid., p. 14.
38 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
39 Richard Stahler-Sholk, “Globalization and Social Movement  Resistance: Th e Zapatista 
Rebellion in Chiapas,  Mexico”, (2001) 23 New Political Science, p. 506 et seq.
40 Jung, note 25 above, pp. 439–440.
41 Stahler-Sholk, note 39 above, p. 507.
42 Ibid., p. 507.
43 Ibid., p. 507; Jung, note 25 above, p. 440.
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are aggravated by the fact that international loans are conditioned to structural 
adjustments seeking to replace the agrarian model of the 1917 Revolution by 
fi nancial liberalisation.44 Since the state of Chiapas is particularly characterised 
by agricultural and peasant production, it was the most aff ected by neo-liberal 
policies.45
In the next sections, we detail the impact of neo-liberal policies on the 
 right to land of peasants and indigenous people in  Mexico. Th is process is 
conditioned by a global standard of capitalist development, according to which 
the accumulation of capital always depends on the appropriation of non-
capitalist spaces – that is, the commodifi cation of spaces that had hitherto not 
been commodifi ed – to ensure its expansion. At the macro-sociological level, 
Klaus Dörre conceptualised this phenomenon with the abstract category of 
Landnahme or  land grabbing.46 From a concrete perspective, the phenomenon 
of  land grabbing is connected to the investment opportunities for fi nancial 
capital as well as to the opening of new markets as as a response to the 2008 
fi nancial crisis. David Harvey shows that this process (abstractly or concretely) 
refl ects the permanent repetition of primitive accumulation.47 Th is means that 
 land grabbing happens through explicit non-economic  violence, that is, through 
robbery, theft , (neo-) colonisation and legal-political-regulatory coercion.48 In 
the Mexican case, such  violence is clearly linked to the amendment of Article 27 
of the Constitution,49 which prescribed the possibility of an agrarian reform 
(which we will analyse subsequently). Such amendment was prepared by  NAFTA 
and had the eff ect of concentrating land in the hands of foreign investors. Its 
impact was particularly felt in Chiapas, where 27 per cent of the (unanswered) 
claims for the  right to land come from.50
Th e contemporary dynamics of accumulation by  dispossession and  land 
grabbing (as observed in peasant and indigenous lands in  Mexico) highlight 
what Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller call the hegemonic disciplining 
character of transnational law.51 Th is character is enough to prove that the 
project of de-colonising human rights may succumb to the naïve hope of liberal 
radicalism whenever it is disconnected from a comprehensive critique of the 
44 Jung, note 25 above, p. 441 et seq; Neil Harvey, “Playing with Fire: Th e Implication of  Ejido 
Reform”, (1994) 11(2) Akwe:kon Journal of Indigenous Issues, p. 20 et seq.
45 Harvey, note 44 above, p. 20 et seq; Dan La Botz, Democracy in  Mexico: Peasant Rebellion and 
Political Reform, (Boston MA: South End Press, 1995), p. 25.
46 Klaus Dörre, “Th e New Landnahme: Dynamics and Limits of Financial Market Capitalism”, 
in: Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (eds), Sociology, Capitalism, Critique, 
(London-New York: Verso Books, 2015), p. 24 et seq.
47 Harvey, note 1 above, p. 74 et seq.
48 Ibid., note 3 above, p. 74; Marx, note 2 above, pp. 874–875.
49 Jung, note 25 above, p. 440; La Botz, note 45 above, p. 25; Harvey, note above 44, p. 20 et seq.; 
Stahler-Sholk, note 39 above, p. 507.
50 Stahler-Sholk, note 39 above, p. 507.
51 Fischer-Lescano and Möller, note 3 above, p. 24-26.
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law, as if “purifying” the legal system from Eurocentrism was enough for its 
normative appeal to come unconditionally to fruition. On the contrary, the 
creation and application of human rights depart from highly unequal conditions 
(expressed, for example, by the IMF or the World Bank when using the  discourse 
of rights to grant credits or execute free  trade policies).52 Contrary to the 
postulates of legal idealism, it is only within these highly unequal conditions that 
a legal-political subaltern struggle can emerge – a struggle capable of articulating 
the complaints against Eurocentrism, the opposition to neo-liberalism, and the 
orientation towards emancipatory concerns. Th is implies re-reading the role 
of human rights from the perspective of a social totality, in which economy, 
politics and law are intertwined in contradictory processes of exploitation and 
 resistance.53
From this perspective, the struggle of peasants and indigenous Mexicans 
for their land is also a struggle for transnational social rights against the legal-
political-regulatory  violence of accumulation by  dispossession and of  land 
grabbing, as implemented by transnational economic conglomerates. From 
the 1917 Revolution to (Neo-) Zapatismo, this struggle confronts the global 
spheres of power and the expansion of transnational capitalism, either in the 
form of imperialism (from the nineteenth to the twentieth century) or in the 
form of fi nancial globalisation in the turn of the twenty-fi rst century. In these 
two moments, the Mexican struggle was immediately anchored in the contest 
for the  right to land; this contest, in turn, ultimately spread to other dimensions 
of the transnational social rights. In its fi rst phase, it served as the driving force 
behind social constitutionalism as well as behind the claims for social, economic 
and cultural rights in the international human rights system throughout the 
twentieth century.
Th e 1994 Zapatista uprising occurred because of the land.54 Its main 
objective was the defence of the peasant model of agrarian organisation as 
defi ned in Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 by Emiliano Zapata.55 
Along with the struggle for the  right to land, the Zapatistas presented a series of 
demands concerning the rights of  indigenous peoples ( non-discrimination, self-
52 Ibid., p.
53 Th e concept of social totality has a Marxian origin. Th is concept is presented in various 
passages, amongst which, in particular, is Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique 
of Political Economy, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p.  494: “Not only do the objective 
conditions change in the act of reproduction, e.g., the village becomes a town, the wilderness 
a cleared fi eld etc., but the producers change, too, in that they bring out new qualities in 
themselves, develop themselves in production, transform themselves, develop new powers 
and ideas, new modes of intercourse, new needs and new language.”
54 Jesús Antonio de la Torre Rangel, “Liberación y Derecho: Pluralismo Jurídico y Resistencia”, 
in: 7. Coloquio Academico, “Ni una vida más para la toga, Homenage a Franz Fanon”, (Puerto 
Rico: Facultad de Derecho Eugenio María de Hostos, 2009), p. 8.
55 Jung, note 25 above, p. 440; La Botz, note 45 above, p. 25; Harvey, note 44 above, p. 20 et seq.; 
Stahler-Sholk, note 39 above, p. 507.
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governance and respect for their traditions, culture and dignity) as well as the 
rights to education, training, health  care and basic needs. Th is set of demands 
refl ects the claims made by the Zapatista delegation during the so-called 
Jornadas por la paz y la reconciliación, held in San Cristóbal de las Casas in late 
February and early March 1994.56 Th e corresponding document pleaded for the 
conservation of Article 27 (demand no. 8) and the revision of  NAFTA (demand 
no. 7). In addition, it called for free and democratic elections (demand no. 1); 
the political, economic and cultural autonomy of indigenous communities 
(demand no. 4); the construction of hospitals (demand no. 9), housing, 
recreational centres, supply of public services and essential goods (demand no. 
11); the eradication of illiteracy through public and free education (demand no. 
12); combating the discrimination against  indigenous peoples (demand no. 15); 
administration of justice based upon traditional practices and customs (demand 
no. 17); fair labour with decent pay (demand no. 18); etc. Th is framework, which 
combines several human rights dimensions, was repeated in the Agreements of 
San Andrés57 and in several other manifestations of Zapatismo.
Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller emphasise the trend in recent 
codifi cations of fundamental and human rights of re-inforcing the conception 
of indivisible human rights.58 Th e above-mentioned Zapatista claims confi rm 
this tendency and show that the divisibility makes no sense from the point 
of view of social struggles and necessities, given that the various forms of 
precariousness are intertwined. However, the particular experience of Zapatismo 
re-conceptualises the terms of the discussion on the interdependence and the 
universality of human rights. According to this experience, the  right to land is 
the radiating and unifying basis of all other rights. As shown by Jesús Antonio de 
la Torre Rangel, this right is the condition for the material support that enables 
the social development of the community and the maintenance of their cultural 
identity.59 From this perspective, the Zapatista struggle against  dispossession 
and land violation cannot be reduced to the state-society confl ict upon which 
the dominant (and European) conception of human rights is based. Not only 
does the Zapatista perspective reveal another type of confl ict based upon (neo-) 
colonialism, it also challenges the notion of a universal subject of rights. Franz 
Fanon summarises this re-orientation in the values of social struggle as follows:
“For a colonized people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is fi rst 
and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity. 
56 See the communiqué of the  EZLN from 1  March 1994 “Las Demandas Torales del 
 EZLN”, (Th e  EZLN Demands Torales), available at: http://palabra. ezln.org.mx/
comunicados/1994/1994_03_01_a.htm, last accessed 4 June 2015.
57 See infra.
58 Fischer-Lescano and Möller, note 3 above, p. 28-31.
59 Rangel, note 54 above, p. 8.
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But this dignity has nothing to do with the dignity of the human individual: for that 
human individual has never heard tell of it.”60
Th e land of Mexican peasants and indigenous people has been historically 
invaded, dispossessed, violated and plundered by global spheres of power, such 
as imperialism, colonialism and fi nancial speculation. Zapatismo has become 
a model for collective transnational action, connected to diff erent networks,61 
and mobilising a set of transnational rights to ensure its autonomy over the 
land. Th e prime example of such action was the successful claim to implement 
 ILO Convention 169 in  Mexico – a guarantee of autonomy for indigenous 
communities.62
Zapatismo proposes the re-conceptualisation of human rights, binding 
them to an autonomous project that radically diff ers from the hegemonic legal 
regime.63 In the next sections, we will analyse in detail the various historical 
stages in which this struggle has been carried out by peasants and  indigenous 
peoples in  Mexico.
III. THE UPRISING OF THE  EZLN AND THE  RIGHT 
TO LAND
On 1  January 1994, the same day that the  NAFTA entered into force, a social 
movement dominated by Chiapanecan indigenous people started an armed 
uprising in Chiapas, one of the poorest states of  Mexico. Presenting themselves as 
the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, they marched from the Lacandon 
Jungle to one of the larger cities of Chiapas, San Cristóbal de Las Casas, occupied 
government buildings and other towns nearby,64 and pronounced the “First 
Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle” with the title “¡Hoy decimos basta!” (“Today 
we say: Stop!”).65 Th e following excerpts of the Declaration summarise the 
critique of the  EZLN and their demands, which mainly refer to social rights:
60 Franz Fanon, Th e Wretched of the Earth, (New York: Grove, 1963), p. 44.
61 Th omas Olesen, “Globalising the Zapatistas: From Th ird World Solidarity to Global 
Solidarity”, (2004) 25 Th ird World Quarterly, p. 259 et seq.
62 Brysk, note 25 above, pp. 158–159; Gemma van der Haar, “Th e Zapatista Uprising and the 
Struggle for Indigenous Autonomy”, (2004) 76  European Review of Latin America and 
Caribbean Studies, pp. 100–101; Jung, note 25 above, p. 445 et seq; Rangel, note 54 above, p. 15 
et seq.
63 Shannon Speed, Rights in Rebellion: Indigenous Struggle and Human Rights in Chiapas, 
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 39.
64 Gloria Muñoz Ramírez, 20 y 10 – el fuego y la palabra, ( Mexico City: La Jornada Ediciones, 
2003), p.  85 et seq; Carlos Tello Díaz, La Rebelión de las Cañadas, reprint, ( Mexico City: 
booklet, 2006) p. 15 et seq.
65 Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona: “¡Hoy decimos basta!” in: Subcomandante 
Insurgente Marcos, Nuestra arma es nuestra palabra, ( Mexico City: Siete Cuentos, 2001), p. 13 
et seq.
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“[Th e élite] have been extracting the wealth of our country and don’t  care about 
the fact that we have nothing, absolutely nothing, not even a roof over our heads, 
no land, no work, no health  care, no food, no education. Nor are we able to elect 
our political representatives freely and democratically, nor is there independence 
from foreigners, nor peace, nor justice for ourselves and our children. […] We, men 
and women, sincere and free, are conscious that the war that we are declaring is 
our last resort, but also that it is a just one. Th e dictators have been waging a non-
declared war of genocide against our people for many years, and therefore we ask 
for your uncompromising participation to support this plan of the Mexican people 
which struggles for work, land, housing, food, health  care, education, independence, 
freedom, democracy, justice and peace. We declare that we will not stop fi ghting until 
these basic demands of our people are satisfi ed […].”66
Formed in the 1980s as a small guerrilla group in the Lacandon Jungle, the 
 EZLN was initially dominated by left -wing students. Th ey were gradually joined 
by indigenous people, who had been struggling for their rights for decades 
and possessed signifi cant practical experience of a political organisation. In 
consequence, the struggle against being marginalised and against the poverty 
of indigenous people became the central engagement of the  EZLN; indigenous 
approaches towards nature and indigenous communalism were united with 
a socialist critique on hegemonic neo-liberal politics and individualism; 
communal political and social structures infl uenced their organisation and 
decision-making processes.67
For many years, the  EZLN continued its political work in the shadows of the 
Lacandon Jungle and was continuously joined by more activists. In 1992, the 
social and political confl icts in Chiapas intensifi ed with the  NAFTA negotiations 
and the neo-liberal Agrarian Counter-Reform of 1992. In huge manifestations, 
peasants and  indigenous peoples criticised the privatisation of agrarian land and 
the abolition of land re-distribution as an attack on their most important right: 
the  right to land, as laid down in Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution. 
Although reality had always lagged the aims of Article  27, this provision had 
given the peasants a legal possibility of receiving land and insisting on their 
demands. Th e Agrarian Counter-Reform brought these possibilities to an end 
and defi nitely rejected the peasants’ most elementary needs. In this context, 
social protests increased, the  EZLN gained more and more support, and the state 
repression against the protests brought forth the increasingly insistent idea that 
an armed struggle was necessary to defend their interests.68
66 In this article, all English versions of the original Spanish are translated by the authors.
67 Tello Díaz, note 64 above, p.  110 et seq; Subcomandante Marcos, quoted in Carlos 
Montemayor, Chiapas: La rebelión indígena de México, reprint, ( Mexico City: Debolsillo, 
2009), p. 156 et seq.
68 Tello Díaz, note 64 above, p.  168 & 179 et seq; Subcomandante Marcos, quoted in 
Montemayor, note 67 above, p. 159.
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As noted, the neo-liberal Agrarian Counter-Reform of 1992 was one of the 
main reasons for the uprising of 1994. Among other social rights, the demand 
for land is repeatedly mentioned in their Declarations of the Lacandon Jungle.69 
Th e  EZLN demands to re-establish Article  27 of the Mexican Constitution 
in accordance with its original version, which was generated by the  Mexican 
Revolution and was still in force before the 1992 Reform. Furthermore, they 
demand that the indigenous territories be protected in accordance with 
Convention 169 of the  ILO.70
IV.  RIGHT TO LAND IN REVOLUTIONARY 
 AGRARIAN LAW
A. REVOLUTIONARY AGRARIAN LEGISLATION
Th e  EZLN continues the struggle of social-revolutionary groups, which, at the 
end of the  Mexican Revolution, had not prevailed against the liberal-bourgeois 
movements in military terms, but nevertheless had a strong infl uence on 
the revolutionary agrarian legislation.71 Specifi cally, the  EZLN refers to the 
agrarian programme of the indigenous peasant leader Emiliano Zapata.72 In 
accordance with this programme, aft er the Agrarian Counter-Reform of 1992, 
they demanded that Article  27 should “retake the spirit of the struggles of 
Emiliano Zapata which may be summarised in two demands: ‘Th e land belongs 
to those who cultivate it!’ and ‘Land and Freedom!’”73 Th us, Adolfo Gilly argued 
that “Zapatismo is still the programme, direction and inspiring myth for the 
69 Th ey have issued six Declarations of the Lacandon Jungle, all available at: http://
enlacezapatista. ezln.org.mx, partly published also in Marcos, note 65 above.
70 See the communiqué of the  EZLN from 15  February 1996 “Diálogo de San Andrés y los 
Derechos y Cultura Indígena”, (Dialogue in San Andrés on  indigenous rights and culture) 
available at: http://palabra. ezln.org.mx/comunicados, last accessed 7  December 2012, and 
part B.1 of the Acuerdos de San Andrés of 16 February 1996, in: Luis Hernández Navarro and 
Ramón Vera Herrera (eds), Acuerdos de San Andrés, 2 reprint, ( Mexico City: Era Ediciones, 
2004), p.  53 et seq. Regarding their critique on the Agrarian Counter-Reform 1992 in the 
context of international neo-liberal politics, see the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, 
(Sexta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, June 2005), available at: http://enlacezapatista. ezln.
org.mx/2005/11/13/sexta-declaracion-de-la-selva-lacandona, last accessed 5 January 2013.
71 As to the revolutionary movements, processes and results, see Adolfo Gilly, La revolución 
interrumpida, 2 reprint, ( Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 2009).
72 Martha Chávez Padrón, El derecho agrario en México, 17 edn., ( Mexico City: Porrúa, 2005), 
p. 257 & 260 et seq; Eduardo López Betancourt,El derecho en México, ( Mexico City: Porrúa, 
2007), p. 37.
73 See the communication of the  EZLN from 15 February 1996, “Diálogo de San Andrés y los 
Derechos y Cultura Indígena”, available at: http://palabra. ezln.org.mx/comunicados, last 
accessed 7 December 2012, and part B.1 of the Acuerdos de San Andrés of 16 February 1996, 
in: Hernández Navarro and Vera Herrera (eds), note 70 above, p. 53 et seq.
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struggles of peasants and indigenous people in today’s  Mexico”.74 In 2011, rural 
and indigenous organisations commemorated Zapata’s “Plan de Ayala of 1911”, 
and insisted on the need to realise this plan.75
Revolutionary  agrarian law was developed upon the basis of the  Agrarian 
Law of 6  January 191576 (later elevated to constitutional level)77 and Article 27 
of the Constitution of 1917.78 As noted above, the Constitution of 1917 was the 
fi rst to guarantee social rights.79 According to Gilly, it was the world’s most 
progressive constitution at the moment of its adoption.80
Th e constitution strongly curbed liberal freedoms, particularly the 
freedom of contracts through labour law (Article  123) and the freedom of 
property through  agrarian law (Article  27).81 Given these provisions, the 1917 
Constitution is not deemed to be a mere reform of the liberal 1857 Constitution, 
but is considered to be a new constitution.82 According to Pastor Rouaix Méndez 
– a member of the constitutional assembly and of the commission that elaborated 
Article  27 and the fi rst president of the National Agrarian Commission aft er 
1917 – it was impossible to realise the necessary “radical modifi cations” of 
 agrarian law within the framework of the 1857 Constitution, as this framework 
gave almost unlimited guarantees and protection to property rights according to 
classic liberalism and individualism. Aft er the Revolution, a new legal basis was 
needed to implement a “revolutionary transformation”. Th e leading idea of this 
transformation was that individual property rights were subject to the superior 
rights of the society: social distribution and sustainable use of land. Indeed, the 
central aim was social justice.83
74 Adolfo Gilly, in an interview on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the  Mexican 
Revolution in the Mexican daily newspaper La Jornada, 8 May 2010, p. 32.
75 See the reports of the Mexican newspaper La Jornada of 29  November 2011, p.  10: “López 
Obrador y unas 30 organizaciones fi rman el Plan de Ayala para el siglo XXI”, and p.  14: 
“Calderón traicionó los ideales de la Revolución: Campesinos.” Th e “Plan de Ayala” of 
25  November 1911 is reprinted in Jesús Silva Herzog, Breve historia de la Revolución 
Mexicana, Vol I, 19 reprint, ( Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2007), p. 309 et seq.
76 Law of 6 January 1915 which declares void all transactions over land, water and mountains 
of rural communities, which were granted contrary to the Law of 25 June 1856, reprinted in 
Jesús Silva Herzog, Breve historia de la Revolución Mexicana, Vol II, 18 reprint, ( Mexico City: 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2004), p. 203 et seq.
77 Article 27, Part VII, Paragraph 3, Constitution 1917 (original version).
78 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos que reforma la de 5 de febrero del 
1857, Diario Ofi cial Federal, 5 February 1917. In general, the cited constitutional articles in 
Section II describing revolutionary  agrarian law refer to their original version; with regard to 
its main principles, this version did not change until the Reform of 1992.
79 Marco Antonio Díaz de León (ed), Historia del derecho agrario mexicano, ( Mexico City: 
Porrúa, 2002), p. 324, 330, 478 & 884 et seq; Chávez Padrón, note 72 above, p. 256.
80 Gilly, note 71 above, p. 256.
81 Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 493.
82 Gilly, note 71 above, p. 256.
83 Pastor Rouaix Méndez, “Génesis de los Artículos 27 y 123 de la Constitución Política de 1917, 
1945”, in: Díaz de León (ed), note 79 above, pp. 303–310, at 308 et seq.
Judith Schacherreiter and Guilherme Leite Gonçalves
280 Intersentia
Th e centrepieces of revolutionary  agrarian law and of the  EZLN’s agrarian 
demands are land re-distribution by expropriation and communal forms of land 
tenancy, which are termed “ social property”. An important legal concept in this 
regard is the “original property of the nation” in terms of land and water. Th is 
concept extends the principle of dominio eminens, known in Mexican land law 
since colonial times. It means that all land and water originally belong to the 
Crown, the Republic and, fi nally, to the nation; hence, in general, they belong 
to the sovereign. In revolutionary  agrarian law, the highest right to the land of 
the sovereign is considered to be the legal basis for expropriating and limiting 
property rights for social purposes.84 In sum, property was declared to be 
deduced from the nation, and the nation holds the right to place limitations on it 
and make modifi cations to it.85
At fi rst glance, the revolutionary Constitution of 1917 seems to protect 
property in the same way as the liberal Constitution of 1857. Th is, however, is 
an illusion. According to Article 27, Paragraph 2, expropriation is allowed only 
for public benefi t and against indemnifi cation. However, realising socially just 
land distribution was considered a public benefi t and could therefore justify 
expropriation. Th ereby, the Constitution of 1917 made expropriation and land 
re-distribution possible for social purposes. Accordingly, Article 27, Paragraph 
3 conferred on rural communities the right of dotación, which meant that they 
were entitled to receive both the land and the water that they needed as a means 
of existence. If necessary, the land could be taken from huge land holdings by 
expropriation. Th e wording of this article reads as follows:
“Article  27. Paragraph 3. Th e nation has at any time the right to apply modalities 
to  private property which public interest demands, […] in order to realise a just 
distribution of public wealth and its protection. Th is aim requires measures to break 
up large land holdings, to foster small property, to create rural communities with the 
necessary extent of land and water, to promote agriculture and avoid the destruction 
of nature […]. Th e towns and communities which lack the land and water necessary 
for their people are entitled to receive land by dotación. Th e required land shall be 
taken from adjacent estates, but small properties86 must be protected at all time. […]”
84 Commentary to the proposal for Article 27, submitted to the constituent assembly, reprinted 
in Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 504; referring to this commentary are Chávez Padrón, note 
72 above, p.  296, and Mario Ruiz Massieu, Derecho Agrario Revolucionario, ( Mexico City: 
Porrúa, 1987), p. 214 et seq.
85 Article 27, Paragraph 1 and 3, Constitution of 1917.
86 Th e term “small property” (pequeña propiedad) refers to land property, the extent of which 
does not supersede a certain limit. Th ese limits are determined by the quality, characteristics 
and cultivation of the respective land. See, for example, Article 14 of the Reglamento Agrario 
de 10. Abril 1922, Diario Ofi cial Federal of 18 April 1922, reprinted in Díaz de León, note 79 
above, p. 360 et seq; Article 105 of the Ley de dotaciones y restituciones de tierras y aguas, 
Diario Ofi cial Federal of 27 April 1927, reprinted in Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 396 et seq; 
Article 51 Código Agrario 1934; Article 173 Código Agrario 1940; Article 104 Código Agrario 
1942; and Article 249 Ley Federal de la Reforma Agraria 1971. According to a constitutional 
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Based upon the proceedings of dotación, land was assigned to a rural community 
that did not possess any land title – an aspect that distinguished the dotación 
from the restitución, another legal institution introduced by Article  27. By 
restitución, rural (above all, indigenous) communities received the land of 
which they had been illegally dispossessed in the decades before the  Mexican 
Revolution. If a demand of restitución was not allowed because of the lack of a 
valid title, the proceedings were automatically converted into the proceedings of 
dotación.87
New legal concepts of tenancy called “ social property” emanated from the 
proceedings of  restitution and re-distribution provided by Article 27. Land, wood 
and water exploited in common by rural communities were all subject to “ social 
property”. Typically, these communities had received the respective land by 
dotación or restitución. Th ey were considered associations with legal personality 
and had a democratic organisation. Revolutionary  agrarian law identifi ed two 
community types: the  ejido (a product of a dotación) and the comunidad (a 
product of restitución or, if communities had not been dispossessed previously, 
of a confi rmation act).88
Furthermore, the Constitution of 1917 stipulated that only Mexicans were 
entitled to acquire land and water. Foreigners could obtain such permission 
provided they “waived their nationality” in relation to the land. Th is meant 
that they would not call upon their home country to protect their land. In no 
case could foreigners acquire land within 100 kilometres of the frontier or 50 
kilometres of the coast.89
In the fi rst years aft er the  Mexican Revolution, the agrarian legislation was 
casuistic and unsystematic.90 Aft er the short-lived Law of Ejidos of 1920,91 
the fi rst codifi cation aiming at a comprehensive and systematic regulation 
of  agrarian law was implemented in 1934 (Código Agrario 1934). Further 
codifi cations followed in 1940, 1942 and 1971 (Código Agrario 1940, Código 
Agrario 1942, Ley Federal de la Reforma Agraria [LFRA] 1971),92 and Article 27 
of the Constitution of 1917 was reformed several times. However, the main 
structures and principles of revolutionary  agrarian law, which are the subject of 
this chapter, remained unchanged until 1992.
reform of 1934 (Diario Ofi cial Federal of 10 January 1934), small property was protected only 
if it was actually cultivated (see Article 27 Part XV Paragraph 3 aft er this reform).
87 Article 27 Part VII Paragraph 3 Constitution of 1917, Article 1 Ley Agraria 1915.
88 For more information on ejidos and comunidades and the respective references, see Section 
III.2.
89 Article 27, Part I, Constitution of 1917.
90 Overview in Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 314 et seq., 325 et seq., & 346 et seq.
91 Ley de Ejidos of 30 December 1920, reprinted in Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 346 et seq. 
Th is law was in force for only 11 months. Th e law with which it was abrogated is reprinted in 
Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 358 et seq.
92 All codifi cations are reprinted in Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 586 et seq.
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B. SOCIAL LAW AND LEGAL “SOCIALISATION”
Revolutionary  agrarian law was developed upon the basis of revolutionary 
agrarian legislation and became an autonomous branch of law. Th is fi eld of law is 
considered a part of the so-called social law (“derecho social”), which emanated 
from the  Mexican Revolution. Apart from  agrarian law, it comprises labour 
law and social security law. Th e constitutional basis of labour law (Article 123) 
resulted from the labour movement that participated in the  Mexican Revolution 
and guaranteed fundamental rights such as the eight-hour day and the 
prohibition of  child labour.93
Mexican legal literature describes social law as a branch of law that regulates 
relationships between diff erent social groups, focusing on the interests of 
socially weaker groups and thereby protecting them. Th e main aim is to achieve 
social justice. Individuals are not abstract, but are, instead, considered parts of 
concrete social groups, such as peasants or workers. Th us, social law highlights 
any inequalities that might be disguised by the liberal conception of the isolated 
individual.  In view of these inequalities, social law tries to transform the 
contradiction between the interests of diff erent social groups in order to create 
social justice and freedom.94
Mexican legal doctrine places social law outside the classic distinction 
between private law and public law.95 Hence,  agrarian law goes beyond this 
dichotomy. Once land enclosure converted land into property, land property 
became a subject of private law, and private law was considered a sphere of 
private dispositions and free from state intervention. Limitations to the freedom 
of property became part of public law and had to be justifi ed. Th is system had 
been adopted in  Mexico aft er independence and was set aside by revolutionary 
 agrarian law.
To solidify the characteristics of social law, Mexican literature refers to 
Gustav Radbruch,96 who generated the concept of social law in opposition 
to “individualistic law”. Th e point of reference of individualistic law is an 
isolated and abstract human being who actuates individually, self-interestedly 
and rationally, and thereby corresponds to the homo economicus of classic 
economics. Judicially, this concept becomes manifest in the legal subject, an 
egalitarian concept that comprises the poor and the rich, the weak and the 
strong. It annihilates all diff erences between persons, and connects the resulting 
93 López Betancourt, note 72 above, p. 62 & 101 et seq.
94 Isaís Rivera Rodríguez, El nuevo derecho agrario mexicano, 2nd edn., ( Mexico City: McGraw 
Hill, 2000), p.  4 et seq; Lucio Mendieta y Nuñez, El Derecho Social, ( Mexico City: Porrúa, 
1953), p.  49; Ruiz Massieu, note 84 above, p.  111, 114 et seq., & 117 et seq., with further 
references.
95 López Betancourt, note 72 above, p.  62 & 108; Chávez Padrón, note 72 above, p.  295; Ruiz 
Massieu, note 84 above, p. 113 & 116 et seq; Rivera Rodríguez, note 94 above, p. 4 et seq.
96 See, for example, Ruiz Massieu, note 84 above, p. 111.
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“equality” with the freedom of property and contract. In social reality, this 
system allows for the interests of the socially stronger party to prevail over the 
interests of the socially weaker party. Material inequality is maintained and 
reproduced. In contrast, social law refers to persons in their social position, 
for example, as workers. Th e concept’s point of reference is one’s social status, 
rather than the idea of equality. In contrast, equality in the form of equalisation 
is the aim of social law. Accordingly, social law limits the rights of freedom and 
attaches diff erent obligations to these rights.97
In the draft ing history of the new  agrarian law itself, no explicit 
reference to a foreign doctrine or law can be found.98 On the contrary, the 
political actors involved were eager to stress the autochthonous origin of 
 agrarian law and criticised the liberal legislation of the nineteenth century 
for having adopted foreign legislation and allegedly universal legal ideas 
(such as property) without taking the Mexican reality into consideration.99 
However, as seen above, the constitution of social rights, as triggered by the 
 Mexican Revolution, is intertwined in the spheres of global inequalities and 
is a driver of the conception of transnational social law that was historically 
consolidated during the twentieth century. Amongst the many contributions 
to the formation of the so-called second-generation human rights, the 
Mexican experience emphasises the struggle for the  right to land as a universal 
condition for the acquisition of social rights. In Section II, we have seen 
that this experience as a whole infl uenced many international treaties and 
constitutions worldwide.
Accordingly, revolutionary  agrarian law forms part of the general “legal 
socialisation”, a post-revolutionary process that was defi nitely inter-related 
with transnational developments. Pastor Rouaix Méndez argues that the new 
Constitution of 1917 expresses the ideas of social law in accordance with the 
new thinking of social and economic justice promoted throughout the world.100 
Similarly, in the 1920s, the commission in charge of draft ing a new civil code 
argued that the aim of the new code was to “socialise” the individualistic 
character of civil law in accordance with the ideas of the  Mexican Revolution 
and international legal developments. Th us, property should no longer be 
understood as an individual right, but as a social function. In this regard, the 
commission explicitly referred to the Constitution of Weimar and to the theories 
97 Gustav Radbruch, “Vorschule der Rechtsphilosophie”, in: idem (ed), Gesamtausgabe Band 3, 
Rechtsphilosophie III, (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Verlag, 1990) (1948), p. 96 et seq.
98 Diario del Congreso Constituyente de Querétaro del 29, 30, 31 de enero 1917, Volume II, Nr 
79, 80 (debate sobre el artículo 27); Rouaix Méndez, note 83 above, p. 303 et seq.
99 Proyecto de la Comisión de Diputados sobre el Artículo 27 de la Constitución, in Díaz de 
León, note 79 above, p. 502, at 504); Luis Cabrera (deputy and lawyer with strong infl uence on 
the revolutionary  agrarian law), speech to the parliamentary assembly of 3 December 1912, in 
Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 260 et seq., at 265.
100 Rouaix Méndez, note 83 above, p. 308 et seq.
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of the León Duguit.101 Nevertheless, this openness to transnational dialogue on 
the part of the Mexican experience was not reciprocal, as it was not followed by 
the recognition of the Mexican struggles in promoting legal innovation for the 
transnational social law. On the contrary, as stated in Section II, this role was 
rendered invisible by a Eurocentric perspective on the development of rights.
C.  SOCIAL PROPERTY: EJIDOS AND COMUNIDADES
1. Characteristics
Th e idea of property as a social function also determines the two central 
institutions of revolutionary  agrarian law: the  ejido and the comunidad. Th e 
 ejido is a rural community arising from the proceedings of dotación, which 
expropriates land from large holdings and assigns it to a rural community in 
need.102 Th e term “ ejido” refers both to the community and to its communal 
land. Only Mexican citizens can be members of the  ejido, and are called 
ejidatarios.103
Th e existence of comunidades, in turn, can be traced to earlier (typically 
pre-Hispanic) times. If these communities were dispossessed of their land aft er 
the liberal counter-reforms of the nineteenth century and have had it restored 
subsequently (restitución), they form a comunidad in terms of  agrarian law.104 If 
they still possess land, they may have it confi rmed and may also be recognised as 
comunidades.105
101 Rodolfo Batiza, “Las fuentes de la codifi cación civil en la evolución jurídica de México”, in: 
José Luis Soberanes Fernández and Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México (eds), Memoria del III Congreso de Historia del Derecho 
Mexicano (1983), ( Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1984), pp. 155–
162, at 158; Juan Carlos Marín in: Juan Carlos Geneyro, Antonio Azuela and Juan Carlos 
Marín (eds), ¿Por qué leer a Durkheim hoy?, ( Mexico City: Fontamara, 2009), pp. 103–130, 
at 103 et seq., 119 & 123; Sara Montero Duhalt, “La Socialización del Derecho en el Código 
Civil de 1928”, in: Jorge A. Sánchez-Dávila and Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (eds), Libro del cincuentenario del Código Civil, 
( Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1978), pp. 157–176, at 161 et seq; 
Ernesto Gutiérrez y González, El Patrimonio, ( Mexico City: Porrúa, 2008), p. 272 et seq.
102 Article 27, Paragraph 3, Constitution of 1917; Article 21, Código Agrario of 1934; Article 62, 
Código Agrario of 1940; Articles 50 ff , Código Agrario of 1942; Articles 195 ff , LFRA of 1971; 
Ruiz Massieu, note 84 above, p. 235 et seq.
103 Article  44 a Código Agrario of 1934; Article  163 I Código Agrario of 1940; Article  54, I 
Código Agrario of 1942; Article 200 I LFRA of 1971.
104 Article  27, Part VII, Paragraph 3 Constitution 1917; Article  20 Código Agrario 1934; 
Articles 59 ff  Código Agrario 1940; Articles 46 f Código Agrario 1942; Articles 191 f LFRA 
1971; Ruiz Massieu, note 84 above, p. 235 et seq.
105 Article 35 Código Agrario 1940; Article 33 Código Agrario 1942; Articles 356 ff  LFRA 1971; 
Ruiz Massieu, note 84 above, p. 235 et seq.
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Ejidos and comunidades are associations with legal personality106 and 
legislative, administrative and controlling bodies of their own. According to the 
literature and the wording of the laws, “property”107 in the land of ejidos and 
comunidades belongs to the communities as legal persons and not to individual 
members.108 In fact, collective cultivation was the sole option envisioned by 
agrarian laws in the immediate aft ermath of the  Mexican Revolution. Only over 
time did legislation allow for individual cultivation.109 Even in these cases of 
individual use, the land remains a property of the community.110 Th e rights of 
the individual ejidatarios and comuneros are considered rights of usage and usus 
fructus, referring to the ideal parts of communal land or – if the land has been 
divided into individual parcels – to specifi c lots of land. Such lands cannot be 
rented and must be cultivated personally by the ejidatarios and comuneros.111 A 
member who tries to sell, mortgage or rent his or her plot of land loses all his or 
her parcel rights.112 Th e same applies if he or she leaves the parcel uncultivated 
for more than two years.113
Apart from the individual parcels, the  ejido comprises diff erent types of land 
that serve diff erent purposes. For example, the tierra de agostadero para uso 
común (land for common pasture) cannot be cultivated and necessarily remains 
subject to common use. Th is also applies to woods and mountains.114 Th e 
parcela escolar (school plot), in turn, provides research and teaching in the fi elds 
of general education, agriculture and rural economics.115 Th e land specially 
106 In the beginning, they were granted legal personality by federal agrarian laws and, in 1934, 
also by constitutional law (Article  27, Part VII, implemented by the constitutional reform 
published in Diario Ofi cial Federal of 10  January 1934); Chávez Padrón, note 72 above, 
p. 302.
107 Th e term “property” might lead to misunderstandings. Th is will be explained below, Section 
III.3.b.
108 Ruiz Massieu, note 84 above, p. 236 & 237; Raúl Lemus García, Derecho Agrario Mexicano, 7 
edn., ( Mexico City: Porrúa, 1991), p. 343 et seq. Article 120 Código Agrario 1940; Article 130 
Código Agrario 1942; Article 51 LFRA 1971.
109 Primera ley reglamentaria sobre repartición de tierras ejidales y constitución del patrimonio 
parcelario ejidal de 19 de diciembre de 1925 (First law on the re-distribution of ejidal land 
and the constitution of the ejidal parcel of 19  December 1925), Diario Ofi cial Federal of 
31 December 1925; Chávez Padrón, note 72 above, p. 335.
110 Article 52 LFRA 1971.
111 Article 123 Código Agrario 1940; Article 140 Código Agrario 1942; Articles 55, 76, 85 I LFRA 
1971.
112 Article 140 V a Código Agrario 1934; Article 139 I Código Agrario 1940; Article 85 V LFRA 
1971.
113 Article  140 VI b Código Agrario 1934; Article  139 II Código Agrario 1940; Article  169 
Código Agrario 1942; Article 85 I LFRA; Ruiz Massieu, note 84 above, p. 246 et seq., & 292 et 
seq.
114 Ruiz Massieu, note 84 above, p. 255 et seq; Article 147 Código Agrario 1934; Articles 85 I, 86 
II, 138 Código Agrario 1940; Articles  77, 80 I, 206 Código Agrario 1942; Articles  138, 221 
LFRA 1971.
115 Article 133 II Código Agrario 1934; Articles 145 ff  Código Agrario 1940; Articles 185 f Código 
Agrario 1942; Articles 102 f LFRA 1971.
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dedicated to women helps guarantee a certain income and thereby economic 
independence.116
Th ese are the most important characteristics that distinguish  social property 
from civil law property. To protect land as a means of existence for the rural 
population, they remove land from the free market, so that land ceases to be a 
commodity.
2. Legal Form
As mentioned, the Mexican legal literature classifi es the land of the ejidos 
and comunidades as “property” (propiedad) of the community. However, the 
literature notes that  agrarian law “property” diff ers strongly from civil law 
property.117 Th is diff erence is expressed by the term “ social property” (propiedad 
social), as opposed to “ private property” (propiedad privada). Sometimes, the 
“property” of the ejidos and comunidades is also called “property sui generis”.118 
Th e commission that elaborated Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 uses the 
term “propiedad privada plena/perfecta” (full/perfect  private property) for civil 
law property and “propiedad privada restringida” (restricted  private property) 
for the  agrarian law “property” of the ejidos and comunidades.119 Agrarian laws 
generally qualify the ejidos and comunidades as the “proprietors” (proprietarios) 
of their land.120
Although the term “property” is used for agrarian land communities, the 
characteristics of the ejidos and comunidades force the literature to modify 
the concept of property in this context. For example, Ruiz Massieu argues that 
the “property rights” of the ejidos and comunidades are not absolute rights, as 
the communities cannot dispose freely of their land.121 Furthermore, the legal 
literature employs the term “relative property”,122 and argues that the “property 
sui generis” of agrarian communities does not correspond to the concept of 
property in Roman and natural law, as adopted by the Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Napoleonic Code.123
In addition to the dominant idea that the ejidos and comunidades have 
property rights to their land, we also fi nd approaches in the literature and legal 
texts that do not use the concept of property. Instead, they use the notions of 
116 Articles 103 ff  LFRA 1971; Ruiz Massieu, note 84 above, p. 250 et seq.
117 See Ruiz Massieu, note 84 above, p. 273 et seq; Lemus García, note 108 above, p. 343 et seq.
118 Carlos Humberto Durand Alcántara, El Derecho Agrario y el Problema Agrario en México, 
( Mexico City: Porrúa, 2009) p. 261 et seq.
119 Commentary to the proposal for Article 27, submitted to the constituent assembly, reprinted 
in Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 505.
120 Article  139 Código Agrario 1934; Article  120 Código Agrario 1940; Article  130 Código 
Agrario 1942; Article 51 LFRA 1971.
121 Ruiz Massieu, note 84 above, p. 276 & 315.
122 Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 622.
123 Durand Alcántara, note 118 above, p. 262 & 272, footnote 8.
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dominio directo and dominio útil, which have their origins in feudal land 
regimes. Carlos Humberto Durand Alcántara describes the  ejido as a regime of 
simple land tenancy and possession (“regimen de tenencia de la tierra”;“simple 
posesión del suelo”) for purposes of use and exploitation, in which the nation 
keeps the dominium directo and assigns to the ejidatarios the rights of usus 
fructus.124 Similarly, the National Agrarian Commission explained in 1921 that 
the dominio in the land was divided into two parts. First, the dominio directo 
is the right to control dispositions of land, in which the land remains with the 
nation to prevent the communities from losing the land by contract, prescription 
or other legal acts. Second, the dominio útil is the right to use and exploit the 
land which belongs to the communities.125
Th e dominant classifi cation of the land of ejidos and comunidades as 
“property” is somehow misleading, above all because the respective land can 
neither be sold, nor rented, nor mortgaged. As the so-called “proprietor”, the 
community cannot dispose of “its” land and is obliged to use it according to the 
pre-ordained purposes.
D.  RIGHT TO LAND AS A FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL 
RIGHT
Revolutionary  agrarian law entitles rural communities to receive land according 
to their social and economic needs. Th e respective rights of the communities are 
social and collective rights which have their roots in the revolutionary demand 
“¡Queremos tierra para todos, para todos pan!” (“We want land for all, bread for 
all!”). Th e Constituent Assembly considered this slogan – originally proclaimed 
by the anarchistic revolutionary Ricardo Flores Magón – to be a utopia, but 
accepted it as a directive for constitutional legislation.126 One of the members of 
the Assembly argued that the demand “Land for all!” had been the central device 
of the Revolution.127
Revolutionary aims included the social liberation of the people and the 
guarantee of a life lived with dignity. Flores Magón pointed out that “the French 
Revolution achieved the right to think, but not the right to live”.128 Indeed, 
124 Ibid., p. 272, footnote 8, p. 273 & 274.
125 Circular Number 28 of 1 September 1921, quoted in Chávez Padrón, note 72 above, p. 334.
126 Ricardo Flores Magón, “Vamos hacia la vida”, (1910) 5 Regeneración, p.  3; the original 
versions of the journal Regeneración are available at: www.archivomagon.net, last accessed 
7 December 2012. (1910). Bojórquez, deputy and member of the constituent assembly, refers 
to this slogan in his speech in the constituent assembly, Diario del Congreso Constituyente of 
29, 30 and 31 January 1917, Volume II, Nr 80, p. 785 & 786.
127 See the speech of the deputy Bojórquez, Diario del Congreso Constituyente of 29, 30 and 
31 January 1917, Volume II, Nr 80, p. 785, and of the secretary Lizardi, ibid., Nr 79, p. 774 et 
seq.
128 Flores Magón, note 126 above.
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with the term “living”, he referred to a life with dignity that should include an 
appropriate economic and social basis. According to Pastor Rouaix Méndez, the 
constitutional principles of revolutionary  agrarian law were based upon giving 
the peasant the “life of the citizen”.129 Similar arguments were advanced in the 
Constituent Assembly itself, for example, when it was argued that “ rural workers 
who become proprietors achieve the independence and ease which they need to 
develop their intellectual and moral conditions”.130
At transnational level, the struggle of Mexican peasants imported two 
fundamental consequences for expanding the horizon of the notion of rights. On 
the one hand, it denounced the limits of the liberal legal model and explained 
its inability to deal with re-distributive issues. In this fashion, it contributed 
decisively to creating the legal social model and conceiving transnational social 
law. On the other hand, it challenged the notion of a universal individual by 
exposing that material inequalities are re-produced from the  power asymmetries 
already in existence, under the veil of formal freedom and equality between all 
people. Th e legacy of the Mexican struggles consists in emphasising that the 
fulfi lment of a revolutionary agrarian programme is a fundamental condition 
for the affi  rmation of social transnational rights. Th ere are no social rights 
without rights to land.
IV. THE NEO-LIBERAL REFORM OF 1992 AND NEW 
FORMS OF  LAND-GRABBING
A. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Th e realisation of the revolutionary agrarian programme has always been 
diffi  cult because of the political and economic relationships of power. 
Nevertheless, in the early 1990s, when the neo-liberal agrarian reform was 
adopted and abrogated the re-distribution of land, over 50 per cent of agrarian 
land and more than 70 per cent of the woods were subject to the regime of the 
ejidos and comunidades.131
Th e background of the 1992 Agrarian Reform was dominated by the 
economic and debt crises of the 1980s. Th e productivity of the Mexican 
agrarian sector had decreased and most of the alimentation formerly produced 
by Mexican peasants had to be imported.132 Th e government argued that the 
129 Rouaix Méndez, note 83 above, quoted in Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 310.
130 Speech of the secretary Lizardi, Diario del Congreso Constituyente of 29, 30 and 31 January 
1917, Volume II, Nr 79, p. 775.
131 Ana de Ita, “Land Concentration in  Mexico aft er PROCEDE”, in: Peter Rosset, Raj Patel and 
Michael Courville (eds), Promised Land: Competing Visions of Agrarian Reform, (Oakland 
CA: Food First Books, 2006), pp. 148–164, at 149.
132 José Luis Calva, La disputa por la tierra, ( Mexico City: Fontamara, 1993), p. 13 et seq.
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decrease in production was due to the “rigid property regime” of the ejidos, 
which did not allow for investment.133
Critics of the Agrarian Counter-Reform reject this explanation and argue 
that it was a mistake to hold the ejidos responsible for the agrarian crises. Th e 
ejidos were also the basis of agrarian production in the past, when the Mexican 
agrarian sector was referred to as the “Mexican miracle” due to its high 
productivity. Hence, the tenancy structure of ejidos does not prevent productivity 
per se.134 Th e decrease in agrarian production in the 1980s occurred due to 
general economic developments, in particular the decline of public agrarian 
support and the price erosion of agricultural products on the world market.135 
Also, a working paper by John Richard Heath of the World Bank (1990) argues 
that there is no evidence that the ejidos are less productive per se than agrarian 
land subject to  private property. Th e decisive factors aff ecting the productivity of 
both forms of agrarian production are price and subsidy policies.136
In contrast, the Mexican government under President Salinas de Gortari 
insisted on the need to “modernise the agrarian sector”. Th e notion of 
“modernisation” meant de-regulation, privatisation and opening the agrarian 
sector to transnational  trade and competition. Accordingly, reforming the 
tenancy structures of agrarian land meant privatising agrarian land and 
subjecting it to the free market.137
Th ese policies were closely connected to the  NAFTA negotiations, to  Mexico’s 
public debt and the resulting infl uence of the transnational fi nancial institutions, 
mainly the World Bank.138 Hence, the Reform was also an adaptation of 
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 to the transnational normative 
order dominated by the neo-liberal politics of free  trade and protecting 
investments.
Th e  NAFTA liberalised the agrarian sector by eliminating tariff  and non-
tariff  barriers. Th is resulted in severe competition problems for the Mexican 
agrarian sector, which was fl ooded by highly subsidised agrarian products from 
133 Iniciativa de Reformas de 1992 al Artículo 27 Constitucional, reprinted in Díaz de León, note 
79 above, p. 918 et seq.
134 Calva, note 132 above, p. 13 et seq; Durand Alcántara, note 118 above, p. 419.
135 Calva, note 132 above, p.  13 et seq. With regard to the adverse eff ects of reduced agrarian 
support, see, also, Alicia Puyana and José Romero, Diez años con el TLCAN. Las experiencias 
del sector agropecuario mexicano, ( Mexico City: Flacso México/Colegio de México, 2005), 
p. 21, and Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 870.
136 John Richard Heath, “Enhancing the Contribution of Land Reform to Mexican Agricultural 
Development”, Working Paper of the Agriculture and Rural Development Department and 
Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Offi  ce of the World Bank, February 1990; World 
Bank Working Paper (1990) p. 1, 7, 45 et seq., & 56.
137 Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 868 et seq; Durand Alcántara, note 118 above, p. 414 & 418 et 
seq.
138 Durand Alcántara, note 118 above, p. 346 et seq., 411 et seq; Calva, note 132 above, p. 73 et seq; 
Willem Assies, “Land Tenure and Tenure Regimes in  Mexico: An Overview”, (2008) 8 Journal 
of Agrarian Change, pp. 33–63, at 49 et seq; Chávez Padrón, note 72 above, p. 395 et seq.
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the United States. Th e situation was aggravated by the fact that the Mexican 
government had started to reduce agrarian support even before the  NAFTA was 
enacted.139 Although the  NAFTA does not include rules regarding the agrarian 
property regime, it infl uenced the Agrarian Counter-Reform in several ways. 
First, the opening of the agrarian sector to transnational  trade and competition, 
and the privatisation of agrarian land stemmed from the same neo-liberal 
agrarian politics. Second, the agrarian property regime was actually an issue 
during the  NAFTA negotiations. Th e United States in particular questioned 
the possibility of expropriating land for purposes of social re-distribution, 
the inalienability of the land of the ejidos and comunidades, and the strong 
restrictions on foreign investors acquiring agrarian land.140 Th e long story of 
US interventions against Mexican revolutionary  agrarian law continued; indeed, 
since 1917, Washington had been pressuring Mexican governments again and 
again to protect the landed property of US citizens and enterprises.141
Th e World Bank also infl uenced the Agrarian Counter-Reform of 1992. 
Heath’s 1990 working paper includes a list of “recommendations” for the 
Mexican agrarian sector. According to this publication, the central problem of 
the ejidal land regime is the legal uncertainty caused by the prohibition of selling 
and renting of the land – a prohibition oft en infringed in practice.142 Another 
problematical aspect is that many ejidatarios do not possess land titles, which 
prevents them from investing in improvements of their land.143 Furthermore, 
Heath makes the criticism that the ejidos do not have access to the commercial 
credit market and depend on public credit systems that are allegedly paternalistic 
and ineffi  cient.144
In this context, Heath criticises common use according to the typical 
argument advanced against the  commons: the individual ejidatario does not 
feel responsible for the land used in common and exploits it according to his or 
her egoistic interests as much as he or she can, which leads to over-exploiting 
and exhausting the land. Hence, compared to land that is cultivated upon the 
basis of  private property, productivity decreases. Th e same argument had 
already been brought forward by the defenders of the enclosure system against 
the  commons in feudal England, and, following Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of 
the  Commons”,145 it still dominates the debate about the  commons today. In all 
139 Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 868 et seq; Puyana and Romero, note 135 above, p. 21.
140 Calva, note 132 above, p. 76 et seq. See, also, Assies, note 138 above, at 49, and Chávez Padrón, 
note 72 above, p. 307 et seq.
141 Gilly, note 74 above, p. 259 et seq., & 351; Sergio Reyes Osorio, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Salomón 
Eckstein and Juan Ballesteros, Estructura Agraria y desarrollo agrícola en México: Estudio 
sobre las relaciones entre la tenencia y uso de la tierra y el desarrollo agrícola de México, 
reprint, ( Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1979), p. 27 et seq.
142 Heath, note 136 above, p. 4, 6, & 22 et seq.
143 Ibid., p. 44.
144 Ibid., p. 5, 35 et seq.
145 Garret Hardin, “Th e Tragedy of the  Commons”, (1968) 162 Science, pp. 1244–1247.
Chapter 11. Th e Zapatista Struggle for the Right to Land
Intersentia 291
of these contexts, the defenders of  private property allege that  common land is 
over-exploited and treated without diligence, and that the users do not invest in 
the land due to lack of incentives.
Notwithstanding this, according to Heath’s working paper, there is no 
evidence that an  ejido would be less productive per se than  private property,146 
except that ejidal land divided into parcels is preferred to land used in 
common. Heath also stresses the symbolic signifi cance of the ejidos. Th ey 
represent the  Mexican Revolution and its heroes as well as the government’s 
historical obligation towards the rural poor. Th erefore, the total abolition of 
the ejidos could provoke  resistance. As a result, he recommends not abolishing 
the institution, but substantially de-regulating it.147 For this purpose, Heath 
concretely suggests issuing documents that prove the titles of the ejidatarios 
to their parcels, to permit the renting and leasing of ejidal land, as well as 
transferring the rights to the parcels from one ejidatario to another.148 However, 
the expansive privatisation of agrarian land fulfi lled by the 1992 Reform went 
well beyond these recommendations.
B. PRIVATISATION AND END OF 
LAND RE-DISTRIBUTION
Th e 1992 Reform brought about fundamental changes to Article 27 of the 1917 
Constitution, including a new  agrarian law (Ley Agraria 1992) that abrogated 
the LFRA 1971. Th e changes were so extensive that the  agrarian law post-1992 
was no longer called the “revolutionary  agrarian law”. In general, the  agrarian 
law moved from social to civil and commercial law, as directly refl ected in 
Article  2 Ley Agraria 1992, which stipulates the subsidiary application of civil 
and commercial law rules.
One of the most important and disputed changes refers to the 
re-distribution of land. Th e 1992 Reform abolished the possibility 
of expropriating land from large land holdings for the purposes of 
re-distribution. Concretely, it abolished the previously mentioned dotación. 
Hence, since the Reform of 1992, the limits to the so-called “small properties” 
are relevant only with regard to the general constitutional aims of fostering 
small properties and breaking up large land holdings.149 Th ese aims, however, 
are no longer accompanied by a legal entitlement either for individuals or 
146 Heath, note 136 above, p. 1, 7, 45 et seq., & 56.
147 Ibid., p. 55 et seq.
148 Ibid., p. 1, 6, 7 et seq., 22, & 57 et seq.; Calva, note 132 above, p. 73 et seq.
149 See Article 27, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution of 1917 in the version of the Diario Ofi cial 
Federal of 6  January 1992 (which is still in force) in contrast to its original version (which 
corresponds to the version in force before the Reform of 1992. Th is was the version of the 
Diario Ofi cial Federal of 10 August 1987).
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communities. Hence, they are hardly eff ective and do not bring about social 
re-distribution.
Th e second important change was the opening of  social property to the 
transnational free market. With the Reform, diff erent legal options to sell, 
rent, mortgage and prescribe ejidal land were implemented. Furthermore, 
ejidal land could now be converted to civil law property and detracted from 
the  agrarian law regime.150 Th e respective provisions of the Ley Agraria 1992 
refer explicitly to the ejidos but, in large part, also apply to comunidades.151 In 
detail, they stipulate that third persons (meaning persons who are not members 
of the community) can acquire rights of usage for both  common land and in the 
parcels of an  ejido.152 Th is involves abolishing the obligation of the ejidatarios 
to cultivate the land personally.153 Furthermore, the right of usus fructus in 
the ejidal land used in common and in the ejidal parcel can be transferred or 
pledged as security.154 Th ereby, the ejidos gain access to the private credit 
market, whereas, formerly, they could only receive public credits specially 
provided to the agrarian sector.155
Th eoretically, the principle that the “property” in ejidal land is inalienable 
and imprescriptible, and that it cannot be subject to a mortgage, still applies.156 
In practice, companies can now acquire communal land, provided that the  ejido 
and/or the ejidatarios acquire shares in the respective company in return.157 
Correspondingly, an individual ejidatario can assign his or her rights of use and 
usus fructus in his or her parcel to a company if, with this assignment, he or 
she acquires shares in this company.158 All these assignments involve a change 
in the regime for the respective land. Th e rights held by companies in the land 
must also be rights of civil law or commercial law. Aft er all, a company is a legal 
“person” not of  agrarian law but of general civil and commercial law. Hence, 
the companies acquire civil law property rights or civil law rights of use. Th ese 
rights are subject not to  agrarian law but to civil and commercial law, and the 
150 Article 27, Part VII, Paragraph 4 in the version of the Diario Ofi cial Federal of 6 January 1992 
(version still in force at this writing).
151 Th e relevant articles in particular are Articles 20, 45, 46, 60 & 74 together with Articles 75, 79, 
80 & 100 regarding the freedom of disposition and Articles 20, 48 Ley Agraria 1992 regarding 
the prescription. Th e wording of these articles mentions only ejidos; with regard to their 
application to comunidades, see Article 107 Ley Agraria of 1992.
152 Articles  45 and 79 Ley Agraria 1992. According to Articles  100, 107 this also applies to 
comunidades.
153 Armando López Nogales and Rafael López Nogales, Ley Agraria Comentada, ( Mexico City: 
Porrúa, 2008), p. 132.
154 Article 46 Ley Agraria 1992.
155 López Nogales and López Nogales, note 153 above, p. 133.
156 Article 74 Ley Agraria 1992.
157 Article  75 Ley Agraria 1992. In accordance with Articles  100 and 107, this also applies to 
comunidades.
158 Article 79 Ley Agraria 1992.
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 ejido and/or the ejidatarios become(s) shareholders.159 As a further possibility of 
disposition, the Reform of 1992 allows an ejidatario to transfer his or her rights 
in the parcel to another ejidatario.160
Moreover, the 1992 Reform enables the conversion of ejidal land into civil 
law property. In this context, the  agrarian law provisions refer to civil law 
property as “dominio pleno” (full property). With this conversion, the respective 
land is also detracted from the  agrarian law regime. Two proceedings can be 
distinguished: fi rst, the conversion of an ejidal parcel into property by a decision 
of the asamblea and an application to the National Agrarian Register by the 
ejidatario concerned;161 and second, the termination of the ejidal regime for the 
entire  ejido by a decision of the asamblea, whereby the ejidatarios acquire the 
ejidal land proportionally in the form of civil law property.162
In addition, the Reform brought new rules to facilitate foreign investment. 
Companies can now acquire a land surface 21 times larger than the limits of the 
so-called “small property”; with regard to the shareholder, this applies diff erent 
rules of proportionality.163 Foreign shareholders must not hold more than 49 
per cent of the capital, which represents the agrarian property of a company.164
Finally, the Agrarian Counter-Reform of 1992 was accompanied by 
programmes of land certifi cation, entitled Procede and Procecom.165 With these 
programmes, certifi cates are issued for  common land and for parcels in order to 
guarantee legal certainty, facilitate dispositions over the land, and attract foreign 
investment.166
C. THE EXPLANATIONS AND AIMS 
OF THE GOVERNMENT
According to the Mexican government,167 the 1992 Agrarian Counter-Reform 
is a response to the extreme poverty of the rural population and the low 
159 López Nogales and López Nogales, note 153 above, p.  188 et seq. Th e authors use the term 
“derecho común”, which, in this context, means the general private law in the sense of a law 
that is applied in general and not only to the agrarian land.
160 Article 80 Ley Agraria 1992.
161 Article 81 ff  Ley Agraria 1992.
162 Article 29 Ley Agraria 1992.
163 Article 27 Part IV Constitution 1917 in the version of the Diario Ofi cial Federal of 6 January 
1992; Articles 126, 129 Ley Agraria 1992.
164 Article 130 Ley Agraria 1992.
165 “Programa de Certifi cación de Derechos ejidales y Solares Urbanos”, (Procede, Programme 
for the Certifi cation of ejidal rights and solares urbanos); “Programa de Certifi cación 
de Derechos Comunales”, (Procecom, Programme for the Certifi cation of the rights of 
comunidades).
166 de Ita, note 131 above.
167 Iniciativa de Reforma de 1992 al Artículo 27 Constitucional, reprinted in Díaz de León, note 
79 above, p. 918 et seq.
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productivity of the agrarian sector. Specifi cally, the government notes that 
the rural population oft en violated the prohibitions of  agrarian law in the 
past, renting and selling ejidal land in reaction to social misery. In fact, this 
practice oft en happened with the complicity of the responsible state authorities. 
Th erefore, it should be legalised so that the peasants can dispose of their land 
upon a legal basis and with legal protection.168 Moreover, the government argues 
that previous demands for land could no longer be satisfi ed due to population 
growth, therefore justifying the need for an agrarian counter-reform.169
In the end, these arguments are directed towards prompting poor 
peasants to transfer their land to those who are supposed to exploit the land 
more effi  ciently according to the capitalist and neo-liberal logic of profi t – 
above all, because they have more capital and technology. Although it is not 
stated explicitly, this aim implies that the peasants, having sold their land, 
are subsequently to maintain themselves by wage labour, perhaps even by 
working on the land that was formerly theirs, and that thereby both the quality 
of their life and the agrarian productivity will increase. Th is idea is not new. 
As stated above, it had already been advanced by the defenders of enclosure 
against the commoners in feudal England. Privatised land was to become the 
property of those who were both able and willing to cultivate it according to 
capitalist standards, and the landless commoners should convert themselves 
into agricultural or industrial workers. Th is was also deemed to be a factor 
of modernisation and progress.170 In Section II, we showed that this process 
implies the repetition of primitive accumulation, in terms of what Harvey labels 
“accumulation by  dispossession”. It is a fundamental mechanism for the cross-
border expansion of neo-liberalism.
In truth, the government’s argument that the sale and rent of the ejidal land 
had already been a common practice is weak. Th e government itself argues 
that the reason for this practice was the peasants’ lack of technology and 
capital.  Yet this problem could be solved with specifi c support, in particular 
regarding machinery and irrigation systems. Furthermore, with regard to the 
low education level and the widespread illiteracy of rural people, it is doubtful 
whether they would fi nd any work that could guarantee a means of subsistence 
once they had lost their land. Moreover, the reform goes far beyond the alleged 
practice of de facto selling and renting when it allows the mortgaging and the 
conversion of the ejidal land into  private property.
168 Díaz de León, note 79 above, p. 924.
169 Iniciativa de Reforma de 1992 al Artículo 27 Constitucional, reprinted in Díaz de León, note 
79 above, p. 924 & 926 et seq; Comments of the parliamentary commission, reprinted in Díaz 
de León, note 79 above, p. 941 et seq., & 946.
170 J.M. Neeson, Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in England, 1700–
1820, reprint, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 21 et seq.
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D. THE CONCENTRATION OF LAND AND LAND GRABS
Abolishing land re-distribution by dotación ended a process that was still a 
work in progress at that time. Because of the economic and politic power of the 
large landholders, and because governments and local politicians oft en did not 
support the revolutionary agrarian programme, its realisation lagged far behind 
its ambitious aims. Th is is particularly true for the south of  Mexico. In Chiapas, 
for example, the social and economic situation in the early 1990s was still 
dominated by land confl icts between the large land holders and the rural (above 
all, indigenous) poor, who had either insuffi  cient or no land to enable them to 
survive.171 Th e Agrarian Counter-Reform of 1992 legalised these confl ictual 
structures of distribution.
In addition, the special rules for land acquisition by companies created 
further possibilities of land concentration.172 José Luis Calva criticises the huge 
properties which, in the wake of the Reform, can be acquired by stock companies 
as modern share-based latifundio. Economically, these large land holdings are 
unjustifi ed, as no proof exists that they are more productive than smaller land 
holdings when provided with the same technological equipment.173 Moreover, 
critics of the reform argue that the allowed percentage of foreign capital 
participation in agrarian land is too high and threatens both territorial and  food 
sovereignty.174
Th e new possibilities of disposing of the ejidal land and of converting it 
into  private property have brought about a phenomenon that may be described 
as “legitimised land grab”. Th is term refers to the problem that economic and 
sometimes political pressure, the low education level of the rural population, 
and the corruption of local authorities lead to situations in which apparently 
legal transactions over land disguise new forms of fraudulent and violent land 
acquisitions. Th ere is thus a clear pattern of accumulation by  dispossession, 
exactly as described in Section II.
Th e  NAFTA aggravates this problem by opening the agrarian sector to the 
highly subsidised products of the United States, against which Mexican products 
cannot compete.175 Th ereby, further economic pressure on Mexican peasants 
ensues. Th is pressure, coupled with the low level of education and the scant 
171 Calva, note 132 above, p. 27; de Ita, “México: Impactos del Procede en los confl ictos agrarios y 
la concentración de la tierra”, note 131 above, p. 24 & 27 et seq.
172 Durand Alcántara, note 118 above, p. 440 et seq; Calva, note 132 above, p. 81.
173 Calva, note 132 above, p. 63, 152 et seq.
174 See the critique of the parliamentary opposition in Gaceta Parlamentaria of 16  June 2000, 
p. 5.
175 See Timothy Wise, “Agricultural Dumping under  NAFTA. Estimating the Costs of U.S. 
Agricultural Policies to Mexican Producers”, Working Paper 2009, available at: www.ase.
tuft s.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/09–08AgricDumping.pdf, last accessed 7  December 2012; in the 
context of the Agrarian Counter-Reform of 1992, see, also, Díaz de León, note 79 above, 
p. 869, and Assies, note 138 above, p. 56 et seq.
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economic experience of the rural population, leads to contracts regarding the 
ejidal land being concluded with national or transnational investors in situations 
of extremely unequal bargaining power.176
Th e media has reported many cases of highly unfair contracts between 
ejidatarios and transnational enterprises. In many cases, the purchase price 
or the rents paid to the peasants were much lower than the true value of 
the acquired land. Many of these contracts benefi ted international mining 
companies.177 Furthermore, cases came to light in which the interested buyer 
– sometimes in collaboration with state authorities or the ejidal administrative 
bodies – exerted enormous pressure on the ejidatarios, sometimes using threats 
and  violence,178 or concluded contracts without the necessary approval of the 
asamblea.179 Moreover, dispositions over the ejidal land can provoke severe 
confl icts within the ejidal community between those who want to sell or rent 
and those who do not.
For illustration purposes, one example of these new forms of “legitimised 
land grabs” is described in more detail. Th is land grab occurred in San José 
del Progreso, a municipality in the southern state of Oaxaca, and provoked an 
explosive confl ict that peaked in early 2012 when one of the leading activists 
was murdered. Th e parties involved are an  ejido of San José del Progreso and 
the mining company Cuzcatlán, a subsidiary of the Canadian mining company 
Fortuna Silver. Th e confl ict arose from contracts concluded between the 
176 Calva, note 132 above, p. 23, 68 et seq., 81 et seq., & 157 et seq.
177 See, for example, the contracts between ejidatarios of the state of Oaxaca and Spanish 
enterprises, La Jornada, 6  November 2008, p.  19: “Buscan sacar a fi rmas españolas de 
Oaxaca”, and La Jornada, 17 November 2008, p. 13: “Apoyo del gobierno al Corredor Eólico.” 
Furthermore, the contracts between ejidatarios and a Canadian mining company in San José 
del Progreso, Oaxaca, La Jornada, 8 August 2011, p. 9: “Mentiras y traiciones, estrategias de 
trasnacionales para obtener ganancias”, and La Jornada, 8 August 2011, p. 8: “Se alista minera 
canadiense a explotar ejidos en Oaxaca; temen grave contaminación”; for further cases that 
also involve mining companies: La Jornada, 26 June 2009, p. 34: “Ejidatarios de Chihuahua 
demandan a minera renegociar precio de tierras”; La Jornada, 26 May 2009, p. 30: “Habitantes 
de tres ejidos en Zacatecas exigen a minera canadiense cumplir compromisos”; La Jornada, 
23 April 2009, p. 36: “Firman ejidatarios de Zacatecas acuerdo con la minera Goldcorp.”
178 See, for example, the case of the comunidad Santa Rosa Jáuregui in Querétaro, La Jornada, 
8  August 2008: “Ejidatarios queretanos denuncian presiones para vender tierras”; the legal 
dispute between the  ejido El Quince and the company Coppel, La Jornada, 8  December 
2008, p. 40: “Amenazan a ejidatarios de Sinaloa”, and La Jornada, 9 December 2008, p. 38: 
“Investigan anomalías en desistimiento de juicio campesino contra Coppel en Sinaloa”; 
the contracts between a Canadian mining company and the  ejido San José del Progreso in 
Oaxaca, La Jornada, 8 August 2011, p. 9: “Mentiras y traiciones, estrategias de trasnacionales 
para obtener ganancias”, and La Jornada, 8 August 2011, p. 8: “Se alista minera canadiense 
a explotar ejidos en Oaxaca; temen grave contaminación”; a case of threats and pressure 
towards ejidatarios is reported in La Jornada, 17 March 2009, p. 31: “Ejidatarios denuncian 
hostigamiento”. Many cases are mentioned in a report in La Jornada, 25  July 2011, p.  17: 
“Obliga la Procuraduría Agraria a ejidatarios a vender sus tierras a empresas particulares: 
Cocyp.”
179 Report in La Jornada, 24  May 2009, p.  33: “Poladores de El Monteón, Nayarit, denuncian 
despojo de playa y represión por defenderla.”
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ejidatarios of this  ejido and the enterprise Cuzcatlán. According to background 
reports,180 Cuzcatlán was granted a public licence for mining activities in 
the region of San José del Progreso. Because the corresponding land was an 
ejidal, the exercising of mining activities also required the acquisition of the 
appropriate  land rights (the property rights or rights of usage) from the  ejido and 
the ejidatarios. Th e then-governor of the state of Oaxaca and the Procuraduría 
Agraria intervened in the  ejido so that individual parcels were converted into 
property. Furthermore, the governor took action against a  resistance movement 
that arose from within the  ejido, which tried to prevent the assigning of rights 
to Cuzcatlán. Ultimately, Cuzcatlán concluded contracts with 32 ejidatarios, 
earning the rights of usus fructus for 30 years. However, it seems that these 
ejidatarios neither knew of the intentions of the mining company nor about 
the gold and silver deposits on their land. One of them argued in an interview 
that he “had no idea what this was all about” and that only aft er concluding the 
contract did he learn that Cuzcatlán was interested in the gold and silver. He 
had assigned the right of usus fructus for eight hectares of land for 30 years and 
received 40,000 Mexican pesos (about 2,270 euros) per hectare. “Never in my life 
had I seen so much money! I got carried away.” Cuzcatlán, in contrast, alleges 
that, in general, it had paid per hectare between 160,000 and 180,000 Mexican 
pesos (between about 9,000 and 10,200 euros). Th e aff ected  ejido forms part of a 
semi-arid zone, its land is of low fertility and production has served, above all, to 
meet the needs of its own population. “Th erefore, the contracts with the mining 
company gave many of us hope.” Within the  ejido, violent confl icts erupted 
between those who had concluded contracts with Cuzcatlán and the opponents 
of these transactions. In total, Cuzcatlán acquired usus fructus rights to 92 
hectares of land. Th e company argues that its project will benefi t the community, 
because it will create 650 jobs.
Th e confl icts regarding the aff ected land continue at the time of writing. In 
early 2012, a leading activist of the movement against Cuzcatlán was murdered. 
Th e ejidatarios who have assigned the rights of their land to the company have 
thereby lost their means of subsistence. It was a poor livelihood, but when the 
money received from Cuzcatlán ends, they will be left  with nothing and will 
be dependent on wage labour. Perhaps they will work in Cuzcatlán’s mines 
or migrate to larger cities in  Mexico or to the United States. In general, the 
communities of San José del Progreso fear contamination of the  environment 
and the water because of the mining operations, but Cuzcatlán denies such 
risks.
180 See the background report in La Jornada, 8  August 2011, p.  9: “Mentiras y traiciones, 
estrategias de trasnacionales para obtener ganancias”, and La Jornada, 8 August 2011, p. 8: 
“Se alista minera canadiense a explotar ejidos en Oaxaca; temen grave contaminación.” 
Further reports on this case are available at: www.educaoaxaca.org.
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V. FORMS OF STRUGGLE AND THEIR 
TRANSFORMATION DIMENSION
A. TRANSNATIONAL RESONANCE
With the privatisation of agrarian land, Mexican neo-liberal politics reached 
their peak with intense and escalated rural social protests. On the day  NAFTA 
entered into force, at a time when rebellions seemed to have passed and the 
neo-liberal order seemed to have become the only alternative at global and 
transnational level, the  EZLN’s “¡Ya basta!” fundamentally opposed this 
restriction of perspectives.
Th e enormous resonance of the Zapatista uprising among left ist movements 
and with intellectuals worldwide was not only a result of solidarity, but also 
– and this is even more interesting – of identifi cation. Although the living 
conditions in European cities, for example, diff er from those in the Lacandon 
Jungle, the “¡Ya basta!” of the Zapatistas expressed an unease also felt by many 
European urban people.
Aware of the transnational dimension of its struggle, the  EZLN consistently 
addresses an international audience, in particular with their communiqués 
and organising of transnational political events. For example, two years aft er 
the insurrection, the  EZLN called the “First Intercontinental Meeting for 
Humanity and against Neo-liberalism” (Primer Encuentro Intercontinental por 
la Humanidad y contra el Neoliberalismo).181 In the Sixth Declaration of the 
Lacandon Jungle,182 they argue that “the neo-liberal globalisation is a global 
war of conquest, a world war, a war made by capitalism in order to enforce its 
domination worldwide”.
B. TWO COMPLEMENTARY STRATEGIES
1. Building their own World beyond the Existing Order
On the one hand, the  EZLN turns its back on the state, the political institutions, 
political parties and laws, building “its own world”. Th e occupation 
(re-conquest) of land and the establishment of the municipios autónomos form 
a central part of this strategy. Th ey have enacted several “laws” to be applied 
throughout their autonomous territory, for example, a “Revolutionary  agrarian 
181 Th is information is available at: http://palabra.ezln.org.mx, last accessed 7 December 2012.
182 Sexta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, June 2005, available at: http://enlacezapatista.
ezln.org.mx/2005/11/13/sexta-declaracion-de-la-selva-lacandona, last accessed 5  January 
2013.
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law”183 based upon the principles of the revolutionary agrarian legislation of 
1917.
John Holloway describes the Zapatista autonomies as the “other side of 
saying that we want to change the world without taking power”. Th is form of 
struggle fi ghts the dominant neo-liberal order by creating space and time beyond 
the capitalistic logic. Th ereby, neo-liberalism suff ers fractures and disruptions. 
According to Holloway, this strategy might serve as a source of inspiration for 
other social movements.184 It “is the revolutionary challenge at the beginning 
of the twenty-fi rst century: to change the world without taking power. […] Th e 
Zapatistas have said that they want to make the world anew, to create a world of 
dignity, a world of humanity, but without taking power”.185 Th e  EZLN describes 
its strategy as “building from below and for below an alternative to neo-liberal 
destruction”.186 Based upon their autonomous municipalities, they aim to build 
a “non-institutional alternative”.187
In this context, the poetic language and artistic images used by the Zapatistas 
are not just a matter of form, but rather a central part of their struggle, because:
“[they] off er a diff erent way of seeing the world, a vision that breaks with the 
dominant logic of there-is-no-alternative. Poetry (and indeed other forms of artistic 
expression) has come to play a central role in the anti-capitalist struggle: poetry not 
as pretty words but as struggle against the prosaic logic of the world, poetry as the 
call of a world that does not yet exist.”188
2. Struggling within the Existing National and Transnational Order
Although the  EZLN focuses on creating its own element beyond the existing 
order, we should not ignore, in contrast, that it also struggles for the realisation 
of reforms within the existing legal system to gain as much room as possible in 
order to establish an alternative world. Accordingly, the Zapatistas negotiated 
with the government, proposed concrete reforms of the Constitution, in 
183 Ley Agraria Revolucionaria 1993, in: Carlos Monsiváis and Elena Poniatowska (eds),  EZLN. 
Documentos y comunicados, Vol. 1. ( Mexico City: Era, 2003), p. 43 et seq.
184 John Holloway, “Die zwei Zeiten. Lieder von Unschuld und Erfahrung”, in: idem (ed), Die 
zwei Zeiten der Revolution. Würde, Macht und die Politik der Zapatistas. 2nd edn., (Vienna: 
Turia + Kant, 2007), pp. 69–74. (2007) p. 72; idem, “Zapatismo Urbano”, (2005) 29 Humboldt 
Journal of Social Relations, pp. 168–178, at 172.
185 Holloway, “Die zwei Zeiten. Lieder von Unschuld und Erfahrung”, note 184 above, p. 20.
186 Sexta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, June 2005, http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.
mx/2005/11/13/sexta-declaracion-de-la-selva-lacandona, last accessed 5 January 2013.
187 Comunicado del Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena – comandancia General del 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, 30 de diciembre de 2012 (Communiqué from the 
Indigenous Revolutionary Clandestine Committee – General Command of the  Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation, 30  December 2012), http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/
2012/12/30/el- ezln-anuncia-sus-pasos-siguientes-comunicado-del-30-de-diciembre-del-2012, 
last accessed 15 January 2013.
188 Holloway, “Zapatismo Urbano”, note 185 above, at 176.
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particular of Article 27, and still insist on the constitutional implementation of 
the Agreements of San Andrés.189
At transnational level, the Zapatistas refer mainly to  ILO Convention 169. 
Th ey pose the social question as a transnational social question, and many of 
their demands correspond to transnational social rights that are protected in 
international agreements such as the Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including, 
for example, the  right to food, health, housing, education, etc. Hence, the  EZLN 
is just one of the social movements “joining in the call for transnational social 
rights and global  commons”.190
Th is is specifi cally true for the agrarian problem. Although there is no 
international consensus that  land rights are human rights, particularly due to the 
dominant Eurocentric perspective on human rights, it cannot be disputed that 
 tenure rights – which provide access to land, fi sheries and forests – are essential 
for the realisation of human rights, in particular, the right to a standard of living 
adequate for health and well-being, including food and housing. Tenure systems 
are thus increasingly discussed in the context of international human rights,191 
and some experts even argue that land should be recognised and protected as a 
human right.192
Indeed, several international human rights’ provisions off er a legal basis for 
land claims. Primarily, access to land is closely related to the right to adequate 
food, as recognised under Article  25 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and Article  11 of the International Covenant on  Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. Indeed, the  right to food does not automatically translate into 
a  right to land because governments may pursue its realisation through policy 
interventions in other areas. However, not taking appropriate steps to tackle 
resource access violates the  right to food if it results in insuffi  cient access to 
adequate food because of a lack of alternative livelihood sources.193
Consequently, the  right to food requires that states refrain from taking 
measures that may deprive individuals of access to the productive resources 
upon which they depend when they produce food for themselves (the obligation 
189 See, for example, the reports in the Mexican newspaper La Jornada, 2  January 2013, p.  6 
& 7, (“Los comunicadoes del  EZLN, mensaje de vigencia y visión de la realidad nacional”, 
“Demanda el gobernador de Chiapas cumplir los acuerdos de San Andrés”) and the recent 
Comunicado del Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena – comandancia General del 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, 30 de diciembre de 2012, note 230 above.
190 Fischer-Lescano and Möller, note 3 above, p. XXX.
191  FAO, “Voluntary  Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests in the Context of National  Food Security”, (Rome:  FAO, 2012); De Schutter, note 4 
above.
192 De Schutter, note 4 above, p. 4 & 5.
193 Lorenzo Cotula, “Th e  Right to Food and Access to Natural Resources: Using Human Rights 
Arguments and Mechanisms to Improve Resource Access for the Rural Poor”, (Rome:  FAO, 
2008), p. 23 & 59.
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to respect). When a community has settled on a piece of land and depends 
upon that land for its livelihood, the obligation to respect the  right to food thus 
requires that eviction of the community from that land be prohibited and, should 
prevention fail, it should provide eff ective remedies to those whose human rights 
have been violated. Furthermore, states are obliged to protect such access from 
encroachment by other private parties (the obligation to protect). Finally, the 
state must pro-actively engage in activities intended to strengthen people’s access 
to resources to ensure their livelihood(s), including  food security (the obligation 
to fulfi l).194 Th us, if landless groups have no alternative means of producing or 
purchasing food, the state has to make access to resources possible – for example, 
through re-distributive programmes that may result in restrictions on others’ 
rights to property. In these cases, the realisation of the  right to food constitutes a 
public purpose which justifi es the taking of property.195
Th e right to property196 is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it may be 
used by private proprietors against landless groups to constrain re-distributive 
reform eff orts. On the other, it may also be used to protect marginalised groups, 
because it extends to forms of land occupation that are not formally recognised 
through a legal title or that are based only upon customary tenure. For example, 
the  Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights consider that indigenous people’s traditional 
possession of their lands has eff ects equivalent to those of a full property title. 
Th us, states may have to recognise the customary systems of land tenure that 
protect communal property rights.197 In this sense, the struggles of Mexican 
peasants and indigenous people put pressure on the transnational legal order not 
only to adopt the principle of the social function of property, but also to re-defi ne 
this principle as communal property.
Clearly, the situation of indigenous people is specifi c in so far as the  land 
rights of such peoples are explicitly recognised under international human 
rights law. In particular,  ILO Convention 169 (Articles  13–19) and the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples [Articles  8 (2) (b) and 10] 
protect the relationship of indigenous communities with their lands, territories 
and resources.
Neo-liberal agrarian policies that promote individual titling, propertisation 
and the creation of marketable  land rights have not been able to fulfi l the 
obligations arising from transnational social rights. In fact, they have been an 
194  Committee on  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12 on the right to 
adequate food, 12. May 1999 (E/C. 12/1999/5), paragraph 15; De Schutter, note 4 above, p. 3.
195 Cotula, note 193 above, p. 59; De Schutter, note 4 above, p. 4.
196 Th e right to property is protected under Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
197 De Schutter, note 4 above, p. 8.
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obstacle. Olivier De Schutter, the  Special Rapporteur on the  Right to Food, 
argues that, for groups living upon the basis of  common land usage, the 
formalisation of property rights is the problem, not the solution: it may cause 
them to be fenced off  from the very resources upon which they depend. In 
addition, individual titling can become a source of confl ict and legal insecurity 
if it confl icts with customary rules and communal land ownership. Finally, 
the creation of a market for  land rights may have a series of undesirable 
consequences. Th e primary justifi cation for the establishment of such a market 
is that it facilitates the re-allocation of land towards more effi  cient users, thus 
providing an exit route from agriculture for rural residents for whom farming 
is not suffi  ciently profi table. However, experience shows that land sales tend to 
favour not those who can make the most effi  cient use of land, but those who 
have access to capital and whose ability to purchase land is greatest. In fact, the 
creation of a land-rights market can cause land to be taken out of production 
in order to be held as an investment by speculators, resulting both in decreased 
productivity and in increased landlessness among the rural poor.198
Fortunately, the neo-liberal approach is being increasingly challenged by 
alternative policies that link agricultural policies with transnational social rights 
and the concept of the global  commons. Accordingly, customary rights and 
systems of common use will increasingly come to be recognised and protected 
in order to provide eff ective security and favour long-term investments. Th e 
requirements applicable to  indigenous peoples are to be extended to certain 
traditional communities that entertain a similar relationship with their lands and 
are centred on the community rather than on the individual. Th is will encourage 
the management of common-pool resources at local level by the communities 
directly concerned, which is deemed to work better than top-down prescriptions 
or privatisation of the  commons.199 In the presence of the sometimes highly 
unequal distribution of land in rural areas, land re-distribution for the benefi t of 
smallholders is considered to be necessary.200
VI. CONCLUSION: A WORLD WHERE MANY 
WORLDS FIT
In conclusion, the Zapatista struggle operates at two levels in its quest to realise 
an alternative to neo-liberalism and obtain the  right to land. On the one hand, 
the protesters occupied land against the existing legal rules in order to realise 
the pre-conditions for their autonomies – namely, cultivating their own land 
and growing their own most basic food. By establishing their autonomies on 
198 Ibid., p. 10 et seq.
199 Ibid., p. 13;  FAO, note 191 above, p. 8 & 11 et seq.
200 De Schutter, note 4 above, p. 14 et seq;  FAO, note 191 above, p. 15 et seq.
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occupied land, they create their own world “from below” and turn their back 
on the existing (legal and institutional) order. Aft er a long period of silence, 
in December 2012, they re-appeared in public with a spectacular march of 
silence and a communiqué which re-affi  rmed that they aim to build up a “non-
institutional left  alternative” both in  Mexico and in the world, and to co-operate 
with other social movements worldwide.201
On the other hand, their struggle is eff ective within the existing legal 
(national and transnational) order. Here, together with other counter-
movements, it may help to extend this order so that establishing counter-models 
(such as the Zapatista autonomies) can be pushed forward as far as possible. 
In this context, relying on the legal provisions of the existing (national and/or 
transnational) legal system may be considered as an attempt to gain as much 
room as possible to establish an alternative world. It only complements the fi rst 
form of the struggle, which aims to create another world beyond that of the 
capitalist logic.
201 Comunicado del Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena – comandancia General del 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, 30 de diciembre de 2012, note 230 above.
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